• Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co., Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco NVNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 5, 2026 · IPR2025-00598 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–31 were not shown unpatentable under either § 103 ground because the asserted combinations did not teach required claim limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “admissions by Patent Owner in litigation, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a Master of Science (M.S.) degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and five years of work experience in a related field” and that “[a]dditional educational experience could substitute for some of the work experience.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art (Petition, 5) at this time.” PO Resp. 6. On the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is uncontested and is consistent with the technology described in the ’347 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “In the Preliminary Response, “Patent Owner accept[ed] the Petition’s claim construction.” Prelim. Resp. 6. However, in the Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner argues that “the claims of the ’347 Patent require no construction as they are valid under their plain and ordinary meaning.” PO Resp. 6. Based on the complete record, we do not find it necessary to provide express claim constructions of any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Beel actually discloses the following: [0321] On the peripheral device 32 the video packets are received at the corresponding plug and play port, e.g. the USB port 11, read by the Human Interface Driver (HID) interface handler 13, unpacked to remove HID protocol headers in an unpacker 20 and then transmitted to the communications network by a transmitter 21. The network can be wireless for example WiFi or LiFi network. [0322] Having been routed over a communications network to the base unit 33, the incoming stream is read from the communications interface such as a WiFi access point 22, unpacked in an unpacker 25, decoded in a decoder 26 and then inserted into a suitable composition such as an OpenGL based composition in the compositor 29 for display on a central display device. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 321–322 (emphasis added to portions quoted by Petitioner). Patent Owner notes that “[t]he Petition mistakenly cites to ¶ 322 of Beel but quotes ¶ 321.” PO Resp. 20 n.3. However, it appears that Petitioner has grafted together a portion of paragraph 321 that introduces peripheral device 32 with a portion of paragraph 322, which discusses features of base unit 33. However, this grafting has been done in such a way as to convey (incorrectly) that peripheral device 32, not base unit 33, includes unpacker 25, decoder 26, and compositor 29 that process the first processed video data received by the first peripheral device to generate second video data. Dr. Almeroth’s testimony, which copies Petitioner’s incorrectly altered quotation to paragraph 322 of Beel, is unreliable as to this claim limitation and is entitled to no weight.4 Thus, Petitioner has no expert testimony on which to rely for this claim limitation.” slip op. at 19

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “5 At the oral argument, when challenged on its reliance on paragraph 322, Petitioner argued that paragraph 321 of Beel teaches this limitation. Tr. 22:26–23:24. Petitioner did not make this argument in the Petition and, instead, raised it for the first time during oral argument; thus, it will not be considered. See Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, 884 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Unless it chose to exercise its waiver authority under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(b), the Board was obligated to dismiss Dell’s untimely argument given that the untimely argument in this case was raised for the first time during oral argument.”). Even if we were to consider this new argument, it would not be persuasive. As Patent Owner observes (PO Resp. 20), any processing performed by peripheral device 32 in paragraph 321 is on data received from the processing device and destined for the base station via the network, rather than data flowing in the direction of the first processed video data of claim 1.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 11,966,347 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,966,347
• BTL Industries, Inc. v. Inmode Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00703 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–58 were not shown unpatentable: the Edwards, Ingle, and Mosher combination fails to establish key limitations, and Ollivier was not shown to be a prior art printed publication.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We apply Patent Owner’s proposed definition, as it appears consistent with the field of the ’511 patent and the prior art and is consistent with testimony of Dr. Poulos and the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Berenholz. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355, (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the level of ordinary skill in the art may be reflected in the prior art itself); Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 35–39; Ex. 2005, 55:5–17, 57:17–58:19. In our view, however, Petitioner’s proposed definition is not so different that our decision would change if we were to apply Petitioner’s proposed definition.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner’s argument are persuasive. We agree with Patent Owner that a plain reading of the wherein clause requires the treating to begin at the introitus and extend at least the first centimeter into the vagina and up to 3.5 cm in from the introitus. This construction is consistent with the ’511 patent’s Specification, which states: In typical embodiments, the length of the energy delivery element is about 1 to about 3 cm in length, in other embodiments it may be as long as about 4 cm. This is a length well adapted to treating the lower aspects of the vagina, wherein treatment by the method comprises contacting the vaginal epithelium in a region that extends from the introitus inward to a position about 3 to 4 cm inward from the introitus. In some embodiments of the invention, the method can b[e] practiced with a single row of parallel contract sites immediately inside the introitus. In other embodiments, the method may include deeper rows, or rows that overlap an initial row, while keeping the contact sites within the lower portion of the vagina. Ex. 1001, 3:28–40 (emphasis added); see also id. at 14:47–57. The ’511 patent Specification also states: “the portion of the vagina to be treated is a region between the introitus and a position located no further than about 3 to about 4 cm inward from the introitus.” Id. at 11:48–51 (emphasis added). Given the plain language of claim 1, consistent with the ’511 patent’s Specification, we construe “heating a portion of the vagina extending from the introitus inwardly to a location from 1 cm to 3.5 cm in from the introitus” to require heating a portion of the vagina beginning at the introitus and extending at least the first centimeter into the vagina and up to 3.5 cm in from the introitus.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Patent Owner’s arguments is persuasive. The cited portion of Mosher does not explicitly state the location of the treatment area. Ex. 1006 ¶ 74. In it Reply, Petitioner additionally points to paragraph 54 of Mosher, which states: “Preferably, the location of the treatment volume of endopelvic fascia will be disposed along a length of the urethra between the bladder neck and the external meatus so as to avoid injuring nerves.” Pet. Reply 14 (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶ 54). Petitioner argues that “[t]reating the vaginal wall adjacent to the mid-urethral region is within the claimed region of ‘from 1 cm to 3.5 cm in from the introitus.’” Pet. Reply 14–16. This, however, does not teach the claimed area beginning at the introitus and extending at least the first centimeter into the vagina and up to 3.5 cm in from the introitus. The Petition fails to show that either Edwards or Mosher discloses heating a portion of the vagina beginning at the introitus and extending at least the first centimeter into the vagina and up to 3.5 cm in from the introitus. In its Reply, Petitioner argues that it would have been obvious to modify Edwards to treat the area beginning at the introitus and extending at least the first centimeter into the vagina and up to 3.5 cm in from the introitus. See, e.g., Pet. Reply 2–4, 16–17 (citing Pet. 35). The Petition’s argument is unpersuasive because it is conclusory and does not adequately address Edwards’s use of a speculum. Pet. 35. The Petition includes no” slip op. at 26

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “In its Reply, Petitioner argues that it would have been obvious to modify Edwards to treat the area beginning at the introitus and extending at least the first centimeter into the vagina and up to 3.5 cm in from the introitus. See, e.g., Pet. Reply 2–4, 16–17 (citing Pet. 35). The Petition’s argument is unpersuasive because it is conclusory and does not adequately address Edwards’s use of a speculum. Pet. 35. The Petition includes no persuasive explanation as to why it would have been obvious to modify Edwards to use the treatment blade without the speculum. See Pet. 22–24, 35–36. We determine that Petitioner fails to meet its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is unpatentable over Edwards, Ingle, and Mosher.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 8,961,511 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,961,511
• Hesai Technology Co., Ltd. v. Ouster, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 13, 2025 · IPR2023-01422 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–2, 4–9, 11–14, 16–17, and 19–25 not shown unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds, principally because the combinations lacked claimed limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Considering the applicable factors in light of the parties’ contentions, we adopt the following level of ordinary skill in the art, which we apply in this Decision: A person of ordinary skill in the art would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical or electrical engineering and two to three years of work experience with electro-optical and electro-mechanical devices or systems, relevant to light ranging systems. Less work experience would have been compensated by a higher level of education or vice versa. The work experience would have included at least one year relevant to light ranging systems including LIDAR with a rotor-stator structure. We determine that this level of skill is consistent with the problems and solutions identified in the ’515 patent and the prior art. See, e.g., Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Ex. 1001, 1:30–3:48; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 3–10; Ex. 1005, 1:1–2:31; Ex. 1006, 1:1–2:60; Ex. 1007, 1. We also determine that the proposed level of skill is reflective of the education and experience a person of ordinary skill would have had. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 39–41; Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 67–68.” slip op. at 19

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We determine that the claimed “stator circuit board” and “stator assembly” are separate and distinct elements in claims 1 and 14 because they are set forth as separate elements in these claims. See Ex. 1001, 48:27–29, 48:37–42, 50:8–10. Similarly, claim 22 recites “a stator circuit board assembly” that includes as subcomponents “a first circuit board,” “a second circuit board,” and a “stator assembly” which are separate and distinct subelements. Id. at 51:49–59. “Where a claim lists elements separately, ‘the clear implication of the claim language is that those elements are ‘distinct component[s]’ of the invention.” Becton, Dickinson and Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Gr., LP, 616 F.3d 1249, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Gaus v. Conair Corp., 363 F.3d 1284, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398, 1404–05 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). This construction is confirmed by the ’515 patent’s specification. For example, the specification states that stator assembly 644 is affixed to circuit board 622, and, consistent with this statement, Figures 6A and 6D show them as separate elements joined together. Ex. 1001, 28:28–31, 30:16–24. Contrary to Petitioner’s contention, the specification’s stating that the stator elements are “built onto” or “integrated on” circuit boards (or assemblies containing them) does not mean that the stator assembly and circuit board are the same thing. Pet. Reply 1 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:19–22, 4:28–31). Rather, the specification describes the stator elements as part of the stator assembly which is coupled to a circuit board, as follows: VII. Integrated Electric Motor According to certain embodiments, an electric rotary motor can be integrated directly onto the circuit boards. The motor can have a "pancake" or "axial" design having a planar rotor assembly on a rotor board that opposes a planar stator assembly on an opposing stator board. The stator and rotor assemblies of the electric motor can be integrated onto the boards of the rotary actuator 608, i.e., the elements of the electric motor are one of many components on the surface of the printed circuit boards and thus a separate motor module is not required for LIDAR system 600. For example, referring back to FIG. 6D, stator assembly 644 can include an annular arrangement of multiple stator elements 644(i), e.g., vertically oriented solenoids (having their longitudinal axes perpendicular to the surface of the board) that are affixed (e.g., using an adhesive) to a board of the lower circuit board assembly 620 (e.g., board 622) or to a soft magnetic core that is then affixed to the lower circuit board assembly 620. Ex. 1001, 30:16–22. Thus, the ’515 patent’s specification expressly states that the stator elements of the stator assembly can be affixed to a printed circuit board, and thus the stator assembly is not the same thing as the board. Other parts of the specification are consistent with this view. See, e.g., id. at 4:54–57, 5:14–18, 6:50–53, 16:22–25.” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We have construed claim 1’s limitation 1(g) to require “stator circuit board” and “stator assembly” that are separate and distinct elements. See § III.C.1, supra. Johnson discloses coil windings that are formed by patterning interleaved structures in a multi-layered printed circuit board (PCB) forming the stator platform 330, and interconnecting them in groups with vias filled with conductive material. Ex. 1005, 11:66–13:57. Figs. 3C–3D; Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 138–139. We agree with Patent Owner that a POSITA would have considered the coil windings to be subcomponents of Johnson’s stator platform 330, which do not define a separate and distinct “stator assembly . . . coupled to a stator circuit board.” Ex. 2004 ¶ 139. In other words, the “printed” conductive tracks and traces would have been considered part of the PCB, not something separate. Id. Although Petitioner contends that Johnson discloses other embodiments in which a stator assembly is comprised of wires wound around a magnetic core (Pet. Reply 14–15 (citing Ex. 1005, 3:30–39, 4:56– 5:7; Ex. 1050 ¶ 30)), Petitioner does not show that Johnson discloses that those embodiments are coupled to a stator circuit board as recited in claim 1’s limitation 1(g). Petitioner did not rely on Pacala, Pardhan, nor Zhang to cover the deficiencies of Johnson. Accordingly, for the above reasons, we determine that Petitioner has” slip op. at 41

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Patent Owner’s arguments are persuasive. Johnson, Pardhan, and Zhang all disclose transformer coils positioned inside of the rotor/stator elements of the motor. Specifically, Johnson’s Figure 3B shows a transformer coil 310b positioned inside rotor elements (magnets 320, 322, 324, 326), and Figure 3C shows the corresponding transformer coil (unnumbered) inside of the stator coils defined by conductive structures. Ex. 1005, 11:51–60, 13:26–40. Similarly, Pardhan shows in Figure 7B a transformer 740a, 740b positioned inside of rotor/stator elements 738a, 738b, and suggests that a smaller rotary transformer is desirable. Ex. 1006, 20:64–21:13. Likewise, Zhang’s Figures 2 and 3 show an electrical power transmission unit including first coupling coil (5) and second coupling coil (unnumbered) positioned inside of motor coil (2). Ex. 1007, 4–5. Against the teachings of Johnson, Pardhan, and Zhang, Petitioner argues that putting the transformer coils outside of the stator coils would have been an obvious design choice. Pet. 50–51, 54–55. However, as Patent Owner noted, “merely stating that a particular placement of an element is a design choice does not make it obvious.” PO Resp. 50 (citing Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1067–70, 1069 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Ex. 2004 ¶ 186). That Johnson, Pardhan, and Zhang all disclose the transformer coils inside of the rotor/stator elements of the motor suggests that there were good reasons for doing this in their configurations. Zhang expressly teaches that one such reason is to avoid interference with power transmission.15 Ex. 1007, 3. Thus, according to Zhang, moving transformer coils outside of the rotor/stator elements in Petitioner’s combination would undesirably interfere with power transmission such that a POSITA would not have pursued the combination. Accordingly, we find that claim 22’s limitation 22(h) is missing from the combination of Pacala, Johnson, Pardhan, and Zhang.” slip op. at 53

  Patent outcomesUS 11,287,515 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,287,515
• Tesla, Inc. v. Charge Fusion Technologies, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 17, 2024 · IPR2022-01217 · APJ Jeremy M Plenzler · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–10 not shown unpatentable as obvious over Kato, the Tesla Roadster Manual, and Eberhard because the asserted combination did not teach the claimed scheduled charging times and processor-controlled charging.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner’s declarant, Mr. Wilson, testifies that one skilled in the art during the relevant time frame “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, or physics (or an equivalent field) and at least two years of work experience involving automotive systems, including vehicle information systems, vehicle sensors, and vehicle controllers (ECUs),” but “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 27). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s articulation of the level of skill in the art. See PO Resp. 16 (“Because the proposed level of ordinary skill does not affect the ultimate analysis, Patent Owner takes no position with respect to Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.”). We analyze the asserted prior art with respect to the level of skill set forth by Petitioner because it is consistent with the prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “According to Petitioner, “all claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning.” Pet. 10. Similarly, “for all claim terms, Patent the claim terms as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 14. And after institution, Petition made clear that “[t]he Parties agree the Challenged Claims should be given their ordinary and customary meaning for purposes of this IPR.” Pet. Reply 1. We do not need to construe any terms expressly to reach our decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “reliance on the time period that can be spent at a charging location corresponding to the recited calculated scheduled start time. Petitioner’s testimony from Dr. Wilson does little to help, as it simply parrots the contentions laid out in the Petition. And, like the contentions in the Petition, that testimony does not offer persuasive explanation as to why one skilled in teaching “computing . . . a charging schedule . . . comprising a scheduled start time and an indication of a scheduled stop time” as required by the claims. Contrary to Petitioner’s representations, we see nothing in paragraphs 53–55 of Kato teaching a specific time that is computed as a scheduled start time. Absent persuasive explanation and evidence from Petitioner, the preponderance of the evidence before us does not support Petitioner’s assertion that the beginning of an available time window for charging is a scheduled start time or that the end of that window is a scheduled stop time for charging. We note, again, that Petitioner relies on the express teachings of Kato. The Petition does not assert that it would have been obvious to employ a scheduled start time based on any modification to Kato’s teachings. Our decision is limited to the particular basis for the challenge advanced by Petitioner.” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 10,998,753 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,998,753
• MG Freesites Ltd. v. Scorpcast, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 6, 2022 · IPR2021-00513 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 9–11, and 16–18 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the required limitations and motivation to combine.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) at the time of the invention of the ’519 patent would have had the following education and experience: “a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or Computer Science (or the equivalent degree) plus approximately two years of work experience with technologies relating to content annotation and/or content sharing among multiple users.” Pet. 15. vice versa.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 1–21). Patent Owner does not dispute this level of skill. PO Resp. 9. We adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner provides any explicit construction of any claim terms. See Pet. 14; PO Resp. 9. Upon review of the parties’ arguments and based on the evidentiary record, we determine that no claim terms require explicit construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”).” slip op. at 10

  • ExcludeNot reached

    “Because of our disposition of this case based on the disclosures of Roberts and Kilar, it is not necessary to reach the issue of conception and and dismiss Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude as moot.” slip op. at 32

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “consideration of the arguments presented during trial, we are not persuaded by Petitioner that a POSA would be motivated to make the proposed modification, particularly, in light of the different uses of Fink-722’s objects and Kilar’s digital photograph. See Dec. 15–19. Our reviewing court has stated that “obviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.” Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “[O]bviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Fink-722’s objects in object display 306 (i.e., human 325, rocket ship” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 9,832,519 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,832,519
• MG Freesites Ltd v. Scorpcast, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 3, 2022 · IPR2021-00512 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 5–8, 10, 11, 15–17, 20, 21, and 25–28 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted grounds failed to establish required claim limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a skilled artisan “would have had a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or Computer Science (or equivalent) plus approximately two years of work experience with technologies relating to content annotation and/or content sharing among multiple users.” Pet. 16–17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 1–28). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp. 9. We apply Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it comports with the level of skill reflected in the ‘463 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with the determination in IPR2020-01697 that not all areas in the recited “scrubber area” must perform scrubbing functionality for the following reasons. First, claim 1 recites “the scrubber area comprising a scrubber that includes a draggable scrubber control that indicates video playback progress via a scrubber timeline . . . and which is manipulable to control playback of the first video file by dragging the scrubber control.” Ex. 1001, 50:61–67. The use of the open-ended transition “comprising” indicates the scrubber area may include more than the draggable scrubber control. Second, the Specification of the ’463 patent describes “scrubber area” as including a “scrubber bar” and optionally “an area adjacent to the scrubber bar.” Id. at 2:48–54. But, the description of the optional area the adjacent area must include scrubbing functionality. See id. Third, our determination that the area adjacent the scrubber control does not necessarily include scrubbing functionality is consistent with Figure 10 of the ’463 patent where the right-hand side of scrubber area 1002 includes items unrelated to scrubbing functionality, e.g., volume control.10 For the foregoing reasons, we do not adopt the EDTX construction of scrubber area because doing so would require us to read a limitation into “scrubber area” that, in our view, is not supported by the evidence.” slip op. at 32

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Pet. 46. We note, however, that Roberts does not use the terms “scrubber” or “scrubber area.” See generally Ex. 1004. Dr. Porter testifies that the red rectangles added to Figures 9 and 13 represent a “scrubber area” but, he cites no persuasive evidence from Roberts to support his opinion concerning the size and shape of the alleged scrubber areas in Roberts’ Figures 9 and 13, nor does he explain why images 904 and 1004 are “adjacent” the timeline. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 78–79. Therefore, his testimony is entitled to little, if any, weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). In order to satisfy this limitation, Petitioner creates different size scrubbing areas in Figures 9 and 13 of Roberts to fit its obviousness theory. Image 904 in Roberts’ Figure 9 is near the timeline but does not border the timeline. In addition, only one image, not the first plurality of images, is shown in the scrubber area Petitioner identifies in Figure 9. In Roberts’ Figure 13, images 904 and 1004 are shown within Petitioner’s larger proposed scrubbing area, but neither image borders the timeline. In Figure 13, image 904 is further from the timeline than image 1004 and further from the timeline than in Figure 9. Ex. 1004, Figs. 9, 13. Petitioner, however, fails to explain why image 904, which is positioned differently in Figure 9 and Figure 13, is adjacent the timeline in both. See Pet. 45–48.” slip op. at 34

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Analysis The language of limitation 1.5 recites that “at least partly in response to detecting that a user . . . select[s] the first image . . . causing the playback of the first video file to jump to a segment of the first video file corresponding to the first image.” Ex. 1001, 51:1–11. Both parties agree that this language imposes a temporal requirement that the user selects the first image and, then after the user selection, the playback of the first video file jumps to a segment of the first video file corresponding to the first image. Tr. 58:8–18, 109:9–10.” slip op. at 48

  Patent outcomesUS 9,703,463 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,703,463
• Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation v. Siemens Mobility, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 12, 2019 · IPR2017-02104 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6, 20, and 21 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 over Burns, Burns and Nickles, Judge, or Judge and Nickles.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “As Patent Owner contends, its construction is consistent with the context of the claims and the specification of the ’926 patent. See Pet. 12– 13 (reproducing Ex. 1001, 3:42–49, 4:7–14, 4:25–32, 9:26–65, 10:10–14). Further, the testimony of both Patent Owner’s and Petitioner’s declarants supports Patent Owner’s construction. Mr. Loud testifies: “As the context of the claims make clear, and as confirmed by the description in the specification, ‘stopping the train before the train moves outside the boundary …’ refers to slowing down of a moving train until it is not moving, whereas ‘preventing the train from moving’ refers to preventing a stationary train from moving.” Ex. 2009 ¶ 30; see also Ex. 2006, 55:3–56:12 (cross-examination testimony of Dr. Pullen). Given the above, we are persuaded that the broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification of the ’926 patent of “stopping the train” is to slow down a moving train until it is not moving and “preventing the train from moving” is to prevent a stationary train from moving.” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “In determining the level of skill in the art, we consider the type of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. U.S., 702 F.2d 1005, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Both Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s definitions include an undergraduate engineering degree or the equivalent and both include experience related to transportation control and safety systems. The difference between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s definitions is whether the transportation control and safety systems relate specifically to train control and safety systems. Patent Owner’s argument that the level of ordinary skill in the art would include experience with train control and safety systems is persuasive. The ’926 patent is directed to “automatic control of trains” and solves safety problems with train operations and movements. Ex. 1001, 1:14–4:3.” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner’s argument is not persuasive. Dr. Pullen holds several degrees in Aeronautics, a field of study that involves control systems: an undergraduate degree he received in 1989, a Master’s degree he received in 1990, and a Ph.D. he received in 1996. Ex. 1003, 1. Dr. Pullen’s declaration indicates that he has “twenty years of experience in the field of transportation safety and control systems, with [the] last three years specifically focused on train safety and control systems.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 7; see also id. ¶¶ 8–17 (describing education and experience related to control systems). Dr. Pullen’s lack of experience specific to trains before the last three years may detract from the weight to be given his testimony on certain matters, but we are not persuaded to give Dr. Pullen’s testimony little or no weight.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “evidence how claims 1 and 20 are unpatentable over Burns. See 35 U.S.C. § 316 (e). Petitioner fails to meet its burden. Burns does not explicitly disclose the preventing step, and Dr. Pullen’s testimony does not sufficiently show that a POSITA would have understood Burns to teach the preventing step. Dr. Pullen testifies: [A] person of skill in the art would also understand that, because of the TCC’s enforcement of movement authorities, the application of brakes would be performed automatically, and that without proper authorization, a train would not be permitted to move at all. Ex. 1002 ¶ 62. As can be seen from the above, Dr. Pullen’s testimony is conclusory. In the Petitioner’s Reply, Petitioner argues that Burns’ disclosure of waiting for opposing traffic supports Dr. Pullen’s testimony. Pet. Reply 8–12 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 61). Burns states: “Movement authorities separate and protect trains in unsignaled portions of the railroad, by commanding movements between designated points over particular track segments, into and out of sidings, through speed restrictions and past work crews, after waiting for opposing traffic.” Ex. 1006, 37 (emphasis added). Burns’ statement, however, also does not disclose the preventing step. Burns’ statement does not teach that the waiting occurs if the current location is not within a boundary for an accepted authorization. Although Dr. Pullen cites to Burns’ statement in ¶ 61 of his Declaration, Dr. Pullen does not provide sufficient explanation as to how a POSITA would have understood Burns’ statement to teach the preventing step. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 61, 62. Further, Mr. Loud’s testimony contradicts Dr. Pullen’s testimony. Mr. Loud testifies: A POSITA would understand that Burns only addresses applying brakes to moving trains after a movement authority is approved and acknowledged so that the train does not subsequently leave the boundary for the accepted authorization absent additional authorization (i.e., for the adjacent section of track). Thus, Burns only refers to enforcing a movement authority while the train is within an accepted boundary: brakes are applied so that the train does not leave the authorized area, which resembles the “stopping” step recited in the challenged claims of the ’926 Patent.” slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 7,079,926 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,079,926
• Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation v. Siemens Mobility, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 24, 2018 · IPR2017-01263 · APJ Timothy J Goodson · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4–6, 14, 16, 17, 19, 28, 32, 35, 42–44, and 48 were not shown unpatentable under either remaining § 103 ground because the combinations did not teach a targeted request for status information.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “B. “transmitting . . . to a configurable device” The phrase “transmitting . . . to a configurable device” appears in each of independent claims 1, 14, 28, and 44. In our Decision on Institution, we determined that this phrase does not require direct transmission. Dec. on Inst. 8. In arriving at that determination, we considered whether the prosecution history of the ’461 patent supports an understanding that the phrase requires direct transmission, but we concluded that it does not. Id. at 6–8. In the parties’ briefing after institution, Patent Owner agreed with the construction in our Decision on Institution, and Petitioner did not address the construction of this phrase. PO Resp. 14; Reply 2. We maintain the construction set forth in our Decision on Institution for the reasons stated therein.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITADecided for patent owner

    “claims 1, 14, 28, and 44, and in several dependent claims. In our Decision on Institution, we construed the term to mean “a request for status information.” Dec. on Inst. 8. After institution, Patent Owner urged, as it had before institution, that we should construe the term as “a targeted request for status information.” PO Resp. 14–19. Patent Owner pointed out that in the Parallel District Court Case, the court’s construction of this term requires that the request is targeted. Id. at 15 n.2 (citing Ex. 2008, 10–12); see also Power Integrations, Inc. v. Lee, 797 F.3d 1318, 3126 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining that although the Board is not generally bound by a previous judicial interpretation of a disputed claim term, the Board should nevertheless assess whether it is consistent with the broadest reasonable construction of the term). In its Reply, Petitioner states that Patent Owner’s “proposed construction is acceptable.” Reply 2; see also Tr. 8:24–9:1 (Petitioner’s counsel confirming that the parties agree on the construction of this term as a targeted request for status information). We will adopt the parties’ agreed-upon construction, which is also consistent with the construction in the Parallel District Court Case. Thus, we interpret “interrogation message” to mean “a targeted request for status information.”” slip op. at 7

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s proposal that an ordinarily skilled artisan at the time of the invention of the ’461 patent “would have had an undergraduate degree or the equivalent thereof and at least five (5) years of experience in train operations or train control systems” and “would have had knowledge of train control systems, train safety systems that include wayside systems, and train communication systems, and would have understood how to search available literature for relevant publications.” Dec. on Inst. 10 (quoting Pet. 7–8). Following institution, Patent Owner stated its agreement with this definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp. 19. We maintain the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art set forth in our Institution Decision for the reasons stated therein. See Dec. on Inst. 10–11.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentable

    “agreed construction that “interrogation message” means “a targeted request for status information.” We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not established that the cited combination teaches a train transmitting a targeted request for status information to a configurable device near the train. Petitioner primarily relies on Petit as disclosing this limitation. Specifically, Petitioner points out that in Petit, the “first message from the train is initiated when the train locomotive passes a beacon, which is preferably a beacon transponder interrogated by locomotive-carried equipment.” Pet. 33 (quoting Ex. 1008, 2:31–34). It is this first message that the train sends to the crossing after passing the beacon that Petitioner points to as the “interrogation message.” Id. Petitioner contends that “this initial message . . . discloses the claimed ‘interrogation message’ because it is a request for status information.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 53). The record does not support Petitioner’s contention that this initial message in Petit is a request for status information from the crossing. The cited portion of Mr. Ditmeyer’s declaration concerns whether the train communicates directly with the crossing, without intervening communication equipment; it does not address whether the message from the train to the crossing includes a request for status information from the crossing. Ex. 1002 ¶ 53. The Petition itself quotes Petit’s description that train’s message to the crossing “giv[es] loco I.D., speed, direction of approach and distance from crossing.” Pet. 33 (quoting Ex. 1008, Fig. 5B). None of those items constitute a request for status information from the crossing, and Petitioner does not point to any disclosure in Petit indicating that this message additionally includes a request for status information.” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 6,996,461 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,996,461
• Ulthera, Inc. v. Dermafocus LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 19, 2018 · IPR2016-01459 · APJ James A Worth · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6–9, and 11–18 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations failed to establish focused ultrasound in the dermis or a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art According to Petitioner, a person having ordinary skill in the field of the subject matter described in the ’559 patent would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical, mechanical, or biomedical engineering with at least 4–5 years of work experience designing and/or working with medical devices using energy for the treatment of tissue, with at least some experience with focused ultrasound, and would be familiar with the anatomy/biology of the areas that the medical devices are intended to treat, or a master’s degree in electrical, mechanical, or biomedical engineering with at least 2–3 years of work experience and other knowledge as discussed above. Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 42–44). Patent Owner does not offer a counter-definition with respect thereto. See PO Resp. 10–12. On this record, and given the general lack of dispute, we agree with Petitioner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical, mechanical, or biomedical engineering with at least 4–5 years of work experience designing and/or working with medical devices using energy for the treatment of tissue, with at least some experience with focused ultrasound, and would be familiar with the anatomy/biology of the areas that the medical devices are intended to treat, or a master’s degree in electrical, mechanical, or biomedical engineering with at least 2–3 years of work experience. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 44. As such, a person of ordinary skill would be an engineer with experience designing medical devices intended to focus ultrasound energy into patients, or experience working with such devices.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Patent Owner argues that “to stimulate” or “irritate” means “to increase the functional, biological activity of the dermis.” PO Resp. 10. Petitioner argues that it is not necessary to construe this limitation because it is undisputed that Knowlton, relied upon by Petitioner to teach or suggest this limitation, discloses heating the dermis to produce a biological response. Reply 3 (citing Ex. 1005, 1:9–22, 5:20–26). At the oral argument, counsel for Patent Owner agreed that Knowlton discloses this limitation. Tr. 24:10– 21. Accordingly, we do not provide an express construction of this limitation. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (claim terms require construction only as relevant and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute). As set forth in more detail below, the dispute in this proceeding centers on the term “focusing ultrasound energy in a dermis layer of the region of the skin.” Ex. 1001, 10:24–25. The parties have not requested construction of this limitation nor provided proposed constructions thereof. We do not provide an express construction because, although the limitation is central to our analysis, the construction does not appear to be in dispute and there appears to be agreement among the parties and experts that the term “focused ultrasound,” at least includes a type of ultrasound that has a focal point or focal region. See Vivid Techs., Inc., 200 F.3d at 803 (construing terms to resolve issues in dispute). We note that focused ultrasound is depicted, inter alia, in Figure 1 of the ’559 patent. Ex. 1001, 5:20–30; Tr. 18:16–25 (Counsel for Petitioner: “There’s basically a lens. You have an ultrasound source and you have a lens and the lens concentrates the sound waves at a desired point.”); Ex. 1003 (Schafer Decl.) ¶ 18 (focus line); Ex. 2002 (Palmeri Decl.) ¶¶ 17, 20 (focused ultrasound has a focal region); Ex. 2003 (Schafer Depo.), 23:20–24 (focal point), 24:14–17 (focal region).” slip op. at 7

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We find that Knowlton only discloses the use of focusing element 62 for treatment of the subcutaneous layer. Ex. 1005, 14:16–15:8; Ex. 2002 ¶ 57; Ex. 2003, 174:12–24. Although Knowlton discloses the use of ultrasound to heat the dermis in the embodiment of Figure 1, it is unclear at 9 Patent Owner argues that Knowlton fails to disclose focused ultrasound in the dermis and also teaches away therefrom. PO Resp. 24–26. Petitioner argues that Knowlton does not teach avoiding the dermis. Reply 9–10 (citing, e.g., In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). Although we credit the expert testimony of Dr. Palmeri that there may be a focal burn from focused ultrasound, Ex. 2002 ¶ 61, inter alia, based on the Technomed PCT’s teachings, discussed infra, we do not understand this teaching to come from Knowlton itself. best whether this ultrasound is focused or unfocused. We credit the testimony of Dr. Palmeri that unfocused ultrasound may be used for heating, that focused ultrasound has different applications than unfocused ultrasound, and that there may be reasons to use one application as opposed to another. Ex. 2002 ¶ 61. As such, Petitioner has not shown that Knowlton necessarily discloses focused ultrasound in the embodiment of Figure 1, as opposed to unfocused ultrasound. See Southwire Co. v. Cerro Wire LLC, 870 F.3d 1306, 1311 (“While ‘[w]e have recognized that inherency may supply a missing claim limitation in an obviousness analysis,’ PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1194–95 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (collecting cases), we have emphasized that ‘the limitation at issue necessarily must be present’ in order to be inherently disclosed by the reference, id. (emphasis added).”). See also Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Mexichem Amanco Holding S.A., 865 F.3d 1348, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 6,113,559 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,113,559
• 3shape Medical A/S v. Sirona Dental Systems GmbHNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 21, 2017 · IPR2016-00481 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10 were not shown unpatentable: Mushabac did not anticipate claims 1–5 and 9–10, and the asserted combinations did not render claims 1–8 obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We determine that only the following claim phrase requires explicit construction for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (internal citation omitted)).” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner provides evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) is someone with a D.M.D. (Doctor of Medicine in Dentistry or Doctor of Dental Medicine) or D.D.S. (Doctor of Dental Surgery) and at least several years of experience with 3-D technology used in dental implant treatment, planning, and surgery. Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 63–66). Alternatively, such a person may have a computer engineering degree or be a trained dental laboratory technician having substantial experience with 3-D technology and software applications used in dental implant treatment, planning, and surgery. Id. Patent Owner has accepted Petitioner’s definition of a POSA for purposes of this IPR. We adopt and apply Petitioner’s definition of a POSA in this Decision.” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “2. Analysis of “optical measuring of the visible surfaces of the jaw” Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 requires “the presence in a single prior art disclosure of all elements of a claimed invention arranged as in the claim.” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008).” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Dr. Ganz agreed under cross-examination that “Mushabac optically measures the teeth [a]nd then it uses … bone sounding to measure the surfaces of the jawbone.” Ex. 2026, 252:11–20. When directly asked where a three-dimensional optical measuring of visible surfaces of the jaw was “stipulated” in Mushabac, Dr. Ganz could not identify any passage to support that assertion made in paragraph 100 of his Declaration. Id. at 248:16–252:20. We find Dr. Ganz’s cross-examination testimony to be highly persuasive and consistent with the disclosures in Mushabac and the testimony of Dr. Erickson. For the reasons given above, we determine that Mushabac does not expressly disclose an “optical” (light-based) measurement of the “visible surfaces of the jaw” in three dimensions, as recited in claim 1 of the ’006 patent.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 6,319,006 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,319,006

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.