- Medivis, Inc. v. Novarad Corp.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 1, 2026 · IPR2023-00042 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Remand
Claims 1–6, 11, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Doo and Amira; claims 12–19 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted tissue properties were not shown in Amira.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“Federal Circuit. The court issued its decision in Medivis, Inc. v. Novarad Corp., No. 2024-1794, 2026 WL 587294 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 3, 2026) (“Medivis”) (Paper 40),1 affirming-in-part, reversing-in-part, and remanding our Final Written Decision (Paper 35) for further proceedings. In its opinion, the Federal Circuit reversed our “determination of no motivation to combine Doo and Amira” and remanded for further proceedings to evaluate whether claims 1–6 and 11–20 (“the Remanded Claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 11,004,271 B2 (“the ’271 patent,” Ex. 1001) are unpatentable in view of Petitioner’s obviousness challenge over Doo and Amira. Medivis, slip op. at 9–10. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We issue this Final Written Decision on Remand pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 144, 318 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73 in an inter partes review involving Medivis, Inc. (“Petitioner”) and Novarad Corp. (“Patent Owner”). For the reasons discussed below, after considering the entirety of the record in light of the Federal Circuit’s directives in Medivis, we hold that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1–6, 11, and 20 are unpatentable; however, Petitioner has not demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 12–19 are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, except that we excise part of Petitioner’s definition to produce the following modified version: 4 Throughout this decision, we eliminate the parties’ italicization of reference names from quotations without noting “emphasis omitted.” 5 Doo, WO 2015/164402 A1, published October 29, 2015 (Ex. 1008). 6 Excerpt of Amira 5 User’s Guide, title through Chapter 2 (Visual Imaging 2009) (Ex. 1005). engineering, or a related field with several years of experience in the design, development, and study of augmented reality devices and . . . familiarity with conventional medical imaging data and visualization of data for medical procedures . . . . Our edit removes the alternative of “working with a team including someone with such familiarity” because one’s role in a team may be tangential to their personal experience with medical imaging. Regardless, had we adopted Petitioner’s original definition, our decision would not have changed.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that the term “3D slices” has no apparent connection to the phrase “direct volume rendering.” Patent Owner’s argument appears to be that DVR “requires an image of the entire anatomical volume that is neither feature-specific nor segmented, [which] would seemingly require that all inner layers be displayed.” Reply 4; see Sur-reply 6–10 (not disputing Petitioner’s characterization). But, as Petitioner notes, the specification directly undermines this by teaching “display [of] a slice of the 3D data instead of a volume of the 3D data.” See Reply 4 n.2 (quoting Ex. 1001, 5:34–35). In other words, to the extent DVR would depict an image of the entire anatomical volume, displaying 3D slices “instead of a volume of the 3D data” implies the opposite of DVR. Even if “3D slices” somehow implied DVR, Patent Owner’s position is still untenable. Claim 1 does not recite “3D slices.” Instead, claim 1 recites “3D data” and “inner layers.” Ex. 1001, 18:54–65. Patent Owner fails to clarify the relationship between “slices,” “3D data,” and “layers,” and its expert even admits that slices and layers are two different things. See PO Resp. 13; Ex. 1022, 32:7–16 (agreeing that the words “slice” and “layer” are not “synonyms”), cited in Reply 4. We also agree with Petitioner that dependent claim 3 distinguishes slices and layers by reciting “slices of the projected inner layer.” Reply 4 (quoting Ex. 1001, 19:3–10). Thus, even if 3D slices somehow implied DVR, the language of claim 1 does not support limiting the claim this way.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“The determination of whether a document was publicly accessible “involves a case-by-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Barry, 891 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2018). For instance, courts routinely rely on the Wayback Machine to determine when a reference was first made available to the public. Valve Corp. v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd., 8 F.4th 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“District courts have taken judicial notice of the contents of webpages available through the Wayback Machine ‘as facts that can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.’”). We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that “Medivis cannot rely on additional prior art”—Exhibits 1023 and 1024—“that was submitted after its Petition to carry its burden without leave from the Board.” Sur-reply 4. As Patent Owner did not file a motion to exclude these exhibits, we decline Patent Owner’s invitation to disregard them. We also find Petitioner’s Reply argument proper because it directly responds to Patent Owner’s contention that Petitioner did not prove the public accessibility of Amira. See Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. One World Techs., Inc., 944 F.3d, 919, 925 on issues previously raised.”). Petitioner’s Reply argument appropriately elaborates on the Petition’s contention that Amira was publicly accessible. Patent Owner also does not dispute the substance of Petitioner’s evidence. For example, Patent Owner does not address the substance of Mr. Frank-White’s declaration. We find that this evidence, including Mr. Frank- White’s declaration testimony, persuasively supports the public availability of Amira as of the date shown in the Wayback Machine URL. See Ex. 1024.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 11,004,271 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,004,271 - Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 12, 2025 · IPR2024-00477 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7 are unpatentable as anticipated by and obvious over Komata; the Board did not reach the Tsuji or Rosenberg grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner contends that a POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science (or an equivalent degree), and two years of practical or industry experience in the field of human computer interaction (HCI), including implementation of computer-based systems and software for providing haptic feedback effects to a user. . . . Also, a person could have qualified as a [POSITA] with more formal education and less practical or industry experience, or vice versa. PO Resp. 17–18 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶ 17). Although these level of skill definitions are not the same, the differences are minor, and Patent Owner does not argue that its level of skill definition is dispositive. To the contrary, Patent Owner asserts that “[i]n any event, the challenged claims of the ’260 Patent are patentable under either . . . definition.” Id. at 18. We apply Petitioner’s level of skill but would have reached the same result had we applied Patent Owner’s.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“As we explained in our Institution Decision, we disagreed then, and still disagree, “that the second pressure must be detected after the first pressure is detected (or that the third pressure must be detected after the first pressure is detected) simply because the second pressure is greater than the first pressure (and the third pressure is greater than the second pressure).” Dec. 27. As we explained there, “[t]he claimed relative magnitudes of the first, second, and third pressures do not define any temporal relationships regarding the detection of the pressures.” Id. We agree with Petitioner that claim 1 recites quantitative relationships for the pressures, not temporal relationships. Reply 4. For example, claim 1 requires “the second pressure greater than the first pressure” but says nothing about when the second pressure must be greater than the first pressure. A key misconception undergirding Patent Owner’s argument is its statement that “a ‘first pressure’ must first exist before the invention can detect that the ‘second pressure’ is greater.” PO Resp. 27 (emphasis added). The claim does not require detecting that the second pressure is greater than the first pressure. Limitation [1c] simply says, “detect a second pressure on the first input device, the second pressure greater than the first pressure.” In other words, all the detection that this limitation requires is detecting a second pressure. The claim then observes that the second pressure is greater than the first pressure but does not require detecting this. Limitation [1e] similarly detects pressure but not the comparison: “detect a third pressure on the first input device, the third pressure greater than the second pressure.” Thus, it does not follow that “a ‘first pressure’ must first exist before the invention can detect that the ‘second pressure’ is greater.” See id. Accordingly, we determine that Patent Owner’s analysis of the claim language is unpersuasive.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Our decision here does not depend on the meaning of this term. Patent Owner only argues the phrase “tactile sensation” for Petitioner’s challenge over Rosenberg, which we do not reach because Petitioner’s challenge over Komata is dispositive. See PO Resp. 63–66. Accordingly, we do not construe this term.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“that Komata discloses all the limitations of claim 1. Patent Owner does not dispute that Komata discloses all the limitations of claim 1. Instead, Patent Owner disputes that Komata discloses the order of all the steps of claim 1, based on its construction requiring the steps to be performed in order. PO Resp. 50–54; Reply 17 (observing that Patent Owner “does not dispute that Ground 1 demonstrates how Komata anticipates or renders obvious claims 1–7 if [Patent Owner’s] ordered-steps argument is rejected”); Sur-reply 12–14 (not disputing the Reply’s observation). As Patent Owner’s argument relies on a claim construction we have not adopted, Patent Owner fails to undermine Petitioner’s persuasive showing.7 To the extent, as we note above, that the claims may require a partial ordering (i.e., limitation [1a] preceding limitation [1b] and limitation [1c] preceding limitation [1d], see supra Section I.A.1.a), Petitioner has persuasively shown that Komata discloses such ordering. a. Summary as to Claim 1 For the above reasons, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is anticipated by and would have been obvious over Komata. 3. Dependent Claims 2–7 Petitioner also contends that claims 2–7 would have been obvious over Komata. Pet. 28–35. Patent Owner does not dispute these dependent claims. Petitioner provides detailed explanations indicating where Komata teaches or suggests the limitations of claims 2–7, supported by Mr. Ward’s testimony. Id. We determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2–7 are anticipated by and would have been obvious over Komata.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 7,336,260 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,336,260 - Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 12, 2025 · IPR2024-00478 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–19 are unpatentable because Petitioner proved that Rosenberg I anticipates them.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field, plus at least two years of industry or graduate level experience with software engineering, haptics programming, and/or human-computer interaction, including experience with user-interfaces and applications involving touchscreens, touchpads, and related technologies.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“feedback that simulates a mechanical detent.” PO Resp. 28; Sur-reply 3. Petitioner “does not explicitly disagree” that a virtual detent is “vibrotactile feedback that simulates a mechanical detent.” Reply 2. Petitioner asserts that “[i]f there is a dispute, it is whether Rosenberg I’s vibrotactile feedback ‘simulates a mechanical detent’ because [Patent Owner] says such simulation requires a sense of mechanical resistance and Rosenberg I allegedly lacks such simulated resistance.” Id. (citing PO Resp. 58–59).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“To the extent Patent Owner urges us to require virtual detents to vary on a system or application basis, we do not find this interpretation required by the claims or specification either. Although the claims refer to “a plurality of systems,” they do not recite different detent profiles for each of those systems. Claim 1, for example, recites “receiving a detent profile associated with one of the systems.” The other claims are similar. Patent Owner’s reliance on non-limiting specification language is also unavailing. E.g., Ex. 1001, 8:38–46 (“can” and “may”), 4:30–44 (“embodiment” and “may”).” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner
“supports its proposed construction. See PO Resp. 32. Patent Owner argues that claim 15 recites a “system comprising” “an input device configured to control one of a plurality of systems,” and hence “the recited plurality of systems are subsystems in addition to the containing system.” Id. We question how this point supports Patent Owner’s proposal because this does not address why each system must “provide[] context for virtual detents.” But regardless, we find it unpersuasive because claim 15’s preamble is not limiting (merely reciting “A system comprising”). See Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[P]reamble language that merely states the purpose or intended use of an invention is generally not treated as limiting the scope of the claim.”); see also Tr. 80:4– 8 (Patent Owner conceding that the preamble is non-limiting). Nor is there any explicit language in claim 15 that would exclude any particular system, such as the system recited in the preamble, from the recited “plurality of systems.”” slip op. at 9
Patent outcomesUS 9,430,042 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 9,430,042 - Inductev, Inc. v. Witricity CorporationSome claims unpatentablePTAB · May 16, 2025 · IPR2024-00140 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 7–10, 12–16, 18, and 19 are unpatentable over the stated grounds; claims 4–6 were not shown unpatentable because the proposed multi-coil alignment lacked prior-art support.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had . . . a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, microelectronics, or equivalent and . . . two to three years of industry or research experience in the field of wireless energy transfer,” and that “a higher level of education or skill might make up for less experience, and vice-versa.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 39–44). Patent Owner does not contest this. See PO Resp. Petitioner’s proposed articulation is supported by testimonial evidence and appears to be consistent with the types of problems and solutions in the ’654 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:15–28. We adopt it for this decision.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We agree with Petitioner that the evidence does not suggest (and Patent Owner does not explicitly argue) that the terms “transmitting antenna” and “receiving” antenna depart from the ordinary and customary meanings of those terms. Pet. 1–2. However, for the reasons discussed below, the outcome of our decision would be the same whether we adopted Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Thus, we need not adopt either party’s proposed construction for this decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“spaced configuration are not confined to ferrite cores 32 and 3, and that at least a component of the flux lines will escape the cores. See Ex. 1032 ¶¶ 48–52; Ex. 1038 ¶ 54 Fig. 2. Indeed, the evidence suggests (and Dr. Horenstein acknowledges in his first declaration) that at least a component of flux will escape the core of even a traditional transformer. See Ex. 1032 ¶¶ 45–47; Ex. 1044, 6; Ex. 2001 ¶ 27. In his second declaration, Dr. Horenstein provides contrary testimony that in Odachi’s open configuration during alignment, cores 32 and 3 “act to confine or guide the magnetic flux lines, rather than radiate them into free space,” and “the flux lines would [not] leave the gap area and enter into the space distal to the magnetic circuit.” Ex. 2010 ¶ 69. But in view of Dr. Horenstein’s contrary position in his first declaration, and the lack of supporting evidence in his second, we do not find it credible. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (2022) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); Apple Inc. v. MPH Techs. Oy, 28 F.4th 254 (Fed. Cir. 2022).” slip op. at 24
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“(4) Analysis We are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that during the alignment process in Odachi corresponding to claim 13, there is a “spaced distance between the primary inductive coupler [230] and the secondary inductive receptacle 2” which is “reduced gradually and electromagnetic induction occurs between the coupler to the receptacle when the former coupler comes close to the latter receptacle.” Ex. 1005, 6:1–6. Thus, prior to any contact or precise alignment between the two cores, “an electromotive force is induced in the secondary coil 4 and this induced force is increased with the decrease in the spaced distance.” Id. at 6:6–8. At least in that spaced configuration, the evidence of record suggests that primary coil 31 produces a near-field component of flux into free space (the air space between the coils where there is no intervening core material) that is intercepted by secondary coil 4 to effect resonant inductive coupling, and that secondary coil 4 intercepts and receives the near-field component of flux in free space that is generated by primary coil 31 to effect resonant inductive coupling. See Ex. 1032 ¶¶ 48–52, 55. Thus, we find that Odachi discloses a “transmitting antenna” (coil 31) and a “receiving antenna” (coil 4) under Patent Owner’s proposed construction. We would reach the same finding under Petitioner’s proposed broader construction because the evidence suggests that Odachi’s coils 31 and 4 would have been considered “antennas” under the parties’ uncontested definition of that term, which is “a device that radiates and/or receives radio waves.” See id. ¶¶ 43–47, 53–54; Ex. 1032 ¶ 15 (Dr. Allen agreeing with this definition of “antenna”); Ex. 2001 ¶ 25 (Dr. Horenstein agreeing with this definition of “antenna”)). In addition, Petitioner persuasively shows that the free space between Odachi’s coils in the spaced configuration includes the “near-field region,” which includes the induction field around primary coil 31. See Ex. 2006, 498; Ex. 1045, 5:4–7; Ex. 1032 ¶¶ 53–54). Dr. Horenstein’s testimony does not contradict this. Although he points out that there are separate terms for inductive, near, and far fields, he also acknowledges that “[t]he region of space closer to the antenna than the far field is the near-field region.” Ex. 2010 ¶ 37 (citing Ex. 2006, 275).8” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 8,466,654 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,466,654 - PTAB · Feb 20, 2025 · IPR2024-00996 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 13–18 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“inter partes review, “the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). The Board uses a two-part framework in determining whether to exercise its discretion under § 325(d), specifically: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. The art or arguments presented in the Petition are not “substantially the same” as those previously presented to the Office when there are differences between them that are material to the Office’s prior consideration of the art and arguments. Wolfspeed, Inc. v. Trs. of Purdue Univ., IPR2022-00761, Paper 13 at 7–8 (Vidal Mar. 30, 2023).” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner contends that: [A] person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention (“POSITA”) would have had a bachelor’s degree or higher in electrical engineering, at least 3 years of experience designing or researching electronic circuits, and familiarity with power electronics and inductive power transfer circuits. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 20). Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this preliminary response, Patent Owner adopts the Petitioner’s proposal.” Prelim. Resp. 17. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that “[a]ll claim terms should be construed according to the Phillips standard,” and “[h]ere, given the remarkable overlap between the preferred embodiment of the ’461 patent and the prior art/predictable combinations articulated in Grounds 1A–3, Petitioners submit that no claim elements need a formal construction for purposes of resolving the controversy in this proceeding.” Pet. 8. Patent Owner states that, “[t]o simplify the issues before the Board, Patent Owner has not asserted any claim constructions in this preliminary response and adopts the Petitioner’s position that ‘[a]ll claim terms should be construed according to the Phillips standard.’” Prelim. Resp. 17 (quoting Pet. 8). On this record and for purposes of this decision, we determine that no” slip op. at 19
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“At this preliminary stage of the proceeding, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments. Patent Owner does not cite to evidence, such as expert testimony, to support its implied argument that Olson’s measured current is “fundamentally different” from the current received by the primary coil. See Prelim. Resp. 31–32. Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Woods, on the other hand, testifies, inter alia, that “[t]he ‘[c]urrent measured by current measure block 226 is used in the calculation of power, which as depicted in FIG. 14, measures the ‘power in’ provided to transmit block 214/primary coil 54.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 37 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 74–75, Fig. 14) (first alteration added); see also, e.g., id. ¶ 42 (Dr. Woods testifying that the measured current to the power supply “is the current driving the external antenna 52, via the transmit block 214 and to the primary coil 54.” (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 74–75, 112, Fig. 14)). Paragraph 75 of Olson, cited in support of that testimony, provides: “The power in is gauged by the power generated by charging unit 50 and is determined by multiplying the voltage of the internal voltage of charging unit 50, e.g., the voltage of a battery or batteries internal to charging unit 50, by the current driving external antenna 52.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 75 (emphasis added). We note that external antenna 52 includes primary coil 54. See, e.g., Fig. 14. Dr. Woods’ testimony is, at this stage, unrebutted. Patent Owner also argues that “Petitioner fails to provide any evidence regarding the function of Olson’s microprocessor 212 in relation to measuring input power,” and that, “[w]hile Olson describes a power calculation in paragraph [0075], Olson does not describe this power calculation as performed by microprocessor 212.” Prelim. Resp. 32 (citing Pet. 16; Ex. 1004 ¶ 72) (first alteration added). At this preliminary stage of the proceeding, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments regarding the microprocessor. Although Patent Owner does not bear the burden to show patentability, we observe that Patent Owner does not suggest that there is another component in Olson’s external charging device that might perform the admittedly-disclosed power calculation. See Prelim. Resp. 32–33. Dr. Woods testifies that microprocessor 212 receives the measured current and the input voltage of the charging device, and, from those values, calculates power in. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 43–44 (citing, inter alia, Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 71–78, Fig. 14); see also Ex. 1004 ¶ 74, Fig. 14 (Olson stating that “[c]urrent measured by current measure block 226 is used in the calculation of power in along with the voltage of batteries 160,” and Figure 14 depicting the signal from measure block 226 as an input to microprocessor 212). Dr. Woods’ testimony is, at this stage, unrebutted.” slip op. at 26
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,626,461 - PTAB · Feb 20, 2025 · IPR2024-00995 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–6, 8, and 10–13 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“inter partes review, “the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). The Board uses a two-part framework in determining whether to exercise its discretion under § 325(d), specifically: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. The art or arguments presented in the Petition are not “substantially the same” as those previously presented to the Office when there are differences between them that are material to the Office’s prior consideration of the art and arguments. Wolfspeed, Inc. v. Trs. of Purdue Univ., IPR2022-00761, Paper 13 at 7–8 (Vidal Mar. 30, 2023).” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’204 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all the challenged claims of the ’204 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey–Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“different from the resonant frequency of the inductive couple.” Ex. 1001, 21:16–20. The Specification then states the following: “Preferably the transmission frequency is selected to lie within one of the near-linear regions 6, 8 [of Figure 6b] where the slope of the frequency-amplitude graph is less steep.” Id. at 21:20–23; see also id. at 21:56–59 (“Referring back to FIG. 6b, the frequency of transmission is selected to be in the approximately linear region 8 of the curve between a lower frequency value of fL and an upper frequency value of fU.”9); Pet. 8 (citing the same).” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,083,204 - Google LLC v. Geoscope Technologies Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 18, 2025 · IPR2023-01210 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 18 is unpatentable as anticipated by Shkedi and Zhu; claims 1, 15, 41, and 52 were statutorily disclaimed, and the alternative obviousness grounds were not reached.
RulingsFinal written decision- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“After institution, Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner Response (Paper 26, “PO Resp.”). Patent Owner also filed a statutory disclaimer of claims 1, 15, 41, and 52. PO Resp. 1; Ex. 2024. Accordingly, the only claim remaining for our consideration at trial is claim 18. See 35 U.S.C. § 253 (disclaimer of claims considered effective as if part of original patent); 37 C.F.R. § 42.107 (Board will not institute trial on disclaimed claims). Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 33, “Reply”), and Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply (Paper 37, “Sur-reply”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this proceeding. PO Resp. 11–12 (citing Ex. 2020 ¶¶ 47–48). For purposes of this Final Written Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Upon consideration of the parties’ arguments and for the reasons explained below, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s additional requirement of evaluating the calibration data to determine the boundaries of the area represented by a grid point should not be included in the construction of either “grid point” or “non-uniform grid point.” Instead, based on the full record, we discern no reason to alter our prior construction of “grid point” as “a point associated with representative calibration data for an area” and maintain that construction for this Final Written Decision for the following reasons. First, the construction of “grid point” we adopt here is supported by the Specification of the ’358 patent. Namely, the ’358 patent discloses that “[i]n general, a non-uniform grid point (NUG) may represent the signal characteristics and/or calibration data over a given region,” and “NUGs represent an area of collected calibration data.”9 Ex. 1001, 3:57–67. The district court identified the second quoted passage, which is identically recited in the ’104 patent (see Ex. 1018, 3:50–60) as “provid[ing] a clear indication of the meaning of ‘grid point.’” Ex. 1028, 19 (emphasis added). We agree with the district court’s analysis. Although the ’358 patent does not explain how a generic “grid point” might differ from the described “nonuniform grid point,” we do not find this distinction pertinent to construing “grid point” in this case because neither party raises this issue. Furthermore,” slip op. at 18
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We agree with Petitioner. The pertinent disclosure from Shkedi reads: Simply stated, if a mobile telephone (at a user selected location) measures a plurality of service antenna signals and stores these with their respective service antenna identifications, then that mobile telephone (or an equivalent unit) upon observing an respective signal strengths—can reasonably conclude that it is within a predetermined proximity of the original user selected location. Ex. 1006, 8:41–48. Here, we find that the language “within a predetermined proximity of the original user selected location” refers to an area around the original user selected location. In other words, “within a predetermined proximity of the original user selected location” discloses that, instead of being exactly at the original user selected location, the mobile telephone only need be in the area or vicinity of the original user selected location. Indeed, in acknowledging “that Shkedi assumes the user is within some ‘predetermined’ distance of [the original user selected] location” (PO Resp. 33), Patent Owner effectively confirms this interpretation of Shkedi’s disclosure. That is, being within some predetermined distance of the original user selected location is equivalent to being within a circle centered on the original user selected location and having a radius equal to the predetermined distance. That Shkedi allegedly only “assumes” that the user is within the predetermined distance of the original user selected location does not detract from the fact that Shkedi’s disclosure of “within a predetermined proximity of the original user selected location” describes an area around the original user selected location.” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 8,400,358 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,400,358 - Google LLC v. Geoscope Technologies Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 18, 2025 · IPR2023-01209 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 2 is unpatentable as anticipated by Shkedi; the Board did not reach the alternative obviousness ground based on Shkedi and Spain.
RulingsFinal written decision- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“After institution, Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner Response (Paper 27, “PO Resp.”). Patent Owner also filed a statutory disclaimer of claims 1, 3, and 11. PO Resp. 1; Ex. 2024. Accordingly, the only claim remaining for our consideration at trial is claim 2. See 35 U.S.C. § 253 (disclaimer of claims considered effective as if part of original patent); 37 C.F.R. § 42.107 (Board will not institute trial on disclaimed claims). Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 34, “Reply”), and Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply (Paper 39, “Sur-reply”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this proceeding. PO Resp. 11–12 (citing Ex. 2020 ¶¶ 47–48). For purposes of this Final Written Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“contention that, because the district court referred to the data points within an area being statistically similar as the defining characteristic of a NUG region, the claimed grid points cannot exist until after the calibration data is gathered and analyzed. See PO Resp. 18–19. This contention, even if correct, is not persuasive because it is generally improper to read limitations from specific embodiments into the claims. See Cadence Pharms. Inc. v. Exela PharmSci Inc., 780 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[E]ven if all of the embodiments discussed in the patent included a specific limitation, it would not be proper to import from the patent’s written description limitations that are not found in the claims themselves.” (internal quotations omitted)); see also SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim.”). Patent Owner’s assertion that the ’379 provisional application and the ’784 patent both describe evaluating the statistical similarities of calibration data (PO Resp. 10, 20) also fails to provide a sufficient reason to import a requirement to evaluate the calibration data into the construction of “grid point” or “non-uniform grid point.” Similarly, Patent Owner’s assertion that is “of great importance” because it is fundamental to generating the grid points is unpersuasive. See PO Resp. 27. Even describing evaluation as being “of great importance” is an insufficient basis for importing a requirement for evaluation. See Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“[The Federal Circuit] has cautioned against limiting the claimed invention to preferred embodiments or specific examples in the specification.”).” slip op. at 19
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We agree with Petitioner. The pertinent disclosure from Shkedi reads: Simply stated, if a mobile telephone (at a user selected location) measures a plurality of service antenna signals and stores these with their respective service antenna identifications, then that mobile telephone (or an equivalent unit) upon observing an identical list of service antennas with substantially identical respective signal strengths—can reasonably conclude that it is within a predetermined proximity of the original user selected location. Ex. 1006, 8:41–48. Here, we find that the language “within a predetermined proximity of the original user selected location” refers to an area around the original user selected location. In other words, “within a predetermined proximity of the original user selected location” discloses that, instead of being exactly at the original user selected location, the mobile telephone Indeed, in acknowledging “that Shkedi assumes the user is within some ‘predetermined’ distance of [the original user selected] location” (PO Resp. 33), Patent Owner effectively confirms this interpretation of Shkedi’s disclosure. That is, being within some predetermined distance of the original user selected location is equivalent to being within a circle centered on the original user selected location and having a radius equal to the predetermined distance. That Shkedi allegedly only “assumes” that the user is within the predetermined distance of the original user selected location does not detract from the fact that Shkedi’s disclosure of “within a predetermined proximity of the original user selected location” describes an area around the original user selected location.” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 7,561,104 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,561,104 - Google LLC v. Geoscope Technologies Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 14, 2025 · IPR2023-01212 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 7, 9, 32, 38, and 40 are unpatentable as anticipated by Spain and obvious over Spain as evidenced by Agiwal.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“III. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art: would have been someone knowledgeable in wireless networks, cellular radio systems, mobile communication devices and radio navigation systems. That person would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, with a background in radio frequency communications and/or navigation system technology as well as approximately two years of industry experience working on radio communication and/or navigation systems. Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 44). Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 13. 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 287–88 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, effective March 16, 2013. Because the application and provisional application for the ’753 patent were filed before this date, the pre-AIA version of §§ 102, 103 apply. See Ex. 1001, codes (22), (60). Petitioner does not dispute that the filing date of the provisional application filing date applies. See Pet. 6; see generally Pet. Reply. 2 US 2003/0064735 A1, published April 3, 2003 (Ex. 1006). 3 Ankur Agiwal, LOCATOR – Location Estimation System For Wireless LANs, WMASH 2004: Proceedings of the Second ACM International Workshop on Wireless Mobile Applications and Services on WLAN Hotspots, 102–109 (2004) (Ex. 1005). For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner as it is consistent with the ’753 patent and the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s additional requirements of evaluating the calibration data to determine the boundaries of the area should not be included in the construction of “grid point.” Instead, based on the full record, and for the reasons explained below, we discern no reason to alter our prior construction in the Institution Decision of “grid point” as “a point associated with representative calibration data for an area.” Dec. 22– 23.” slip op. at 17
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“The evidence supports that Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated that Spain teaches “generating one or more sets of grid points for said calibration data,” as recited in limitation [1.2]. Spain states that: In another embodiment, the database is built by taking fingerprint measurements at predetermined locations and using intelligent algorithms that interpolate the fingerprints at all locations in between the sampled locations. Ex. 1006 ¶ 101. Relevant to this disclosure, Mr. Williams testifies that “Spain discloses generation of sets of grid points wherein each set includes newly interpolated grid points” because “the two grid points used to interpolate an additional grid point or points and the generated additional grid point or points are collectively a generated ‘set’ of grid points (i.e., a ‘set’ which includes the two calibrated grid points and the associated interpolated grid points).” Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 76–77 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 54, 55, 101). It is not disputed that Spain’s “fingerprints” are calibration data having characterizing parameters, such as observed signal strength, observed at calibration points. See Ex. 1006 ¶ 35. We find that this evidence demonstrates that Spain discloses generating one or more grid points, where the grid points are associated with calibration data.10 Accordingly, the evidence provides support that Spain’s interpolation of fingerprints at different locations discloses generation of one or more sets of grid points, where the grid points are associated with calibration data. Spain also discloses that: . . . the fingerprint corresponds not to one exact spot on the surface of the earth, but instead to a small area. The Lat and Long fields in this embodiment indicate a position inside the area, preferably the center point.” slip op. at 33
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“2. Discussion Petitioner refers to Agiwal to note that, like Spain, “Agiwal discloses an initial approximate location-based search of its database using live measurement data transmitted from a mobile device.” Pet. 18. Petitioner, however, relies only on Spain for its obviousness assertions. Id. at 22–38. The above discussion and Petitioner’s showing related to anticipation by Spain also equally apply to the obviousness showing over Spain as presented by Petitioner. See Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Patent Owner presents no additional arguments specifically directed to Petitioner’s showing as to obviousness under Spain that we have not already addressed. See generally PO Resp. Patent Owner also presents no evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness. See generally PO Resp. Weighing the record as a whole in view of the findings and analysis above, we conclude that Petitioner has met its burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 7, 9, 32, 38, and 40 would have been obvious over Spain as evidenced by Agiwal.” slip op. at 43
Patent outcomesUS 8,406,753 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,406,753 - Google LLC v. Geoscope Technologies Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 14, 2025 · IPR2023-01211 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 4 and 26 are unpatentable: claim 4 is anticipated by Shkedi, and claims 4 and 26 are obvious over Zhu and Spain.
RulingsFinal written decision- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“requirement of evaluating the calibration data to determine the boundaries of the area represented by a grid point should not be included in the construction of either “grid point” or “non-uniform grid point.” Instead, based on the full record, we discern no reason to alter our prior construction of “grid point” as “a point associated with representative calibration data for an area” and maintain that construction for this Final Written Decision. The construction of “grid point” we adopt is supported by the Specification of the ’494 patent. Namely, the ’494 patent discloses that “[i]n general, a non-uniform grid point (NUG) may represent the signal characteristics and/or calibration data over a given region,” and “NUGs represent an area of collected calibration data.”9 Ex. 1001, 3:58–4:2. The district court identified the second quoted passage, which is identically recited in the ’104 patent (see Ex. 1018, 3:50–60) as “provid[ing] a clear indication of the meaning of ‘grid point.’” Ex. 1028, 19 (emphasis added). We agree with the district court’s analysis. Although the ’494 patent does not explain how a generic “grid point” might differ from the described “nonuniform grid point,” we do not find this distinction pertinent to construing “grid point” in this case because neither party raises this issue. Also, based on the claim words “non-uniform grid point,” a “non-uniform grid point” is a type of grid point. Furthermore, the district court construed “grid point” only, not “non-uniform grid point.” Id. at 18–20.” slip op. at 19
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“at the time the application was filed, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the critical time. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. The resolution of this question is important because it allows us to “maintain[] objectivity in the obviousness inquiry.” Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu–Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In assessing the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted). Generally, it is easier to establish obviousness under a higher level of ordinary skill in the art. Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“A less sophisticated level of skill generally favors a determination of nonobviousness . . . while a higher level of skill favors the reverse.”). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have been someone knowledgeable in wireless networks, cellular radio systems, mobile communication devices and radio navigation systems, having at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, with a background in radio frequency communications and/or navigation system technology as well as approximately two years of industry experience working on radio communication and/or navigation systems. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶ 30). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 11–12. We adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’494 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“We also credit Mr. Williams’s testimony that determining which calibration data is representative of an area “would not require analysis” because “[i]t could be just the actual measurement,” and “analysis could be part of it, but it doesn’t have to be.” Ex. 2023, 37:10–22. Patent Owner’s argument that this testimony is not instructive because Mr. Williams limited his responses to the construction of calibration data and avoided responding to the question asked is not persuasive. See Sur-reply 8–9. Although Mr. Williams did refer to “the calibration data construction” in his response, we disagree that he avoided responding to the question asked. He was asked: “To determine which of that calibration data is representative of an area would require analyzing that set of collected calibration data, right?” and directly responded: “It would not require analysis. It could be just the actual measurement.” Ex. 2023, 37:10–16. This testimony responded to the question asked. He then stated: “I believe that is an issue as part of the calibration data construction,” before concluding: “So analysis could be part of it, but it doesn’t have to be.” Ex. 2023, 37:17–22. Merely expressing a belief that the issue or question asked relates to the calibration data construction does not equate to his response being limited to the calibration data construction.” slip op. at 23
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Thus, “grid points” and “calibration points” in the ’494 patent are distinct elements that can overlap. Specifically, a “grid point” is a point associated with representative calibration data for an area, and a “calibration point” is a point at which calibration data is collected. These points can occupy the same physical location (i.e., the same longitude/latitude coordinates) but still be a “grid point” and a “calibration point.” For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the overlap between “grid points” and “calibration points” in Shkedi undermines Petitioner’s position and evidentiary showing. Petitioner, thus, has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Shkedi teaches each element of claim 4 including non-uniform grid points. We determine that the preponderance of the evidence establishes that claim 4 is anticipated by Shkedi.” slip op. at 42
Patent outcomesUS 8,786,494 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,786,494
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.