- Reed Semiconductor Corp. v. Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 22, 2026 · IPR2024-01158 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 7–15, 17, and 18 are unpatentable: claims 1–4, 9–14, 17, and 18 as anticipated by Tateishi, and claims 5, 7, 8, and 15 as obvious over Tateishi.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We discern no material difference between the parties’ definitions. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. We note, however, that were we to adopt Patent Owner’s assessment, the outcome of this Decision would be the same.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that Patent Owner has not offered persuasive evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art reading the claims in light of the Specification would understand the plain and ordinary meaning of “control signal” to be as narrow as Patent Owner proposes. We do not construe the claims such that the “control signal” must be the exclusively controlling factor of a component, as Patent Owner urges. Petitioner’s position, on the other hand, is consistent with the evidence of record. We construe “control signal” as having its plain and ordinary meaning, namely a signal configured to control a circuit component. D. The Asserted Anticipation of Claims 1–4, 9–14, 17, and 18 by Tateishi” slip op. at 24
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We determine that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Tateishi discloses the “control signal” recited in limitations 1B2 and 1D of independent claim 1.” slip op. at 37
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“based on the Tateishi application publication (Ex. 1007), that the Tateishi Patent (Ex. 1005) also anticipates claims 1–4, 9–14, 17, and 18. See Pet. 23–24 (“The Tateishi Patent is also prior art under (pre-AIA) §102(e)”; identifying Ground 1 as anticipation “under §102 by Tateishi and/or the Tateishi Patent”). However, we are unable to locate in the Petition or Petitioner’s Reply a discussion of or citation to the Tateishi Patent other than under the Petitioner’s heading “Identification of Challenge and Relief Requested” on pages 23 and 24 of the Petition. Cf. id. at i–x (Table of Contents identifying a section of the Petition discussing the Tateishi (Application) anticipation ground but not a section discussing a Tateishi Patent anticipation ground). Although the issued patent may be substantively identical to the published application, Petitioner does not assert that, and we decline to compare the documents to determine whether that is the case. In light of Petitioner’s silence on the alternative ground, Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the Tateishi Patent anticipates 1–4, 9–14, 17, and 18.” slip op. at 47
Patent outcomesUS 9,041,377 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,041,377 - MPL Brands NV, Inc. v. Buzzballz, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 16, 2025 · IPR2024-01098 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6 are unpatentable as anticipated by or obvious over Kick and as obvious over Ackermann and Kaminski, with or without Hutchinson.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(sometimes abbreviated herein as “POSITA”) would have had “(i) an associate’s or bachelor’s degree in mechanical, industrial or manufacturing engineering and (ii) at least two to three years of practical experience with designing or manufacturing mechanical products, such as food or beverage packaging. A POSITA could substitute additional education for industry experience and vice versa.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1002 (Delson Decl.) ¶ 14).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that no claim term requires an express construction. See Pet. 15. We agree and find it unnecessary to construe any claim term to resolve the issues in this case. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedDecided for petitioner
“is no earlier than the February 25, 2020, filing date of the ’195 application. Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the volume limitations recited in independent claim 1 and dependent claims 2 and 6 lack adequate written description support in the ’934 application as filed. See Pet. 10–11. The specification, figures, and claims of the ’934 application as originally filed do not disclose any volume limitations. See Ex. 1004 (’934 prosecution history), 1–17. Instead, the volume limitations recited in the challenged claims find their first support in Figure 7, which was filed over one month after the ’934 application was filed. Compare id. at 1–17, with id. at 34–56. The addition of new matter during prosecution of a patent application is prohibited. See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (“No amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the invention.”); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.121(f); Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 608.04. Therefore, we agree with Petitioner that “the new matter improperly added during the prosecution of the ’934 application cannot be considered part of the disclosure of the original, April 19, 2010 application and/or relied upon for claiming priority in subsequent applications.” Pet. 9.” slip op. at 20
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“obvious over Kick. Pet. 16–41. Kick published with the additional figures and disclosure the applicant submitted during prosecution of the ’934 application, and its detailed description and figures are the same as or similar to that of the ’904 patent. See id. at 16; compare Ex. 1007 (Kick), with Ex. 1001. Petitioner compares Kick to each limitation of the challenged claims. See Pet. 16–41. Based on the record before us, we find that Kick teaches or suggests each of the limitations of the challenged claims, for the reasons discussed in the Petition. See id. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Kick renders claims 1–6 of the ’904 patent unpatentable as anticipated and as obvious.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 11,738,904 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,738,904 - PTAB · Nov 18, 2025 · IPR2025-00782 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’469 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that: [A] POSITA would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, business information systems, software engineering, or systems engineering and at least two years of experience in computer networking or telecommunications. Ex.1002 ¶21; see also Ex.1001 (1:14-31). Additional education could substitute for professional experience. Ex.1002 ¶21. Significant work experience could substitute for formal education. Ex.1002 ¶21. Pet. 7–8. Patent Owner, at this stage, does not disagree or propose a different definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner states that it “do[es] not believe explicit construction is required to resolve this Petition.” Pet. 7. Patent Owner proposes constructions for “Internet,” “access the Internet,” “subscriber access website.” Prelim. Resp. 12–15. On this record and for purposes of this decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction. D. Alleged Anticipation of Claims 1, 2, 10, 11, and 24–28 by Bruner and” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentable
“We find Patent Owner’s argument to be persuasive. Petitioner does not explain adequately how Bruner discloses the positional requirement of a subscriber access unit being coupled between the satellite dish and the router. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently for purposes of institution that Bruner anticipates independent claim 24. Although, for the obviousness challenge, Petitioner contends that Clark discloses a wireless router (for limitation 24c), Petitioner relies solely on Bruner for the “between” limitation. See Pet. 17 (“Bruner and/or Bruner in view of Clark both disclose each limitation of claim 24c, including a router (e.g., Bruner’s ‘ADS’ and Clark’s ‘wireless router’)”); id. at 18–19 (the discussion of the “between” limitation 24d asserting that “Bruner discloses claim 24d,” with no mention of Clark). Furthermore, Petitioner merely asserts that both Bruner and Clark disclose a router. See id. at 17–18. Petitioner, however, does not indicate clearly which is used in the proposed combination, does not describe the configuration of a proposed combination or a proposed modification of Bruner’s system, and fails to set forth an adequate and persuasive reason with rational underpinning as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Bruner’s system to arrive at the positional requirement of the subscription access unit being coupled between the satellite dish and a router. See id. at 13–14 (motivation section for this ground); id. at 18–19 (addressing the “between” limitation 24d). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge to independent claim 24 as obvious over Bruner in view of Clark.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,324,469 - Cradlepoint, Inc. / Honeywell International, Inc. et al. v. Sisvel S.P.A.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 29, 2025 · IPR2021-00580 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board held claims 1–10 not shown unpatentable under the Sachs anticipation and obviousness grounds because Sachs did not disclose the required timer stopping, and the new theories were not considered.
RulingsRemand decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Whether Mr. Bates is a Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art In the Final Written Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s definition because “there does not appear to be a dispute that needs to be resolved.” FWD 8. Here, where Mr. Bates’ qualifications are challenged, we have reviewed the complete record including the parties’ arguments on remand and we find that Mr. Bates does not meet the requirements for a person of ordinary skill in the art according to Petitioner’s definition for level of ordinary skill in the art, which we adopted (see FWD 8). Notably, the panel adopted Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the Institution Decision (Paper 16, 8), and neither party challenged that determination during the trial, although Patent Owner did offer its own definition (PO Resp. 9). Mr. Bates has one degree: “a bachelor’s degree in Business Management.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 7. A degree in Business Management is not “a degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline.” Pet. 35 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we disregard the testimony of Mr. Bates in rendering our findings and conclusions in this Decision. We note that, even if we did consider Mr. Bates’s testimony, the findings and conclusions rendered in this Decision would not change.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“cover for his lack of education.” Pet. Remand Br. 4. Patent Owner disagrees and argues, inter alia, that “Mr. Bates was a pioneer in the cellular telecommunications field with more than five decades of practical and teaching experience.” PO Remand Resp. 5 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 8–23) (emphasis omitted); see id. at 3–4, 6. Whether Mr. Bates is a Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art In the Final Written Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s definition because “there does not appear to be a dispute that needs to be resolved.” FWD 8. Here, where Mr. Bates’ qualifications are challenged, we have reviewed the complete record including the parties’ arguments on remand and we find that Mr. Bates does not meet the requirements for a person of ordinary skill in the art according to Petitioner’s definition for level of ordinary skill in the art, which we adopted (see FWD 8). Notably, the panel adopted Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the Institution Decision (Paper 16, 8), and neither party challenged that determination during the trial, although Patent Owner did offer its own definition (PO Resp. 9). Mr. Bates has one degree: “a bachelor’s degree in Business Management.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 7. A degree in Business Management is not “a degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline.” Pet. 35 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we disregard the testimony of Mr. Bates in rendering our findings and conclusions in this Decision. We note that, even if we did consider Mr. Bates’s testimony, the findings and conclusions rendered in this Decision would not change.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“C. Claim Construction The Federal Circuit determined that “the plain and unambiguous language of claim 1 requires that a method, to come within the claim, must perform both limitations 1[c] and 1[d] where their preconditions apply.” Sierra Wireless, 130 F.4th at 1022. We interpret the claims and analyze Petitioner’s unpatentability arguments under the Federal Circuit’s determination.” slip op. at 13
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner was on notice, when Patent Owner’s Response was filed at the latest, that claim 1 could be construed as unconditionally requiring both limitations 1[c] and 1[d]. Indeed, Petitioner contended that it had shown both limitations “in single references.” Pet. Reply 5. Petitioner now seeks to shift its unpatentability contentions for limitation 1[c] from Figure 5 of Sachs to Figures 6 and 7. Petitioner’s new reliance on Figures 6 and 7 of Sachs is “a meaningfully distinct contention” from its position in both the Petition and the Reply. See Ariosa Diagnostics v. Verinata Health, Inc., 805 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We therefore find that Petitioner impermissibly presents new theories of unpatentability on remand. 3. Independent Claim 1 We decline to address Petitioner’s new theories of unpatentability proposed on remand concerning Sachs’s Figure 7. See Pet. Remand Br. 15– 20. Although Petitioner cites pages 59–61 of the Petition as discussing Figure 7 of Sachs (see Pet. Remand Br. 15), the cited discussion concerns dependent claims 5 and 10, not independent claims 1 and 8.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 7,869,396 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,869,396 - PTAB · Sep 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00141 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Remand
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–21 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the Nishida-based challenges.
RulingsRemand decision- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“partes review of U.S. Patent No. 8,266,749 B2 (“the ’749 patent,” Ex. 1001). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). The Petition challenges the patentability of claims 1–21 of the ’749 patent. Nike, Inc. (“Patent Owner”)2 filed a Preliminary Response to the Petition. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). With our authorization, Petitioner filed a Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response (Paper 10) and Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply (Paper 13). We discretionarily denied institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Paper 20. Petitioner filed a request for Director Review of the Decision denying institution. Paper 21. Director Review was granted, the Decision denying institution of inter partes review was vacated, and the case was remanded to the Board. Id. at 4. Specifically, the case was “remanded to the Board with instructions to consider Petitioner’s Nishida grounds and to determine whether the Petition should be instituted.” Id. at 3–4.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’749” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“In support of Petitioner’s position, Dr. Adanur testifies that “Nishida discloses that the unfinished surface area 1.1 is part of the web 1 itself,” that Nishida discloses that the computer-controlled process can (using Nishida’s phrase) “put in” up to seven different textile fibers or yarns into the web of material in one operation, and that, “[t]hus, Nishida discloses simultaneously knitting its layouts 2 and tongue 40 (each a ‘textile element’) with the unfinished surface area 1.1 (a ‘surrounding textile structure’).” Ex. 1002 ¶ 216 (citing Ex. 1022, 2:12–20, 4:47–55, 5:45–49). For purposes of institution, we credit that testimony over the testimony of Dr. Pastore, because, on the current record, we regard Dr. Adanur’s testimony as more consistent with the evidence. This and the other related issues may be explored more fully during the trial.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) in the field of the ’749 patent in March 2004 would have been someone with at least a few years of experience in knit materials and knitting methods and machines that can be used in making footwear, or a bachelor’s degree in textile-related sciences, engineering, or industrial product design, or equivalent academic or work experience, including in the footwear industry. EX1002, ¶68. Such a person of ordinary skill would have at least a general understanding of general construction processes and materials used in the manufacturing process of fabric-based articles. For individuals with a lower educational level, a person could still be of ordinary skill in the art provided that person’s working experience compensates for any such lower educational level, or vice versa. See id. Pet. 23–24. Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this Preliminary Response, Nike applies Skechers’ definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 14. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,266,749 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 4, 2025 · IPR2024-00430 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 6–10, 14–18, and 22–24 are unpatentable; claims 4–5, 11–13, and 19–21 are not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that the ’690 patent does not limit the term “probe” to channel assessment. Pet. Reply 2–4. Reviewing the intrinsic evidence, the “Technical Field” of the ’690 patent states that “some embodiments relate to channel assessment probes,” implying others do not. Ex. 1001, 1:13–14. The ’690 patent further states that “receiver determined probes may be used in a variety of applications” including to “discover hidden nodes” and “off-site network diagnosis.” Id. at 2:20–27. In addition, the ’690 patent states that probes may be used for “network maintenance procedures,” to “replicate a potential problem, reach or discover a distant or previously undetected node on the network, or assist with network admissions procedures.” Id. at 4:25–38. Turning to the claims of the ’690 patent, the evidence of record does not establish that the independent claims recite anything unique or specific to channel assessment (although their scope covers that purpose). Furthermore, dependent claim 7 of the ’690 patent recites that the “probe” is used to diagnose a network problem, and dependent claim 13 recites that the “probe” is used to identify a hidden node. Restricting the independent claims to probes used solely for channel assessment would be contradictory to these dependent claims. Littlefuse, Inc. v. Mersen USA EP Corp., 29 F.4th 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (construction of term in independent claims should not render dependent claims superfluous or lacking scope).” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that a “physical layer probe” is “a probe that relates to the physical layer.” The term does not appear per se in the specification of the ’960 patent, nor in the prosecution history, but only in claims 9, 17, and 19. However, the term “physical layer” is well-known and is the first layer in the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) network model. See, e.g., Ex. 1021, 35–40, 69; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 49–50. The physical layer is used to transmit digital bits over a network, and defines the timing, mechanical, and physical network characteristics required for transmitting the data bits. Hence, a “physical layer probe” is a probe that relates to the physical layer. We need not, and do not, construe the term further to resolve the parties’ dispute. See Realtime, Vivid Techs., supra. Having decided proper constructions for the disputed terms, we proceed in our analysis to consider the parties’ arguments concerning the challenge grounds. In the following sections, we apply the plain meaning of the claim terms, and as necessary, specify what the plain meanings are.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends as follows: A POSITA8 would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a similar discipline, and three to four years of experience working in signal processing and/or communication systems/networks. Additional education may substitute for experience, and significant work experience may substitute for formal education. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 115–120). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art. We adopt and apply Petitioner’s proposed skill level because it is consistent with the problems and solutions identified in the ’690 patent and the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. In addition, we find the adopted skill level consistent with the education and experience that a POSITA would have had. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) (citing factors to consider when determining level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 25
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“Hence, we determine that Petitioner has shown by preponderant evidence that the Ranging Request (“probe request”) message includes CID and SS MAC address and other parameters (“first plurality of parameters”) which at least specify the CID (“content payload of the probe”) and the SS MAC address (“second node”) of the Ranging Response.12 We thus proceed to consider Petitioner’s contentions for the remaining limitations of claim 1, which are undisputed, and determine that claim 1 is anticipated by IEEE-802.16.” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 8,284,690 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,284,690 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 3, 2025 · IPR2024-00441 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18 are unpatentable over Kamieniecki and Konstantinos; Petitioner did not show claims 1–18 unpatentable over Renken or Renken and Cholas because Renken is not prior art.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Level of Ordinary Skill in The Art Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had a degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, and three-to-four years of experience working with television signal processing and communication 1 Because the challenged claims have an effective filing date before the effective date of the AIA, we apply the pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 103. 2 US 2005/0114879 A1, published May 26, 2005 (Ex. 1009). 3 US 2010/0120386 A1, published May 13, 2010 (Ex. 1010). 4 US 2010/0303181 A1, published Dec. 2, 2010 (Ex. 1016). 5 US 2008/0313691 A1, published Dec. 18, 2008 (Ex. 1017). 6 US 8,649,421 B2, issued Feb. 11, 2014 (Ex. 1011). systems,” and that “[a]dditional education may substitute for professional experience and significant work experience may substitute for formal education.” Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 40–42). “Patent Owner accepts the Petition’s [description of a person of ordinary skill] solely for purposes of responding to the Petition in this proceeding.” PO Resp. 11. Based on our review of the record before us, we determine that Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable because it appears consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art. Accordingly, we apply Petitioner’s definition in this Decision. B.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“On the present record, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analyses and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). C.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We agree that the record provides sufficient evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it advantageous to add a multi-channel receiver to improve monitoring, as Petitioner argues. Having the ability to monitor without waiting for idle or disturbing users would be a clear advantage.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“We conclude that Patent Owner has not shown a sufficient nexus between the claimed invention and any product embodying the claimed invention that was successful, praised, or solved a long-felt need. Patent Owner identifies five elements allegedly required “[t]o implement MaxLinear’s Remote Spectrum Monitoring in CPE.” See PO Resp. 65. To support this, Patent Owner cites pages 5–7 of Exhibit 2009. See id.7 That exhibit, however, describes requirements for “Full Band Capture,” not MaxLinear’s “Remote Spectrum Monitoring.” To” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 8,792,008 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,792,008 - Tesla, Inc. v. Graphite Charging Company LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 19, 2025 · IPR2024-00388 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable because Wang and Wang with AESO did not establish the claimed analysis, and Cooley did not disclose reducing current power consumption.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“the claims require a decision engine to perform those elements.” Tr. 48:17– 20. In light of this, we fail to understand the basis for Patent Owner’s objection to the characterization of the level of ordinary skill involving experience with “intelligent” techniques or devices that control grid electricity. We determine that Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the Specification and the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). We, therefore, apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. We note, however, that were we to adopt Patent Owner’s assessment, the outcome of this Decision would be the same.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner (PO Resp. 12, 49–50) points to the Specification’s list of “[e]xamples of power reduction actions.” Ex. 1001, 8:47–63. Patent Owner asserts that the list includes numerous examples of power reductions that occur in the present and one that takes place in the future—namely, “scheduling nonessential operations at a different time (e.g., nonessential software or hardware upgrades).” Ex. 1001, 8:61–62 (cited at PO Resp. 12, 50). We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention (PO Resp. 12) that the applicant, by including the term “current” in the claims, intentionally narrowed the claims to power consumption reductions that occur temporally in the present, rather than those that occur in the future. See Pet. Reply 6–7 (Petitioner asserting that Patent Owner’s position is “inconsistent with the specification’s examples,” but then arguing that the Specification does not support that position rather than pointing to any purported inconsistencies). Because the independent claims recite the term “current,” construing the term in the temporal sense is not, as Petitioner argues, importing into the claims an example from the Specification. See Pet. Reply 8.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Given the interchangeable nature taught for various features of Wang’s embodiments, it would have been a routine and obvious matter for a POSA to combine aspects from Wang’s various embodiments (e.g., data acquisition, internal hardware, data analysis performed by the UMC receiver 400 and/or the display 200). Moreover, many of Wang’s embodiments–particularly of specific smart appliance types– include common components, thus further confirming combinability of aspects of the disclosed embodiments. A POSA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining features of the embodiments together. Id. at 77–78 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 201–203). We determine that these reasons are inadequate and too generic to satisfy Petitioner’s burden as they lack a clear explanation of what and how “aspects from Wang’s various embodiments” are proposed to be combined along with reasoning specific to that proposal. Petitioner, for example, does not explain adequately or persuasively why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have added a display that purportedly receives and analyzes data to a “smart appliance,” when that appliance already has an application processor that purportedly receives and analyzes the same data. It is not enough for Petitioner to allege that all of the elements of the challenged claims can be found somewhere in the various embodiments of Wang; Petitioner must also show that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason to combine the elements in the manner as arranged in the challenged claims. See KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418 (“[A] patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art. Although common sense directs one to look with care at a patent application that claims as innovation the combination of two known devices according to their established functions, it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does.”). We find Petitioner has not shown an adequate reason to combine embodiments.” slip op. at 38
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentable
“We determine that these reasons are inadequate and too generic to satisfy Petitioner’s burden as they lack a clear explanation of what and how “aspects from Wang’s various embodiments” are proposed to be combined along with reasoning specific to that proposal. Petitioner, for example, does not explain adequately or persuasively why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have added a display that purportedly receives and analyzes data to a “smart appliance,” when that appliance already has an application processor that purportedly receives and analyzes the same data. It is not enough for Petitioner to allege that all of the elements of the challenged claims can be found somewhere in the various embodiments of Wang; Petitioner must also show that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason to combine the elements in the manner as arranged in the challenged claims. See KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418 (“[A] patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art. Although common sense directs one to look with care at a patent application that claims as innovation the combination of two known devices according to their established functions, it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does.”). We find Petitioner has not shown an adequate reason to combine embodiments.” slip op. at 38
Patent outcomesUS 8,291,243 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,291,243 - Lululemon USA Inc. v. Nike, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 6, 2025 · IPR2024-00460 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–21 are unpatentable: claims 1–21 under Nishida grounds and claims 11 and 21 also over Nishida with Zuckerman; Zuckerman-only grounds fail for lack of a surrounding structure.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that: A hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in textile engineering, mechanical engineering, or similar technical degree and at least 3 years of experience working with knitted textiles for use in fabric-based articles, including apparel such as footwear. Ex.1003, ¶¶34-37. For individuals with different educational backgrounds, a person could still be of ordinary skill in the art provided that person’s additional experience compensates for any differences in that person’s education as stated above. Id., ¶37. Pet. 14–15. Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this proceeding, Nike applies lululemon’s proposed level of skill in the art.” PO Resp. 13. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Id. at 99:12–25. Dr. Brookstein stated during his deposition that he has “49 years of experience of teaching textile engineering.” Id. at 97:6–8. We credit Dr. Brookstein’s testimony over that of Dr. Pastore’s because it is consistent with the reference and based on decades of experience in the textile field. Nishida’s claim 1 states that, “during the production of the material web (1), [shoe patterns] . . . are produced by . . . a textile production method within the material web.” Ex. 1005, 9. We find that Nishida’s claim language discloses the recited, “simultaneously knitting a textile element with a surrounding textile structure.”” slip op. at 22
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We find the District Court’s reasoning persuasive, and we, like the District Court, decline to adopt Petitioner’s overly broad proposed construction. However, for purposes of deciding the dispositive fact issue before us, we need not determine the precise boundaries of “surrounding textile structure,” for example whether it completely or mostly encircles the textile element, and if “mostly,” what percentage of encircling is required. See Pet. Reply 2 (Petitioner characterizing Patent Owner’s position as “mostly” means over 50%); id. at 4 (Petitioner impliedly arguing that the “surrounding” need not be complete, i.e., 100%); PO Sur-reply 3–4 (Patent Owner arguing that “Zuckerman’s textile structures . . . each abut only about 25% of the periphery of Zuckerman’s blank.”). We find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not understand the portion of Zuckerman’s strip 13 in purple to surround the green blank 11 (textile element) under any reasonable construction of “surrounding textile structure.” Dr. Pastore testifies that “Zuckerman discloses two separate textile structures adjacent the blank—one on each side . . . they abut only two sides of Zuckerman’s blank, with each structure abutting only about a quarter of the blank’s periphery,” and opines that “a POSITA would not have understood these two separate structures, designated by purple in the figure above, to be a textile structure ‘surrounding’ the blank [shown in green].” Ex. 2003 ¶ 54. We find Dr. Pastore’s tesimony credible as it is consistent with Zuckerman’s Figure and with the plain and ordinary meaning of “surrounding” and with the Specification of the ’749 patent (particularly Figure 9). Dr. Brookstein’s testimony, on the other hand, is based on Petitioner’s overly broad proposed construction—that any part of a textile area that is not a textile element is “surrounding textile structure”—” slip op. at 44
Patent outcomesUS 8,266,749 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,266,749 - DISH Network LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 22, 2025 · IPR2024-01059 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 3 are unpatentable as obvious over Kliger and Isaksson, and over Amit, Jacobsen, and Isaksson.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“Although Patent Owner points to various parts of the ’518 patent as supporting its proposal, other parts of the patent are not so limited. For example, the ’518 patent repeatedly mentions prior art patents disclosing communication techniques applied to twisted pair wiring, including discrete multi-tone (DMT) modulation and bit loading. Ex. 1001, 3:49–50, 3:67–4:2, 8:19–26. The patent further mentions that its data network overlays cable or satellite services. See, e.g., id. at 5:1–6. Thus, a POSITA would not be limited to experience only with “coaxial cables” as opposed to work involving signal processing and/or communication systems/networks more generally. The ’518 patent describes the “Technical Field” as “broadband communication networks and specifically . . . communications using coaxial cable building wiring.” Id. at 1:25–30. We find it appropriate here to use the broader statement of “broadband communication networks” as the field of a POSITA’s experience. The challenged claims of the ’518 patent relate to a “data communication network” comprising “cable wiring” with “segments of coaxial cable.” Id. at 12:16–19. This does not mean that the “cable wiring” is strictly coaxial—only that it includes segments that are.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther
“Petitioner contends that the challenged claims are “obvious under any reasonable interpretation,” so “no express constructions are required.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner does not offer construction of any claim term, so there is no dispute over claim construction that we need to resolve. We apply the ordinary and customary meanings consistent with 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“The ’518 patent seeks to overcome channel impairments by using probe messages to characterize the communication channel and determine optimum bit loading. Ex. 1001, code (57). These impairments include signal reflections, ISI, and signal attenuation. Pet. Reply 9–10 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:5–19). Similarly, Isaksson estimates channel characteristics by periodic transmission of a base sync frame from one transceiver to another where it is compared with a reference frame. Ex. 1013, 10. Isaksson’s channel characteristics may include attenuation, phase shifting, and variance, which are similar to the problems identified in the ’518 patent. Id. Both the ’518 patent and Isaksson address the problem of ISI by using bit loading to transmit data using sub-carriers less affected. Ex. 1001, 3:5–20; Ex. 1013, 16, 35, 79. Hence, we find the problems identified in the ’518 patent and Isaksson of how to overcome channel impairments reasonably pertinent such that Isaksson is analogous art to the ’518 patent. We find unavailing Patent Owner’s arguments that the ’518 patent is specific to in-home networks with coaxial cables and splitters whereas Isaksson is restricted to twisted pair, point-to-point networks having no intervening devices and which are located outside of homes. PO Resp. 15– 20; PO Sur-Reply 21–24. Any such differences do not change the fundamental nature of the problems of noise and interference affecting these environments. Such differences go more toward the field of endeavor than the reasonable pertinence of the problems each address. See Pet. Reply 10 (citing Donner Tech., LLC v. Pro Stage Gear, LLC, 979 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2020)). Specifically, both the ’518 patent and Isaksson address the problem of channel impairments such as interference (e.g., ISI) and noise, and use the solution of bit loading to overcome them. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 4:42–47; Ex. 1013, 1:3–7, 6:17–20, 16:10–16, 79:5–14. Hence, we find that the ’518 patent and Isaksson are analogous art because Isaksson is reasonably pertinent to the problems addressed in the ’518 patent notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments. We do not reach the question of whether the two are in the same field of endeavor.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Kliger identifies the problems of splitter reflections causing inter- symbol interference, external noise, and dynamic network conditions adversely affecting home network communications. Pet. 23–24 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 73; Ex. 1010, 5; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 65–68). Isaksson teaches using multi-carrier modulation, such as DMT and OFDM, to address frequency dependent loss and noise using synchronized bit-loading based on carrier SNR. Id. at 24 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 69; Ex. 1013, code (57), 26:4–20). We agree with Petitioner that the combination of Kliger and Isaksson amounts to the use of known techniques (Isaksson’s synchronized bit-loading) to improve similar devices in the same way (overcoming interference and maintaining connections with other modems). Id. at 26–27 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 415–421). We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that Kliger already solves the issues that Petitioner identifies such that a POSITA would not have looked to Isaksson’s synchronized bit-loading. PO Resp. 50. Petitioner has established that Isaksson’s solutions would improve Kliger’s modulation by determining the number of bits-per-carrier based on SNR, disabling noisy carriers, and synchronizing bit loading. Pet. 23–28; Pet. Reply 23–24. Hence, a POSITA would have been motivated to improve Kliger with Isaksson. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (“if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a [POSITA] would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill”). Patent Owner alleges that Kliger’s network is coaxial whereas Isaksson’s is point-to-point, twisted pair with no intermediary devices such as splitters which would cause the interference, noise, and attenuation that the ’518 patent addresses. PO Resp. 50–55. However, we do not agree that these alleged differences would have precluded a POSITA from making the combination of references. “Signal impairments such as reflections, noise, attenuation, and inter-symbol interference (ISI) are common challenges in nearly all communication mediums.” Ex. 1036 ¶¶ 23–27. Communication networks experience these challenges, whether point-to-point or shared, twisted pair or coaxial, in-home or out-of-home, with or without splitters. Id. As Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Williams, puts it, “a POSITA can draw from the same toolbox of known solutions to address these impairments regardless of the medium.” Id. ¶ 27. Among those solutions is Isaksson’s approach of synchronized bit-loading. Moreover, Isaksson expressly states that “[i]t should be emphasized that the present invention can be used not only with the MUSIC system as herein described, but with other multi-carrier systems employing dynamic bit loading.” Ex. 1013, 72:5–8 (emphasis added); Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 81–82. Hence, a POSITA would have been led to consider using Isaksson’s synchronized bit-loading with Kliger’s coaxial network which uses a multi-tone transmitter to determine whether to transmit power on each particular tone. See, e.g., Ex. 1007 ¶ 166; Ex. 1013 1:1–7. Further facilitating the combination is Kliger’s disclosure of using “a regular multi-tone transmitter (either OFDM or DMT) to determine whether to transmit power on each particular tone wherein tones can be silenced (which is, in effect, a form of bit-loading). See, e.g., Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 6, 166, Fig. 1; Ex. 1013, 1:1–7, 3:24–34, 4:21–25, 16:8–12. In addition, Kliger expressly recognizes and seeks to address signal impairments caused by splitters, including poor signal isolation, return loss performance, degradation at higher frequencies, and inter-symbol interference due to reflections (the same problems the ’518 patent addresses). Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 61, 73. Accordingly, a POSITA would have been motivated to combine teachings of Kliger and Isaksson. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner did not explain how a control channel would exist across a coaxial splitter’s multipath signal. PO Resp. 56–58 (citing Pet. 26; Ex. 1013, 73:4–15, 74:22–31, Fig. 33; Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 147–148). Patent Owner does not explain why it would be necessary to use Isaksson’s control channel in Kliger, particularly when Kliger has its own control channel. Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 63–64, 166. Patent Owner’s argument amounts to bodily incorporation of Isaksson in Kliger, which is not a proper approach to obviousness. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). We further disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that Isaksson’s base sync frames (equivalent to the claimed probe messages) would not function in Kliger’s network. PO Resp. 58–60 (citing Pet. 26; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 55–57; Ex. 1013, 24:8–28, Fig. 1; Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 149–154). Patent Owner’s arguments are directed toward an embodiment of Isaksson that Petitioner did not cite in its Petition. Pet. Reply 26. In any case, Patent Owner does not establish that using Isaksson’s base sync messages in Kliger’s system would have been beyond a POSITA’s skill. Id. at 25–26 (citing Ex. 1036 ¶¶ 90– 93). Patent Owner argues that Isaksson’s base sync frames would alter the principle of operation of Kliger because Kliger requires all devices to transmit fixed constellation size based on overall network characteristics rather than specific channel characteristics between each HNM. PO Resp. 60–63 (citing Ex. 1007, code (57), ¶¶ 40–44, 91, 99, Fig. 1; Ex. 1013, 3:24– 27, 20:24–25, 26:14–17, 78:5–79:5, Fig. 36; Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 155–157). Patent Owner has not established, however, that fixed constellation size is a “principle of operation” of Kliger, or that Kliger would require substantial reconstruction or redesign to incorporate variable constellation sizes. See In re Ratti, 270 F.2d 810, 813 (CCPA 1959). We agree with Dr. Williams that a POSITA would have sought to improve Kliger with Isaksson’s techniques. Ex. 1036 ¶ 95.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 7,295,518 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,295,518
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.