• Lenovo (United States), Inc. v. University Of RochesterSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 2, 2026 · IPR2024-01225 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1 and 3–7 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 8–12 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted grounds did not establish asynchronous operation between domains.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

    “specification is the ‘single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term,’ . . . and ‘is, thus, the primary basis for construing the claims.’” Trs. of Columbia Univ. in City of New York v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). Although Patent Owner contends that the Specification disparages systems that impose significant restrictions on the possible choices of frequencies (PO Resp. 21), we find availing Petitioner’s contention that “[s]upport for Patent Owner’s construction is absent from the specification.” Pet. Reply 10. As Petitioner points out, Patent Owner’s claim construction “appears to be based on a single paragraph of the ’443 patent referring to preexisting ‘synchronization schemes [that] restrict the phase relationship and relative frequencies of the clocks.” Id. That is, the only reference by Patent Owner to the Specification is that the Specification states that “Some synchronization schemes restrict the . . . relative frequencies of the clocks, thereby eliminating the need for hardware arbitration [27]. Unfortunately, these schemes impose significant restrictions on the possible choices of frequences.” PO Resp. 26 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:32–36). We agree with Petitioner that such disclosure in the Specification “does not describe how these synchronization schemes ‘restrict the phase relationship and relative frequencies’ with any specificity.’” Pet. the Specification that some schemes impose restrictions on the possible choices of frequency is not a disparagement of any system that has limited choices of frequency or would preclude the claims from covering such prior art techniques. Instead, as Petitioner points out, the Specification of the ’443 patent states “[t]he preferred embodiment uses four domains […] so that domains may vary somewhat in size and still be covered by a single clock.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 5:57–59). As Dr. Baker testified in support of Petitioner’s contention, “the preferred embodiment of the ’443 patent relies on a single external master clock that distributes a signal to the local PLL of each domain.” See Ex. 1032 ¶ 9. Thus, although Patent Owner contends that clock signals generated based on a master clock cannot be interpreted to be generated independently of the clock signals generated for others of the plurality of domains (PO Resp. 49), we agree with Petitioner that such claim construction would “exclude[] the preferred embodiment of the ’443 patent,” which is disfavored. Pet. Reply 11. For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that “changeable independently” of the other domains does not require that the separate clocks in the plurality of domains be globally-asynchronous.” slip op. at 12

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedDecided for petitioner

    “As both parties recognize, (PO Resp. 5; Pet. Reply 12), “[actual] [r]eduction to practice in the United States requires that the invention be embodied in tangible form.” Scott v. Koyama, 281 F.3d 1243, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In particular, actual reduction to practice requires a showing of the invention in a physical or tangible form that shows every element. not sufficient. See Kimberly-Clark v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Here, Patent Owner does not provide any evidence showing every element of the claims in physical or tangible form, as required, but rather contends that the Specification refers to the Paper, wherein the Paper stated that simulation using a software, SimpleScalar, was performed. PO Resp. 16. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that the SimpleScalar simulation was not an actual reduction to practice of the claimed invention. Pet. Reply 12. As Petitioner points out, claim 1, for example, is directed to a “microprocessor,” wherein “Patent Owner has presented no evidence and has not alleged that any physical microprocessor was ever produced or operated.” Id. at 13; see PO Resp. 15–17. And as Petitioner points out, “Patent Owner has produced no evidence of any physical prototype of the claimed microprocessor that could have validated the simulation.” Pet. Reply 13–14. We agree with Petitioner that, at most, such simulation “demonstrated feasibility for prototyping of a microprocessor,” but not a tangible form of the microprocessor itself as required for an actual reduction to practice. Id. at 14; see also Standard Mfg. Co. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 1, 67 (1991) (“The feasibility of the optical alignment system may have been proven by the optical mock-up, but the optical mock-up was not a reduction to practice of the proposed MHU–145/M trailer.”).” slip op. at 36

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “Here, we find that Petitioner has not met its burden to prove that one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that “the functional units of Georgiou operate asynchronously since they have different clocks.” Pet. 74 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 53–56, 211–219). Specifically, although Petitioner relies on Georgiou for teaching different clocks, Petitioner’s conclusory statement that such application would operate asynchronously requires gapfilling. Id. As Patent Owner points out, Georgiou discloses a clocking architecture in which “all domain clocks are derived from a shared master clock through predetermined rational dividers.” PO Resp. 49. Petitioner concedes during the oral hearing that, in systems such as Georgiou, each domain clock is set a fraction of a master clock, and thus, the various domain clocks are “possibly” synchronous with each other. Tr. 59:4–14 (JUDGE DANG: . . . would being fractions of the master, wouldn’t they be synchronized with each other? MR UHR: They may be, . . . the answer is possibly.”) Thus, we find Petitioner’s contention that a POSITA would have recognized that the functional units of Georgiou operate “asynchronously” lacks sufficient support in the record. We find the testimony of Dr. Baker insufficient to support Petitioner’s position. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 53–56, 213, 215–219. In his declaration, Dr. Baker testified that he “provided several references . . . that explain operating domains asynchronous to one another while the domains operate synchronously.” Id. ¶¶ 215–219. However, although such references explain “globally asynchronous, local synchronous (GALS) systems” (id. ¶ 216), Dr. Baker does not explain why a POSITA “would have known that a functional unit of Georgiou also operates asynchronous with respect to at different frequencies.” Id. ¶ 217. Without evidentiary support, we are left with speculation and impermissible hindsight. See in Re Wagner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967). We decline to engage in speculation. See, e.g., In re Vaidyanathan, 381 F. App’x 985, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Wallen, 565 F. App’x 867, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2014), both citing In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386 (Fed. Circ. 2001) ([T]he Board must point to some concrete evidence in the record in support of these findings.”). In sum, based on our review of the record, we find Petitioner’s showing is insufficient. Thus, based on the complete record presented, we determine that Petitioner has not persuasively shown that Georgiou teaches “operating the microprocessor such that each domain operates synchronously, while the domains operate asynchronously relative to one another,” as recited in claim 8.” slip op. at 28

  • BurdenMixed

    “of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that “the functional units of Georgiou operate asynchronously since they have different clocks.” Pet. 74 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 53–56, 211–219). Specifically, although Petitioner relies on Georgiou for teaching different clocks, Petitioner’s conclusory statement that such application would operate asynchronously requires gapfilling. Id. As Patent Owner points out, Georgiou discloses a clocking architecture in which “all domain clocks are derived from a shared master clock through predetermined rational dividers.” PO Resp. 49. Petitioner concedes during the oral hearing that, in systems such as Georgiou, each domain clock is set a fraction of a master clock, and thus, the various domain clocks are “possibly” synchronous with each other. Tr. 59:4–14 (JUDGE DANG: . . . would being fractions of the master, wouldn’t they be synchronized with each other? MR UHR: They may be, . . . the answer is possibly.”) Thus, we find Petitioner’s contention that a POSITA would have recognized that the functional units of Georgiou operate “asynchronously” lacks sufficient support in the record. We find the testimony of Dr. Baker insufficient to support Petitioner’s position. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 53–56, 213, 215–219. In his declaration, Dr. Baker testified that he “provided several references . . . that explain operating domains asynchronous to one another while the domains operate synchronously.” Id. ¶¶ 215–219. However, although such references explain “globally asynchronous, local synchronous (GALS) systems” (id. ¶ 216), Dr. Baker does not explain why a POSITA “would have known that a functional unit of Georgiou also operates asynchronous with respect to at different frequencies.” Id. ¶ 217. Without evidentiary support, we are left with speculation and impermissible hindsight. See in Re Wagner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967). We decline to engage in speculation. See, e.g., In re Vaidyanathan, 381 F. App’x 985, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Wallen, 565 F. App’x 867, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2014), both citing In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386 (Fed. Circ. 2001) ([T]he Board must point to some concrete evidence in the record in support of these findings.”). In sum, based on our review of the record, we find Petitioner’s showing is insufficient. Thus, based on the complete record presented, we determine that Petitioner has not persuasively shown that Georgiou teaches “operating the microprocessor such that each domain operates synchronously, while the domains operate asynchronously relative to one another,” as recited in claim 8.” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 7,089,443 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,089,443
• Crusoe Energy Systems, LLC v. Upstream Data Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 21, 2025 · PGR2023-00039 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1 and 24 are unpatentable under § 101 as directed to an abstract idea without an inventive concept; the petitioner did not prove the remaining challenged claims unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The level of ordinary skill in the art is “a prism or lens” through which we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, we may consider certain factors, including: “(1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.” Best Med. Int’l, Inc. v. Elekta Inc., 46 F.4th 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). “The patent’s purpose can also be informative.” Id. (citation omitted). Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had “a degree in chemical engineering, petroleum engineering, process engineering, mechanical engineering, or a similar field with 1–2 years of experience in designing power generation systems, Blockchain mining systems, or other comparable hands-on experience.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 19). Petitioner adds that “[a]lternatively, a person having 3–5 years of experience in the Blockchain mining industry would also qualify as a POSITA” and “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience, or vice versa.” Id. at 7–8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 19).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We apply the same claim construction standard used in district court actions under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), namely that articulated in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b) (2024). In applying that standard, claim terms generally are given their ordinary and customary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. “In determining the meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17).” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentable

    “To address that “the mining processors are connected to the network interface and adapted to mine transactions associated with the blockchain database and to communicate with the blockchain database,” as recited by limitation [1c_iii], Petitioner asserts that CryptoKube’s system includes “Bitcoin miners such as spondooliestech SP35 servers.” Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1006, 1–4). And, relying on the declaration testimony of Mr. Kasdorf, Petitioner concludes that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that to mine Bitcoin, the mining processors need to be connected to a network interface and adapted to mine transactions associated with the blockchain database and to communicate with the blockchain database, which is implemented as a public ledger distributed among many peer-to-peer devices connected to the Internet. Id. (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 108–109; Ex. 1010 ¶ 419). Mr. Kasdorf’s declaration testimony is nearly verbatim to the Petition and similarly provides no indication as to what in CryptoKube constitutes a “mining processor” other than his conclusory opinion that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood that to mine bitcoin, the mining processors need to be connected to a network interface and adapted to mine transactions associated with the 19 We note that Mr. Kasdorf’s reliance on Kheterpal is limited to Kheterpal’s background discussion regarding the Bitcoin protocol inasmuch as it “defines a system in which the creation and distribution of the bitcoin cryptocurrency is governed by consensus among a peer-to-peer network” and includes “a public ledger in which new transactions are verified and recorded by members of the network via cryptography.” Ex. 1010 ¶ 4. Ex. 1004 ¶ 108 (citing Ex. 1010 ¶ 4). Thus, we agree with Patent Owner that in the Petition, neither Petitioner nor Mr. Kasdorf explains or “cite[s] any evidence regarding which component is the ‘necessarily’ present mining processor (limitation 1[c_i]) or how this unspecified mining processor is ‘connected to the network interface and adapted to . . . communicate with the blockchain database’ (limitation 1[c_iii]).” PO Resp. 42–43 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 104–105, 108–109).” slip op. at 21

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner’s contention that “a combination of an ASIC chip and a controller would meet the ‘mining processor’ limitation” (Pet. Reply 11 (citing Ex. 1036 ¶ 21)) is an improper new argument. In determining whether an argument is a proper argument in reply, we look to see if the Reply argument is responsive to an argument from Patent Owner and expands on a position in the Petition. See Rembrandt Diagnostics, LP v. Alere, Inc., 76 F.4th 1376, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“[W]e have held that a reply may be proper if it is responsive and simply expands on previously raised arguments.”). Or, if Petitioner relies on previously unidentified disclosure “to make a meaningfully distinct contention.” Id. at 1383 (“[W]e held that a petitioner who asserted in its reply previously unidentified prior-art disclosures ‘to make a meaningfully distinct contention’ was impermissibly raising a new theory of unpatentability.”). We find that Petitioner’s argument in reply is closer to the later situation. Here Petitioner does not expand on a position from the Petition that Patent Owner criticizes based on the merits of the contentions. Rather, Petitioner supplements its conclusory assertion that a “mining processor” is necessarily present in CryptoKube’s spondooliestech SP35 servers (Pet. 23, 25 (citing Ex. 1006, 1–4)) with its new assertion that that “a combination of an ASIC chip and a controller would meet the ‘mining processor’ limitation.” Pet. Reply 11. Petitioner does not purport to have presented this theory in the Petition. Id. Instead, Petitioner argues that this theory was properly raised in response to what Petitioner alleges to be an admission by” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 11,574,372 mixed
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Berkheimer · Electric Power · Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,574,372
• Fredman Bros. Furniture Company, Inc. v. Bedgear, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 12, 2018 · IPR2017-00350 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11, 13, 15–22, 24, 25, and 27–34 are unpatentable; claim 23 was not shown unpatentable, because the Rasmussen anticipation challenge failed.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd mixedMixed

    “Accordingly, Petitioner has not persuaded us that claim 23 is” slip op. at 62

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “Accordingly, Petitioner has not persuaded us that claim 23 is” slip op. at 62

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable

  Patent outcomesUS 8,887,332 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,887,332
• General Electric Company v. United Technologies CorporationSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 26, 2017 · IPR2016-00952 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 11 was held unpatentable as obvious over Davies; Petitioner did not show claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, and 8 unpatentable on the instituted grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Claim 1 recites “wherein said row of propulsor blades has a solidity value (R) defined as CD/CP that is between 0.6 and 0.9.” Ex. 1001, 4:59– 60. Similarly, now disclaimed independent claim 9 recites “wherein said row of propulsor blades has a solidity value (R) defined as CD/CP.” Id. at 6:9–10. Thus, according to the claims, “solidity value (R)” is defined as “CD/CP,” or chord dimension CD divided by circumferential pitch CP. Also, as pointed out by Patent Owner (PO Resp. 15), the specification of the ’412 patent states that the “solidity value is defined as a ratio (R) of CD/CP (i.e., CD divided by CP).” Ex. 1001, 3:24–25; see also Mathioudakis Decl. ¶ 19 (Patent Owner’s declarant testifying that the ’412 patent defines solidity as the ratio of CD and CP). Patent Owner also quotes a portion of the specification that describes chord dimension CD as the “length that extends between the leading edge 82 and the trailing edge 84 at the tip” (Ex. 1001, 3:5–7) and circumferential pitch CP as “equivalent to the arc distance between the tips 80 of neighboring propulsor blades” (id. at 3:8– 10). PO Resp. 15. In view of these portions of the specification, we find that the ’412 patent provides a clear, deliberate, and precise definition of “solidity value.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Any special definitions for claim terms or phrases must be set forth with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision). Also, as discussed above, claim 1 similarly relates “solidity value” to “CD/CP.” Compare Ex. 1001, 4:59–60 with id. at 3:24–25.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “art would use fan dimensions given to “illustrate the magnitude of the problem” of restraining blades in the hub to calculate a value of tip solidity, which has already been disclosed in a list of “main features of the chosen design” for the V.P. fan. The tip solidity of 0.83 comes immediately after Davies discusses the “aerodynamic design philosophy” of fixed pitch fans (Ex. 1005, 6) and V.P. fans (id. at 6–8). Davies also states that “[i]n order to achieve a design pressure ratio of say 1.27:1 . . . , a transonic blade design was required with a tip solidity of .8.” Id. at 7. The fan diameter and blade chord at the tip, which Petitioner uses to calculate its tip solidity value, come from a discussion in Davies regarding the hub, in particular restraining V.P. blades in the hub. Id. at 9. Davies states, at the design speed, each aerofoil part exerts 15 tons of centrifugal force, and a “total restraint of about 40 tons” would be required. Id. at 9–10. The numbers that Petitioner uses to calculate its tip solidity value are numbers that Davies uses “[t]o illustrate the magnitude of the problem” in designing its hub. Pet. 29–30; Ex. 1005, 9–10. Thus, we find that Davies gives fan dimensions sufficient to calculate that each fan blade exerts 15 tons of centrifugal force and hence a needed “total restraint of about 40 tons.” See id. We find that these statements would indicate to one of ordinary skill in the art that the numbers given for the fan dimensions are for purposes of estimating what the hub is required to restrain, and not sufficient for calculating tip solidity value, which was previously listed as 0.83 and as one of the “main features” after discussing aerodynamic design philosophy for its V.P. fan. See id. at 7–8; Mathioudakis Decl. ¶¶ 57, 69, 70 (“One would not attempt to use the approximate chord lengths and blade diameters in Section 6 to derive or interpret from Davies a substitute solidity value”). The Petition also does not explain sufficiently why one of ordinary skill in the art would understand Davies to disclose a tip solidity value of 0.74 instead of the expressly disclosed tip solidity of 0.83. See Pet. 29–30 (citing Abhari Decl. ¶¶ 80–82). The Petition and the cited portions of the Abhari Declaration do not address the disclosed tip solidity of 0.83. See Pet. 29–30; Abhari Decl. ¶¶ 80–82. Thus, given the entire context of Davies, a “Solidity Tip” of 0.83 as one of the “main features,” and Petitioner’s tip solidity calculated from fan dimensions given for illustration purposes, the full record does not persuade us that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that Davies discloses a tip solidity value of 0.74, as argued by Petitioner, for its V.P. fan. One of ordinary skill in the art would understand, instead, that the fan dimensions provided for illustration purposes are not sufficiently specific to calculate a tip solidity value because they are given for evaluating the restraint the hub must provide. See Mathioudakis Decl. ¶ 69. Also, the record provides insufficient basis for determining that one of ordinary skill in the art would have accepted the calculated value of 0.74 over the listed value of 0.83 for tip solidity.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Davies indicates, as Patent Owner argues, that chord length, circumferential pitch, and solidity are interrelated and one of ordinary skill in the art considers implications of varying one parameter on other parameters of a V.P. fan. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, 6–8; Mathioudakis Decl. ¶¶ 72–76. However, Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner’s proposed modification would lead to larger, heavier, fan blades (PO Resp. 36) does not show a deficiency in Petitioner’s reason for modifying the blade chord of Davies to achieve a ratio of N/R of 15.7 (Abhari Decl. ¶ 95), which would be within the recited range 15 to 16. Petitioner argues, and its Declarant states, that “blade chord dimension can be varied in order to balance the stability, efficiency, and weight of the fan section.” Pet. 39; Abhari Decl. ¶ 94 (citing Ex. 1021). Petitioner’s Declarant acknowledges that increasing chord length would “result in increased weight” but indicates that “increasing the chord length can lead to improved efficiency and stability margin.” Abhari Decl. ¶ 94 (citing Ex. 1021). Petitioner’s reason for modification, thus, acknowledges and anticipates that increasing the chord length to achieve a ratio of N/R equal to 15.7 would lead to heavier blades, but also greater efficiency and stability margin. See Pet. 39; Abhari Decl. ¶¶ 94–95. Also, the arguments and evidence before us persuade us that Petitioner’s proposed modification to achieve a ratio of N/R of 15.7 would not render Davies inoperable for its intended purpose, as argued by Patent Owner (PO Resp. 34, 37, 38). Davies states that the “requirement of reverse thrust via fine pitch implies that the blade solidity must be less than unity since the blades must pass each other.” Ex. 1005, 7. Davies also indicates that “to achieve a design pressure ratio of say 1.27:1 . . . a transonic blade design was required with a tip solidity of .8,” thus indicating that a different design pressure ratio requires a different tip solidity. Id.; see also id. at 5 (“The precise choice of pressure ratio . . . is not particularly important.”). Davies determines a taper ratio based on a “hub solidity near 1 and a tip solidity of 0.8.” Id. We, thus, find that Davies teaches or suggests that a taper ratio can be determined for a hub solidity near 1 and a different tip solidity for a different design pressure ratio in view of the requirement of blade solidity less than unity so that blades can pass. Therefore, we find that Petitioner’s proposed modification to achieve a ratio of N/R of 15.7 would not render Davies inoperable for its intended purpose. Further, based on the statements that the “precise choice of pressure ratio for technology demonstration fan design is not particularly important” (Ex. 1005, 5) and that “[i]n order to achieve a design pressure ratio of say 1.27:1 . . . a transonic blade design was required with a tip solidity of 0.8” (id. at 7), we find that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the pressure ratio depends on the application and that one of ordinary skill in the art has the skill to choose an appropriate pressure ratio, and thereby, determine an appropriate tip solidity value and blade chord, as was done in Davies with a design pressure ratio of 1.27:1. We find that, other than the requirement of blade solidity less than unity so that blades can pass, Davies does not preclude increasing the chord length for a different design pressure ratio or for greater efficiency and stability margin to achieve a ratio of N/R between 15 and 16, as proposed by Petitioner. Also, we agree with Petitioner that the record shows that increasing chord dimension to achieve a ratio of N/R of 15.7 would increase blade efficiency and stability margin. Abhari Decl. ¶ 94; Ex. 1021, 1:30–33. We are not pointed to any part of the record that indicates increasing chord dimension would degrade blade efficiency. See PO Resp. 34–44. For the reasons above, we agree with Petitioner that, for claim 11, one of ordinary skill would have modified Davies’ N/R ratio to be 15.7 or between 15 and 16 because the modification can “lead to improved efficiency and stability margin” (Pet. 39 (citing Abhari Decl. ¶ 94; Ex. 1021 1:30–33)). We, thus, determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 11 is unpatentable over Davies.” slip op. at 31

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “A. Level of Ordinary Skill Petitioner’s Declarant provides a level of ordinary skill. Abhari Decl. ¶ 4. Patent Owner’s Declarant generally agrees to that level of ordinary skill. Mathioudakis Decl. ¶ 16. We note that, to the extent there are any differences in the parties’ proposed level of ordinary skill, such differences do not impact our analysis.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 9,121,412 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,121,412
• Subaru Of America, Inc. / Toyota Motor North America, Inc. et al. v. Cruise Control Technologies LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 29, 2015 · IPR2014-00279 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 12–15, 18–20, 25–31, and 34–36 were held unpatentable as anticipated or obvious; claims 21 and 23 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Decided for patent owner

    “As discussed in our Decision on Institution, we are not persuaded that claim 15, which broadly recites “indicating,” requires the indication to be a visual indication. Dec. on Inst. 8. Patent Owner’s argument relies on a claim construction we determined as too narrow. See id. Because Patent Owner’s Response provides no reasons or evidence for a narrower construction, it is not persuasive. Moreover, claim 16, which depends from claim 15, recites that “wherein indicating the unset status of the preset speed includes displaying a visual symbol to the operator.” Thus, the scope of claim 15 must be broader than “displaying a visual symbol to the operator.” Therefore, based on the complete record before us, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), claim 15 is anticipated by Miura.” slip op. at 43

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We are not persuaded by these arguments that we should conclude the McNamara Declaration to be materially deficient. Paragraph 59 of the McNamara Declaration cites page 5, first paragraph of Mizuno, and paragraph 62 cites page 3, seventh through ninth paragraphs of Mizuno. Paragraphs 59 and 62 of the McNamara Declaration also declare that Mizuno discloses or inherently discloses certain features.” slip op. at 18

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “Petitioner does not explain suitably why the powering off of the display in Mizuno does not eliminate the presence of any indicia upon the display, and thus the display, in that particular reference, discontinues the presentation of any indicia or symbols. That an operator may be able to devise from the off condition of the display that the preset speed is not set does not mean that a “symbol” of that unset state is displayed. Thus, based on the complete record before us, we determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), claim 21 is anticipated by Mizuno.” slip op. at 25

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundMixed

    “claims 19 and 20, which depend from claim 18; and claims 27 and 28, which depend from claim 26, would have been obvious over Mizuno and ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 40–41 (citing Ex. 1004 at 4, 5, 7, Figs. 1, 2; McNamara Decl. ¶¶ 47–53), 41 (citing Ex. 1004 at 5, 8, Fig. 1; McNamara Decl. ¶¶ 44– 54), 42–43 (citing McNamara Decl. ¶ 54). Petitioner provides a rationale for modifying Mizuno to arrive at the subject matter of claims 4, 19, 20, 23, 27, and 28. Pet. 38–39 (citing McNamara Decl. ¶¶ 50–51, 53), 41–42. For institution, we determined that Petitioner demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the challenge that these claims are unpatentable over Mizuno and ordinary skill in the art. Patent Owner responds that “Mizuno serves as the primary reference” and “[b]ecause none of the alleged grounds of obviousness in the Petition addresses the deficiencies of Mizuno discussed above,” the Petition does not show that Mizuno in view of ordinary skill in the art renders obvious claims 4, 19, 20, 23, 27, and 28. PO Resp. 31; see also Reply 15 (noting “Patent Owner does not separately contest [obviousness] ground[]”). For the reasons discussed above, we determine Mizuno is not deficient for independent claims 2, 18, and 26, from which claims 4, 19, 20, 27, and 28 depend. Thus, Patent Owner’s arguments are not persuasive. For claim 23, which depends from claim 21, we agree with Patent Owner. Petitioner’s challenge of claim 23 as unpatentable over Mizuno and ordinary skill in the art cites its argument for claims 4 and 18–21 and paragraph 54 of the McNamara Declaration. Pet. 42. The cited arguments for claims 4 and 18–20 and paragraph 54 of the McNamara Declaration do not address “after the cruise control system is deactivated, displaying a symbol indicative of an unset state of the preset speed,” as recited by claim 21. For the reasons discussed above, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments for claim 21 because they do not explain suitably why the powering off of the display in Mizuno does not eliminate the presence of any indicia upon the display, thereby discontinuing presentation of any indicia or symbols. Accordingly, based on the complete record before us, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), claims 4, 19, 20, 27, and 28 would have been obvious over Mizuno and ordinary skill in the art. Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 23 is unpatentable over Mizuno and ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 53

  Patent outcomesUS 6,324,463 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 6,324,463

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.