- PTAB · Mar 17, 2022 · PGR2021-00109 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · PGR · Institution
Instituted post-grant review of claims 1–23 on all grounds; petitioner showed that claims 1–12, 15–17, and 21–23 were more likely than not unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 324(c) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021). We may not institute a post-grant review “unless . . . it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). When instituting post-grant review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.208(a).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“pertinence of Timony’s disclosure or of the combined teachings of Gilb ’792/Bundy and Timony/Bundy (and Tsukamoto/Bundy), and did not issue a rejection based on such disclosure or combined teachings, and that this constitutes Examiner error. As discussed below in Section III, we determine that Petitioner has established that it is more likely than not that at least claims 1–12, 15–17, and 21–23 of the ’867 patent are unpatentable. Accordingly, Becton Dickinson factor (e) weighs against exercising discretion to deny institution under § 325(d).” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionOther
“Owner’s arguments as supported by the above-cited evidence, and find Patent Owner’s proffered construction reasonable. Accordingly, for purposes of institution, we construe the limitation “each extension flange lying in an extension flange plane” to mean “for each extension flange an extension flange plane is within the extent of the extension flange from the channel-shaped portion to the connection portion.”” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“we are persuaded that Petitioner’s cited evidence provides sufficient rational reasons for purposes of institution to combine Tsukamoto and Bundy with a reasonable expectation of success, and sufficiently supports Petitioner’s contention that independent claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over the combination of Tsukamoto and Bundy. Accordingly, at this stage of the proceeding, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown that it is more likely” slip op. at 85
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,021,867 - 3shape A/S / 3shape Inc. v. Align Technology, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 26, 2022 · IPR2021-01241 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–20 were unpatentable under any asserted ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). After considering the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine that the reasonable likelihood standard is not met. Accordingly, we deny institution of an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“For purposes of the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of a POSA. See, generally Prelim. Resp. We find that Petitioner’s definition of a POSA is consistent with the scope and content of the ’936 Patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply this definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that the claim language provides a temporal relationship between “first scan data” and “second scan data.” We determine that, in claims 1 and 9, “first scan data” pertains to an earlier scan than “second scan data,” and “second scan data” includes surface data of a physically changed portion of the intra-oral cavity, where the physical change occurs after the first scan and before the second scan. Our interpretation is based on the plain language of claims 1 and 9, which recite that “second scan data” includes “surface data of a physically changed portion of the patient’s intraoral cavity.” The claim language as a whole makes clear that a physical change occurs between the first scan and the second scan. Petitioner implicitly agrees with this interpretation by characterizing its arguments as showing that “a dentist or orthodontist makes a physical change to the tooth between scans.” Pet. 12 (emphasis added). In other words, claims 1 and 9 require the following order of steps: first scan, physical change, second scan.” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“For the reasons discussed above, we determine that claim 1 requires a temporal relationship between “first scan data” and “second scan data.” More specifically, we determine that “first scan data” pertains to an earlier scan than “second scan data,” and “second scan data” includes surface data of a physically changed portion of the intra-oral cavity, where the physical change occurs after the first scan and before the second scan. Petitioner contends that “Rubbert’s original scan of the patient’s teeth (without brackets) satisfies the ‘second’ scan data limitation, and the monitoring scan of the patient’s teeth (with brackets) satisfies the ‘first’ scan data limitation, with the teeth without brackets being a ‘physically changed portion’ relative to the teeth with brackets.” Pet. 28. Petitioner’s contention does not satisfy our claim construction for “first scan data” and “second scan data.” Although Petitioner contends that “first scan data” is disclosed by Rubbert’s “monitoring scan of the patient’s teeth (with brackets)” (id.), Petitioner does not show that Rubbert’s monitoring scan is an earlier scan than the one that produces “second scan data.” Instead, Petitioner contends that “second scan data” is disclosed by Rubbert’s earlier scan—an original scan of the patient’s teeth without brackets retrieved from a stored patient record. Pet. 26–28. The temporal relationship between “first scan data” and “second scan data,” as identified by Petitioner in Rubbert, is the reverse of the temporal relationship required by claim 1. According to Petitioner’s contentions, Rubbert’s “second scan data” pertains to an earlier scan than “first scan data.” As properly construed, claim 1 requires the opposite. Furthermore, Petitioner does not show that Rubbert discloses “surface data of a physically changed portion of the patient’s intra-oral cavity,” as recited in claim 1. Petitioner contends that Rubbert discloses this limitation “because the second scan data (without a bracket) is a physically changed portion in the oral cavity relative to the first scan data (with a bracket).” Pet. 28. Petitioner’s contention does not satisfy our claim construction. Petitioner does not identify any disclosure in Rubbert of a physical change that takes place after the alleged first scan (with a bracket) and before the alleged second scan (without a bracket). Rubbert does not disclose physically removing a bracket from the patient’s tooth and then rescanning the tooth after removal of the bracket. Petitioner does not assert otherwise. Although Petitioner asserts that “installing a bracket” is a “physical” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,791,936 - Avery Dennison Rfid Company / Avery Dennison Retail Information Services LLC v. Evrythng LimitedInstitutedPTAB · Jan 25, 2022 · IPR2021-01259 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–29, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the Lim anticipation and Fitzpatrick–Herzig obviousness grounds, among others.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Determination on Discretion to Institute We consider the above factors and take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. After considering the factors outlined in the precedential order in Fintiv, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under § 314(a).” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims of the ’321 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision on Institution, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. This level of skill comports with the teachings of the ’321 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“and “rules database” (recited in claims 1, 22, and 29). Pet. 18–23. Patent Owner does not address these proposed constructions and specifically notes its belief that, for the purposes of institution, no claim construction is necessary. Prelim. Resp. 6–7. After considering the parties positions and the record at this time, for the purposes of institution, we determine no claim construction is required. See Nidec Motor Corp., 868 F.3d at 1017.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,794,321 - Nested Bean, Inc. v. Big Beings USA Pty Ltd And LB Online & Export Pty Ltd D/B/A Love To Dream Online And ExportsSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 24, 2022 · IPR2020-01234 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2–16 are unpatentable; claims 1, 17, and 18 were not shown unpatentable, principally because the cited combinations did not establish claim 1’s arm-retention limitation.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner
“Generally, a preamble is not limiting.” Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Whether a preamble is limiting is “determined on the facts of each case in light of the overall form of the claim, and the invention as described in the specification and illuminated in the prosecution history.” Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563, 1572–73 (Fed. Cir. 1996). A preamble limits the claimed invention if it recites essential structure or steps, or if it is “necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality” to the claim. Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999). A preamble is not limiting, for example, if the patentee “defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention.” Catalina Mktg. Int'l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002). And, a preamble is generally not limiting unless there is “clear reliance on the preamble during prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art.” Id. A preamble can be limiting if it recites “additional structure or steps underscored as important by the specification,” is “essential to understand limitations or terms in the claim body,” or provides necessary structure absent from the claim body. Id. at 808–09. We agree with Petitioner that the preamble is not a limitation. The term “swaddling suit” is merely a descriptive name for the apparatus that is covered by the claims. IMS Tech, Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Terms in the preamble are not limiting if they “merely give[] a descriptive name to the set of limitations in the body of the claim that completely set forth the invention.”). It is well-established that “[a]pparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a device does.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir 1990). For example, in Cochlear Bone Anchored Solutions AB v. Oticon Med. AB, the Federal Circuit held that a statement of intended purpose in the preamble—“for rehabilitation of unilateral hearing loss”—was not limiting, because the claimed apparatus was fully structurally claimed in the body of the claim, and its structure would allow it to function identically whether or not used for its stated intended purpose. See 958 F.3d 1348, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2020). We find that this is the case here. The bodies of claims 1 and 2 recite structurally complete inventions, which would function identically whether or not they are used for its stated intended purpose. Indeed, if the term “swaddling suit” were replaced by the word “garment,” it would not change the nature of the claim. This interpretation is consistent with the Specification that The invention has been developed primarily for use as a means for swaddling infants for safe sleeping. However, it will be appreciated that the invention is not restricted to this particular use. Ex. 1001, 1:7–10; see also id. at 11:6–11 (the alleged invention “is not restricted to these particular fields of use and it is not limited to particular embodiments or applications described herein”). slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“meaning. But we further agree with Patent Owner that the plain and ordinary meaning for that term is simply “to hold or to keep.” See Ex. 2022. Petitioner’s argument that the Specification uses “retain” to mean that the wing portions are closed, as opposed to having open ends like sleeves reads retain out of context. The portion of the Specification identified by Petitioner states The ends of the wing portions 140 may be open, allowing the hands to extend through the opening end as shown in FIG. 5E. Alternatively, the ends of the wing portions 140 may be closed so that the hands are retained within the wing portions 140 as shown in FIGs. 5C and D. Ex. 1001, 10:3–7 (emphasis added). We do not read this passage as creating a special meaning for “retained,” as Petitioner suggests. Reply 7–8. Petitioner focuses on the portion of this statement that “the ends of the wing portions . . . may be closed so that the hands are retained. . .” to argue that the Specification uses the term “retained” to mean “closed.” However, this argument ignores the end of the sentence that “the ends of the wing portions . . . may be closed so that the hands are retained within the wing portions.” When considered in its full context, we agree with Patent Owner that this passage is consistent with Patent Owner’s construction. See Sur-Reply 11. Indeed, the passage simply uses “retained” in its ordinary sense—i.e., “the ends of the wing portions 140 are closed so that the hands are [held or kept] within the wing portions.” Accordingly, we determine that “retain” has its plain and ordinary meaning, i.e., “to hold or retain.”” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill would have had either formal or informal training in fashion or clothing design with at least 1 year of experience. A person of ordinary skill in the art would likely have had experience designing, producing, or working with clothing for infants, either in a formal or informal setting, including as a new parent or expected parent. Pet. 22–23. Patent Owner does not dispute this definition of a person of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill as it appears to be consistent with the level of skill reflected by the specification and in the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art). E. OVERVIEW OF THE PRIOR ART” slip op. at 18
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“limitations of claims 1 and 2, including: (a) “a swaddling suit,” (of limitations [1P] and [2P] above), (b) “wing portions extending laterally from a bodice portion” (limitations [1E] and [2E] above), (c) “wing portions” that have “a wing tip at an uppermost portion of each of the wing portions that is positioned above a level of the neck hole of said suit” (limitations [1F] and [2F]), and (d) “wing portions” that “retain an infant’s arm and hand in a hand-raised and elbow-bent position” (limitation [1G]) and “wing portions” that “retain an infant’s arm” (limitation [2G]). PO Resp. 14–29. On the full record and as we explain in detail below, we agree with Patent Owner that Parks fails to disclose “wing portions” that “retain an infant’s arm and hand in a hand-raised and elbow-bent position” (limitation [1G]). iii. Undisputed Limitations With respect to the undisputed limitations, we have reviewed the record and determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Parks discloses limitations [1A]–[1D], [1H], [2A]–[2D], and [2H]. We consider the arguments regarding the disputed limitations below.” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 9,179,711 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,179,711 - Intel Corporation v. Parkervision, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 21, 2022 · IPR2020-01302 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, 4, 7, and 9–11 were not determined unpatentable because the asserted Larson and Larson–Butler grounds did not teach sampling.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“Neither party contends that the differences in proposals affect the outcome of this proceeding and we do not find that they do. Nonetheless, on the full record before us, we find that our identification of the level of ordinary skill in art from the Institution Decision as well as Patent Owner’s option (b) are supported by the prior art of record, the ’474 patent, and the opinions of Drs. Subramanian and Steer (which, as discussed above, recognize that additional work experience can compensate for the lack of a formal degree). Accordingly, we modify our preliminary finding to include the specifics from option (b) of Patent Owner’s proposal. Thus, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related subject and two or more years of experience in the field of RF circuit design, or at least five years of work experience and training in the design and development of RF circuits and/or systems. We also find that less work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education, such as a master’s degree.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Because the parties agree that the claims remaining in the trial require “sampling” and also agree that the prior art asserted in this case does not teach “sampling” (as discussed further below), we need not construe these terms expressly to resolve the controversy before us. See Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803. sampling Although claim 1 does not recite “sampling” expressly, the post- institution briefs make clear that the parties agree that claim 1 and its dependent claims require sampling. In particular, Patent Owner contends, (1) “the ’474 patent pertains to a technique called sampling, which involves the use of a ‘switch’” (PO Resp. 2); (2) “all of the challenged claims are directed to a sampling system and, in particular, an energy sampling system (also known as an energy transfer system)” (id.); and (3) “[t]he challenged claims only cover energy sampling and the use of switches” (id. at 20). In its Reply, although Petitioner disagrees with Patent Owner’s interpretation of the claims as limited to energy sampling (i.e., energy transfer systems) (Pet. Reply 3–7), Petitioner contends that based on its “subsequent analysis of [Patent Owner’s] foundational ’551 patent—one of the multiple patents which the ’474 patent incorporates by reference—[Petitioner] now agrees with [Patent Owner] that the claims cover only systems that down-convert by sampling.” Pet. Reply 2. Thus, at a minimum, the parties agree that the claims at issue in this proceeding require sampling.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Discussion As discussed above, the parties now agree that (1) the claims at issue in this proceeding require “sampling” and (2) Larson alone or in combination with Butler do not disclose “sampling” and do not otherwise render the claims unpatentable. See Pet. Reply 2 (stating Petitioner agrees that “the claims cover only systems that down-convert by sampling”), 13 (stating that Larson and Butler do not disclose “down-conversion by sampling” and therefore agreeing that “Larson and Butler do not invalidate those claims”); see Ex. 2031, 6:20–22 (Patent Owner explaining, that “as the Board is aware, both parties agree that sampling is in the claims, and the claims are not invalid in view of all the cited prior art” (capitalization altered)). As such, based on Petitioner’s explicit admissions, Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) Larson anticipates claims 1, 3, 4, and 9–11 or (2) the combination of Larson and Butler would have rendered the subject matter of claims 1, 3, 4, 7, and 9–11 obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Discussion As discussed above, the parties now agree that (1) the claims at issue in this proceeding require “sampling” and (2) Larson alone or in combination with Butler do not disclose “sampling” and do not otherwise render the claims unpatentable. See Pet. Reply 2 (stating Petitioner agrees that “the claims cover only systems that down-convert by sampling”), 13 (stating that Larson and Butler do not disclose “down-conversion by sampling” and therefore agreeing that “Larson and Butler do not invalidate those claims”); see Ex. 2031, 6:20–22 (Patent Owner explaining, that “as the Board is aware, both parties agree that sampling is in the claims, and the claims are not invalid in view of all the cited prior art” (capitalization altered)). As such, based on Petitioner’s explicit admissions, Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) Larson anticipates claims 1, 3, 4, and 9–11 or (2) the combination of Larson and Butler would have rendered the subject matter of claims 1, 3, 4, 7, and 9–11 obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 7,539,474 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,539,474 - 3shape A/S / 3shape Inc. v. Align Technology, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 11, 2022 · IPR2021-01120 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 4, 10, 11, 13, 18, 19, 25, and 30 were obvious over Babayoff ’529 and Atiya.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“2. Summary Regarding Obviousness Challenge Because Patent Owner’s arguments and evidence persuasively rebut Petitioner’s assertion that the Ancestral Applications do not provide written description support for the challenged claims, Petitioner has not shown adequately that Babayoff ’529 is prior art to the challenged claims. Accordingly, Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that claims 1, 4, 10, 11, 13, 18, 19, 25, and 30 would have been obvious over Babayoff ’529 and Atiya. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we determine that the information presented in the record does not establish there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim of the patent ’151 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review. IV. ORDER For the reasons given, it is: ORDERED that the Petition is denied; and FURTHER ORDERED that no inter partes review is instituted.” slip op. at 26
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The level of ordinary skill in the art usually is evidenced by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). As Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill is supported by expert testimony and appears consistent with the technology at issue, for purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“In response, Patent Owner objects that “Petitioners’ interpretation of the claims as requiring the use of unfiltered white light to determine depth data is plainly at odds with the claims themselves.” Prelim. Resp. 4. Patent Owner argues that “[t]his interpretation leads to a contradiction between the independent and dependent claims: the same light illuminating the intraoral structure would have to be simultaneously filtered (as recited in the dependent claims) and unfiltered (as Petitioners presume to be required by the independent claims).” Id. Patent Owner also suggests the possibility that the Petition’s arguments mean “the independent claims encompass using unfiltered white light to obtain depth data.” Id. at 7. We do understand the Petition’s arguments to mean that the independent claims encompass using unfiltered white light to illuminate an intraoral structure, not that the independent claims require using white light to illuminate an intraoral structure. And we agree with that understanding of the independent claims’ scope. Consistent with Patent Owner’s explanation, if we construed the independent claims to require using unfiltered white light to illuminate an intraoral structure, that would conflict directly with the dependent claims’ express requirement to use colored filters.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached
“2. Summary Regarding Obviousness Challenge Because Patent Owner’s arguments and evidence persuasively rebut Petitioner’s assertion that the Ancestral Applications do not provide written description support for the challenged claims, Petitioner has not shown adequately that Babayoff ’529 is prior art to the challenged claims. Accordingly, Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that claims 1, 4, 10, 11, 13, 18, 19, 25, and 30 would have been obvious over Babayoff ’529 and Atiya.” slip op. at 26
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,750,151 - Avery Dennison Rfid Company / Avery Dennison Retail Information Services LLC v. Evrythng LimitedInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 16, 2021 · IPR2021-00865 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner failed to show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–26 were unpatentable over the asserted anticipation and obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner. As Petitioner argues, Gentile does discuss the use of a scanner to add “additional information” to a unique record for an object, however, Gentile does not disclose the use of a scanner to read a unique identifier for an object during the creation of an association between the unique identifier and an object as required by the claims. Id. at 23–26; see Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 59–61, 65–72. Gentile discloses that “[a]t the time and “stored in product information database 108.” Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 59, 65. Gentile also discloses that at the time the product record associated with the identifier is stored, additional information can be added that could come from a scanning device. Id. ¶¶ 66–67. However, this “additional information” is disclosed as information in addition to the unique identifier. Id. ¶ 67. It is only after the initial association has been created that a scanner is disclosed in Gentile as being used to scan the unique identification tag on a product. Id. ¶¶ 61, 69–70. The claim requires that a scan be performed to determine an identifier for an object, “and then” that the identifier is used to add the object to the object information service, but this is not disclosed by Gentile’s process of creating an association between a unique product identifier and a database record (as disclosed in Figure 2 of Gentile and related disclosure) or by Gentile’s process of scanning a unique product identifier to access an already extant record (as disclosed in Figure 3 of Gentile and related disclosure). Petitioner’s showing relies on elements from each of these two separate processes, for example relying on Gentile’s disclosures of a device scanning a QR code on an object to obtain the identifier (Pet. 42–44) for step (b) and then on the disclosures relating to the initial association of the identifier with a database record for step (c) (Pet. 45–47).” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“E. Asserted Obviousness of Claims 1–11, 13–18, and 21–26 over Gentile and Massé Petitioner’s arguments regarding the unpatentability of claims 1–11, 13–18, and 21–26 rely on the arguments made with respect to anticipation of claim 1 by Gentile. Pet. 58–62. Therefore, for the same reasons, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing claims 1–11, 13–18, and 21–26 would have been obvious over Gentile and Massé. F. Asserted Obviousness of Claims 1–11, 13–18, and 20–26 over Gentile and Harris Petitioner’s arguments regarding the unpatentability of claims 1–11, 13–18, and 20–26 rely on the arguments made with respect to anticipation of claim 1 by Gentile. Pet. 62–74. Petitioner does describe Harris as teaching a portion of step (c) of claim 1, however, Petitioner’s argument is that Harris teaches providing “product updates” in order to “update” the records in the ¶¶ 343–345). Petitioner argues that a product ID is included in such updates, and that therefore, “the product updates of Harris include ‘a unique identifier’ and are provided to the ‘product identification database’” via an API. Id. at 69–70. However, Petitioner does not provide any teaching that addresses the deficiency noted in the ground with respect to anticipation over Gentile – and there is no discussion of any teaching of Harris which, alone or in combination with Gentile, would describe the required determination of an identifier for an object that is unique within the information service, which is obtained at a device and then used to add an object to the object information service so as to be accessible using the unique identifier. For this reason, and for the reasons described with respect to the anticipation of claim 1 by Gentile, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing claims 1–11, 13–18, and 21–26 would have been obvious over Gentile and Harris. G. Asserted Obviousness over Combinations including Boncyk Relying on arguments regarding anticipation by Gentile and obviousness over Gentile and Massé or Gentile and Harris, Petitioner argues that certain claims are unpatentable over a combination of Gentile and Boncyk (claims 1–11, 13–18, and 21–26), Gentile, Massé, and Boncyk (claims 1–11, 13–18, and 20–26), and Gentile, Harris, and Boncyk. Pet. 74– 80. These arguments incorporate by reference the prior arguments, describing a different location for the identification mechanism of step (b) of claim 1. Id. Again, no teaching is identified that addresses the deficiency noted in the grounds upon which these arguments rely. anticipation by Gentile and obviousness over Gentile and Massé or Gentile and Harris, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing claims 1–11, 13–18, and 21–26 would have been obvious over Gentile and Boncyk, or that claims 1–11, 13–18, and 20–26) would have been obvious over Gentile, Massé, and Boncyk or over Gentile, Harris, and Boncyk. H. Asserted Obviousness over Combinations including Davis Relying on arguments regarding anticipation by Gentile and obviousness over Gentile and Massé or Gentile and Harris, Petitioner argues that claims 1–26 are unpatentable over a combination of Gentile and Boncyk, Gentile, Massé, and Boncyk, and Gentile, Harris, and Boncyk. Pet. 80–85. These arguments incorporate by reference the prior arguments, substituting an online identification mechanism and the generation of new identifiers for objects “on the fly” when identifying an object. Pet. 80–83. No teaching is identified that addresses the deficiency noted in the grounds upon which these arguments rely. Therefore, for the reasons described with respect to the showings of anticipation by Gentile and obviousness over Gentile and Massé or Gentile and Harris, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing claims 1–26 would have been obvious over Gentile and Davis, over Gentile, Massé, and Davis, or over Gentile, Harris, and Davis.” slip op. at 20
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“the time of the effective filing date, a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field of study, and at least three years of experience with online web services, database systems, and/or related software applications.” Pet. 21–22 (citing Ex. 1003 at ¶ 127). Petitioner adds, “[t]his is an approximation and additional education (e.g., masters/doctorate degree(s)) could make up for less practical experience (and vice versa). Id. Patent Owner does not present a different proposal for level of skill or comment on Petitioner’s proposal. See Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision on Institution, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. This level of skill comports with the teachings of the ’595 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,582,595 - SAP SE v. Teradata US Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Nov 15, 2021 · IPR2021-00861 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–16 and all petitioned grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Based on the present record, we do not find Patent Owner’s proposed construction supported by the intrinsic evidence. The ordinary meaning of “manage the storage of data in the volatile storage” does not require limiting the number of copies of the data in the volatile storage, and Patent Owner does not argue to the contrary. Turning to the language of the other claims, we note that claim 5, which depends from claim 1, specifically includes additional language stating that the data is stored “only in one of two portions of the volatile storage,” but claim 1 does not include such language. The use of this additional limitation in dependent claim 5 suggests that the inventors did not intend it to be included within claim 1’s broader language reciting “manag[ing] the storage of data in the volatile storage.” See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“the presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption that the limitation in question is not present in the independent claim”). Turning to the ’923 patent specification, the portions of the specification Patent Owner relies on appear to discuss a preferred embodiment of the invention, rather than limiting the invention itself. The portions of columns 14 and 15 upon which Patent Owner relies discuss Figure 3 which, the specification explains, “depicts a volatile storage 300 that uses a persistent temperature-based storage management technique as well as a conventional storage management technique in accordance with one embodiment.” Ex. 1001, 14:48–51 (emphasis added); see id. at 5:5–8 (also describing Figure 3 as being “in accordance with one embodiment” of the invention). Interpreting claim 1 to require maintaining only a single copy of a data portion in either the first portion or second portion, where that language does not exist in claim 1, would be tantamount to reading a limitation from a preferred embodiment into the claims, which would be improper. See Philips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”). Patent Owner does not identify any portions of the specification suggesting that limiting the number of copies of the data in the volatile storage is a necessary part of the invention, or that the inventors intended to expressly or impliedly define “manage the storage of data in the volatile storage” to include this requirement. Consequently, at this stage of the proceeding, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction requiring that “manag[ing] the storage of data in the volatile storage” requires “coordinating placement of data into and out of the volatile storage so as to limit the number of copies of the data in the volatile storage.” The parties may further address the meaning of this claim phrase during the trial, if appropriate.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“3. Other Terms We determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any other claim terms at this stage of the proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention would have had “a Bachelor of Science degree in computer science and two years of industry experience or research working 2 At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner has not presented objective evidence of non-obviousness. with database and related storage management technologies,” and that “[a]dditional education, such as an M.S. in computer science, could substitute for the industry experience as it typically involves at least two years of additional study focused exclusively on computer science, as well as a thesis or project spanning several terms to implement a substantial project.” Pet. 12–13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 31). According to Petitioner, the person of ordinary skill would have “understood the advantages of partitioning a volatile memory into multiple different sections (e.g., buffer pools) and applying multiple different storage management (e.g., cache replacement) policies to those different sections, and known how to implement such designs.” Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 32). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill at this stage of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 14. For purposes of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’923 patent and the asserted prior art of record.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“At this stage of the proceeding, Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that Lee discloses this claim element. Paragraph 17 of Lee discloses the use of a temperature-based storage management technique and a non-temperature-based storage management technique (the LRU replacement policy), and that both “may be used to manage a cache.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 17. Based on the present record, Petitioner sufficiently shows that Lee’s disclosure of using these techniques “to manage a cache” involves “manag[ing] the storage of data in” the cache, because both techniques operate in order to control what data is stored in the cache. We do not find Patent Owner’s argument persuasive because it is based on Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “manag[ing] the storage of data in the volatile storage” to require “limit[ing] the number of copies of the data in the volatile storage,” which we do not adopt. See § II.A.2, supra. Consequently, we determine that, on the record before us, Petitioner’s cited evidence sufficiently supports its contentions regarding this limitation.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,851,923 - Autostore System Inc. v. Ocado Innovation LimitedInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 8, 2021 · IPR2021-00798 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable over the asserted anticipation and obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“storage locations, but that this grid is defined by a structural framework. Ex. 1001, 14:5–6. Thus, we agree with Patent Owner that the language of claims 1 and 23 strongly suggests that the structural framework defines the grid of storage locations, and not merely that the structural framework provides open areas within which storage containers could be arranged in a grid-like pattern.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, for the reasons set forth below, we are not persuaded that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“As discussed in Section II.A.2 above, we construe “a structural framework defining a grid of storage locations,” as recited in claims 1 and 23, to require that a “structural framework” define the grid of storage locations, as opposed to these locations being defined merely by the orientation or location of stacked containers. Petitioner identifies no Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that independent claims 1 and 23 are anticipated by Lert.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“would have been obvious over Lert. Pet. 21–53. Petitioner’s obviousness arguments with respect to these claims do not resolve the issues noted above with respect to independent claims 1, 13, and 23. In particular, Petitioner provides no persuasive argument that one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Lert to have a structural framework that defines the storage locations or to have delivery containers stored within storage containers and delivered to picking workstations. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–8, 13–20, and 23 would have been obvious over the disclosures of Lert.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,796,080 - Platform Science, Inc. v. Omnitracs, LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Sep 3, 2021 · IPR2020-01612 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted rehearing and instituted IPR on all petition grounds for claims 1–4, 6–9, 11, 12, and 15, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“preliminary stage, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to claim 1.” slip op. at 44
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“The only dispute pertaining to claim construction at this stage of the proceeding is whether the phrase “a process for creating said response message,” recited in claim 1, is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.6 Petitioner 6 As noted above, Petitioner raises a second claim construction issue in its Rehearing Request. See Req. Reh’g 12–15 (asserting that the claims require only one instance of copying information from a formatted message to a response message based on which formatted message was received). Petitioner did not raise this issue in the Petition, Patent Owner has not had an contends that the phrase should be interpreted as a means-plus-function limitation, whereas Patent Owner contends that it should not. Compare Pet. 2–7 (advocating for a means-plus-function construction), with Prelim. Resp. 9–11 (advocating for an ordinary and customary meaning). At this stage of the proceeding, the dispute between the parties regarding the construction of this claim phrase does not impact our Decision. Accordingly, we need not construe expressly any claim terms for the purpose of this Decision.” slip op. at 17
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“VI. ANALYSIS Legal Standards – Anticipation “[A] claim is anticipated ‘if each and every limitation is found expressly or inherently in a single prior art reference.’” King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs., Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Anticipation is a question of fact, In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2009), assessed from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art, see Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“the dispositive question regarding anticipation [i]s whether one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer from the [prior art reference’s] teaching that every claim element was disclosed in that single reference” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted)).” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,925,308
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.