• Aquestive Therapeutics, Inc. v. Neurelis, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Sep 27, 2019 · IPR2019-00451 · APJ Jamie T Wisz · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, finding no abuse of discretion in instituting review of claims 1–36 because Patent Owner did not show entitlement to the provisional priority date.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “II. ANALYSIS Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d): A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single request for rehearing without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. When reconsidering a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion exists where a “decision [i]s based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988).” slip op. at 2

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedDecided for petitioner

    “burden of going forward to show that there is invalidating prior art. Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379. As discussed in our Decision, Petitioner satisfied its initial burden of production on the issue of whether Gwozdz is prior art by establishing that Gwozdz is entitled to the effective filing date of the Gwozdz provisional. Decision 7. Therefore, Gwozdz is prior art to the ’876 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(1) unless Patent Owner can show that the ’876 patent is entitled to the effective filing date of its provisional application (“the ’558 provisional”). Id. Thus, the burden of production shifts to Patent Owner, who must show not only the existence of earlier applications, but also how the written description in the earlier applications supports the challenged claims. Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379–80. “[T]o gain the benefit of the filing date of an earlier application 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 120, each application in the chain leading back to the earlier application must comply with the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112.” Zenon Envtl., Inc. v. U.S. Filter Corp., 506 F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); see also In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 609 (CCPA 1977) (“[T]here has to be a continuous chain of copending applications each of which satisfies the requirements of § 112 with respect to the subject matter presently claimed.” (alteration in original) (quoting In re Schneider, 481 F.2d 1350, 1356 (CCPA 1973))). Thus, as discussed in our Decision, Patent Owner must show that each application in the priority chain1 makes the requisite disclosure of subject matter; otherwise, the ’876 patent is not entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the ’558 provisional. Decision 7 n.6. On this record, Patent Owner fails to satisfy its burden of production to show entitlement to an earlier filing date. All of Patent Owner’s arguments are focused on the alleged deficiencies with Petitioner’s contentions regarding the disclosure of alkyl glycosides in the ’558 provisional. Prelim. Resp. 24–27. Patent Owner offers no analysis demonstrating that every patent application along the priority chain conveys with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that the inventors were in possession of each limitation of each of the challenged claims, as well as the 1 In this case, the priority chain for the ’876 patent includes a provisional application and a continuation-in-part application. Decision 6. 5 claimed invention as a whole. See Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572. Therefore, on this record, Patent Owner has not demonstrated that the claims of the ’876 patent are entitled to the priority date of the ’558 provisional.” slip op. at 4

  § 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 9,763,876
• Saudi Arabian Oil Company v. SK Innovation Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 9, 2019 · IPR2018-00159 · APJ Monté T Squire · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 2 was held unpatentable as anticipated by Novomer 1; the contingent motion to amend was granted, substituting claim 5.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Applying the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which requires demonstration of a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim, we granted Petitioner’s request and instituted an inter partes review for challenged claim 2. Paper 9 (“Institution Dec.”).” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s assessment regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Mot. Amend 7. We determine the level of ordinary skill proposed by Petitioner is consistent with the ’979 patent and the asserted prior art, and we adopt that level in construing and deciding the patentability of claim 2.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “In the Institution Decision, we determined that the phrase “A poly(alkylene carbonate) represented by Formula 10” did not require construction at that stage. Institution Dec. 9; see also id. at 7 (citing Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only terms which are in controversy need be construed and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy)). Neither party has argued post-institution that this phrase of claim 2 needs be construed. See PO Resp. 2; Pet. Reply 1–3. We conclude that no further construction of this phrase is necessary.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “In the Institution Decision, we agreed with Petitioner that the variable construction of the phrase “each independently” is the broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification, and construed the phrase to mean that “each variable R81, R82, R83, and R84 is independent from one instance to another throughout the polymer.” Institution Dec. 13–14. Based on that construction, we also determined in the Institution Decision that claim 2 encompasses the following genera: (1) “Genus A,” which includes a poly(ethylene glycol) chain transfer agent flanked by poly(ethylene carbonate) chains (Pet. 24); (2) “Genus B,” which includes a poly(propylene glycol) chain transfer agent flanked by poly(propylene carbonate) chains (id. at 25–26); (3) “Genus C,” which includes a poly(propylene glycol) chain transfer agent flanked by poly(ethylene carbonate) chains (id. at 26); and (4) “Genus D,” which includes a poly(ethylene glycol) chain transfer agent flanked by poly(propylene carbonate) chains (id. at 27). Institution Dec. 12–13. Neither party opposes adopting the variable construction of the phrase “each independently” and the determination that, under the variable construction, claim 2 encompasses Genus A, Genus B, Genus C, and Genus D. PO Resp. 2; Pet. Reply 1–3. We maintain the variable construction of the phrase “each independently” on the complete record.” slip op. at 11

  Patent outcomesUS 9,023,979 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,023,979
• Fujifilm Corporation v. Sony CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 3, 2018 · IPR2017-01390 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held that claims 1–18 were not shown unpatentable because the prior art did not establish the claimed volume concentration in the formed magnetic layer.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “define the term “volume concentration.” In the context of the ’331 patent, “volume concentration” refers to the volume concentration of the magnetic particles in the formed magnetic layer.” slip op. at 13

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “(1) a bachelor’s degree in materials science, physics, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, chemistry, or a closely related field, and at least five years of experience in the field of magnetic recording, or (2) a Master’s degree or higher in materials science, physics, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, chemistry, or a closely related field, with an emphasis in magnetic recording, and at least three years of experience in the field of magnetic recording. Pet. 12; Ex. 1017 ¶ 60. Although Patent Owner does not expressly define the appropriate level of skill in the art in the Patent Owner Response or its Supplemental Response, Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Bain, presents a definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art in his declaration that is nearly identical to Petitioner’s definition. Ex. 2001 ¶ 44. In view of this, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 16

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “information, is not sufficient evidence to establish that Mori discloses the “volume concentration” recited in claim 1. Patent Owner does not dispute that there is some magnetic alloy present “in the magnetic layer” of Mori. The relevant question, however, is how much and how Mori’s disclosed values were determined. Unlike the term “volume concentration,” for which the parties offered undisputed evidence regarding accepted meanings of the term in the art (i.e., packing fraction and pigment volume concentration), we have not been directed to similar evidence regarding the phrase “fill rate”/“filling rate” in Mori. Thus, although Mori states “[t]he filling rate by volume of the strongly magnetic alloy powder in the magnetic layer can be equal to or higher than 30%” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 11 (emphasis added)), Petitioner has not offered sufficient evidence demonstrating that the term “filling rate” in Mori refers to a final product-based value. As a result, we find that this language in Mori does not establish, by a preponderance of evidence, that Mori discloses the “volume concentration” recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “For all of the foregoing reasons, we find that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate, by a preponderance of evidence, that the combined teachings of Aonuma and Mori disclose or suggest “[a] dual layer magnetic recording medium comprising . . . a magnetic upper recording layer formed over [a] lower support layer, the magnetic upper recording layer comprising a volume concentration of at least about 35% of a primary magnetic particulate pigment,” as recited in independent claims 1 and 16. Ex. 1001, 11:14–20, 12:25–31. Claims 2–15, 17, and 18 depend from claim 1 or claim 16, and, therefore, include the “volume concentration” limitation of claims 1 and 16. As a result, we find that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that Aonuma and Mori disclose or suggest each limitation of claims 1–18, and, therefore, has not demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence that claims 1–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Aonuma and Mori.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 7,115,331 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 7,115,331
• Fujifilm Corporation v. Sony CorporationSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 7, 2018 · IPR2017-01268 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 15 and 17 are unpatentable as anticipated by Ishikawa; the petitioner did not show claims 1–11, 16, and 18–20 unpatentable over Aonuma or Aonuma and Abe.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “(“POSITA”) at the time of the ’774 patent would have had “a bachelor’s degree in materials science, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, chemistry, or a closely related field, and at least five years of experience” in industry or academic research relating to magnetic tape, or “a master’s degree or higher” in the same fields and at least three years of experience relating to magnetic tape. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 65; Ex. 1018 ¶ 60). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assessment in its Response, and Dr. Talke agrees that it “is reasonable.” Ex. 2026 ¶¶ 25–26. Petitioner’s assessment appears consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163–64 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “the broadest reasonable construction, claim terms are presumed to have their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire patent disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For the purposes of the Decision on Institution, we determined that, based on the record at that time, no claim term required express construction (Dec. on Inst. 7), and we see no reason to modify that determination in light of the record developed during trial. C.” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedMixed

    “considerably greater than Ishikawa’s stylus load of 50–300 μN (Ex. 1015 ¶ 45). The Talke Declaration does not address this discrepancy, and Dr. Talke stated during his deposition that reducing the stylus load would reduce scratching of the magnetic tape surface. Ex. 1030, 108:14–19 (“Q: Would reducing the contact pressure for the stylus instrument reduce the scratching of the magnetic tape surface by the stylus? A: Yes, it would, but you have to remember the other problem is the diameter and size of the stylus.”). Moreover, Petitioner provides evidence that it was not uncommon to use stylus-type profilometers to measure the properties of magnetic tape, even after Bhushan was published in 1996. See Reply 6. In particular, Petitioner points to Saliba,6 which describes using a stylus-type profilometer, under identical conditions to those used in Ishikawa, to measure the surface characteristics (including peak-to-valley roughness) of the backcoating of magnetic tape. Ex. 1027, 7:28–40, 57–60. Petitioner further points to Ohno,7 which also describes using “a stylus type 3D profilometer in accordance with JIS B0601” to measure the surface roughness characteristics of magnetic tape. Ex. 1028 ¶ 36; see also Ex. 1015 ¶ 45 (Ishikawa explaining that surface roughness characteristics were measured “in accordance with JIS-B0601-1994”); Ex. 1027, 7:28–39 (Saliba explaining that surface roughness characteristics where measured “in accordance with JIS-B0601-1994”). Accordingly, we are persuaded that the 6 US Patent No. 6,558,774 B1, issued May 6, 2003 (Ex. 1027). 7 U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. US 2005/0175866 A1, published Aug. 11, 2005 (Ex. 1028). evidence establishes that a stylus-type profilometer is a suitable device for measuring the surface characteristics of magnetic tape.” slip op. at 19

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We agree with Petitioner that Ishikawa teaches “peak-to-valley roughness less than about 325 nm” as recited in claim 15. Pet. 24–25; Reply 5–8; Ex. 1003 ¶ 216. In particular, Ishikawa teaches a backcoating layer of a magnetic tape that has a peak-to-valley roughness “Rz of 40 to 250 nm, particularly 50 to 200 nm.” Ex. 1015 ¶ 44. Ishikawa provides five example embodiments of its magnetic tape, and reports the measurements of a number of characteristics of the backcoat layer for each example, including peak-to-valley roughness Rz. Id. ¶¶ 120–134, Table 1. Ishikawa discloses that peak-to-valley roughness Rz was measured using a stylus-type profilometer under the following conditions: Stylus: diameter: 1.5 to 2.5 μm; curvature: 60º Contact pressure: 50 to 300 μN Cut-off length: 80 μm Sampling length: 80 μm Assessment length: 400 μm Id. ¶¶ 45, 49. The reported peak-to-valley roughness Rz values for the five examples ranged from 58 to 87 nm, as shown in the annotated portion of Ishikawa Table 1 from the Petition, reproduced below: Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1015, Table 1). The annotated portion of Ishikawa Table 1 shows the results for the measured characteristics of the backcoat layer of Examples 1–5, with the peak-to-valley roughness Rz values highlighted by a red box. Id. Because Ishikawa teaches that the backcoating layer of its magnetic tape should have a peak-to-valley roughness “Rz of 40 to 250 nm, particularly 50 to 200 nm,” and because Ishikawa presents examples of magnetic tape with backside surfaces having a peak-to-valley roughness of 87 nm or less, Ishikawa discloses “a peak-to-valley roughness less than about 325 nm” as recited in claim 15.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 7,029,774 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,029,774
• Unified Patents Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II, LLCRehearing denied
  PTAB · Sep 27, 2018 · IPR2016-01404 · APJ Kamran Jivani · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board granted the motion to excuse late filing and denied rehearing, maintaining that claims 1, 2, 13, 14, 33, 34, 39, 46, and 48 were not shown unpatentable over Bensimon.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision . . .” who “must specifically identify all matters the party believes [we] misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Petitioner’s argument is predicated upon a mischaracterization of our factual findings. Petitioner asserts that we found Bensimon “taught all of the elements of the claim in ‘one possible mode of operation.’” Reh’g Req. 1 (citing Decision 17). We, however, made no such finding. The phrase that Petitioner attributes to us—namely, “one possible mode of operation”—does not appear anywhere in our Final Written Decision. Compare Reh’g Req. 1 (citing Decision 17) to Decision 17. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, we did not find “that Bensimon sometimes teaches all of the elements of the claim” nor did we find “that Bensimon discloses a ‘restricted-access mode’ by disclosing a ‘write protection’ mode.” Reh’g Req. 1–3 (citing Decision, 16–17). Rather, we found the exact opposite—that Bensimon fails to disclose the claimed restricted-access mode because, as claimed, that mode requires the absence of the claimed device-specific security information (i.e. the read/write password, or alternatively the combination of the read/write password and password-enabling flag). Decision 16–17 (citing Reply 16– 22) (“Petitioner identifies Bensimon’s read/write password, alone or in combination with the password-enabling flag, as the device-specific security information, yet Petitioner does not identify in Bensimon an explicit disclosure that Bensimon’s storage device operates in the claimed restricted-access mode when the read/write password is absent from the device.”) (bolding added; italics original). slip op. at 5

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “claim” nor did we find “that Bensimon discloses a ‘restricted-access mode’ by disclosing a ‘write protection’ mode.” Reh’g Req. 1–3 (citing Decision, 16–17). Rather, we found the exact opposite—that Bensimon fails to disclose the claimed restricted-access mode because, as claimed, that mode requires the absence of the claimed device-specific security information (i.e. the read/write password, or alternatively the combination of the read/write password and password-enabling flag). Decision 16–17 (citing Reply 16– 22) (“Petitioner identifies Bensimon’s read/write password, alone or in combination with the password-enabling flag, as the device-specific security information, yet Petitioner does not identify in Bensimon an explicit disclosure that Bensimon’s storage device operates in the claimed restricted-access mode when the read/write password is absent from the device.”) (bolding added; italics original).” slip op. at 6

  § 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 6,968,459
• BMW Of North America, LLC v. Stragent, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 13, 2018 · IPR2017-00677 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 51–59 are unpatentable: claims 51–59 over Staiger and Millsap, and claims 51 and 54–57 over each OSEK-based obviousness ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “We have reviewed the relevant deposition testimony, in which Dr. Miller was asked to identify the standard he used when construing claim terms in his Declaration. Ex. 1025, 27:1–34:14. We agree with Petitioner that Dr. Miller did not provide responses sufficient to conclude that he was aware of and/or applied the correct claim-construction standard. See id. at 27:5–6 (“I used what is generally accepted in the field.”), 27:9–11 (“So to – for construing the claim terms is providing a definition of what the term is. So I provided a general definition for the terms.”), 30:3–6 (“Well, that’s the standard that I used for construing the claim terms in this Declaration. I don’t know if that’s the legal qualification for construing claim terms.”), 32:18–23 (“broadest reasonable interpretation” would mean “when you’re defining a term that you would define it in a way that is, first of all, reasonable, that it makes sense and that it’s broad, meaning general and that it’s interpreting the phrase or the term”). Nevertheless, we are not persuaded that the appropriate remedy is exclusion of Dr. Miller’s testimony. As Patent Owner asserts, “[t]he role of the expert witness under the Federal Rules of Evidence is to ‘help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.’” Paper 24, 2–3 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702) (emphasis by Patent Owner). As Patent Owner further asserts, Petitioner does not “impugn[]” Dr. Miller’s credibility as an expert in the subject matter at issue. Id. at 3–4. We agree with Patent Owner that “Petitioner’s attack on the sufficiency of the evidence is improper in a motion to exclude.” Id. at 4 (citing Microsoft Corp. v. Surfcast, Inc., Case IPR2013-00292 at 52–53 (Paper 93) (PTAB Oct. 14, 2014)). We accordingly deny Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude.” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedOther

    “Petitioner alternatively argues in its Reply that “Because Dr. Miller did not apply the correct claim construction standard, his opinions on claim construction (Ex. 2001, §§16-21) should be afforded no weight.” Reply 2. Although we agree that the weight to be accorded to Dr. Miller’s testimony on claim construction is impacted by the uncertainty of the analytical procedure he followed, we are not persuaded that his testimony should be discounted wholesale. Dr. Miller provides relevant opinions on a number of issues, particularly including how a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand certain terms in light of the Specification, that are helpful to us as the trier of fact. “There is no more certain test for determining when experts may be used than the common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute.” Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 414, 418 (1952).” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “shared “in real time utilizing a second network protocol . . . ,” and dependent claim 59 recites that information is processed “to create, in real-time, messages in at least two other message formats . . . .” Petitioner argues that the Specification of the ’843 patent expressly defines “real-time”: “In the context of the present description, real-time may include any response time that may be measured in milli- or microseconds, and/or is less than 1 second.” Ex. 1001, col. 3, ll. 35–38. Accordingly, Petitioner proposes that “‘real-time’ should be construed as responses that occur in less than one second.” Pet. 13. Patent Owner contends that the definition from the Specification should be adopted. PO Resp. 15. We construe “real-time” as Petitioner proposes, i.e., as including responses that occur in less than one second. The first part of the quote cited above provided in the Specification (“may be measured in milli- or microseconds”) is not limiting because any response time, no matter how large or small, may be measured in milli- or microseconds.” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “been reached in association with the storage request.” Petitioner proposes that “threshold” be construed consistent with a dictionary definition it provides, as a “value above which something is true or will take place and below which it is not or will not.” Pet. 13–14 (citing Ex. 1016, 5). Observing that the Specification of the ’843 patent uses “threshold” in the context of an elapsed time, Petitioner further proposes that this construction “include the maximum value (i.e., time-out) of a timer.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, col. 8, ll. 21–25, col. 8, ll. 47–51). We agree, and accordingly construe “threshold” as Petitioner proposes.3 3. “heterogeneous networks” Dependent claim 55 recites that the “apparatus is operable such that the first network and the second network are heterogeneous networks.” The Specification of the ’843 patent defines “heterogeneous networks”: “In the context of the present description, heterogeneous networks may refer to any different communication networks with at least one aspect that is different.” Ex. 1001, col. 7, ll. 26–29. In light of this explicit definition, for purposes of this Decision, we construe “heterogeneous networks” as Petitioner proposes, i.e., as “networks having at least one aspect that is different.” Pet. 14 (citing 3 Patent Owner advocates for the same construction advanced by Petitioner, but omits inclusion of the maximum value of a timer. PO Resp. 15. Although Patent Owner asserts that the construction is otherwise “the definition provided by the ‘843 Patent,” it does not cite to the ’843 patent to support its assertion, and we are unable to identify such a definition in the patent. Nevertheless, we agree with Petitioner that any distinction between the constructions is not material to any grounds. See Reply 6.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 8,566,843 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,566,843
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Infobridge Pte. Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 23, 2018 · IPR2017-00100 · APJ John P Pinkerton · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 8 and 9 were not proven unpatentable because Samsung did not establish that WD4 was a prior art printed publication.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable

    “Because there are many ways in which a reference may be disseminated to the interested public, ‘public accessibility’ has been called the touchstone in determining whether a reference constitutes a ‘printed publication’ bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).” In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898–99 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). Whether a reference is publicly accessible is determined on a case-by-case basis based on the “facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public.” In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). A reference will be considered publicly accessible if it was “disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citations omitted) (GSM standard was “sufficiently accessible, at least to the public interested in the art” (citing In re Hall, 781 F. 2d at 899)). Just as indexing plays a significant role in evaluating whether a reference in a library is publicly accessible, “indexing, ‘[w]hether . . . through search engines or otherwise,’ [] is also an important question for determining if a reference stored on a given website in cyberspace is publicly accessible.” Blue Calypso LLC v. Groupon Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Voter Verified, Inc. v. Premier Election Sols., Inc., 698 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). “[A] printed publication need not be easily searchable after publication if it was sufficiently disseminated at the time of its publication.” Suffolk Technologies, LLC v. AOL Inc., 752 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Whether a reference qualifies as a printed publication is a legal conclusion based on underlying factual determinations. In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2009). slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 8,917,772 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 8,917,772
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Infobridge Pte. Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 23, 2018 · IPR2017-00099 · APJ John P Pinkerton · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7 were not proven unpatentable because Samsung did not establish that WD4 was a prior art printed publication under § 102(b).

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable

    “evidence does not establish WD4 was indexed in a manner that one ordinarily skilled in the art, exercising reasonable diligence, could locate it. See Response 45. There is no evidence that the JCT-VC site provided users sufficient guidance on finding documents of interest. Importantly, there is no evidence that one could search for or locate WD4 based on its subject matter. Although the Torino document register contains the number, title, and source (i.e, authors’ names) of each document, the subject of the document is not listed or identified. See In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1160– 61 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding references were not publicly accessible, despite the use of indexing, because the references were indexed only by title and author’s name, rather than by subject). Furthermore, identifying a meeting location was key to navigating the JCT-VC site; however, there is no evidence showing that persons of skill in the art outside of JCT-VC would have had any knowledge or familiarity with the cities in which the JCT-VC meetings were conducted or that the names of the cities were helpful in any respect in locating a document on the site. For these reasons, the evidence does not support the conclusion by a preponderance of the evidence that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the art at the time of the invention would have been aware of the JCT-VC document repository site, or that, if they were aware of the site, would have been able to locate the WD4 document relied upon by Samsung.” slip op. at 19

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Mr. Bross’s testimony is conclusory and insufficiently factually supported. We understand Mr. Bross to be testifying in this regard as a fact witness pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 602, rather than as an expert witness pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Under Rule 602, a fact witness may testify as to a matter only if “evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.” Fed. R. Evid. 602. Here, Mr. Bross’s testimony is based on his “knowledge and recollection” and “the prominence of the JCT-VC” in the video coding industry. However, the particular factual knowledge on which the testimony is based is not described. Similarly, the “prominence” of the JCT-VC is nothing more than an unsupported assumption. We also find Mr. Bross has not been shown to have the requisite personal knowledge to testify about persons “who would regularly visit the JCT-VC site.” Even if we accepted Mr. Bross’s premise of the “prominence of the JCT-VC,” we would not find that to be a sufficient basis for Mr. Bross to reliably testify about persons “regularly visit[ing]” the JCT-VC site.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 8,917,772 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 8,917,772
• Alere Inc. v. Rembrandt Diagnostics, LPSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 9, 2018 · IPR2016-01502 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 2 is unpatentable as anticipated by MacKay; claims 3–5 were not shown unpatentable over MacKay and Cipkowski.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner

    “structure or steps, or if it is ‘necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality’ to the claim.” Catalina Mkt’g Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett–Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For example, a preamble may be limiting when the disputed preamble phrase provides antecedent basis for a claim term in the body of a claim, the specification underscores that the additional structure recited in the preamble is important, or when the patentee clearly relied upon the preamble during prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. Id. at 808–09. “Conversely, a preamble is not limiting ‘where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention,’” id. at 808, or where the patentee uses the preamble to give “a descriptive name to the set of limitations in the body of the claim,” IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The phrase ‘control apparatus’ in the preamble merely gives a descriptive name to the set of limitations in the body of the claim that completely set forth the invention.”). The term “device” is not recited in the body of any claim of the ’019 patent,4 the body of claim 1 recites a structurally complete invention, and the preamble phrase “device for collecting and assaying a sample of biological fluid” specifies the intended use of the invention. Thus, we find the claims of the ’019 patent do not support construing “device” as a limitation. See Catalina Mkt’g, 289 F.3d at 808–09.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “device” set forth above requires a single, unitary structure rather than a collection of separate structures that could be used during the test. See id. at 18 (concluding without analysis that the dictionary definition requires a “single, unitary structure”). Indeed, despite the ubiquitous use of the term “device” in patents generally, we are directed to no case in which the term “device,” by itself, was found to require a single, unitary structure. See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, Section 2106, I (identifying “devices” as one of the four categories of statutory subject matter); Saffran v. Johnson & Johnson, 712 F.3d 549, 565 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (O’Malley concurring in part) (confirming that, in general, the term “device” is generic). Thus, we are not persuaded that the ordinary meaning of the term “device” requires a “single, unitary structure.” See Ex. 1023 ¶ 66 (Dr. Bohannon testifying that the word device, like the words “apparatus” or “system,” is merely a generic term that does not have a specialized meaning in the art and does not require a single, unitary structure). slip op. at 12

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We do not find this argument persuasive. As noted above, we do not construe claim 1 to contain a method step of adding fluid to the container. We construe the first wherein clause of claim 1(c), instead, to require a structure that is capable of allowing liquid to enter the container when the flow control channel is properly disposed therein and is capable of directing this liquid to the sample loading zone of the assay test strip without the liquid having to migrate through an intermediate structure, such as a wicking material. We are persuaded—and Patent Owner does not dispute—that the apparatus of MacKay, as disclosed in Figures 8A–C, has a structure that is capable of achieving both functions. See, e.g., Tr. 26:10–30:20. First, given the open nature of the container, it is evident that liquid may be added to the container when the flow control channel is disposed within the container, and Patent Owner does not assert otherwise. See, e.g., id. Second, even if the fluid present in Figures 8A–C is considered, there is no intermediate structure in the container of MacKay that would prevent additional assay sample fluid from entering the container and being immediately directed to the sample loading zone of the assay test strips.6 Based on the foregoing, we find that MacKay discloses every limitation of claims 1 and 2 of the ’019 patent. Accordingly, Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 2 is anticipated by MacKay.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “discloses the subject matter of claims 3–5 of the ’019 patent. Pet. 26–30. Petitioner also asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to insert the test trip and flow control channel of MacKay in the holder of Cipkowski, in order to prevent “flooding of the test strip as taught in MacKay.” Id. at 29.” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 6,548,019 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,548,019
• Unified Patents Inc. v. Harry Heslop And Sportbrain Holdings, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 6, 2018 · IPR2016-01464 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16 are unpatentable under § 103 over the combinations of Vock, Smith, and Onari; Vock, Smith, Onari, and Root; Vock, Smith, Onari, and Browne; or Shum, Nikolic, and Root.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner proposes the claim term “step data corresponding to a number of steps” should be interpreted to mean data related to a number of steps, which can include data gathered by a pedometer. Pet. 21. Petitioner highlights that during prosecution, Applicants argued that the scope of this claim term encompasses pedometer step data. Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1017, 8). Petitioner also highlights that the Examiner in the reissue application interpreted this claim term to encompass any data developed from the number of steps of the user. Id. (citing Ex. 1022, 35). The Specification of the ’002 patent discloses examples of personal data as the number of steps counted during the user’s fitness activity or during the day, the distance walked by the user during the day, and the amount of calories burned by the user during the day. See Ex. 1001, 7:34, 8:53–55, 10:27–30. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s proposed construction of the claim term “step data corresponding to a number of steps.” Pet. 22. Patent Owner also does not provide its own proposed construction of this claim term. We agree with Petitioner’s reasoning and construe the term “step data corresponding to a number of steps” as encompassing at least data gathered by a pedometer, including a number of steps, or data developed from a number of steps, including a distance walked or an amount of calories burned.” slip op. at 7

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Supported by testimony of Dr. Eldering, Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least two years of work towards a Bachelor’s Degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related subject or equivalent, or at least one year of experience working with computer networks and web sites.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 22). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “We determine that Patent Owner’s contention that Vock teaches away from using the pedometer of system 620 shown in Figure 21 with the system shown in Figure 1 is inconsistent with Vock’s disclosure that “system 620 [shown in Figure 21] is useful to joggers who can gate it to serve as a pedometer” and that “[d]ata may also be acquired by the accelerometer and telemetered to the electronics 626 via an RF link 631 back to a remote base 632 for storage and processing (e.g., such as the base station 70, FIG. 1).” Ex. 1006, 50:5, 49:21–23, and Fig. 21. We determine that the Petition and supporting testimony of Dr. Eldering show that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to modify the sensing unit of Vock to measure and transmit the number of steps taken by a user, and to modify the base station of Vock to provide feedback based on the number of steps, in light of the teachings of Smith, for the benefit of providing a user with additional information with which to quantitatively assess performance during a physical activity, and that such modifications would have been accomplished with a high chance of success. See Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 50–52. We determine that the Petition and supporting testimony of Dr. Eldering show that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified the sensing unit of Vock to periodically transmit data gathered by the sensing unit to a base station, in light of the teachings of Onari, for the benefit of providing other users with updates on the performance of a user as new data is collected. See Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 55–62.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “SportBrain iSTEP product is evidence that the claims are not obvious. PO Resp. 32–36. Petitioner contends that Patent Owner has not established a nexus between the evidence of commercial success and the patented invention. Reply 22–23. In particular, Petitioner contends that the evidence suggests that data was sent from the activity tracker over a telephone line when the device was docked, rather than “over a wireless network” from “wireless communication devices” as claimed. Reply 22 (citing Ex. 1024, 11). Accordingly, Petitioner shows that the challenged claims do not encompass the docked/telephone product for conveying data, and no nexus presumption exists. See Reply Br. 22–23; WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1328–29 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (error to reach obviousness conclusion without first weighing all the factors, and relied upon product must be “the invention disclosed and claimed in the patent” to obtain a presumption of nexus) (quoting J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atl. Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). Even if a nexus presumption were to apply, Patent Owner’s alleged commercial success does not provide any analysis with respect to market share, so it is not clear how 10,000 subscribers or units with accessories sold shows success that alters the obviousness calculus appreciably. See PO Resp. 35–36 (alleging 10,000 subscribers and 35,000 related units and accessories); Pet. Reply 23 (citing Ex. 1024, 7–8 (showing any success probably was due to the growing popularity of exercise trackers in general)). We determine that Patent Owner has not established commercial success or a nexus, such that the product identified by Patent Owner sent data over a wireless network from wireless communication devices, as required by the claims.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 7,454,002 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,454,002

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.