- PTAB · Aug 25, 2025 · PGR2025-00028 · APJ George R Hoskins · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–20 and all asserted grounds after finding claim 1 more likely than not unpatentable under § 101.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), the Director may not authorize a post-grant review unless the information in the petition, if unrebutted, “would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). For the reasons that follow, we institute a post-grant review as to claims 1–20 of the ’423 patent on all grounds of unpatentability asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“ordinary skill in the art would have had “an educational background of, or practical experience equivalent to, a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately three years of experience with electronic payment systems, vending machine technologies, or distributed network systems,” where “[l]ack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20–26). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art in its Preliminary Response. Based on the record presented, including our review of the ’423 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’423 patent and cited 2 Petitioner states that it “takes no position on the proper priority date for the [c]hallenged [c]laims” and “uses the earliest possible priority date claimed, December 18, 2013,” for purposes of its asserted grounds. Pet. 14. prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s definition and apply it for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:42–2:21 (stating that “[t]he present application relates to the field of payment processing systems” and describing the functionality of payment accepting units in the “Background” section).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“B. Claim Interpretation We interpret each challenged claim using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b). Petitioner states that, “for purposes of [its] Petition, the Board need not construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes, and the claims should be given their ordinary and customary meaning.” Pet. 20. Patent Owner agrees that “[n]o constructions are necessary” to decide the issues disputed by the parties. Prelim. Resp. 2–3. We conclude that no express interpretation of any claim term is necessary to determine whether to institute a post-grant review in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe [a particular claim limitation] where the construction is not ‘material to the . . . dispute.’” (citation omitted) (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelNot reached
“For the reasons explained below, we conclude, on the merits and based on the current record, that Petitioner has shown that it is more likely than not that claim 1 is unpatentable as claiming patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See Pet. 77–84. Accordingly, we need not determine at this time whether collateral estoppel applies based on the Board’s decision in PGR2021-00093. The parties, however, should address the issue in their papers during trial, with citations to relevant authority. In particular, the parties are encouraged to address (1) how the collateral estoppel requirement that the issue be “identical to one decided in the first action” applies in the context of an asserted ground under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and (2) the parties’ apparent disagreement as to whether collateral estoppel may be applied in such circumstances on a “limitation-by-limitation basis.” See Pet. 72, 75 (quoting Google LLC v. Hammond Dev. Int’l, Inc., 54 F.4th 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2022)); Prelim. Resp. 20–21; see also Kroy IP Holdings, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., – F.4th –, No. 2023-1359, 2025 WL 2178321, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 1, 2025) (Dyk, J., dissenting) (“In subsequent Board proceedings, it is well established that collateral estoppel applies to claims adjudicated by the Board to be unpatentable and also to ‘related claims that present identical issues of patentability,’ i.e., patentably indistinct claims. . . . ‘It is well established that patent claims need not be identical for collateral estoppel to apply.’” (citing MaxLinear, Inc. v. CF CRESPE LLC, 880 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Google, 54 F.4th at 1381)).” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Mayo · Bilski · Berkheimer · Enfish · Electric PowerPatents in suitUS 11,972,423 - PTAB · Dec 6, 2023 · IPR2023-01020 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 1–20 on all grounds; the Lyren and Reif combination showed a reasonable likelihood of obviousness for at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, and for the reasons set forth below, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims of the ’184 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review with respect to all challenged claims and grounds asserted in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2022).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Director’s Memo 3. With our authorization, Petitioner has filed a stipulation which stipulates that If the PTAB institutes the pending IPR in IPR2023-01020 challenging the patentability of claims 1-20 of the ’184 patent, then [Defendants Meta Platforms, Inc., Meta Platforms Technologies, LLC, and Twisted Pixel Games, LLC] will not pursue as to the challenged claims any ground raised or that could have been reasonably raised in the IPR in the above-captioned district court litigation (No. 6:22-cv-00575-ADA).” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A POSA [person of ordinary skill in the art or “POSITA”] in the relevant timeframe (2015 to 2019) would have had a Bachelor’s degree in computer science/engineering, music technology, or a related field, and at least two years of industry experience, or academic research experience, in virtual/augmented reality, audio engineering, or an equivalent. Additional education can compensate for less experience, and vice-versa. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 34–36). Patent Owner uses Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art at this stage. Prelim. Resp. 7. We are persuaded, on the present record, that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’184 patent and prior art of record. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“The parties do not propose any claim constructions. See Pet. 7; Prelim. Resp. 7. As no terms are in dispute, we determine that no terms require construction at this stage. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,448,184 - PTAB · Dec 6, 2023 · IPR2023-01019 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–20 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim, including over Lyren and Reif assuming Lyren is prior art.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, and for the reasons set forth below, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims of the ’179 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review with respect to all challenged claims and grounds asserted in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2022). Our factual findings and conclusions at this stage of the proceeding are based on the evidentiary record developed thus far. This is not a final decision as to patentability of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“The Director’s Memo provides that “[c]onsistent with Sotera Wireless, Inc.,[8] the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Director’s Memo 3. With our authorization, Petitioner has filed a stipulation which stipulates that 7 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ interim_proc_discretionary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_ litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf. 8 Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 18–19 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential). If the PTAB institutes the pending IPR in IPR2023-01019 challenging the patentability of claims 1-20 of the ’179 patent, then [Defendants Meta Platforms, Inc., Meta Platforms Technologies, LLC, and Twisted Pixel Games, LLC] will not pursue as to the challenged claims any ground raised or that could have been reasonably raised in the IPR in the above-captioned district court litigation (No. 6:22-cv-00575-ADA). Prelim. Reply 1. Patent Owner concedes that Petitioner has filed a “Sotera-like stipulation” but argues that it is insufficient because it “leaves the door open to a duplication of efforts and the possibility of conflicting decisions.” Prelim. Sur-reply 1 (citing Ex. 1141, 4 (“This stipulation is not intended . . . to limit Meta’s ability to assert . . . invalidity under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 not available in IPR and under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 112[], regardless of whether IPRs are instituted.” (emphasis omitted))). Namely, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s stipulation carves out “the right to assert overlapping system art in the parallel district court proceeding,” such that institution here would not address the risk of “inconsistent outcomes between the PTAB and the district court.” Id. at 4. We disagree with Patent Owner, as Petitioner’s stipulation sufficiently” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 13, 17. Petitioner asserts that A POSA [person of ordinary skill in the art or “POSITA”] in the relevant timeframe (2015 to 2019) would have had a Bachelor’s degree in computer science/engineering, music technology, or a related field, and at least two years of industry experience, or academic research experience, in virtual/augmented reality, audio engineering, or an equivalent. Additional education can compensate for less experience, and vice-versa. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 34–36). Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art at this stage. Prelim. Resp. 4. We are persuaded, on the present record, that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’179 patent and prior art of record. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“In inter partes review, we construe a claim using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). The parties do not propose any claim constructions. See Pet. 6–7; Prelim. Resp. 4. We agree that no terms require construction at this stage. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,368,179 - Sophos Ltd. / Sophos Inc. v. Open Text Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Nov 29, 2023 · PGR2023-00031 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that any challenged claim was more likely than not unpatentable over the asserted obviousness or indefiniteness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review under 35 U.S.C. § 324 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. A post-grant review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324 (2018). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated that it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the patent is unpatentable. Accordingly, we do not institute a post-grant review of the challenged claims of the ’869 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 16). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal. Prelim. Resp. 33. Considering the subject matter of the ’869 patent, the background technical field, and the asserted prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed qualifications for an ordinary level of skill, except we decline to adopt “at least” as that language is vague and open-ended. Otherwise, Petitioner’s proposed definition is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the Specification of the ’869 patent and the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, and based on the current record, except as noted above, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“We agree with Patent Owner that the claims are directed to the classification stage, as they require extracting “a plurality of static data points” from an executable file and “generating a feature vector from [that] plurality of static data points using a classifier” (emphasis added). The claims also recite that the classifier has been “trained to classify” (emphasis added). Further, the claims recite that “features of the feature vector” are selectively turned on or off, indicating that the feature vector has been generated. We also agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown that Ideses teaches or suggests a classification method in which one or more features of a feature vector generated from a plurality of static data points are selectively turned on or off based on the value of the static data point. As explained in the summary of Ideses above, Ideses describes “methods and systems for generating classifiers” (Ex. 1005 ¶ 2) in which “extracted features [may be] identified for pruning to generate the group of classifying features,” and “the selection [may be] based on identifying a classification effectiveness rank for each of the features of the training software applications” or “based on identifying resource requirements for each of the features of the training software applications.” See id. ¶¶ 98, 99. “[T]he group of classifying features [may be] selected based on the significance of the extracted features,” such that “[s]ignificant features, such as those that have a large effect on the classification outcomes, may be retained” and “[i]nsignificant features, such as those that have a small, negligible or no effect on classification outcome may be pruned.” Id. ¶¶ 101, 106. Petitioner argues that “Ideses explains that in the method depicted in Figure 1, ‘[t]he full feature list is optionally selectively pruned,’ i.e., ‘selectively turned off’ as required by [1.e],” and “[f]urther, ‘each feature of the group is selected from-the-ground-up; added to the group as opposed to removed from or retained within a larger group,’ i.e., ‘selectively turned on’ as required by [1.e].” Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 71). Petitioner also argues element 1.e is taught by Ideses’s “approaches to pruning insignificant features,” which Petitioner argues are “to selectively includ[e]/exclud[e] features based on whether a feature coefficient ‘is within a predetermined range’ as required” by element 1.e. Id. at 34 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 107, 109–110). But all of the selection and pruning described in Ideses concerns the” slip op. at 22
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that the claims are directed to the classification stage, as they require extracting “a plurality of static data points” from an executable file and “generating a feature vector from [that] plurality of static data points using a classifier” (emphasis added). The claims also recite that the classifier has been “trained to classify” (emphasis added). Further, the claims recite that “features of the feature vector” are selectively turned on or off, indicating that the feature vector has been generated. We also agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown that Ideses teaches or suggests a classification method in which one or more features of a feature vector generated from a plurality of static data points are selectively turned on or off based on the value of the static data point. As explained in the summary of Ideses above, Ideses describes “methods and systems for generating classifiers” (Ex. 1005 ¶ 2) in which “extracted features [may be] identified for pruning to generate the group of classifying features,” and “the selection [may be] based on identifying a classification effectiveness rank for each of the features of the training software applications” or “based on identifying resource requirements for each of the features of the training software applications.” See id. ¶¶ 98, 99. “[T]he group of classifying features [may be] selected based on the significance of the extracted features,” such that “[s]ignificant features, such as those that have a large effect on the classification outcomes, may be retained” and “[i]nsignificant features, such as those that have a small, negligible or no effect on classification outcome may be pruned.” Id. ¶¶ 101, 106. Petitioner argues that “Ideses explains that in the method depicted in Figure 1, ‘[t]he full feature list is optionally selectively pruned,’ i.e., ‘selectively turned off’ as required by [1.e],” and “[f]urther, ‘each feature of the group is selected from-the-ground-up; added to the group as opposed to removed from or retained within a larger group,’ i.e., ‘selectively turned on’ as required by [1.e].” Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 71). Petitioner also argues element 1.e is taught by Ideses’s “approaches to pruning insignificant features,” which Petitioner argues are “to selectively includ[e]/exclud[e] features based on whether a feature coefficient ‘is within a predetermined range’ as required” by element 1.e. Id. at 34 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 107, 109–110). But all of the selection and pruning described in Ideses concerns the” slip op. at 22
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,409,869 - Sophos Ltd. / Sophos Inc. v. Open Text Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Nov 2, 2023 · IPR2023-00732 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show Li was prior art, defeating the reasonable-likelihood showing for all challenged claims and grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, and for the reasons set forth below, Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims of the ’932 patent. Accordingly, we decline to institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Our rules require that “[a]ll evidence must be filed in the form of an exhibit,” and that “[e]ach exhibit must be filed with the first document in which it is cited except as the Board may otherwise order.” Id. §§ 42.63(a), 42.6(c). Despite Petitioner not filing the webpage links as exhibits with Exhibit 1009, we gave Petitioner the opportunity to correct this error and ordered Petitioner to file late copies of these webpage links as exhibits by September 22, 2023. See Ex. 3001 (email order); 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(c) (“except as the Board may otherwise order”). Petitioner declined to do so, instead choosing to request authorization to file a Motion to Dismiss, which we authorized in an order mailed October 2, 2023 (Paper 17).8 In our email order, we informed Petitioner that failure to file the webpage links as exhibits would result in the Board not considering the webpage links as evidence in these proceedings. Ex. 3001. Our order authorizing filing of the Motion to Dismiss did not obviate Petitioner’s responsibility to file copies of the webpage links as exhibits. See id.; Paper 17.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner provides a slightly different definition of the level of skill. Prelim. Resp. 23 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 41–43). We are persuaded, on the present record, that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’932 patent and prior art of record. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for the purposes of this decision. Our decision would not have changed had we adopted Patent Owner’s definition.” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“reasonable likelihood that Li was publicly accessible before the priority date of the ’932 patent. In particular, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that Li “has been disseminated” or that Li was “otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” See SRI, 511 F.3d at 1194. As an initial matter, Li is undated. We can find no indication anywhere in Li itself evidencing a timeframe in which it might have been published, not even a copyright date. There is also no indication in Li of any journal or website where Li may have been published. Dr. Hall-Ellis testifies that Li “appears beginning on page 12” of, purportedly, a record of the 12th International Conference on Telecommunication Systems: Modeling and Analysis, but the copy of Li submitted by Petitioner starts on page “1” and includes no further pages describing any conference. See Ex. 1009 ¶ 40; Ex. 1005, 1. Ultimately, there is nothing in the text of Li itself to distinguish Li from a draft paper that was never published. Petitioner submits no evidence that Li was disseminated at or around the time of the 12th International Conference on Telecommunication Systems: Modeling and Analysis. See Medtronic, 891 F.3d at 1381. Dr. Hall-Ellis testifies that Li was “presented” at the conference but submits no evidence in support of this assertion. Ex. 1009 ¶ 43. For example, Dr. Hall-Ellis does not address “whether the copies were freely distributed to interested members of the public” or whether there was a “legal obligation of confidentiality” when distributing any copies, among other factors. See Medtronic, 891 F.3d at 1381. Absent any such evidence, we conclude that Petitioner has not shown dissemination of Li at or around the time of the conference, or at any other time before the ’932 patent’s asserted priority date. Petitioner also does not sufficiently establish that Li was “otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” See SRI Int’l, 511 F.3d at 1194. Dr. Hall-Ellis’s testimony is deficient because her testimony does not establish that Li was likely made available to the public before the critical date of the challenged patent. See Hulu, Paper 29 at 16. For example, Dr. Hall-Ellis does not claim personal knowledge of when Li was first published, was unclear as to when she obtained Li from the OPERA digital repository, and unpersuasively asserts that Li “is” available from other digital repositories. See Prelim. Resp. 32–33; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 40–41. Whether Li “is” available online now does not establish that Li was publicly accessible in the relevant timeframe, i.e., 17 years earlier, prior to the April 20, 2006 priority date of the ’932 patent. Further, Dr. Hall-Ellis presents no persuasive evidence that the identified digital repositories hosted Li in the relevant timeframe. Patent Owner persuasively asserts that ResearchGate was established in 2008, after the priority date, and that Google Scholar’s page referencing Li links to ResearchGate. Prelim. Resp. 33–34 (citing Ex. 2014 (“We started ResearchGate in 2008 . . . .”); Ex. 1009 ¶ 41; see also id. n.23 (Google Scholar link, showing “[PDF] from researchgate.net”). Accordingly, these repositories do not support Dr. Hall-Ellis’s testimony that Li was publicly available in the relevant timeframe, before April 20, 2006. Dr. Hall-Ellis’s reliance on the CiteSeer repository is also unavailing because Dr. Hall- Ellis’s link to CiteSeer directly opens a PDF file of Li and does not provide any evidence showing that CiteSeer hosted Li in the relevant timeframe. See Ex. 1009 ¶ 41 n.24.” slip op. at 15
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,719,932 - Volkswagen Group Of America, Inc. v. Stratosaudio, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 24, 2023 · IPR2022-00204 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 11, 14–16, and 18 are unpatentable as obvious over Mackintosh; the Board did not reach the alternative Takahisa anticipation ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Mazda Motor of America, Inc., Subaru of America, Inc., and Volvo Car USA, LLC filed a motion for joinder and a petition in Case IPR2022-00204, which were granted, and, therefore, were joined as petitioners in this proceeding. Paper 36. We adjusted the time of pendency in this proceeding beyond one year after institution due to joinder. Paper 55.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“patent, we look to “1) the types of problems encountered in the art; 2) the prior art solutions to those problems; 3) the rapidity with which innovations are made; 4) the sophistication of the technology; and 5) the educational level of active workers in the field.” Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 666–667 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “Not all such factors may be present in every case, and one or more of them may predominate.” Id. at 667. Petitioner argues that at the time of the ’028 patent (September 2000), a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a B.S. in computer science or electrical engineering (or a related field), and approximately three years of experience working in the communications- or Internet-related industries, or, alternatively, an advanced degree (such as a master’s degree) in computer science or electrical engineering (or a related field).” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 44); see Ex. 1003 ¶ 29. Patent Owner applies the same definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 16–17 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 57–58). Based on the full record developed during trial, including our review of the ’028 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’028 patent and cited prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art and apply it for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, col. 1, l. 25–col. 2, l. 49 (describing in the “Background” section of the ’028 patent various FM broadcast and other communication methods).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“1. Preamble of Claim 11 In the Decision on Institution, we determined based on the record at the time that the preamble of claim 11 is limiting because the body of the 3 The claim interpretations adopted herein are identical to those set forth in the concurrently entered final written decision in the Hyundai IPR, with one exception—we need not interpret “broadcast stream” in that proceeding. content identifying data,” “at least one broadcast segment,” and “communication device.” See Dec. on Inst. 27 n.5; Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 323 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“When limitations in the body of the claim rely upon and derive antecedent basis from the preamble, then the preamble may act as a necessary component of the claimed invention.”). Patent Owner agrees, and Petitioner does not argue otherwise in its Petition or Reply. See Pet. 48 (arguing that “[r]egardless of whether the preamble is limiting, it is disclosed by Mackintosh”); PO Resp. 34–35. Based on the full trial record, we determine that the preamble of claim 11 is limiting.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“2. “Broadcast Stream” Petitioner argues that “broadcast stream” should be interpreted to mean “any media conveyance methodology that conveys information in the form of a signal,” including, for example, data, information, or programming distributed over AM/FM radio, digital radio, the Internet, satellite, cable, analog television, digital television, or the like. Pet. 9. Patent Owner does not object to Petitioner’s proposed interpretation. PO Resp. 17. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed interpretation, which is consistent with the Specification of the ’028 patent. See Pet. 9–11 (citing Ex. 1001, col. 1, l. 26–col. 2, l. 49, col. 4, ll. 16–21, col. 10, l. 56–col. 11, l. 20).” slip op. at 11
Patent outcomesUS 8,688,028 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,688,028 - Volkswagen Group Of America, Inc. v. Stratosaudio, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 24, 2023 · IPR2021-00716 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 11, 14–16, and 18 are unpatentable as obvious over Mackintosh; the Board did not reach the alternative Takahisa anticipation ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art for a challenged patent, we look to “1) the types of problems encountered in the art; 2) the prior art solutions to those problems; 3) the rapidity with which innovations are made; 4) the sophistication of the technology; and 5) the educational level of active workers in the field.” Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 666–667 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “Not all such factors may be present in every case, and one or more of them may predominate.” Id. at 667. Petitioner argues that at the time of the ’028 patent (September 2000), a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a B.S. in computer science or electrical engineering (or a related field), and approximately three years of experience working in the communications- or Internet-related industries, or, alternatively, an advanced degree (such as a master’s degree) in computer science or electrical engineering (or a related field).” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 44); see Ex. 1003 ¶ 29. Patent Owner applies the same definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 16–17 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 57–58). Based on the full record developed during trial, including our review of the ’028 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’028 patent and cited prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art and apply it for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, col. 1, l. 25–col. 2, l. 49 (describing in the “Background” section of the ’028 patent various FM broadcast and other communication methods).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“1. Preamble of Claim 11 In the Decision on Institution, we determined based on the record at the time that the preamble of claim 11 is limiting because the body of the 3 The claim interpretations adopted herein are identical to those set forth in the concurrently entered final written decision in the Hyundai IPR, with one exception—we need not interpret “broadcast stream” in that proceeding. content identifying data,” “at least one broadcast segment,” and “communication device.” See Dec. on Inst. 27 n.5; Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 323 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“When limitations in the body of the claim rely upon and derive antecedent basis from the preamble, then the preamble may act as a necessary component of the claimed invention.”). Patent Owner agrees, and Petitioner does not argue otherwise in its Petition or Reply. See Pet. 48 (arguing that “[r]egardless of whether the preamble is limiting, it is disclosed by Mackintosh”); PO Resp. 34–35. Based on the full trial record, we determine that the preamble of claim 11 is limiting.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“After reviewing the full trial record, we are persuaded that the phrasing of Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation is correct, primarily because of its use of “as broadcasted.” First, by its plain language, a “broadcast segment” is a “segment” of a “broadcast.” See Tr. 10:24–11:1, 17:20–18:5 (Petitioner agreeing that a “broadcast segment” is “a segment of the broadcast” and is, for example, “distinguishable from the very next segment and the segment after that”); Ex. 2021, 22:20–23:7 (Dr. Madisetti agreeing that the ’028 patent “clearly describe[s] an example of a distinguishable piece or portion of the work as streamed as an individual song” (emphasis added)). Petitioner’s proposed interpretation is that a “broadcast segment” is a piece or portion “of a broadcast stream,” but that is already part of the claim—limitation 11[a] recites “a broadcast stream comprising the at least one broadcast segment” (emphasis added). See Pet. 11. Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation more clearly specifies that a “broadcast segment” is a portion of programming “as broadcasted.” See PO Resp. 17. To illustrate, although a is not the song in the abstract, but rather the portion of the broadcast that is the song. In other words, “‘[a]n individual song’ as broadcasted may serve as one example of a ‘broadcast segment’ because the broadcast of the song constitutes a discretely identifiable portion of broadcasting as broadcasted.” See id. at 20 (emphasis added); Sur-Reply 9–10. We are persuaded that the language of claim 11 supports Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation. Second, although the Specification of the ’028 patent only uses the term “broadcast segment” twice, it provides some support for Patent Owner’s view that a “broadcast segment” is a portion of programming “as broadcasted.” The Specification discloses: [R]adio station 140, using either a standard radio automation system for tracking of music content which is being broadcast, or a data-enabled audio player, broadcasts audio material and synchronously sends RBDS/RDS or similar data to an APS server 144 that assigns a unique identifier to each specific broadcast segment or song.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“We disagree. Mackintosh discloses an overall system for providing broadcast and supplemental materials to a user, then describes more specific examples with different features that can be included in that system. See Pet. 48–49, 63; Ex. 1005, col. 8, ll. 18–32 (“Having thus generally described a system and method for coordinating supplemental information with broadcast material provided to user equipment 112, a specific application of this generalized system is now described.” (emphasis added)), col. 12, ll. 18–34 (“one example player is now described in order to illustrate the features and functionality that can be provided or included”), col. 19, ll. 1–7 (stating that the “player” of Figure 7 (similar to that of Figure 12) “can be used with other architectures, including those architectures illustrated in [Figures 1–4]”), 55–61, col. 21, ll. 3–4 (noting that “[a] more specific example implementation is . . . described with reference to” Figures 10–12), col. 24, ll. 5–9 (“The above specific example [of Figures 10–12] is provided by way of example only, and it should be appreciated that other invention, including the more generic examples described [for Figures 1–9].” (emphasis added)). Thus, there is ample support in Mackintosh for Petitioner’s position that the relied upon features in the cited examples are “additive and compatible with each other.” See Pet. 65. We also see no reason why it would have been beyond the level of ordinary skill to implement a system in which the user’s computer receives data in either fashion—either in a “pull” scenario (i.e., by first requesting the data and then receiving it) or a “push” (i.e., receiving the data without first transmitting a request for it). See supra Section II.A. The computer receives the data in either case, and Mackintosh contemplates both types of data reception. See Ex. 1005, col. 6, l. 45–col. 7, l. 45, col. 21, ll. 14–25, col. 22, ll. 1–60, Fig. 2 (showing supplemental materials provided to the user equipment directly by the data server (steps 136–140) or by a different server after the user equipment makes a request (steps 142–146)); Reply 25; Ex. 1018 ¶ 91. Petitioner has persuasively shown that Mackintosh teaches the limitations of claim 11 in its various embodiments and a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Mackintosh’s disclosures in the manner asserted.” slip op. at 42
Patent outcomesUS 8,688,028 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,688,028 - Volkswagen Group Of America, Inc. v. Stratosaudio, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 24, 2023 · IPR2022-00205 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 11 and 15–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Mackintosh; the Board did not reach the alternative Takahisa grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableDecided for petitioner
“art would have understood Mackintosh to teach all of the limitations of claim 11 and a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine specific disclosures from the reference to arrive at the system of claim 11 with a reasonable expectation of success. See Pet. 48–64; Ex. 1003 claim 11 would have been obvious based on Mackintosh under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).” slip op. at 43
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“patent, we look to “1) the types of problems encountered in the art; 2) the prior art solutions to those problems; 3) the rapidity with which innovations are made; 4) the sophistication of the technology; and 5) the educational level of active workers in the field.” Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 666–667 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “Not all such factors may be present in every case, and one or more of them may predominate.” Id. at 667. Petitioner argues that at the time of the ’307 patent (September 2000), a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a B.S. in computer science or electrical engineering (or a related field), and approximately three years of experience working in the communications- or Internet-related industries, or, alternatively, an advanced degree (such as a master’s degree) in computer science or electrical engineering (or a related field).” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 44); see Ex. 1003 ¶ 29. Patent Owner applies the same definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 58–59). Based on the full record developed during trial, including our review of the ’307 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’307 patent and cited prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art and apply it for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, col. 1, l. 28–col. 2, l. 51 (describing in the “Background” section of the ’307 patent various FM broadcast and other communication methods).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner
“the time that the preamble of claim 11 is limiting because the body of the 3 The claim interpretations adopted herein are identical to those set forth in the concurrently entered final written decision in the Hyundai IPR, with one exception—we need not interpret “broadcast stream” in that proceeding. content identifying data,” “at least one broadcast segment,” and “communication device.” See Dec. on Inst. 27 n.5; Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 323 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“When limitations in the body of the claim rely upon and derive antecedent basis from the preamble, then the preamble may act as a necessary component of the claimed invention.”). Patent Owner agrees, and Petitioner does not argue otherwise in its Petition or Reply. See Pet. 49 (arguing that “[r]egardless of whether the preamble is limiting, it is disclosed by Mackintosh”); PO Resp. 33–34. Based on the full trial record, we determine that the preamble of claim 11 is limiting.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“After reviewing the full trial record, we are persuaded that the phrasing of Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation is correct, primarily because of its use of “as broadcasted.” First, by its plain language, a “broadcast segment” is a “segment” of a “broadcast.” See Tr. 10:24–11:1, 17:20–18:5 (Petitioner agreeing that a “broadcast segment” is “a segment of the broadcast” and is, for example, “distinguishable from the very next segment and the segment after that”); Ex. 2021, 22:20–23:7 (Dr. Madisetti agreeing that the ’307 patent “clearly describe[s] an example of a distinguishable piece or portion of the work as streamed as an individual song” (emphasis added)). Petitioner’s proposed interpretation is that a “broadcast segment” is a piece or portion “of a broadcast stream,” but that is already part of the claim—limitation 11[a] recites “a broadcast stream comprising the at least one broadcast segment” (emphasis added). See Pet. 10. Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation more clearly specifies that a “broadcast segment” is a portion of programming “as broadcasted.” See PO Resp. 17. To illustrate, although a is not the song in the abstract, but rather the portion of the broadcast that is the song. In other words, “‘[a]n individual song’ as broadcasted may serve as one example of a ‘broadcast segment’ because the broadcast of the song constitutes a discretely identifiable portion of broadcasting as broadcasted.” See id. at 19 (emphasis added); Sur-Reply 9. We are persuaded that the language of claim 11 supports Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation. Second, although the Specification of the ’307 patent only uses the term “broadcast segment” twice, it provides some support for Patent Owner’s view that a “broadcast segment” is a portion of programming “as broadcasted.” The Specification discloses: [R]adio station 140, using either a standard radio automation system for tracking of music content which is being broadcast, or a data-enabled audio player, broadcasts audio material and synchronously sends RBDS/RDS or similar data to an APS server 144 that assigns a unique identifier to each specific broadcast segment or song.” slip op. at 13
Patent outcomesUS 8,903,307 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,903,307 - Volkswagen Group Of America, Inc. / Hyundai Motor America v. Stratosaudio, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 24, 2023 · IPR2021-00720 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 12–16 are unpatentable as anticipated by Lee under § 102(b); the Board did not reach the alternative grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill is generally consistent with the subject matter of the ’405 patent. We agree with Petitioner’s description with the exception of the qualifier “at least” to keep the description from extending to a level beyond that of ordinary skill. Accordingly, for purposes of this Final Written Decision, a person of ordinary skill in the art is a person with a bachelor’s degree in computer science or electrical engineering or a related field, and approximately three years of experience working in the communications or Internet-related industries, or other equivalent industry experience in the field. A person with a master’s degree in one of these fields with less industry experience would also qualify as a person of ordinary skill in the art. B. Claim Construction” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“For purposes of this Decision, we do not find it necessary to expressly construe the term “media content.” See Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803 (holding that only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”). To the extent that the determination of the meaning of this claim term is necessary, we use its ordinary and customary meaning.” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We agree with Petitioner. Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, Lee discloses that multimedia device 20 receives advertisement-related data (i.e., the recited “second media content”) from Internet gateway 30 through device 20’s gateway communication unit, whereas device 20 receives the broadcast of audio advertisements (i.e., the recited “first media content”) from a digital audio broadcaster through device 20’s software programmable multiband receiver 210. See, e.g. Ex. 1004, Fig. 1. Lee shows these two pathways in Figures 1 and 3, annotated by Petitioner and shown above.” slip op. at 29
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached
“Petitioner asserts claims 12–16 are unpatentable as obvious over Lee. Pet. 53. Petitioner asserts claims 12, 15, and 16 are anticipated and rendered obvious by Barnes under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103. Id. at 54–71. Petitioner also asserts that claims 13, and 14 would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Barnes and the RBDS Standard. Id. at 72–77. However, because Petitioner has already shown that all of the challenged claims are unpatentable over Lee as anticipated, as discussed supra, we do not reach these additional asserted grounds.4 See Beloit Corp. v. Valmet Oy, 742 F.2d 1421, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The Commission . . . is at perfect liberty to reach a ‘no violation’ determination on a single dispositive issue.”); Boston Sci. Scimed, Inc. v. Cook Grp. Inc., 809 F. App’x 984, 990 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 2020) (non-precedential) (recognizing that “[t]he Board has the discretion to decline to decide additional instituted grounds once the petitioner has prevailed on all its challenged claims”). 4 Because we do not reach Petitioner’s asserted ground based on Barnes and the RBDS Standard, we also dismiss as moot Petitioner’s motion to submit supplemental information (Paper 19) pertaining to the RBDS Standard.” slip op. at 58
Patent outcomesUS 9,355,405 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,355,405 - Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Co. Ltd. v. Yogesh RathodInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 27, 2022 · DER2022-00002 · APJ Michael R Zecher · DER · Institution
The Board denied institution because Tencent did not make a sufficient showing that the named inventors conceived the invention allegedly communicated to Rathod.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“that the standards for instituting a derivation proceeding are met, the Director may institute a derivation proceeding.” 35 U.S.C. § 135(a)(1). We have authority to institute a derivation proceeding on behalf of the Director. 37 C.F.R. § 42.408(a). The threshold showing for institution of a derivation proceeding is whether the petition demonstrates substantial evidence that, if unrebutted, would support a determination of derivation. See 35 U.S.C. § 135(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.405(c).1 Once a derivation proceeding has been instituted, the standard of proof for establishing that a challenged claim constitutes a derived invention is by a preponderance of the evidence. 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d). For the reasons set forth below, we conclude” slip op. at 2
- BurdenDenied
“is devoid of any explanation of the circumstances surrounding conception of the invention by the three named inventors of the ’371 application. Most notably, Tencent does not provide supporting testimony from any of the three named inventors or, for that matter, from any other parties that could corroborate the alleged conception. Indeed, the word “conception” does not appear in Tencent’s Petition at all. See Pet. Put simply, Tencent fails to provide any meaningful information regarding the work done by each of the three named inventors that resulted in conception of the invention covered by the pending claims of the ’371 application. Absent some evidence in the record, such as testimony from the three named inventors together with corroborating evidence showing there was formation in the mind of the named inventors of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, Tencent has not demonstrated prior conception.6 To the extent Tencent expects us to scour the preliminary record to unearth supporting evidence of prior conception, we decline to do so. It is well-settled that Tencent is “master of its complaint.” SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355 (2018). We are constrained by the arguments and evidence presented and developed in Tencent’s Petition, and we are not” slip op. at 13
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not reached
“6 We recognize that Tencent contends that the ’265 patent and the three applications in its priority chain lack sufficient written description support for the claimed invention. Pet. 17–28. We need not reach Tencent’s arguments that the three applications in the priority chain of the ’265 patent lack sufficient written description support for the claimed invention because, as we explain above, Tencent does not demonstrate that the named inventors in the ’371 application conceived, at any time, the inventions purportedly communicated to Mr. Rathod.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyNot reached
“is devoid of any explanation of the circumstances surrounding conception of the invention by the three named inventors of the ’371 application. Most notably, Tencent does not provide supporting testimony from any of the three named inventors or, for that matter, from any other parties that could corroborate the alleged conception. Indeed, the word “conception” does not appear in Tencent’s Petition at all. See Pet. Put simply, Tencent fails to provide any meaningful information regarding the work done by each of the three named inventors that resulted in conception of the invention covered by the pending claims of the ’371 application. Absent some evidence in the record, such as testimony from the three named inventors together with corroborating evidence showing there was formation in the mind of the named inventors of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, Tencent has not demonstrated prior conception.6” slip op. at 13
§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 10,990,265
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.