• Bizlink Technology, Inc. v. Anderson Power Products, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 7, 2025 · IPR2024-00687 · APJ Lisa L Tsang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3 and 7–12 are unpatentable; claim 4 is not shown unpatentable because Winkler does not establish that its insulating barriers press against each other when partially disconnected.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner’s first argument that a level of ordinary skill in the art that encompasses an individual having experience with electrical circuits but not electrical connectors is not consistent with the technology and descriptions in the ’017 patent. See PO Resp. 7. The field of the invention of the ’017 patent is “electrical connectors, and more particularly, . . . an electrical connector that suppresses arcing if connected or disconnected while current is flowing.” Ex. 1001, 1:7–9. Consistent therewith, the challenged claims are directed to “[a]n electrical connector pair” and recite structural features of the electrical connector pair. Id. at 4:20–56, 5:1–20.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We find that the intrinsic evidence supports maintaining our construction in the Institution Decision that “insulating” means “electrically insulating.” See Dec. 11–12. In particular, we agree with Patent Owner’s argument that the insulating barriers would be unable to be configured to “block[] substantially all through-air arcing paths between the first and second electrical contacts,” as claimed, unless they were electrically insulating. See Ex. 1001, 4:36–44. Moreover, as Patent Owner avers, our interpretation of “insulating” as it applies to the first and second insulating barriers should be the same as for the first and second housings. See Digital Biometrics, 149 F.3d at 1345 (“whatever interpretation we assign [to a word used in a claim] should encompass both uses because the same word appearing in the same claim should be interpreted consistently” (citation omitted)).” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Ex. 2001 ¶ 102. Accordingly, we find Dr. Eldering’s testimony persuasive as to this issue and determine that the diagram shows what an ordinarily skilled artisan would have reasonably inferred Winkler to disclose when the connectors are partially disconnected. Compare Ex. 1004, Fig. 2, with Pet. 33; see also Ex. 1004, 3:14–27 (discussing the process by which the connectors are engaged with each other).” slip op. at 44

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Id. at 3:27–37 (emphasis added). These wall portions 58 are located between the distal ends of the terminals and where Petitioner proposes to add a printed circuit board or wiring board to Winkler. See id. at Fig. 2; Pet. 44–46 (diagrams showing Winkler as modified to have a printed circuit board or wiring board). As such, movement of Winkler’s terminals appears to be mostly limited to within their respective receiving pockets. Given the above teachings, we fail to see how Petitioner’s proposed modification would have meaningfully interfered with the degree of freedom of movement required by Winkler’s terminals. Notably, Mr. Locati’s testimony regarding this issue is conclusory. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 120. Because movement of Winkler’s terminals occurs primarily in the receiving pockets, we also do not discern how the solder joint of Petitioner’s proposed modification would experience undue stress or risk breaking due to that movement. See Ex. 1004, 1:47–55, 3:14–37, Fig. 2; Pet. 44–46. This is particularly true in view of Winkler’s teaching that each cylindrical end portion may be soldered to a cable. See id. at 2:6–10; see also Pet. 43 (arguing that Winkler teaches soldering to a cable but not specifically to a printed circuit or wiring board). Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 8 would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Winkler and Handbook.” slip op. at 55

  Patent outcomesUS 8,808,017 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,808,017
• Alivecor, Inc. v. Apple Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 7, 2025 · IPR2023-00949 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 11–14 and 16–20 are unpatentable over Kim; claim 15 was not shown unpatentable over Chang.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s asserted level of ordinary skill in the art is essentially the same as Petitioner’s, for example requiring a bachelor’s degree in science or engineering and “at least two years of relevant work experience with capture and processing of data or information, including but not limited to physiological information.” Id.; Pet. 9. In view of the similarity, our record now before us, and as we did in our Institution Decision, we rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art as it is essentially the same as that proposed by Patent Owner. Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’619 patent and the asserted prior art references. Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “C. Claim Construction We interpret a claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2020). Under this standard, we construe the claim “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id. Furthermore, “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Neither Patent Owner nor Petitioner indicate that any claim terms require construction. See generally Petition; PO Resp. For purposes of this Decision where no claim terms are in dispute, we need not explicitly construe any claim terms.” slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “What these cases and examples clearly articulate, is that whether there is sufficient description in an anticipation reference for linking different disclosures, elements, and embodiments, is particularly case and fact dependent. Moreover, a finding of anticipation resting upon a reference’s disclosures of elements in different embodiments turns on whether an ordinarily skilled artisan would understand that the reference suggests arranging the elements of the embodiments to one another in the same way as the challenged claims. For the reasons that follow, we determine that there is sufficient description and teaching in Kim such that the “combined button” disclosed by Kim, for example in Figure 10(b), can be the same “combined button” as discussed in the embodiment of Figure 18.” slip op. at 28

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “As to Patent Owner’s first and second arguments, as we discussed in detail above with respect to anticipation, we find that there is sufficient evidence in Kim itself of contextual and even express links between the various combined button embodiments and Figure 18. Section II.D.2.b)(1)– (4). We have already determined “that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand Kim to disclose the ‘combined button’ structure and function that could be implemented on the face or sidewall of a device.” Id. We likewise determine, based on the same evidence, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Kim to suggest that the combined button structure and function, for example in the embodiment of Figure 10(b), could be implemented in an opening on the face or sidewall of a device. Obviousness does not require an instruction manual on how to physically incorporate or combine the disclosures of two embodiments in a reference. As KSR informs us, “in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 420. Moreover, in this case we have only one prior art patent, Kim, so at least the pieces of the puzzle are all in the same box. The persuasive testimony of Dr. Berger that “a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been familiar with electronic devices with sealed and/or insulated button assemblies, and would understand that those assemblies were not limited to the front face of a device,” is unrebutted in this case. Ex. 1003 ¶ 110. “A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. Given the background knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art in conjunction with the motivation and teachings in Kim itself for placing sufficient motivation to support the combination of Kim’s Figure 10(b) embodiment with the sidewall placement of the combined button taught in Figure 18 for obviousness purposes. It is well-settled that a single prior art obviousness reference itself can provide motivation for the combination. See General Elec. Co. v. Raytheon Techs. Corp., 983 F.3d 1334, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (Reversing the Board’s finding of nonobviousness over a single prior art reference, the Court explained that “the Board’s approach would require a motivation to combine each element of the claim—even those present together in a reference. This analysis unduly dissects prior art references into collections of individual elements, requiring a party showing obviousness to re-do the work already done in the prior art reference.”). Patent Owner’s third argument is unavailing because although Dr. Anthony testifies that “implementing the fingerprint sensor assembly of Kim’s Figure 10 embodiment in the ‘lateral surface’ of Kim’s Figure 18 embodiment would have complicated the manufacturing process for the resulting mobile device,” Dr. Anthony does not provide testimony or evidence that implementing the combined button on the sidewall would have been difficult or beyond the level of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 2009 ¶ 73. We credit Dr. Berger who explains persuasively that “[p]rior to the ’619 patent’s earliest alleged priority date of June 19, 2017, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known that a mobile electronic device could include one or more button assemblies in a sidewall.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 47 (citing Ex. 1013, 4:40, 19:42–20:4, Figs. 13B, 17, 19A, 19B). It is well-settled that a person of ordinary skill can use his or her ordinary skill, creativity, and common sense to make the necessary adjustments and further modifications to result in a properly functioning device. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (“the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.”).” slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 10,866,619 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,866,619
• Lululemon Athletica Canada Inc. / Lululemon USA Inc. v. Nike, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 13, 2024 · IPR2023-00189 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 7, 8, and 11–16 are unpatentable over Arrasvuori; claims 5, 6, 9, 10, and 17–20 are not unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The level of ordinary skill in the art also is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Neither party argues that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Considering the subject matter of the ’256 patent, the background technical field, the prior art, and Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the skilled artisan, we apply the level of skill set forth above, which is consistent with the testimony of Dr. Lynch (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 43, 44).” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “simultaneously communicate in real-time to the first user at the first location and the second user at the second location, an interface indicating whether the challenge has been met.” Ex. 1001, 40:64–67 (emphasis added). The claim language itself suggests that “continuously generat[ing]” an interface in “real-time” allows the interface to indicate whether a challenge “has been met,” and doing so “in real-time” suggests that updates to the interface are generated as developments occur that may affect whether the challenge “has been met.” Notably, the subject claim limitation explicitly recites “continuously” generating the interface “in real-time”; it does not recite— but easily could have if intended—“periodically” generating the interface (i.e., at predetermined time intervals independent of the occurrence of developments that may affect whether the challenge has been met).3” slip op. at 29

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends Arrasvuori qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) and 102(e) based on its filing and publication dates. Pet. 24. Patent Owner does not contest the prior art status of Arrasvuori. Also, on this record, we have no evidence of an invention date other than the earliest possible effective filing date of the challenged claims. Thus, for purposes of this Decision, we determine that Arrasvuori qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) because Arrasvuori’s publication date of October 11, 2007, is before the earliest possible effective filing date of the challenged claims, which is March 3, 2008, and under § 102(e) because Arrasvuori’s filing date of March 29, 2006, is before the earliest possible effective filing date of the challenged claims (March 3, 2008). Ex. 1001, codes (22), (60), (63); Ex. 1005, code (22), (43).” slip op. at 18

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Arrasvuori discloses (a) “[m]onitoring” of “users performing real- world fitness tasks” (Ex. 1005 ¶ 38), using (b) “monitoring equipment . . . integrated into . . . wireless nodes and/or other computers of users, and/or [] attached to bodies of users” (id. at ¶ 39 (emphasis added)), where (c) “[u]sers might . . . wear their wireless nodes and/or other computers” (id. (emphasis added)), and where (d) “[t]he phrase[] ‘computer’ . . . refer[s] but [is] not limited to . . . a computerized watch” (id. at ¶ 90 (emphasis added); see id. at ¶ 40 (disclosing that “employed monitoring equipment might include one or more sensors”)). We find that these descriptions in Arrasvuori provide an anticipatory disclosure, particularly to the skilled artisan, of the limitation “wirelessly-connected sensor worn on an appendage of a first user.” See Ex. 1017 ¶ 45; Ex. 2006, 84:10-85:22. Although Arrasvuori does not recite in a single sentence the substance of disclosures (a) through (d) above, such as explicitly stating that its “wireless node is a computerized watch,” this is not necessary for the skilled artisan to understand that Arrasvuori discloses such a feature. See In re Bond, 910 F.2d at 832–33 (anticipation “is not an ‘ipsissimis verbis’ test”). Moreover, as argued by Petitioner, Arrasvuori’s disclosure of sensors “attached to bodies of users” and of users “wear[ing]” sensors itself discloses the subject limitation as broadly recited, even without considering the additional disclosure of a computerized watch. See Pet. Reply 17 (“Arrasvuori teaches wrist-worn sensors by stating that its users can ‘wear their wireless nodes and/or other computers.’” (citing Ex. 1005 ¶39)).” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 9,278,256 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,278,256
• Dynaenergetics Europe GmbH / Dynaenergetics US, Inc. v. SWM International, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 5, 2024 · IPR2022-01372 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 3, 7, 24–26, 29, 30, and 34–36 are unpatentable as anticipated by Yonghong and Hardesty; claims 4 and 16 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had “a Bachelor of Science in mechanical or electrical engineering and 2–5 years of experience designing perforating gun systems.” Pet. 25. According to Petitioner, “[t]he individual should be familiar with prior art methods of using gravity to orient the shaped charges in a rotatable charge tube.” Id. Petitioner further contends that “[p]ersons with different degrees may also have ordinary skill in the art, and increased education or experience could compensate for shortcomings in other areas.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 51). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 7–8. We apply Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the Specification of the ’762 Patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “In the Institution Decision, we agreed with Patent Owner’s proposed construction for the term “collar.” Inst. Dec. 10. Because Patent Owner’s proposed construction is undisputed and supported by the ’762 Patent’s description of “outer collar 24” as having “annular side wall 62” (Ex. 1001, 7:59–63, Fig. 3), we construe a “collar” as “an annular or ring-shaped structure.”” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We are persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that Yonghong discloses a “collar,” as recited in the claims. Petitioner identifies Yonghong’s bushing 4 as the recited “collar.” Pet. 30–31. As discussed below, the evidence shows that bushing 4 is annular or ring-shaped, as set forth in our claim construction.” slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “expert, Dr. Rodgers, who provided a 3-D CAD (three-dimensional computer aided design) model based on Yonghong’s disclosure. Ex. 1003 ¶ 38. Dr. Rodgers’ 3-D CAD model shows an annular or ring-shaped structure corresponding to Yonghong’s bushing 4. Id. At his deposition, Dr. Rodgers explained that Yonghong Figure 1 shows some parts as “half model cuts,” other parts as “a quarter cut-away,” and still other parts in “full circumference,” i.e., “[t]hey’re not cut at all.” Ex. 2008, 37:11–20. The gun carrier is shown as a half cut, and the bushing 4 is shown as a quarter-cut. Id. at 57:24–58:11, 65:3–12. Referring to bushing 4 in Yonghong Figure 1, Dr. Rodgers explained that “[a] person of ordinary skill looks at that and understands it’s a quarter-cut model, and that’s one continuous part, a ring that wraps around the bearing.” Id. at 65:13–22; see also 60:17–24 (“A bushing or a collar slides around the outside of the bearing, or another way to say it is the bearing fits within that bushing or collar to mount it in the carrier.”). According to Dr. Rodgers, there is no need for the text of Yonghong to include this description “because a person of ordinary skill looks at this v[e]ry standard drawing and understands what it is.” Id. at 60:25–61:2.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 11,078,762 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,078,762
• Abbott Diabetes Care Inc. v. Dexcom, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 2, 2023 · IPR2022-00914 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 105 and 106 are unpatentable as obvious over Heller and Mastrototaro; Abbott did not prove claims 49, 80, 81, 85, or 86 unpatentable on the asserted grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “on the general knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art to disclose the predictive relationship limitation of claim 49 not taught by Heller are legally deficient. Resp. 28–38. We agree in that Petitioner’s contentions in the Petition amount to no more than a conclusory assertion that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have known” the predictive relationship limitation. See Pet. 38–39. Petitioner’s arguments in the Petition are divorced from any analysis of Heller and fail to articulate why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Heller to teach the predictive relationship in light of what was purportedly known more generally in the art. Merely asserting that a particular limitation was “known in the art” does not constitute a legally sufficient basis for establishing obviousness. See, e.g., Deere, 383 U.S. at 17–18. While Petitioner purports to identify multiple references that teach a predictive relationship, Petitioner circumvents a legally sufficient obviousness analysis by choosing not to assert any of the references in combination with Heller, but to instead argue they all collectively show that “predictive relationships” were broadly known in the art. See Pet. 28–33. Rather than establish some broad understanding by persons of ordinary skill in the art concerning the predictive relationship limitation, Petitioner’s arguments make clear that each reference uniquely addressed the relationship between a particular sensor and the in vivo performance of the sensor. For example, Petitioner asserts Gross teaches a sensor for which “the pre-insertion, factory-determined in vitro performance curve and” slip op. at 32

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “level in Gross is a “measure of sensor current, not ‘analyte concentration’ is contrary to the express disclosure of Gross. Gross expressly discloses a calibration method that requires, after insertion the in vivo measurement of a saturation level G1 “which can be measured by the sensor and which is of importance for the calibration method.” Ex. 1004, 13:3–18 (further stating that a “voltage V1 (FIG. 4C) applied at time t1 gives a current I1, (FIG. 4B) which corresponds to the saturation level G1 (FIG. 4A) of the enzyme”). Gross explains that “the predetermined stimulus is adapted to saturate the sensor such that the first signal is a maximum signal,” and “[w]hen a sensor is such that it can be saturated by a sufficiently large stimulus, it can be preferable to use this phenomenon in calibrating the sensor as it enables a reproducible first predetermined stimulus, i.e. a saturation stimulus to be provided in all cases, thereby removing uncertainty as to whether the means for providing a predetermined stimulus will in fact achieve exactly the right level of uncertainty.” Id. at 3:17–26.” slip op. at 45

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsNot reached

    “of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) when in evidence, objective evidence of nonobviousness. 5 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). An obviousness analysis “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. However, Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Instead, Petitioner must articulate a reason why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the prior art references. In re NuVasive, 842 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Pers. Web Tech., LLC, v. Apple, Inc., 848 F.3d 987, 993–94 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[O]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention”) (quoting Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015)) (alteration in original).” slip op. at 15

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “In light of the foregoing multiple critical misrepresentations, Petitioner’s MTE is denied regarding sufficiency of Dr. Baura’s qualifications because Petitioner did not timely object to the evidence on the basis asserted in the MTE, fails to refute Patent Owner’s showing that Dr. Baura is sufficiently qualified (see MTE Opp. 3–7; Ex. 2010 ¶ 30), and abandons its argument in its Reply to the MTE.” slip op. at 57

  Patent outcomesUS 11,000,213 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,000,213
• Abbott Diabetes Care Inc. v. Dexcom, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 2, 2023 · IPR2022-00913 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 20, and 21 are unpatentable as anticipated by Heller; the evidence does not establish claims 4–6, 8, or 23–26 unpatentable on the asserted grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “In opposition, Patent Owner first argues, and we agree, that Petitioner failed to timely object to Dr. Laura’s declaration with sufficient particularity. MTE Opp. 1–3 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1)). Our Rule requires that an “objection must identify the grounds for the objection with sufficient particularity to allow correction in the form of supplemental evidence.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1)). Petitioner’s objection to Dr. Baura’s testimony identifies hundreds of paragraphs from her declaration followed by an objection stating her “testimony is based on insufficient facts or data, is not the product of reliable principles and methods, and does not reliably apply the appropriate principles and methods to the fact of the case.” Paper 25, 2. Petitioner’s boilerplate objection is woefully insufficient to show that Petitioner objected with sufficiently particularity to allow correction in the form of supplemental information, as our Rule requires. We further agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s arguments in the MTE are no more than a “transparent attempt to . . . circumvent the word-count limits of its merits briefing by injecting merits arguments in its evidentiary motion.” MTE Opp. 9. In short, Petitioner’s arguments go to the weight to be afforded Dr. Baura’s testimony, not to its admissibility, and are, therefore, an improper basis for seeking the exclusion of hundreds of paragraphs Dr. Baura’s declaration. Accordingly, Petitioner’s MTE is denied.” slip op. at 63

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. Resp. 9. Dr. Baura, in support of Patent Owner, states that she applied Petitioner’s “definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, because,” in her opinion, Petitioner’s “and Dr. Smith’s conclusions are incorrect even under this definition.” Ex. 2010 ¶ 29. Thus, Dr. Baura neither adopts as proper nor refutes Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. We find that the ’213 patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of appropriate skill reflected in these references and the ’213 patent is consistent with the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 17

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “In view of the issues we address below, including how the claimed subject matter is alleged to have been taught or disclosed in the prior art, we determine that it is not otherwise necessary to address the express interpretation of any claim term. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”).” slip op. at 20

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s anticipation argument is insufficiently supported by Heller or the other evidence Petitioner relies upon. Petitioner directs us to no evidence in Heller expressly addressing a predictive relationship between in vitro and in vivo sensitivity, much less any disclosure in Heller of a particular relationship. Instead, Petitioner seeks to stretch a thin disclosure in Heller that “calibration data may simply be factory-determined calibration measurements” to necessarily mean “prior sensitivity information is derived at least in part from a predictive relationship between an in vitro sensor sensitivity to glucose and an in vivo sensor sensitivity to glucose,” as required by claim 23. Pet. 36; Ex. 1005, 77:14–15. Notably, Dr. Smith does not identify any “predictive relationship” disclosed by Heller. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 148–149. We give little weight to Dr. Smith’s conclusory assertion that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have simply “recognized” Heller’s “factory determined calibration measurements” were necessarily “derived at least in part from a predictive relationship between an in vitro and an in vivo sensor sensitivity to glucose,” particularly where Heller does not expressly preclude in vitro measurements from its “factory determined calibration measurements.” See id. Further, in reply, Petitioner argues again that “(1) Heller discloses that calibration data can ‘simply be factory determined calibration measurements’ . . . and (2) a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have recognized that this ‘discloses that factory (in vitro) determined sensitivity adequately predicts in vivo sensitivity.’” Reply 6. From Heller’s disclosure preponderance of the evidence that Heller expressly teaches any predictive relationship, even one in which in vitro and in vivo sensitivity are the same. that calibration data can “simply be factory determined calibration measurements,” Petitioner provides no more than speculation to suggest that there necessarily must be some relationship between in vitro measurements and in vivo measurements. See Reply 6–8. Because Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Heller discloses all of the limitations of clam 23, we determine Petitioner has not shown that Heller anticipates claim 23.” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 11,000,213 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,000,213
• Abbott Diabetes Care Inc v. Dexcom, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 1, 2023 · IPR2022-00909 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 19, and 23 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 5 and 12 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

    “including a “predictive glucose value,” nowhere do we find the written description or drawings to have delineated such a second function expressly as “the present invention.” See, generally, Ex. 1001; see also Evolusion Concepts, Inc. v. HOC Events, Inc., 22 F.4th 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“We have repeatedly held that ‘it is not enough that the only embodiments, or all of the embodiments, contain a particular limitation to limit claims beyond their plain meaning.’”) (citation omitted). And, regardless of the exact wording, the concern we have is that without a persuasive, express, indication in the specification that the “second function” is specifically limited to “predicting glucose values,” it is a disfavored path to read limitations into the claims. Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import limitations into a claim that are not expressly part of may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment. SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The facts and written description here appear to fall more squarely into the category of cases where it is not enough to simply point to embodiments in the specification including the unrecited claim limitation. See Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. Ag, 318 F.3d 1081, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Even in cases where a “present invention” statement is provided, the Federal Circuit has explained that ‘[w]hile clear language characterizing ‘the present invention’ may limit the ordinary meaning of claim terms, . . . such language must be read in context of the entire specification and the prosecution history.”) (citation omitted); see also In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Absent claim language carrying a narrow meaning, the PTO should only limit the claim based on the specification or prosecution history when those sources expressly disclaim the broader definition.”).” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “is any disagreement about the meaning of “a second function” apart from the argument by Patent Owner that the second function should be understood to include “a predictive glucose value.” We are not apprised of any reason for Petitioner to provide an express construction for “second function” in this case. The plain and ordinary reading of limitation 1b is a method step of “evaluating sensor data using a second function to determine whether a parameter indicative of glucose value meets one or more non user settable second criteria.” Ex. 1001, 48:39–41. As far as “second function” goes, the claim language is clear on its face that the second function “determine[s] whether a parameter indicative of glucose value meets one or more non user settable second criteria.” Id. Patent Owner has not offered any construction, nor apart from criticizing Petitioner, indicated in any manner that the “second function” as recited in claims 1 and 19 requires a construction. Our understanding of “second function” is consistent with the specification of the ’215 patent. A plain reading of the specification reveals that the first criteria relates to the claimed “first function,” and the “second criteria” relates to the claimed “second function.” See, e.g., Ex. 1001 3:44–49 (The ’215 Patent describing “a processor configured to: evaluate sensor data using a first function to determine whether a real time glucose value meets one or more first criteria; evaluate sensor data using a second function to determine whether a predicted glucose value meets one or more second criteria.”). The specification description is therefore mostly consistent with the recitations in claim 1 with respect to the first and second functions and relative first and second criteria. Compare id., with Ex. 1001, 48:36–41.” slip op. at 35

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “second function.” PO Resp. 19. However, neither did Patent Owner provide an express construction. See generally id. is any disagreement about the meaning of “a second function” apart from the argument by Patent Owner that the second function should be understood to include “a predictive glucose value.” We are not apprised of any reason for Petitioner to provide an express construction for “second function” in this case. The plain and ordinary reading of limitation 1b is a method step of “evaluating sensor data using a second function to determine whether a parameter indicative of glucose value meets one or more non user settable second criteria.” Ex. 1001, 48:39–41. As far as “second function” goes, the claim language is clear on its face that the second function “determine[s] whether a parameter indicative of glucose value meets one or more non user settable second criteria.” Id. Patent Owner has not offered any construction, nor apart from criticizing Petitioner, indicated in any manner that the “second function” as recited in claims 1 and 19 requires a construction. Our understanding of “second function” is consistent with the specification of the ’215 patent. A plain reading of the specification reveals that the first criteria relates to the claimed “first function,” and the “second criteria” relates to the claimed “second function.” See, e.g., Ex. 1001 3:44–49 (The ’215 Patent describing “a processor configured to: evaluate sensor data using a first function to determine whether a real time glucose value meets one or more first criteria; evaluate sensor data using a second function to determine whether a predicted glucose value meets one or more second criteria.”). The specification description is therefore mostly consistent with the recitations in claim 1 with respect to the first and second functions and relative first and second criteria. Compare id., with Ex. 1001, 48:36–41. slip op. at 34

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In our Institution Decision we determined, in accordance with Petitioner’s proposal, that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’215 patent [w]ould have had a Bachelor’s degree in biomedical engineering, mathematics, statistics, or computer science (or a related or equivalent field), and two or more years of experience researching, developing, designing and/or evaluating (or supervising the same) medical devices for measuring analyte levels, e.g., analyte sensors, including at least some experience in researching, developing, designing and/or evaluating (or supervising the same) methods, systems, or algorithms for providing indicators (e.g., alerts, alarms or other indicators) of analyte levels to users, or equivalent experience. A person with less or different education but more relevant practical experience, or vice versa, may also meet this standard. Inst. Dec. 8; Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 24–26). Patent Owner states that “DexCom does not challenge Petitioner’s POSA definition (Petition, 9-10) because the Petition fails even if it is adopted.” PO Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 20–23). ordinary skill in the art, and because Petitioner’s assessment is consistent with the ’215 patent and the asserted prior art, we continue to rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11

  Patent outcomesUS 10,702,215 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,702,215
• Valve Corporation v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 26, 2023 · IPR2017-01928 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Remand

  Claims 1, 2, 9, 11–17, and 21–24 are unpatentable over Burns with Uy or AlphaGrip; claim 10 was not shown unpatentable because Burns does not teach detachable paddles.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “rendered claims 3–8 and 18–20 unpatentable. Valve, 8 F.4th at 1381. The Federal Circuit reversed our determination that Burns was not prior art. Id. at 1381. The Federal Circuit also vacated our determination that Valve had failed to prove that collectively claims 1, 2, 9–17, and 21–24 were unpatentable as obvious in view of Burns in combination with either Uy or AlphaGrip. Id. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit remanded the case to us to consider Valve’s challenges to the patentability of claims 1, 2, 9–17, and 21–24 of the ’229 patent as obvious based on the combinations of prior art listed in the table below. Claims6 35 U.S.C. § References 1, 2, 9, 10, 14–17, 21–24 103 Burns, Uy 1, 2, 9–17, 21, 22 103 Burns, AlphaGrip Id. C. Remand Background On remand, we authorized the parties to concurrently file an opening brief and then concurrently file responsive reply briefs. Paper 44, 4. The parties agreed, and we concurred, that no new evidence would be submitted during the remand proceeding. Id. at 3. Accordingly, we decide the issues on remand based on the record that was submitted during the original trial.” slip op. at 4

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. Valve contends that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have: a bachelor’s degree in an industrial design or engineering field, and approximately two years of relevant experience, for example. Alternatively, the same or an equivalent level of skill in the art could be obtained by end users or hobbyists who have substantial experience modifying or creating customized game controllers that include features to better suit their needs, even without any college education. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 11). Ironburg, without expressly defining the level of ordinary skill, contends that a college degree of the type identified by Valve is not required. See Supp. PO Resp. 4–6. Ironburg notes that the level of ordinary skill is “relatively low” and the technology involved “is simple and straightforward.” Id. at 4 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶ 21). Ironburg’s contentions regarding the level of ordinary skill are consistent with Valve’s position, id. at 6, which we apply in our analysis. D. Whether AlphaGrip Is a Prior Art Printed Publication” slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “We find Ironburg’s critique of Mr. Willner’s testimony unavailing. Valve persuasively responds that Mr. Willner testifies that he personally recalls reviewing AlphaGrip on the internet during 2006, which significantly predates the filing of the oldest application in the priority chain of the ’229 patent, May 22, 2013, by at least six years. Compare Ex. 1009 ¶ 3 (testifying that online publication of AlphaGrip happened in 2006), with Ex. 1001, code (60) (identifying provisional application filed May 22, 2013, as earliest-filed priority application). Mr. Willner testifies that he is the inventor and designer of the controller that is reviewed in AlphaGrip, which we find to qualify him as an ordinarily skilled artisan. Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 1–3. Besides expressly testifying that he viewed AlphaGrip online during 2006, Mr. Willner also testifies in some detail about his recollection of his interactions with the author of AlphaGrip, Ryan Paul, and the events surrounding the publication of Mr. Paul’s review on Arstechnica’s website. Id. ¶¶ 4–5. Mr. Willner also reviews the version of AlphaGrip that Valve submitted as prior art and testifies that it is a true and correct copy of the review that he remembers seeing online during 2006. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. We find Mr. Willner’s testimony to be reliable in part because he recalls being “delighted” by the praise Mr. Paul lavished on the AlphaGrip controller. Id. ¶ 8. The publication of AlphaGrip marked an important event for Mr. Willner’s company. Mr. Willner states that he immediately posted a link on his own company’s website to Arstechnica’s AlphaGrip review in 2006, and his company maintains the link to Arstechnica’s review of AlphaGrip “to this day.” Id. We find that all these facts increase the probative value of Mr. Willner’s testimony on the issue of whether AlphaGrip was published and could easily have been found by interested persons during 2006. Although Mr. Willner may not have been a webpage manager for Arstechnica or be able to testify about precisely how many people accessed AlphaGrip in 2006, we find his testimony, as one of skill in the art himself to be compelling. Not only has Ironburg failed to refute any of Mr. Willner’s testimony with countervailing evidence, Ironburg did not cross-examine Mr. Willner to test his memory of the specific events set forth in his testimony. See PO Resp. 16–18 (failing to provide countervailing evidence or cite cross examination testimony).” slip op. at 12

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed

    “We also disagree with Ironburg that we should exclude as hearsay or irrelevant Dr. Rempel’s testimony on how flexible the Burns’ paddles were or the extensive body of objective evidence cited and relied upon by him to support his testimony.9 Mot. 12–13. To the contrary, we agree with Valve that Dr. Rempel may properly rely upon the cited exhibits even if they would otherwise be inadmissible hearsay because they constitute the types of information upon which an expert would reasonably rely under Fed. R. Evid. 703. Opp. 10. Accordingly, we deny-in-part the Motion to the extent that it seeks to strike or exclude testimony in Dr. Rempel’s second declaration or Exhibits 1020, 1025, 1026, 1031, 1036, 1042 cited by Dr. Rempel in support of his analysis.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 9,352,229 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,352,229
• Boston Scientific Corp. And Boston Scientific Neuromodulation Corp. v. Nevro Corp.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 14, 2022 · IPR2020-01563 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7 and 9–21 are unpatentable as anticipated by Bradley857 and obvious over Bradley857, Bradley384, and Meadows; claim 8 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “At the outset, we find that the plain language of clauses 1[i], 12[k], and 18[e], in isolation, requires only that the displayed image of one lead is aligned with the displayed image of the other lead without requiring any “repositioning” of previously displayed images. However, Patent Owner argues that other language recited in each independent claim requires first “establishing” the positions of the first and second leads, which necessarily means that “aligning” the images of the first and second leads refers to repositioning them on the display. Sur-reply 2–3. However, Patent Owner’s argument fails to recognize the distinction between establishing the physical “position” of the leads relative to a physical frame of reference and aligning computer-based images of those leads. For example, clauses 18[b] and 18[c] of independent claim 18 recite: “[b] establishing a first positional relationship between a location of a first signal delivery device and an anatomical feature of a patient” and “[c] establishing a second positional relationship between a location of a second signal delivery device and at least one of the location of the first signal delivery device or the anatomical feature of the patient.” Ex. 1001, 40:34–41. None of clauses 18[b] or 18[c] or the substantively identical clauses 1[d], 1[f], 12[h], 12[i]5 from the other independent claims mentions displaying an image of either lead on a computer screen. Rather, these clauses encompass establishing the spatial position of each of the first and second physical leads relative to a physical frame of reference (e.g., an anatomical feature of a patient or another lead). These limitations may be met without displaying leads on a computer screen at all. Accordingly, we reject Patent Owner’s argument that the claims first require positioning images of the leads on a display before aligning those images on the display. Rather, we find that a plain reading of “align” or” slip op. at 10

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsNot reached

    “II. PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO AMEND Patent Owner filed a contingent motion to amend claims. Paper 25. Patent Owner affirmatively withdrew its motion, Paper 36, after we issued Preliminary Guidance on the motion, Paper 32. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s motion to amend is moot, and we do not reach any issue presented in that motion.” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s definition of the ordinary level of skill. PO Resp. 17. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed definition. We also find that Petitioner’s proposed definition is consistent with the level of skill demonstrated in the cited prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). E. CLAIMS 1–21: ANTICIPATION BY BRADLEY857” slip op. at 17

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “which electrodes are selected for delivering therapy. Reply 10. Petitioner also responds that Bradley857’s reference to Meadows incorporates Meadows method for determining whether an electrode is “available” to the user for delivering therapy by first confirming that impedance of the electrode is within a pre-established range. Id. For example, Meadows indicates that the “number of implanted and available electrodes is typically automatically determined by impedance measurements during hardware interrogation,” Ex. 1006, 34:57–59, and that impedance of an electrode “is a general measure of the fitness of the system to perform its required function,” id. at 46:61–64. Dr. Stone, Patent Owner’s expert, agrees that Meadows’s system does not deliver therapy to an electrode if the measured impedance for that electrode is too high or too low, that is, outside a pre-established range. Ex. 1040, 82:8–87:8.” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 10,076,665 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,076,665
• Xilinx, Inc. / Xilinx Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd. v. Analog Devices, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 11, 2022 · IPR2020-01564 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, and 4–8 were not shown unpatentable; claim 12 was shown unpatentable as obvious over Elbornsson and Jamal, and over Eklund and Jamal.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “time it was made, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. Petitioner asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the invention “would have at least a Master’s Degree in Electrical Engineering or equivalent field, including studies in designing data converters, and two to five years of relevant experience; or a Ph.D. degree in Electrical Engineering or equivalent field.” Pet. 34 (citing Ex. 1202 ¶¶ 17–18). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art in its Response. See generally PO Resp. For purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation because it is consistent with the ’750 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “U.S.C. § 282(b) “including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” See Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340, 51,358 (Oct. 11, 2018) (amending 37 C.F.R. §42.100(b) effective November 13, 2018) (now codified at 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019)). Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Patent Owner contends that “random clock,” “offset sensing circuit,” and “sensing” a gain or offset signal need to be construed. PO Resp. 13–17. Petitioner contends that no construction of any term is necessary. Reply 2– 5. The contentions of the parties were addressed in our Final Written Decision for IPR2020-01483, which was mailed on the same day as this Decision. We decline to construe these terms for the reasons given in that Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Dr. Raychowdhury testifies that, in Jamal’s technique, “the input is de-correlated from the pseudo random chopping sequence.” Ex. 2206 ¶ 64. Then, inexplicably, Dr. Raychowdhury testifies that “Jamal is unambiguous that ‘C[m] is white, has zero mean, and is uncorrelated with the input signal.’” Id. at ¶ 69. Patent Owner does not explain nor even address Dr. Raychowdhury’s inconsistent testimony. Given the inconsistent positions taken by Patent Owner’s expert, and the lack of explanation from Patent Owner, we give no weight to Dr. Raychowdhury’s testimony.” slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Even were we to accept Petitioner’s contention, that a ‘“random clock’ can be satisfied by a 1-bit pseudo-random bit sequence,” (Pet. 36), Jamal discloses that the alleged random clock C[m] “is uncorrelated with the input signal.” Ex. 1205, 8. A chopping SHA multiplies the input signal and the uncorrelated random signal C[m], then provides a chopped analog signal to the ADC converter. Id. Petitioner has not persuasively shown that chopping an input signal with an uncorrelated random signal, then providing the chopped signal to a converter as disclosed by Jamal, describes “said random clock configured to decorrelate an input signal provided to said first converter from said random clock” as recited in claim 1. We find that claim 1 is not unpatentable based on Jamal. Because claims 2 and 4–6 depend from claim 1, we find that these claims are also not unpatentable based on Jamal.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 6,900,750 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,900,750

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.