- Volkswagen Group Of America, Inc. v. Stratosaudio, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 24, 2023 · IPR2021-00716 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 11, 14–16, and 18 are unpatentable as obvious over Mackintosh; the Board did not reach the alternative Takahisa anticipation ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art for a challenged patent, we look to “1) the types of problems encountered in the art; 2) the prior art solutions to those problems; 3) the rapidity with which innovations are made; 4) the sophistication of the technology; and 5) the educational level of active workers in the field.” Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 666–667 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “Not all such factors may be present in every case, and one or more of them may predominate.” Id. at 667. Petitioner argues that at the time of the ’028 patent (September 2000), a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a B.S. in computer science or electrical engineering (or a related field), and approximately three years of experience working in the communications- or Internet-related industries, or, alternatively, an advanced degree (such as a master’s degree) in computer science or electrical engineering (or a related field).” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 44); see Ex. 1003 ¶ 29. Patent Owner applies the same definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 16–17 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 57–58). Based on the full record developed during trial, including our review of the ’028 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’028 patent and cited prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art and apply it for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, col. 1, l. 25–col. 2, l. 49 (describing in the “Background” section of the ’028 patent various FM broadcast and other communication methods).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“1. Preamble of Claim 11 In the Decision on Institution, we determined based on the record at the time that the preamble of claim 11 is limiting because the body of the 3 The claim interpretations adopted herein are identical to those set forth in the concurrently entered final written decision in the Hyundai IPR, with one exception—we need not interpret “broadcast stream” in that proceeding. content identifying data,” “at least one broadcast segment,” and “communication device.” See Dec. on Inst. 27 n.5; Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 323 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“When limitations in the body of the claim rely upon and derive antecedent basis from the preamble, then the preamble may act as a necessary component of the claimed invention.”). Patent Owner agrees, and Petitioner does not argue otherwise in its Petition or Reply. See Pet. 48 (arguing that “[r]egardless of whether the preamble is limiting, it is disclosed by Mackintosh”); PO Resp. 34–35. Based on the full trial record, we determine that the preamble of claim 11 is limiting.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“After reviewing the full trial record, we are persuaded that the phrasing of Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation is correct, primarily because of its use of “as broadcasted.” First, by its plain language, a “broadcast segment” is a “segment” of a “broadcast.” See Tr. 10:24–11:1, 17:20–18:5 (Petitioner agreeing that a “broadcast segment” is “a segment of the broadcast” and is, for example, “distinguishable from the very next segment and the segment after that”); Ex. 2021, 22:20–23:7 (Dr. Madisetti agreeing that the ’028 patent “clearly describe[s] an example of a distinguishable piece or portion of the work as streamed as an individual song” (emphasis added)). Petitioner’s proposed interpretation is that a “broadcast segment” is a piece or portion “of a broadcast stream,” but that is already part of the claim—limitation 11[a] recites “a broadcast stream comprising the at least one broadcast segment” (emphasis added). See Pet. 11. Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation more clearly specifies that a “broadcast segment” is a portion of programming “as broadcasted.” See PO Resp. 17. To illustrate, although a is not the song in the abstract, but rather the portion of the broadcast that is the song. In other words, “‘[a]n individual song’ as broadcasted may serve as one example of a ‘broadcast segment’ because the broadcast of the song constitutes a discretely identifiable portion of broadcasting as broadcasted.” See id. at 20 (emphasis added); Sur-Reply 9–10. We are persuaded that the language of claim 11 supports Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation. Second, although the Specification of the ’028 patent only uses the term “broadcast segment” twice, it provides some support for Patent Owner’s view that a “broadcast segment” is a portion of programming “as broadcasted.” The Specification discloses: [R]adio station 140, using either a standard radio automation system for tracking of music content which is being broadcast, or a data-enabled audio player, broadcasts audio material and synchronously sends RBDS/RDS or similar data to an APS server 144 that assigns a unique identifier to each specific broadcast segment or song.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“We disagree. Mackintosh discloses an overall system for providing broadcast and supplemental materials to a user, then describes more specific examples with different features that can be included in that system. See Pet. 48–49, 63; Ex. 1005, col. 8, ll. 18–32 (“Having thus generally described a system and method for coordinating supplemental information with broadcast material provided to user equipment 112, a specific application of this generalized system is now described.” (emphasis added)), col. 12, ll. 18–34 (“one example player is now described in order to illustrate the features and functionality that can be provided or included”), col. 19, ll. 1–7 (stating that the “player” of Figure 7 (similar to that of Figure 12) “can be used with other architectures, including those architectures illustrated in [Figures 1–4]”), 55–61, col. 21, ll. 3–4 (noting that “[a] more specific example implementation is . . . described with reference to” Figures 10–12), col. 24, ll. 5–9 (“The above specific example [of Figures 10–12] is provided by way of example only, and it should be appreciated that other invention, including the more generic examples described [for Figures 1–9].” (emphasis added)). Thus, there is ample support in Mackintosh for Petitioner’s position that the relied upon features in the cited examples are “additive and compatible with each other.” See Pet. 65. We also see no reason why it would have been beyond the level of ordinary skill to implement a system in which the user’s computer receives data in either fashion—either in a “pull” scenario (i.e., by first requesting the data and then receiving it) or a “push” (i.e., receiving the data without first transmitting a request for it). See supra Section II.A. The computer receives the data in either case, and Mackintosh contemplates both types of data reception. See Ex. 1005, col. 6, l. 45–col. 7, l. 45, col. 21, ll. 14–25, col. 22, ll. 1–60, Fig. 2 (showing supplemental materials provided to the user equipment directly by the data server (steps 136–140) or by a different server after the user equipment makes a request (steps 142–146)); Reply 25; Ex. 1018 ¶ 91. Petitioner has persuasively shown that Mackintosh teaches the limitations of claim 11 in its various embodiments and a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Mackintosh’s disclosures in the manner asserted.” slip op. at 42
Patent outcomesUS 8,688,028 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,688,028 - Volkswagen Group Of America, Inc. v. Stratosaudio, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 24, 2023 · IPR2022-00205 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 11 and 15–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Mackintosh; the Board did not reach the alternative Takahisa grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableDecided for petitioner
“art would have understood Mackintosh to teach all of the limitations of claim 11 and a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine specific disclosures from the reference to arrive at the system of claim 11 with a reasonable expectation of success. See Pet. 48–64; Ex. 1003 claim 11 would have been obvious based on Mackintosh under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).” slip op. at 43
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“patent, we look to “1) the types of problems encountered in the art; 2) the prior art solutions to those problems; 3) the rapidity with which innovations are made; 4) the sophistication of the technology; and 5) the educational level of active workers in the field.” Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 666–667 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “Not all such factors may be present in every case, and one or more of them may predominate.” Id. at 667. Petitioner argues that at the time of the ’307 patent (September 2000), a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a B.S. in computer science or electrical engineering (or a related field), and approximately three years of experience working in the communications- or Internet-related industries, or, alternatively, an advanced degree (such as a master’s degree) in computer science or electrical engineering (or a related field).” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 44); see Ex. 1003 ¶ 29. Patent Owner applies the same definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 58–59). Based on the full record developed during trial, including our review of the ’307 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’307 patent and cited prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art and apply it for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, col. 1, l. 28–col. 2, l. 51 (describing in the “Background” section of the ’307 patent various FM broadcast and other communication methods).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner
“the time that the preamble of claim 11 is limiting because the body of the 3 The claim interpretations adopted herein are identical to those set forth in the concurrently entered final written decision in the Hyundai IPR, with one exception—we need not interpret “broadcast stream” in that proceeding. content identifying data,” “at least one broadcast segment,” and “communication device.” See Dec. on Inst. 27 n.5; Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 323 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“When limitations in the body of the claim rely upon and derive antecedent basis from the preamble, then the preamble may act as a necessary component of the claimed invention.”). Patent Owner agrees, and Petitioner does not argue otherwise in its Petition or Reply. See Pet. 49 (arguing that “[r]egardless of whether the preamble is limiting, it is disclosed by Mackintosh”); PO Resp. 33–34. Based on the full trial record, we determine that the preamble of claim 11 is limiting.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“After reviewing the full trial record, we are persuaded that the phrasing of Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation is correct, primarily because of its use of “as broadcasted.” First, by its plain language, a “broadcast segment” is a “segment” of a “broadcast.” See Tr. 10:24–11:1, 17:20–18:5 (Petitioner agreeing that a “broadcast segment” is “a segment of the broadcast” and is, for example, “distinguishable from the very next segment and the segment after that”); Ex. 2021, 22:20–23:7 (Dr. Madisetti agreeing that the ’307 patent “clearly describe[s] an example of a distinguishable piece or portion of the work as streamed as an individual song” (emphasis added)). Petitioner’s proposed interpretation is that a “broadcast segment” is a piece or portion “of a broadcast stream,” but that is already part of the claim—limitation 11[a] recites “a broadcast stream comprising the at least one broadcast segment” (emphasis added). See Pet. 10. Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation more clearly specifies that a “broadcast segment” is a portion of programming “as broadcasted.” See PO Resp. 17. To illustrate, although a is not the song in the abstract, but rather the portion of the broadcast that is the song. In other words, “‘[a]n individual song’ as broadcasted may serve as one example of a ‘broadcast segment’ because the broadcast of the song constitutes a discretely identifiable portion of broadcasting as broadcasted.” See id. at 19 (emphasis added); Sur-Reply 9. We are persuaded that the language of claim 11 supports Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation. Second, although the Specification of the ’307 patent only uses the term “broadcast segment” twice, it provides some support for Patent Owner’s view that a “broadcast segment” is a portion of programming “as broadcasted.” The Specification discloses: [R]adio station 140, using either a standard radio automation system for tracking of music content which is being broadcast, or a data-enabled audio player, broadcasts audio material and synchronously sends RBDS/RDS or similar data to an APS server 144 that assigns a unique identifier to each specific broadcast segment or song.” slip op. at 13
Patent outcomesUS 8,903,307 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,903,307 - Volkswagen Group Of America, Inc. v. Stratosaudio, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 24, 2023 · IPR2022-00203 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 9–11 and 23 are unpatentable because DeWeese anticipates them; the Board rejected both Mackintosh obviousness and DeWeese obviousness grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill is generally consistent with the subject matter of the ’081 Patent. We agree with Petitioner’s description with the exception of the qualifier “at least” to keep the description from extending to a level beyond that of ordinary skill. Accordingly, for purposes of this Final Written Decision, a person of ordinary skill in the art is a person with a bachelor’s degree in computer science or electrical engineering or a related field, and approximately three years of experience working in the communications or Internet-related industries, or other equivalent industry experience in the field. A person with a master’s degree in one of these fields with less industry experience would also qualify as a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“For purposes of this Decision, we do not find it necessary to expressly construe the term “media content.” See Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803 (holding that only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”). To the extent that ordinary and customary meaning.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Our reviewing court has consistently interpreted the word “or” to mean that items in a sequence are alternatives to each other. See Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Given this understanding, in our view the phrasing of limitation 9[d] means that: 1) the output system must be able to present, at the same time, both the first and the second media content on an output of the first receiver module; or 2) the” slip op. at 19
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“would have understood that because of the distinct header associated with each piece of information, each piece of information can be directed to either a separate physical electronic component within the set-top box or a separate software process in order to provide for discrete processing and/or presentation of information to the user. Ex. 1003 ¶ 134 (emphasis added). Dr. Williams concludes that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that set-top box 26 receives the “real-time communications,” which correspond to the claimed “second media content,” discretely from the “television programming,” which corresponds to the claimed “first media content.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 135; see also Ex. 1016 ¶ 75 (explaining how the ’081 Patent characterizes time multiplexed signals as “discretely separated”). We credit the testimony of Dr. Williams regarding DeWeese and “the second media content received discretely from the first media content.”” slip op. at 59
Patent outcomesUS 8,166,081 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,166,081 - Volkswagen Group Of America, Inc. v. Stratosaudio, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 24, 2023 · IPR2021-00721 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 9–11 and 23 are unpatentable because DeWeese anticipates them; the Board rejected both Mackintosh obviousness and DeWeese obviousness grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill is generally consistent with the subject matter of the ’081 Patent. We agree with Petitioner’s description with the exception of the qualifier “at least” to keep the description from extending to a level beyond that of ordinary skill. Accordingly, for purposes of this Final Written Decision, a person of ordinary skill in the art is a person with a bachelor’s degree in computer science or electrical engineering or a related field, and approximately three years of experience working in the communications or Internet-related industries, or other equivalent industry experience in the field. A person with a master’s degree in one of these fields with less industry experience would also qualify as a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“While the ’081 Patent does not provide a strict definition for the term “media content,” the specification does state that “the terms ‘media’ or ‘media content’ are broad terms that comprise any form of content.” Ex. 1001, 5:20–23. The ’081 Patent also provides a number of different examples of media or media content, such as “graphics, videos, sounds, text, text messages . . . television and/or radio programming, podcasts, movies, songs, games, telephone conversations, speeches, news, information, advertisements, polls votes, [and] personal messages.” Id. at 5:24–28. For purposes of this Decision, we do not find it necessary to expressly construe the term “media content.” See Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803 (holding that only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”). To the extent that ordinary and customary meaning.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Our reviewing court has consistently interpreted the word “or” to mean that items in a sequence are alternatives to each other. See Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Given this understanding, in our view the phrasing of limitation 9[d] means that: 1) the output system must be able to present, at the same time, both the first and the second media content on an output of the first receiver module; or 2) the second media content on an output of the second receiver module. This understanding of the output system of claim 9 is consistent with the ’081 Patent specification. For example, the ’081 Patent specification describes an embodiment having “an output module configured to output a primary media content from the first media signal and output a secondary media content from the second media signal.” Ex. 1001, 2:2–5. This understanding of the output system of claim 9 is also consistent with the testimony of Dr. Williams, who explains how one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the ’081 Patent. See Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 30–35. Dr. Williams provides examples from the ’081 Patent specification consistent with this understanding of the output system recited in claim 9. Dr. Williams testifies that “outputting audio data (‘first media content’), for example via a speaker, with corresponding visual data (‘second media content’), for example via a display, using a single device would be sufficient to satisfy the claim.” Id. ¶ 32 (citing Ex. 1001, Fig. 3). Dr. Williams points out numerous examples described in the ’081 Patent where different media content are presented concurrently on a single device’s output. Id. While this understanding of limitation 9[d] acknowledges the” slip op. at 19
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableUnpatentableMixed
“We agree with Petitioner. Here, Petitioner explains that DeWeese’s “set-top box 26” includes a “DOCSIS modem for use in two-way communication to and from a server,” such as chat server 22, over communication path 24. See Pet. 59–64; Ex. 1005 ¶ 59. Because DeWeese explains that its DOCSIS modem is “for use in two-way communication to and from a server,” a person of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably infer that such a server would include DeWeese’s “chat server,” which is a part of DeWeese’s “chat equipment 22” that is capable of handling real-time communications and chat requests involving text, graphics, video, and audio data. Ex. 1005 ¶ 58. DeWeese also explains that [c]ommunication paths 24 preferably have sufficient bandwidth to allow television distribution facility 16 to distribute scheduled television programming, pay programming, real-time communications, chat requests and other video and audio information to user television equipment 20 in addition to non-video program guide information and communications. The real-time communications supported by communication paths 24 may be text-based. Id. ¶ 55 (emphasis added). With respect to Patent Owner’s argument that DeWeese’s DOCSIS modem (Petitioner’s “second receiver module”) may be housed within DeWeese’s set-top box 26, we have already rejected Patent Owner’s and distinct” from each other, i.e. two physically separate modules or devices. See Section II.B.3. There is nothing in claim 9, or in the ’081 Patent specification, that would require such a physical separation between the two recited receiver modules. On the contrary, we have already pointed out that the ’081 Patent specification explains that “the word ‘module’ . . . refers to logic embodied in hardware and/or firmware, and/or a collection of software instructions, possible having entry and/or exit points, written in a programming language” and that “software modules may be callable from other modules and/or from themselves” and logical modules “may be combined with other modules or divided into sub-modules despite their physical organization or storage.” Ex. 1001, 6:47–7:8. Thus, we see nothing in claim 9 or the ’081 Patent that would preclude the second receiver module from being housed within the first receiver module, or vice-versa, as Patent Owner argues. With respect to Patent Owner’s arguments that Dr. Williams relied on” slip op. at 57
Patent outcomesUS 8,166,081 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,166,081 - Volkswagen Group Of America, Inc. / Hyundai Motor America v. Stratosaudio, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 24, 2023 · IPR2022-00224 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 12–16 are unpatentable as anticipated by Lee under § 102(b); the Board did not reach the alternative grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that “a person of ordinary skill in the art (‘POSITA’) would have had at least a B.S. in computer science or electrical engineering or a related field, and approximately three years of experience working in the communications- or Internet-related industries” and that this is approximate because “a higher education or skill level might make up for less experience, and vice-versa; for example, a POSITA could have a master’s degree with no industry experience.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 34). Patent Owner does not object to the level of skill proposed by Petitioner. PO Resp. 18. Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill is generally consistent with the subject matter of the ’405 patent. We agree with Petitioner’s description with the exception of the qualifier “at least” to keep the description from extending to a level beyond that of ordinary skill. Accordingly, for purposes of this Final Written Decision, a person of ordinary skill in the art is a person with a bachelor’s degree in computer science or electrical engineering or a related field, and approximately three years of experience working in the communications or Internet-related industries, or other equivalent industry experience in the field. A person with a master’s degree in one of these fields with less industry experience would also qualify as a person of ordinary skill in the art. B. Claim Construction” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“While the ’405 patent does not provide a strict definition for the term “media content,” the specification does state that “the terms ‘media’ or ‘media content’ are broad terms that comprise any form of content.” Ex. 1001, 5:28–29. The ’405 patent also provides a number of different examples of media or media content, such as “graphics, videos, sounds, text, songs, games, telephone conversations, speeches, news, information, advertisements, polls votes, [and] personal messages.” Id. at 5:30–35. For purposes of this Decision, we do not find it necessary to expressly construe the term “media content.” See Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803 (holding that only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”). To the extent that the determination of the meaning of this claim term is necessary, we use its ordinary and customary meaning.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We agree with Petitioner. Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, Lee discloses that multimedia device 20 receives advertisement-related data (i.e., the recited “second media content”) from Internet gateway 30 through device 20’s gateway communication unit, whereas device 20 receives the broadcast of audio advertisements (i.e., the recited “first media content”) from a digital audio broadcaster through device 20’s software programmable multiband receiver 210. See, e.g. Ex. 1004, Fig. 1. Lee shows these two pathways in Figures 1 and 3, annotated by Petitioner and shown above.” slip op. at 29
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Dr. Williams opines, based on Lee’s description of the functionality of the “BUY” and “INFO” buttons, and Lee’s statement that the labels “change from program to program” based on the “current function” that the button label should indicate, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that data are sent by Lee’s “Internet gateway 30” which inform the “multimedia device 20” as to when (and what) “action button labels 174” to display, so that the display screen is in sync with the audio broadcasts—such as displaying the “BUY” action button label when a product is currently being advertised. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 91–93 (citing Ex. 1004, 10:20–30, Fig. 2) (emphasis omitted); see Pet. 28; Ex. 1017 ¶ 22; Ex. 1004, 11:16–33 (describing the “BUY” and “INFO” buttons, and stating that “[o]nly those ads offering immediate purchase or additional information will preferably show indicators for these actions”). And Lee’s Figures 1–3, reproduced above, “show that the advertisement information from advertiser databases 196 is transmitted to Lee’s multimedia device 20, contemporaneous with the radio broadcast, through internet gateway 30 to the device’s ‘gateway communication unit.’” Ex. 1017 ¶ 17. Dr. Williams’s analysis is consistent with the disclosure of Lee and persuasive as to how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the reference.” slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 9,355,405 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,355,405 - Volkswagen Group Of America, Inc. / Hyundai Motor America v. Stratosaudio, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 24, 2023 · IPR2021-00720 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 12–16 are unpatentable as anticipated by Lee under § 102(b); the Board did not reach the alternative grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill is generally consistent with the subject matter of the ’405 patent. We agree with Petitioner’s description with the exception of the qualifier “at least” to keep the description from extending to a level beyond that of ordinary skill. Accordingly, for purposes of this Final Written Decision, a person of ordinary skill in the art is a person with a bachelor’s degree in computer science or electrical engineering or a related field, and approximately three years of experience working in the communications or Internet-related industries, or other equivalent industry experience in the field. A person with a master’s degree in one of these fields with less industry experience would also qualify as a person of ordinary skill in the art. B. Claim Construction” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“For purposes of this Decision, we do not find it necessary to expressly construe the term “media content.” See Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803 (holding that only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”). To the extent that the determination of the meaning of this claim term is necessary, we use its ordinary and customary meaning.” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We agree with Petitioner. Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, Lee discloses that multimedia device 20 receives advertisement-related data (i.e., the recited “second media content”) from Internet gateway 30 through device 20’s gateway communication unit, whereas device 20 receives the broadcast of audio advertisements (i.e., the recited “first media content”) from a digital audio broadcaster through device 20’s software programmable multiband receiver 210. See, e.g. Ex. 1004, Fig. 1. Lee shows these two pathways in Figures 1 and 3, annotated by Petitioner and shown above.” slip op. at 29
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached
“Petitioner asserts claims 12–16 are unpatentable as obvious over Lee. Pet. 53. Petitioner asserts claims 12, 15, and 16 are anticipated and rendered obvious by Barnes under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103. Id. at 54–71. Petitioner also asserts that claims 13, and 14 would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Barnes and the RBDS Standard. Id. at 72–77. However, because Petitioner has already shown that all of the challenged claims are unpatentable over Lee as anticipated, as discussed supra, we do not reach these additional asserted grounds.4 See Beloit Corp. v. Valmet Oy, 742 F.2d 1421, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The Commission . . . is at perfect liberty to reach a ‘no violation’ determination on a single dispositive issue.”); Boston Sci. Scimed, Inc. v. Cook Grp. Inc., 809 F. App’x 984, 990 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 2020) (non-precedential) (recognizing that “[t]he Board has the discretion to decline to decide additional instituted grounds once the petitioner has prevailed on all its challenged claims”). 4 Because we do not reach Petitioner’s asserted ground based on Barnes and the RBDS Standard, we also dismiss as moot Petitioner’s motion to submit supplemental information (Paper 19) pertaining to the RBDS Standard.” slip op. at 58
Patent outcomesUS 9,355,405 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,355,405 - Kiosoft Technologies, LLC / Techtrex, Inc. v. Payrange Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 26, 2022 · PGR2021-00077 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · PGR · Final written decision
Claim 1 is unpatentable under § 101; claims 2–27 were not shown unpatentable because the other challenges were deficient.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A person having ordinary skill in the art would have had an education background of, or practical experience providing an equivalent to, a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, or a related/equivalent field and at least four years of work experience in identity, transaction, and telecommunication solutions.” slip op. at 12
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable
“As can be seen from claim 1 above, all of the claimed method steps occur “at the mobile device” and the final step is to enable completion of a cashless transaction. Claim 1 does not recite completing the purchase. The ’833 patent describes that any commercial transaction is completed at the automatic retail machine, not at the mobile device. Ex. 1001, 11:5–9; see also id. at 21:4–11, 22:18–20, 23:53–61, 30:25–27. We, thus, agree with Patent Owner that the claimed method does not require completing or conducting the transaction, but only enabling the completion of the transaction. On this complete record, we are persuaded that the elements italicized above recite the concept of obtaining authorization for a purchase and enabling completion of a cashless transaction, prior to user selection of any items or services. See Pet. 22–23 (arguing that the claimed method “is effectively no different than a person entering a store, the store checking the customer’s available credit (or calling a bank to do so) and when the customer decides on the item, completing the purchase”); Pet. Reply 5–6 (arguing that the claim recites “obtaining payment authorization and performing a financial transaction, the same as a person entering a store, the store checking the customer’s available credit (or calling a bank to do so) and, when the customer decides on the item, allowing the purchase”). In particular, claim 1 recites steps for obtaining authorization prior to user selection of any items or services — steps of identifying the automatic retail machine, obtaining a request from the electronic payment device, sending the request to a server, and obtaining from the server an authorization grant. Claim 1 also recites steps for enabling the completion of a purchase (i.e., cashless transaction) — detecting a trigger condition and sending the authorization grant to the electronic payment device. Our slight revision of the abstract idea from what we previously stated in our Institution Decision does not impact the patentability analysis. Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 18
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable
“We are not persuaded. Patent Owner’s arguments rest on the alleged novelty of the abstract idea itself, not the “specific limitation beyond the judicial exception,” i.e., the additional elements. “[A] claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.” BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018). A novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90. “The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89 (emphasis added). Patent Owner and Dr. Shamos do not identify, and we cannot find, anything in the claim suggesting that the mobile device, server, or automated retail device (i.e., the additional elements) are more than generic components. Indeed, the ’833 patent’s specification demonstrates that these elements were well-understood, routine, and conventional to the industry. Ex. 1001, 2:23–29, 37–42, 3:25–38 (explaining that Offer “teaches permitting the cashless utilization of a vending machines via a communications service, such as a cellular telephone;” Khan teaches an application on a user’s “personal trusted device” used to effectuate cashless purchases; and Carlson teaches “a system and a method for using a portable consumer device such as a mobile phone for payments and the like,” the method including prompting a user to select, from his mobile device, a product for purchase at a vending machine, after/if the user is authorized to make the purchase, and sending an authorization response to the vending machine from a “remote payment server”).” slip op. at 26
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“At the institution stage, we determined that no claim term required explicit construction. Inst. Dec. 35–37. Petitioner does not challenge our determination or otherwise advance its claim constructions in its Reply. See generally Pet. Reply. Patent Owner does not advance any explicit claim construction. PO Resp. 7–13. Regarding the identifying limitation, Patent Owner indicates that it is “undisputed between the parties that the claims require automatically determining the identity of the specific automatic retail machine based on an electronic transmission received from an electronic payment device of that automatic retail machine.” Id. at 7–8 (emphasis in original, citing Ex. 2018, 3; Ex. 2016 ¶ 68). Patent Owner submits that Petitioner’s constructions for each of the obtaining, authorization, and payment limitations should be rejected “for lacking accordance with the plain meaning of the claim in view of the specification” or “ignor[ing] the plain meaning of the term.” Id. at 9, 12, 13. As to the detecting limitation, Patent Owner argues that certain prior art asserted in the grounds in the Petition fails to teach the term as construed. Id. at 9. We determine that we need not expressly construe these claim terms” slip op. at 33
Patent outcomesUS 10,719,833 mixedClaim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Mayo · Bilski · Phillips · KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 10,719,833 - Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Co. Ltd. v. Yogesh RathodInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 27, 2022 · DER2022-00002 · APJ Michael R Zecher · DER · Institution
The Board denied institution because Tencent did not make a sufficient showing that the named inventors conceived the invention allegedly communicated to Rathod.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“that the standards for instituting a derivation proceeding are met, the Director may institute a derivation proceeding.” 35 U.S.C. § 135(a)(1). We have authority to institute a derivation proceeding on behalf of the Director. 37 C.F.R. § 42.408(a). The threshold showing for institution of a derivation proceeding is whether the petition demonstrates substantial evidence that, if unrebutted, would support a determination of derivation. See 35 U.S.C. § 135(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.405(c).1 Once a derivation proceeding has been instituted, the standard of proof for establishing that a challenged claim constitutes a derived invention is by a preponderance of the evidence. 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d). For the reasons set forth below, we conclude” slip op. at 2
- BurdenDenied
“is devoid of any explanation of the circumstances surrounding conception of the invention by the three named inventors of the ’371 application. Most notably, Tencent does not provide supporting testimony from any of the three named inventors or, for that matter, from any other parties that could corroborate the alleged conception. Indeed, the word “conception” does not appear in Tencent’s Petition at all. See Pet. Put simply, Tencent fails to provide any meaningful information regarding the work done by each of the three named inventors that resulted in conception of the invention covered by the pending claims of the ’371 application. Absent some evidence in the record, such as testimony from the three named inventors together with corroborating evidence showing there was formation in the mind of the named inventors of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, Tencent has not demonstrated prior conception.6 To the extent Tencent expects us to scour the preliminary record to unearth supporting evidence of prior conception, we decline to do so. It is well-settled that Tencent is “master of its complaint.” SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355 (2018). We are constrained by the arguments and evidence presented and developed in Tencent’s Petition, and we are not” slip op. at 13
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not reached
“6 We recognize that Tencent contends that the ’265 patent and the three applications in its priority chain lack sufficient written description support for the claimed invention. Pet. 17–28. We need not reach Tencent’s arguments that the three applications in the priority chain of the ’265 patent lack sufficient written description support for the claimed invention because, as we explain above, Tencent does not demonstrate that the named inventors in the ’371 application conceived, at any time, the inventions purportedly communicated to Mr. Rathod.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyNot reached
“is devoid of any explanation of the circumstances surrounding conception of the invention by the three named inventors of the ’371 application. Most notably, Tencent does not provide supporting testimony from any of the three named inventors or, for that matter, from any other parties that could corroborate the alleged conception. Indeed, the word “conception” does not appear in Tencent’s Petition at all. See Pet. Put simply, Tencent fails to provide any meaningful information regarding the work done by each of the three named inventors that resulted in conception of the invention covered by the pending claims of the ’371 application. Absent some evidence in the record, such as testimony from the three named inventors together with corroborating evidence showing there was formation in the mind of the named inventors of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, Tencent has not demonstrated prior conception.6” slip op. at 13
§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 10,990,265 - Lenovo Holding Company, Inc. / Lenovo (United States) Inc. et al. v. Interdigital Technology CorporationSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 14, 2022 · IPR2020-01494 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8, 10–12, 21–24, and 26 are unpatentable as obvious over Li and Tiedemann, with or without ETSI1997; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“In its Response, InterDigital does not contest Dr. Acampora’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill, except that “InterDigital applies Petitioners’ alleged baseline level of ordinary skill without the phrase ‘at least.’” PO Resp. 3. We agree with InterDigital that the term at least arguably “creates unnecessary ambiguity.” Id. (citing Inst. Dec. 9–10). But we find that Petitioner’s articulation, after deleting the phrase at least, is reasonable in light of the subject matter involved in the ’449 patent, and we adopt it for our decision.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“To the extent that text was copied and pasted in either direction between the Petition and Dr. Acampora’s declaration, we disagree that this mere fact indicates that we should give Dr. Acampora’s testimony less weight. Patent Owner does not argue that Dr. Acampora was uninvolved with the preparation of his declaration, which he signed, under penalty of perjury, and presented as reflecting his own opinions. That typographical errors may, for example, have been propagated from his declaration to the Petition is by itself of little consequence. The cited Wowza decision does not suggest otherwise. In that case, the Board assigned little weight to the expert declaration, not because of its similarity to the petition, but because the declaration did not disclose the underlying facts or data on which its opinion testimony was based. See IPR2013-00054, Paper 16 at 4–5. As Petitioner correctly argues in its Reply, InterDigital does not “identif[y] where Dr. Acampora fails to provide sufficient facts underlying his opinions.” Pet. Reply 1 n.1.” slip op. at 20
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“1. “channel quality” InterDigital states that the court in the parallel district court litigation adopted the parties’ agreed construction of “channel quality” as meaning “a value/values quantifying how efficiently downlink resources of a channel can communicate information.” PO Resp. 3–4 (citing Ex. 2008, 1; Ex. 2009, 18). InterDigital contends that the ’449 patent suggests this construction, and that both sides’ experts agree with it. Id. at 4 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:36–61; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 33–35; Ex. 2002, 21:14–22; Ex. 2007, 26:12–17). Because the meaning of this term is uncontested, and it is consistent with the evidence of record, we adopt the parties’ agreed construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“For the above reasons, we determine that Petitioner has persuasively shown that a channel quality of the plurality of downlink resources and the related term a first channel quality indication for the plurality of downlink resources mean “a channel quality value related to the ‘plurality of downlink resources’ as a whole.” Pet. 11–13. We also determine that Petitioner has persuasively shown that both alternatives 8 and 9 reflect embodiments of this term, which is consistent with the district court’s construction that provides “a mean or reference value related to the plurality” as examples of a channel quality value related to the plurality of downlink resources as a whole, explicitly referencing alternative 9 in its analysis. See Ex. 2009, 12– 13.” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 9,456,449 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,456,449 - Lenovo Holding Company, Inc. / Lenovo (United States) Inc. et al. v. Interdigital Technology CorporationNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 14, 2022 · IPR2020-01505 · APJ John R Kenny · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to establish that Zhang disclosed the claimed response to a non-zero grant construed as a power ratio greater than zero.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Here, we determine that the term “power ratio” in the involved parenthetical in the Specification is a definition, and not merely an illustrative example, of a “grant.” First, the Specification does not identify any other type of grant. Dr. Mahon testifies that the Specification does not provide an example of any other type of grant. Ex. 2001 ¶ 35. Petitioner offers no rebuttal expert testimony and identifies no other type of grant disclosed in the Specification. See Pet. Reply 1–5. We credit Dr. Mahon’s unrebutted testimony that the Specification does not identify any other type of grant. Ex. 2001 ¶ 35. Thus, the parenthetical at issue in this case does not exclude any grant described in the Specification (nor, as set forth in Section II.B.2.ii, any grant set forth by ordinary meaning of the term grant based on the extrinsic evidence of record).” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner offers no extrinsic evidence, other than the testimony of Dr. Kakaes, regarding the ordinary meaning of the term “grant,” and Dr. Kakaes cites no extrinsic evidence to support his definition of the term “non-zero grant.” Pet. 12; Pet. Reply 1–5; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–65. Dr. Kakaes does not separately address the meaning of “grant.” Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–65. We find Dr. Mahon’s testimony and the 3GPP Technical Specification persuasive. As set forth above, the 3GPP Technical Specification describes grants as power ratios—a fact that Petitioner does not dispute. Pet. Reply 1– 5. Further, as set forth above, in light of the Specification’s references to 3GPP standards and the 3GPP recitations in the preambles of claims 1 and 6, 3GPP standards from the time of the ’873 patent are highly relevant evidence to an ordinarily skilled artisan of the ordinary meaning of the terms “grant” and “non-zero grant.” iii. A Non-zero Power Ratio is a Power Ratio Greater than Zero Dr. Mahon testifies that a “non-zero grant” should be construed as “a power ratio greater than zero.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 33. Dr. Mahon explains that a power ratio cannot be negative, so a “non-zero” power grant must be greater than zero. Id. ¶ 38. Petitioner does not dispute Dr. Mahon’s testimony that a power ratio cannot be negative. Pet. Reply 1–5. Petitioner further does not dispute that if a “grant” is construed to be a “power ratio,” a “non-zero grant” should be construed to be a “power ratio greater than zero.” Id. We credit Dr. Mahon’s testimony that a power ratio cannot be negative. Ex. 2001 ¶ 38. Thus, in light of the Specification’s and extrinsic evidence’s teachings that a “grant” is a “power ratio,” we construe “non-zero grant” to be a “power ratio greater than zero.”” slip op. at 19
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“2. Claim 1 Claim 1 recites the following limitation: triggering transmission of scheduling information (SI), from the WTRU to a Node-B, in response to the WTRU having a non-zero grant smaller than needed preventing the WTRU from sending a medium access control protocol data unit (PDU) of any of a plurality of scheduled medium access control-d (MAC-d) flows. [“responsive limitation of claim 1”] Ex. 1001, 7:36–8:6 (emphasis added). Petitioner does not argue, let alone prove, that Zhang discloses the transmission of scheduling information “in response to the WTRU having a non-zero grant smaller than needed” when “non-zero grant” is construed as a “power ratio greater than zero.” Pet. 25–29; Pet. Reply 1–5, 12–13. Thus, Petitioner has not proven that claim 1 is anticipated by Zhang. 3. Claim 5 Claim 5 depends on claim 1. Ex. 1001, 8:15–16. Petitioner relies on its showing for claim 1 for the limitations that claim 5 incorporates from claim 1. Pet. 29–30. Thus, Petitioner has not proven that claim 5 is anticipated by Zhang.” slip op. at 25
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“B. Ground 2: Asserted Obviousness over Zhang Petitioner asserts that claims 1, 5, 6, and 10 would have been obvious over Zhang. Pet. 5. For the responsive limitations of claims 1 and 6, Petitioner relies on its showing for Ground 1. Id. at 32–33. Thus, Petitioner has not proven that claims 1 and 6 would have been obvious over Zhang. For claims 5 and 10, Petitioner also relies on its showing for Ground 1. Id. at 33. Thus, Petitioner has not proven that claims 5 and 10 would have been obvious over Zhang. C. Ground 3: Asserted Obviousness over Zhang and TS 25.321 Petitioner asserts that claims 1–10 would have been obvious over Zhang and TS 25.321. Pet. 5. For this ground, Petitioner argues “[t]o the extent one might argue that Zhang does not . . . sufficiently disclose a WTRU configured to process ‘a plurality of scheduled medium access control-d (MAC-d) flows,’ it would have been obvious to include that functionality in the WTRU of Zhang in view TS 25.321.” Id. at 34 (emphasis omitted). For the responsive limitations of claims 1 and 6, Petitioner relies on its showing for Ground 1. Id. at 34–40, 48. Thus, Petitioner has not proven that claims 1–10 would have been obvious over Zhang and TS 25.321. D. Ground 4: Asserted Obviousness of Claims 1, 5, 6, and 10 over Zhang and Lohr Petitioner asserts that claims 1, 5, 6, and 10 would have been obvious over Zhang and Lohr. Pet. 5. For this ground, Petitioner argues “[t]o the extent one might argue that Zhang alone, or Zhang in combination with TS 25.321 do not does not sufficiently disclose a WTRU configured to process “a plurality of scheduled medium access control-d (MAC-d) flows,’ it would have also been obvious to include that functionality in the WTRU of Zhang in view” of Lohr. Id. at 52–53 (emphasis omitted). For the responsive limitations of claims 1 and 6, Petitioner relies on its showing for Ground 1. Id. at 52–55. Thus, Petitioner has not proven that claims 1, 5, 6, and 10 would have been obvious over Zhang and Lohr. E. Ground 5: Asserted Obviousness of Claims 1–10 over Zhang, Lohr, and TS 25.321 Petitioner asserts that claims 1–10 would have been obvious over Zhang, Lohr, and TS 25.321. Pet. 5. For this ground, Petitioner argues that claims 1, 5, 6, and 10 would have been obvious over Zhang and Lohr for the reasons set forth for Grounds 1–4. Id. at 56. Thus, Petitioner has not proven that claims 1–10 would have been obvious over Zhang, Lohr, and TS 25.321. See Sections III.A–D above.” slip op. at 27
Patent outcomesUS 8,797,873 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,797,873
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.