• Alliance Laundry Systems, LLC v. Payrange LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 19, 2026 · PGR2025-00027 · APJ George R Hoskins · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6 and 8–20 are unpatentable under § 101; claim 7 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Pet.”) pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–329 to institute a post-grant review of U.S. Patent No. 11,966,920 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’920 patent”), claims 1–20. We issued an Institution Decision (Paper 12) granting the petitioned review. slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelOther

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person having ordinary skill in the art pertaining” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “thereby supporting our conclusion that the plain and ordinary meaning of “affordance” in claim 1 refers to an interactive user interface element.” slip op. at 30

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Petitioner’s reliance on Low’s” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 11,966,920 mixed
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Berkheimer · Enfish · Electric Power · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 11,966,920
• Alliance Laundry Systems, LLC v. Payrange LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 19, 2026 · PGR2025-00028 · APJ George R Hoskins · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6 and 8–20 are unpatentable under § 102, § 103, or § 101; claim 7 was not shown unpatentable because the asserted grounds did not establish its limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “1. Legal Standards “Anticipation requires that every limitation of the claim in issue be” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundMixed

    “2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d at 1368). Further, an assertion of obviousness “cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)); accord In re NuVasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (stating that “conclusory statements” amount to an “insufficient articulation[] of motivation to combine”; “instead, the finding must be supported by a ‘reasoned explanation’” (quoting In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002))); In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“To satisfy its burden of proving obviousness, a petitioner cannot employ mere conclusory statements. The petitioner must instead articulate specific reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”).” slip op. at 36

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionMixed

    “because the “user interface” limitations merely apply the recited abstract idea on a generic mobile device without meaningfully limiting the abstract idea. See 2025 Guidance, at 4–5. For example, these limitations do not reflect an improvement to the functioning of the mobile device (or any other computer device), and instead are “mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on” the mobile device. Id. Indeed, the ’423 patent specification describes only a generic “swipe-to-pay” feature. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 7:13–33, Figs. 8C, 10A–10D. This supports our conclusion here that the claim 11 limitations do not integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application. See MPEP § 2106.04(d)(1) (“[T]he specification should be evaluated to determine if the disclosure provides sufficient details such that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize the claimed invention as providing an improvement,” and “it must describe” slip op. at 108

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptMixed

    “because the “user interface” limitations merely apply the recited abstract idea on a generic mobile device without meaningfully limiting the abstract idea. See 2025 Guidance, at 4–5. For example, these limitations do not reflect an improvement to the functioning of the mobile device (or any other computer device), and instead are “mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on” the mobile device. Id. Indeed, the ’423 patent specification describes only a generic “swipe-to-pay” feature. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 7:13–33, Figs. 8C, 10A–10D. This supports our conclusion here that the claim 11 limitations do not integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application. See MPEP § 2106.04(d)(1) (“[T]he specification should be evaluated to determine if the disclosure provides sufficient details such that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize the claimed invention as providing an improvement,” and “it must describe” slip op. at 108

  Patent outcomesUS 11,972,423 mixed
  § 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Enfish · Electric Power · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,972,423
• Kiosoft Technologies, LLC / Techtrex, Inc. v. Payrange Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 26, 2022 · PGR2021-00077 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · PGR · Final written decision

  Claim 1 is unpatentable under § 101; claims 2–27 were not shown unpatentable because the other challenges were deficient.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A person having ordinary skill in the art would have had an education background of, or practical experience providing an equivalent to, a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, or a related/equivalent field and at least four years of work experience in identity, transaction, and telecommunication solutions.” slip op. at 12

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “As can be seen from claim 1 above, all of the claimed method steps occur “at the mobile device” and the final step is to enable completion of a cashless transaction. Claim 1 does not recite completing the purchase. The ’833 patent describes that any commercial transaction is completed at the automatic retail machine, not at the mobile device. Ex. 1001, 11:5–9; see also id. at 21:4–11, 22:18–20, 23:53–61, 30:25–27. We, thus, agree with Patent Owner that the claimed method does not require completing or conducting the transaction, but only enabling the completion of the transaction. On this complete record, we are persuaded that the elements italicized above recite the concept of obtaining authorization for a purchase and enabling completion of a cashless transaction, prior to user selection of any items or services. See Pet. 22–23 (arguing that the claimed method “is effectively no different than a person entering a store, the store checking the customer’s available credit (or calling a bank to do so) and when the customer decides on the item, completing the purchase”); Pet. Reply 5–6 (arguing that the claim recites “obtaining payment authorization and performing a financial transaction, the same as a person entering a store, the store checking the customer’s available credit (or calling a bank to do so) and, when the customer decides on the item, allowing the purchase”). In particular, claim 1 recites steps for obtaining authorization prior to user selection of any items or services — steps of identifying the automatic retail machine, obtaining a request from the electronic payment device, sending the request to a server, and obtaining from the server an authorization grant. Claim 1 also recites steps for enabling the completion of a purchase (i.e., cashless transaction) — detecting a trigger condition and sending the authorization grant to the electronic payment device. Our slight revision of the abstract idea from what we previously stated in our Institution Decision does not impact the patentability analysis. Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 18

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable

    “We are not persuaded. Patent Owner’s arguments rest on the alleged novelty of the abstract idea itself, not the “specific limitation beyond the judicial exception,” i.e., the additional elements. “[A] claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.” BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018). A novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90. “The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89 (emphasis added). Patent Owner and Dr. Shamos do not identify, and we cannot find, anything in the claim suggesting that the mobile device, server, or automated retail device (i.e., the additional elements) are more than generic components. Indeed, the ’833 patent’s specification demonstrates that these elements were well-understood, routine, and conventional to the industry. Ex. 1001, 2:23–29, 37–42, 3:25–38 (explaining that Offer “teaches permitting the cashless utilization of a vending machines via a communications service, such as a cellular telephone;” Khan teaches an application on a user’s “personal trusted device” used to effectuate cashless purchases; and Carlson teaches “a system and a method for using a portable consumer device such as a mobile phone for payments and the like,” the method including prompting a user to select, from his mobile device, a product for purchase at a vending machine, after/if the user is authorized to make the purchase, and sending an authorization response to the vending machine from a “remote payment server”).” slip op. at 26

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “At the institution stage, we determined that no claim term required explicit construction. Inst. Dec. 35–37. Petitioner does not challenge our determination or otherwise advance its claim constructions in its Reply. See generally Pet. Reply. Patent Owner does not advance any explicit claim construction. PO Resp. 7–13. Regarding the identifying limitation, Patent Owner indicates that it is “undisputed between the parties that the claims require automatically determining the identity of the specific automatic retail machine based on an electronic transmission received from an electronic payment device of that automatic retail machine.” Id. at 7–8 (emphasis in original, citing Ex. 2018, 3; Ex. 2016 ¶ 68). Patent Owner submits that Petitioner’s constructions for each of the obtaining, authorization, and payment limitations should be rejected “for lacking accordance with the plain meaning of the claim in view of the specification” or “ignor[ing] the plain meaning of the term.” Id. at 9, 12, 13. As to the detecting limitation, Patent Owner argues that certain prior art asserted in the grounds in the Petition fails to teach the term as construed. Id. at 9. We determine that we need not expressly construe these claim terms” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 10,719,833 mixed
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Mayo · Bilski · Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 10,719,833
• Lenovo Holding Company, Inc. / Lenovo (United States) Inc. et al. v. Interdigital Technology CorporationSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 14, 2022 · IPR2020-01494 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–8, 10–12, 21–24, and 26 are unpatentable as obvious over Li and Tiedemann, with or without ETSI1997; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “In its Response, InterDigital does not contest Dr. Acampora’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill, except that “InterDigital applies Petitioners’ alleged baseline level of ordinary skill without the phrase ‘at least.’” PO Resp. 3. We agree with InterDigital that the term at least arguably “creates unnecessary ambiguity.” Id. (citing Inst. Dec. 9–10). But we find that Petitioner’s articulation, after deleting the phrase at least, is reasonable in light of the subject matter involved in the ’449 patent, and we adopt it for our decision.” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “To the extent that text was copied and pasted in either direction between the Petition and Dr. Acampora’s declaration, we disagree that this mere fact indicates that we should give Dr. Acampora’s testimony less weight. Patent Owner does not argue that Dr. Acampora was uninvolved with the preparation of his declaration, which he signed, under penalty of perjury, and presented as reflecting his own opinions. That typographical errors may, for example, have been propagated from his declaration to the Petition is by itself of little consequence. The cited Wowza decision does not suggest otherwise. In that case, the Board assigned little weight to the expert declaration, not because of its similarity to the petition, but because the declaration did not disclose the underlying facts or data on which its opinion testimony was based. See IPR2013-00054, Paper 16 at 4–5. As Petitioner correctly argues in its Reply, InterDigital does not “identif[y] where Dr. Acampora fails to provide sufficient facts underlying his opinions.” Pet. Reply 1 n.1.” slip op. at 20

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “1. “channel quality” InterDigital states that the court in the parallel district court litigation adopted the parties’ agreed construction of “channel quality” as meaning “a value/values quantifying how efficiently downlink resources of a channel can communicate information.” PO Resp. 3–4 (citing Ex. 2008, 1; Ex. 2009, 18). InterDigital contends that the ’449 patent suggests this construction, and that both sides’ experts agree with it. Id. at 4 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:36–61; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 33–35; Ex. 2002, 21:14–22; Ex. 2007, 26:12–17). Because the meaning of this term is uncontested, and it is consistent with the evidence of record, we adopt the parties’ agreed construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “For the above reasons, we determine that Petitioner has persuasively shown that a channel quality of the plurality of downlink resources and the related term a first channel quality indication for the plurality of downlink resources mean “a channel quality value related to the ‘plurality of downlink resources’ as a whole.” Pet. 11–13. We also determine that Petitioner has persuasively shown that both alternatives 8 and 9 reflect embodiments of this term, which is consistent with the district court’s construction that provides “a mean or reference value related to the plurality” as examples of a channel quality value related to the plurality of downlink resources as a whole, explicitly referencing alternative 9 in its analysis. See Ex. 2009, 12– 13.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 9,456,449 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,456,449
• One World Technologies, Inc., D/B/A Techtronic Industries Power Equipment v. The Chamberlain Group, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 24, 2018 · IPR2017-00126 · APJ John F Horvath · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 7, 9–12, and 15 are unpatentable as obvious over Doppelt, AAPA, and Jacobs; claims 8 and 16 were not shown unpatentable on either ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMotion to exclude, grantedMixed

    “experience, knowledge, and training to offer expert testimony in this proceeding. Accordingly, Petitioner’s request to exclude his declaration in its entirety is denied.” slip op. at 13

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “1. Level of Skill in the Art Relying on the opinion of its declarant, Mr. Lipoff, Petitioner argues a” slip op. at 21

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “sufficient knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education in systems with embedded microprocessors to establish an adequate relationship between his experience and the invention claimed in the ’319 patent. Accordingly, Dr. Davis is qualified to provide expert testimony in this proceeding. See Fed. R. Evid. 702; Montgomery Ward, 594 F.3d at 1373. Through his uncontroverted testimony, Dr. Davis has established that he has earned a Ph.D. in electrical engineering, has more than 30 years of research experience in computer architecture, digital design, and embedded microprocessors, has authored numerous technical articles on these topics, and has previously provided “expert witness testimony in cases involving embedded computer systems that are similar to the ones envisioned in the ’319 patent.” Ex. 2007 ¶¶ 6, 8, 16–17. Although Dr. Davis has no direct experience with garage door openers, he has experience with systems he considers to be related, such as “elevator controllers where you’ve got to worry about not just opening and closing the doors but the movement of the carriage or the cab that goes up and down . . . that you don’t account for in a garage door.” Ex. 1019, 34:23–35:6. In short, Dr. Davis has demonstrated that he possesses sufficient experience, knowledge, and training to offer expert testimony in this proceeding. Accordingly, Petitioner’s request to exclude his declaration in its entirety is denied.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “Accordingly, based on the evidence in this proceeding, including the Specification and claims of the ’319 patent, the specification and claims of the ’968 patent, the representations Patent Owner made to the ITC regarding the problem confronting the inventors of the ’319 patent, and Dr. Davis’ cross-examination testimony, we find the problem addressed by the inventors of the ’319 patent was how to include microcontrollers in the wall consoles of barrier movement operators that could communicate with the microcontrollers in the motor drive units over digital data buses. We further find that Jacobs teaches a solution to this very problem. In particular, Jacobs teaches a motor-driven system for moving a window shade barrier that includes a wall console (control 31/630) having a microcontroller (microprocessor 800) that sends instructions to a motor drive unit (control 45) having a microcontroller (microcontroller 540) over a digital data bus (serial link 652) to control a motor (motor 215) to move the barrier up and down. Ex. 1005, 5:15–19, 12:42–48, 13:37–39, 15:5–15, Figs. 20, 21, 24. Accordingly, Jacobs is analogous art to the invention claimed in the ’319 patent because it teaches a solution that is “reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor was involved.” Deminski, 796 F.2d at 442. In particular, Jacobs would have logically commended itself to the attention of a person of ordinary skill in the art looking to solve the problem of including microcontrollers in the wall consoles of barrier movement operators that could communicate with the microcontrollers in the motor drive units over digital data buses. See Clay, 966 F.2d at 659. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Jacobs qualifies as” slip op. at 34

  Patent outcomesUS 7,161,319 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 7,161,319
• Flir Systems, Inc. / Flir Maritime US, Inc. (F/K/A Raymarine, Inc.) v. Garmin Switzerland GmbHSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 10, 2018 · IPR2017-00946 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 28, 29, and 45 were held unpatentable; claims 1–7, 12–23, 25–27, and 41–44 were not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 73 and 74 were allowed.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd mixedMixed

    “C. Legal Principles 1. Anticipation A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 if “the four corners of a single, prior art document describe every element of the claimed invention, either expressly or inherently, such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could practice the invention without undue experimentation.” Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “A single prior art reference may anticipate without disclosing a feature of the claimed invention if such feature is necessarily present, or inherent, in that reference.” Allergan, Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 754 F.3d 952, 958 (citing Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). Moreover, the reference must also “disclose[] within the four corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed but also all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). However, “the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test.” In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009). We analyze the ground based on anticipation in accordance with the above-stated principles.” slip op. at 22

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “and agree with Patent Owner that the terms “re-routing the course” and “re-route the course” mean “to change at least a portion of the route of the course relative to a previous routing.” That is, there must be a first routing of a course and that routing must be changed by performance of the marine route calculation algorithm to avoid preselected conditions by identifying one or more non-user selected waypoints. The construction is consistent with the words of the claims. The claims do not merely require routing a course, but “re-routing the course.” The ordinary meaning of the prefix “re” is that something is being done again. See Tr. 18 (Petitioner agreeing that “if you put R-E in front of a word, normally that means it’s occurring a second time”). Although the claims do not explicitly recite both an original “routing” of a course that is changed by “re-routing the course,” the original “routing” is implicitly required by the use of the prefix “re.” See Tr. 34 (Patent Owner agreeing that although the claims do not explicitly require an initial routing, the initial routing is implicit in the use of “re-routing”), 44–45 (Petitioner agreeing that “re-routing” ordinarily implies an initial routing).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “proposed construction of “course” as “the path of intended travel of a craft with respect to the earth.” Instead, we need only focus on the words recited in the claim. Claim 1, which is representative, recites that performing the marine route calculation algorithm to “route a course between a first location and the potential waypoint avoiding the preselected conditions,” where such performance includes “identifying one or more non-user selected waypoints.” Ex. 1001, claim 1. The other independent claims recite similar limitations. See Ex. 1001, claims 12, 20, 27. Based on the limitation recited in the claim, the broadest reasonable interpretation of routing a “course” encompasses the identification of one or more non-user selected waypoints between a first location and a potential waypoint. No further construction is necessary for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 17

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that the person of ordinary skill in the art need not have first-hand experience with marine navigation devices and systems. Pet. Reply 25–26. The ’703 patent explicitly defines “marine navigation” broadly, noting that “the use of the word ‘marine’ in the embodiments of the present invention (including the claims) could be replaced with the phrase ‘non-street based.’” Ex. 1001, 1:57–67 (emphasis added). Such non-street based navigation is broad enough to encompass avionic navigation. See Pet. Reply 25–26; cf. Ex. 1003, 4–7 (demonstrating Dr. Braasch’s experience in avionic navigation). We find that Petitioner’s definition is supported by the testimony of its expert, Dr. Braasch, and, for the reasons stated above, we are not persuaded that the person of ordinary skill in the art necessarily would have had first-hand experience in marine—as opposed to non-street based— navigation. We, therefore, determine, based on the complete record, that Petitioner’s proposed definition correctly states the level of ordinary skill in the art, and we apply it for purposes of this Decision.7, 8” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 7,268,703 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,268,703
• One World Technologies, Inc. D/B/A Techtronic Industries Power Equipment v. The Chamberlain Group, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 24, 2018 · IPR2017-00073 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 10, and 11 are anticipated by Crimmins; claims 4–8, 12, and 13 are obvious over Crimmins and Weik; claim 14 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd mixedMixed

    “evidence, and we find that Crimmins discloses every limitation of claim 1. Petitioner has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 1 is anticipated by Crimmins under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).” slip op. at 32

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner

    “Dec. on Inst. 10–13, 17–19. We also preliminarily interpreted the following limitations as means-plus-function limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph: Limitation Interpretation “apparatus for communicating Functions: communicating the the identities of faults in the identities of faults in the operation of operation of the barrier” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownNo construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “In its Response, Patent Owner states that Petitioner’s proposed interpretations “introduce concepts that have no basis in the claim’s plain language.” PO Resp. 3–4. Patent Owner, however, does not offer any alternative interpretations or take a position as to whether any of the limitations identified above are means-plus-function limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph. Instead, Patent Owner argues that the claims should be interpreted according to their “plain language” and that “no construction is necessary for any claim term.” Id. at 4. Petitioner adopts our preliminary interpretations. Reply 3. Upon review of the full record from trial, we do not perceive any reason or evidence that compels any deviation from our earlier interpretations. See Dec. on Inst. 7–19. We adopt the previous analysis and conclude that no other terms require interpretation.” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Neither party explains in detail why the respective proposed level of ordinary skill in the art should be adopted nor how the different levels affect the parties’ analyses. The parties’ declarants agree that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had an undergraduate degree in electrical or computer engineering (or the equivalent) and two years of work experience. The difference between the two is the substance of that work experience. Mr. Lipoff opines that it would be in “the fields of access control or automated door control systems,” whereas Dr. Davis opines that it would be in “embedded computer systems or related technologies involving microcontrollers.” See Ex. 1003 ¶ 29; Ex. 2006 ¶ 18. Mr. Lipoff’s proposed definition is consistent with the technology at issue in this proceeding. The ’611 patent is directed to “barrier movement operators,” such as “[g]ate operators and garage door operators,” and “human interface methods and apparatus for such systems.” Ex. 1001, col. 1, ll. 6–14. The ’611 patent does not mention specifically “embedded” computer systems, but does disclose that barrier movement operators were known to include a “motor” and “controller” that “selectively energiz[es] the motor to move the barrier” and is “responsive to stimulus signals to perform various barrier movements.” Id. at col. 1, ll. 9–19; see also Ex. 1004, col. 1, ll. 9–13 (Crimmins similarly disclosing that it is directed to “a controller for controlling the motor, interface, safety systems and other functions of a commercial door or barrier operator”); Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 2–5 (Weik similarly disclosing that it is directed to “[a]utomated, motor-driven barriers”). Thus, an individual having experience working with barrier movement operators would have been familiar with their constituent parts, including motors and controllers for the devices. Based on the record developed during trial, including our review of the ’611 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’611 patent and cited prior art, we agree with Mr. Lipoff’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art and apply it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 7,196,611 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,196,611
• Telit Wireless Solutions Inc. / Telit Communications PLC et al. v. M2m Solutions LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 6, 2017 · IPR2016-00055 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–23 and 29 are unpatentable as obvious; claim 24 was not shown unpatentable because Van Bergen does not disclose the coded number and telephone number in the same transmission.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “authenticates the at least one of the transmissions including the at least one telephone number or IP address and the coded number by determining that the at least one of the transmissions includes the coded number.” Ex. 1101, 12:48–52, 15:2–6, 16:15–19 (emphasis added). Here, the emphasized phrase “the at least one of the transmissions” takes antecedent basis from the first recitation of “at least one of the transmissions,” which is the transmission within which the telephone number (or IP address) is included. Therefore, the processing module performs authentication “by determining that the at least one of the transmissions includes the coded number,” and “the at least one of the transmissions” is defined in the claim as the transmission within which the telephone number (or IP address) is included. As such, the independent claims require processing module authentication of one transmission that includes both the telephone number (or IP address) and the coded number. Certainly, the claim allows for the existence of more than one transmission, but there must be at least one transmission that contains both.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “According to the prosecution history, therefore, the applicant added the language “permitted to” because the Examiner did not believe it was “clear” in the claims as written that the language “configured to” meant that the device was also “permitted to” call those numbers. There is no mention of restricting what numbers the device can call. Patent Owner further contends the Specification of the ’717 patent “expressly disclose[s] the concept of restrictive outbound calling lists.” PO Resp. 17 (citing Ex. 1101, 2:20–23, 2:28–32). One of these passages, in the “Background of the Invention” section, states: “Clearly there is a need to provide a means to limit the cost of calling and also to provide a means to prevent the child dialling overseas numbers for extensive periods of time.” Ex. 1101, 2:20–23 (emphasis added). This passage describes a goal of controlling durations of calls to certain numbers, i.e., overseas calls, not completely blocking the sending of outgoing wireless transmissions to such numbers. The other passage cited by Patent Owner similarly states: “An improved child Hotlink communicator, which restricts the usage of the mobile phone and thereby does not generate high charges through uncontrolled calling, is clearly a solution to the family tariffing challenge.” Id. at 2:28–32. This also relates to “control” of calling, not necessarily blocking outgoing transmissions. We do not read these passages as the applicant acting as a lexicographer and defining the “configured to and permitted to” language in the claims.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyNo construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “3. “Processing module for authenticating” Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner argued that the limitation of independent claims 1, 24, and 29 reciting “a processing module for authenticating one or more wireless transmissions sent from a programming transmitter and received by the programmable communicator device by determining if at least one transmission contains a coded number” should be interpreted as a means-plus-function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6. Based on the full record developed during trial, we determine that this limitation is not governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6, and does not require further construction. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“When a claim term lacks the word ‘means,’ the presumption can be overcome and § 112, para. 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)).” slip op. at 14

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “that time, that the skill level of a person of ordinary skill in the art, at the relevant time for the ’717 patent (May 2000), would have been “at least an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering and three years of experience working the development of wireless subscriber terminal systems or components, or an equivalent combination of education and experience in related fields.” Dec. on Inst. 23 n.4 (citing Sierra Wireless Am., Inc. et al. v. M2M Solutions LLC, Case IPR2015-01823, slip op. at 11 n.4 (PTAB Mar. 8, 2016) (Paper 16)). The parties did not propose a different level of ordinary skill in the art during trial. Based on the record developed during trial, we see no reason to deviate from our prior determination of the skill level of a person of ordinary skill in the art. This level of ordinary skill is reflected not only by the information presented by the parties, but also by the prior art of record. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 8,648,717 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,648,717
• Boku, Inc. / Boku Account Services, Inc. v. Xilidev, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 2, 2015 · CBM2014-00148 · APJ Justin T Arbes · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 and 20–23 are unpatentable; claim 19 was not shown unpatentable because Gerson does not disclose its product identification code and quantity limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)IndefiniteUnpatentable

    “the particular function of the limitation and then identifying the corresponding structure for that function in the specification. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2015). A structure is corresponding “only if the specification or prosecution history clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited in the claim.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 248 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). Additionally, the corresponding structure of a means-plus-function limitation must be “more than simply a general purpose computer or microprocessor” to avoid pure functional claiming. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1352 (citing Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). If a special purpose computer is required to carry out the recited function, the specification must disclose an “algorithm for performing the claimed function,” id., which may be expressed “in any understandable terms including as a mathematical formula, in prose, or as a flow chart, or in any other manner that provides sufficient structure,” Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “[I]f a person of ordinary skill in the art would be unable to recognize the structure in the specification and associate it with the corresponding function in the claim, a means-plus-function clause is indefinite” under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1352.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “discloses every limitation of claims 12–16 and 18. For example, with respect to claim 12, Petitioner asserts, with supporting testimony from Dr. Shamos, that Gerson discloses (1) a “payment authorization source” (i.e., bank or other financial institution) configured to authorize payment for a transaction; (2) a “payment resolution module” (i.e., central processing computer) in communication with the bank or other financial institution; (3) a “hand-held device” (i.e., user’s mobile phone) in communication with the central processing computer that transmits an authorization request (i.e., payment transaction) to the central processing computer; and (4) a “confirmation device” (i.e., POST) that receives an “authorization code” (i.e., transaction-specific authorization code) from the user and authorizes the transaction in response to validating the authorization code. -140 Pet. 69–73; see Ex. 1003, 83–90. Petitioner further argues that Gerson necessarily includes an “I/O interface” because the central processing computer transmits (i.e., outputs) the transaction-specific authorization code to the mobile phone via a “wireless telecommunications link,” and such transmission requires an I/O interface between the mobile phone and central processing computer. -140 Pet. 71–72 (citing Ex. 1005, 6 (ll. 8–14)). We also have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence for the other challenged claims, and are persuaded that Petitioner has met its burden of demonstrating anticipation by a preponderance of the evidence. Based on all of the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 12–16 and 18 are anticipated by Gerson under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “It would have been obvious to combine Gerson’s system storing the authorization code in a processor with Wronski’s database additionally storing an indication of the transaction request because in both cases the information relates to the transaction being authorized and therefore Wronski merely stores additional information about the same transaction that Gerson does. Furthermore, a user in Gerson would be motivated to combine the processor database with Wronski’s database including an indication of the transaction request because such a combination would facilitate the later retrieval of transaction specific information (such as when Gerson’s processor database is accessed by the point-of-sale system).” slip op. at 20

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.’” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 405 (2007) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)). Dr. Shamos testifies that he believes a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “an undergraduate degree in computer science, or equivalent work experience, and, in addition, at least two years of experience with electronic payment systems, including familiarity with databases and integration with interactive voice response software.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 14; see -140 Pet. 11. Based on the record presented, including our review of the ’168 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’168 patent and cited prior art, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had an undergraduate degree in computer science (or equivalent work experience) and at least two years of experience with electronic payment systems, including familiarity with databases. We apply this level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision. Although a person of ordinary skill in the art may have had experience with interactive voice response software, we do not see why such experience should be required, as the ’168 patent discloses that “various communication mediums and protocols [for interacting with users were] known in the art,” of which interactive voice response is merely one example. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, col. 5, ll. 4–52.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 7,273,168 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 7,273,168
• Boku, Inc. / Boku Account Services, Inc. v. Xilidev, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 2, 2015 · CBM2014-00140 · APJ Justin T Arbes · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 and 20–23 are unpatentable: claim 17 is indefinite, claims 12–16 and 18 are anticipated by Gerson, claims 1–11 and 20–23 are obvious over Gerson and Wronski, and claims 1–5, 7–16, 18, and 20–23 …

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)IndefiniteUnpatentable

    “the particular function of the limitation and then identifying the corresponding structure for that function in the specification. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2015). A structure is corresponding “only if the specification or prosecution history clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited in the claim.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 248 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). Additionally, the corresponding structure of a means-plus-function limitation must be “more than simply a general purpose computer or microprocessor” to avoid pure functional claiming. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1352 (citing Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). If a special purpose computer is required to carry out the recited function, the specification must disclose an “algorithm for performing the claimed function,” id., which may be expressed “in any understandable terms including as a mathematical formula, in prose, or as a flow chart, or in any other manner that provides sufficient structure,” Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “[I]f a person of ordinary skill in the art would be unable to recognize the structure in the specification and associate it with the corresponding function in the claim, a means-plus-function clause is indefinite” under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1352.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “Petitioner has not shown that Gerson discloses, expressly or inherently, a hand-held device providing a product identification code and product quantity (in addition to the transaction amount), and we do not find any such disclosure in the reference. The mobile phone in Gerson only provides the purchase amount. See Ex. 1005, 3 (ll. 22–23), 7 (ll. 6–13). Further, Petitioner’s assertion that it “would have been obvious” to also provide a product identification code and product quantity is insufficient to prove anticipation. See -140 Pet. 79–80; Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1255–56 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Anticipation requires that every limitation of the claim in issue be disclosed, either expressly or under principles of inherency, in a single prior art reference.”). Based on all of the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 19 is anticipated by Gerson under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentableUnpatentable

    “It would have been obvious to combine Gerson’s system storing the authorization code in a processor with Wronski’s database additionally storing an indication of the transaction request because in both cases the information relates to the transaction being authorized and therefore Wronski merely stores additional information about the same transaction that Gerson does. Furthermore, a user in Gerson would be motivated to combine the processor database with Wronski’s database including an indication of the transaction request because such a combination would facilitate the later retrieval of transaction specific information (such as when Gerson’s processor database is accessed by the point-of-sale system).” slip op. at 20

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.’” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 405 (2007) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)). Dr. Shamos testifies that he believes a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “an undergraduate degree in computer science, or equivalent work experience, and, in addition, at least two years of experience with electronic payment systems, including familiarity with databases and integration with interactive voice response software.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 14; see -140 Pet. 11. Based on the record presented, including our review of the ’168 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’168 patent and cited prior art, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had an undergraduate degree in computer science (or equivalent work experience) and at least two years of experience with electronic payment systems, including familiarity with databases. We apply this level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision. Although a person of ordinary skill in the art may have had experience with interactive voice response software, we do not see why such experience should be required, as the ’168 patent discloses that “various communication mediums and protocols [for interacting with users were] known in the art,” of which interactive voice response is merely one example. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, col. 5, ll. 4–52.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 7,273,168 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 7,273,168

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.