- Platform Science, Inc. v. Omnitracs, LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Sep 3, 2021 · IPR2020-01612 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted rehearing and instituted IPR on all petition grounds for claims 1–4, 6–9, 11, 12, and 15, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“preliminary stage, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to claim 1.” slip op. at 44
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“The only dispute pertaining to claim construction at this stage of the proceeding is whether the phrase “a process for creating said response message,” recited in claim 1, is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.6 Petitioner 6 As noted above, Petitioner raises a second claim construction issue in its Rehearing Request. See Req. Reh’g 12–15 (asserting that the claims require only one instance of copying information from a formatted message to a response message based on which formatted message was received). Petitioner did not raise this issue in the Petition, Patent Owner has not had an contends that the phrase should be interpreted as a means-plus-function limitation, whereas Patent Owner contends that it should not. Compare Pet. 2–7 (advocating for a means-plus-function construction), with Prelim. Resp. 9–11 (advocating for an ordinary and customary meaning). At this stage of the proceeding, the dispute between the parties regarding the construction of this claim phrase does not impact our Decision. Accordingly, we need not construe expressly any claim terms for the purpose of this Decision.” slip op. at 17
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“VI. ANALYSIS Legal Standards – Anticipation “[A] claim is anticipated ‘if each and every limitation is found expressly or inherently in a single prior art reference.’” King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs., Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Anticipation is a question of fact, In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2009), assessed from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art, see Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“the dispositive question regarding anticipation [i]s whether one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer from the [prior art reference’s] teaching that every claim element was disclosed in that single reference” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted)).” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,925,308 - Eis GmbH v. Novoluto GmbHRehearing grantedPTAB · Sep 25, 2020 · IPR2020-00007 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Rehearing
Granted EIS GMBH’s rehearing request and instituted IPR of claims 1–3, 5, 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, 17–21, and 23–26 on all asserted grounds.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“We find that Dr. Prisco’s testimony is a reasonable interpretation of how Taylor works if the bellows are bidirectional, and the bellows are expanded and contracted when the suction cup is sealingly engaged. Figure 3 of Taylor shown above appears to support Dr. Prisco’s testimony that the bellows may be expanded or contracted from the initial position shown in Figure 3 and does not appear to show any valve or second opening in the bellows to provide unidirectional flow as Dr. Jensen, Patent Owner’s declarant, asserts. Also, as Petitioner asserts, Taylor indicates that a squeeze ball may be substituted for the bellows expressly indicating a device with a bidirectional flow. Although Patent Owner raises valid arguments concerning a common definition of bellows indicating unidirectional flow and provides testimony from Dr. Jensen reasonably supporting such a position, these dueling positions create a genuine issue of material fact that we weigh in favor of Petitioner on institution. See 37 C.F.R. 42.108(c).” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“We conclude from a review of Fang and Taylor that they are not substantially the same art nor is Petitioner making substantially the same argument as was presented the Office during prosecution of the ’061 Patent based on Fang. We find that the way in which Fang and Taylor work appear to be materially different. Fang appears to apply only suction to the skin whereas Taylor, with the sealingly connected suction cup, appears to apply a cyclical vacuum that Dr. Prisco testifies meets the claim limitations requiring generation of a pattern of negative and positive pressures, modulated with respect to a reference pressure. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 62–64, 75. Thus Taylor appears to teach the claim element Patent Owner argued during prosecution was missing from Fang. Also, in applying factors (b) and (d) of Becton, Dickinson, because of such differences noted above, we find that Taylor is not cumulative of Fang, which was considered and applied by the Office during prosecution of the ’061 Patent. 4. Conclusion Thus, we find that Taylor and Fang are not substantially the same art, nor were substantially the same arguments based on these references presented in the Petition and during prosecution of the ’061 Patent, respectively. As discussed above, because Petitioner primarily relies on Taylor in all four grounds for teaching the modulation of positive and negative pressures with respect to a reference pressure as required by all of the challenged claims, we also find that, overall, the same or substantially the same art was not previously presented to the Office nor were the same or substantially the same arguments previously presented to the Office. Therefore, we do not need to reach the application of the remaining Becton, Dickenson factors relating to whether the Petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office. Thus, we decline to exercise our discretion under § 325(d) to deny institution of an inter partes review here.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“how Taylor works if the bellows are bidirectional, and the bellows are expanded and contracted when the suction cup is sealingly engaged. Figure 3 of Taylor shown above appears to support Dr. Prisco’s testimony that the bellows may be expanded or contracted from the initial position shown in Figure 3 and does not appear to show any valve or second opening in the bellows to provide unidirectional flow as Dr. Jensen, Patent Owner’s declarant, asserts. Also, as Petitioner asserts, Taylor indicates that a squeeze ball may be substituted for the bellows expressly indicating a device with a bidirectional flow. Although Patent Owner raises valid arguments concerning a common definition of bellows indicating unidirectional flow and provides testimony from Dr. Jensen reasonably supporting such a position, these dueling positions create a genuine issue of material fact that we weigh in favor of Petitioner on institution. See 37 C.F.R. 42.108(c).” slip op. at 18
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“We find that Dr. Prisco’s testimony is a reasonable interpretation of how Taylor works if the bellows are bidirectional, and the bellows are expanded and contracted when the suction cup is sealingly engaged. Figure 3 of Taylor shown above appears to support Dr. Prisco’s testimony that the bellows may be expanded or contracted from the initial position shown in Figure 3 and does not appear to show any valve or second opening in the bellows to provide unidirectional flow as Dr. Jensen, Patent Owner’s declarant, asserts. Also, as Petitioner asserts, Taylor indicates that a squeeze ball may be substituted for the bellows expressly indicating a device with a bidirectional flow. Although Patent Owner raises valid arguments concerning a common definition of bellows indicating unidirectional flow and provides testimony from Dr. Jensen reasonably supporting such a position, these dueling positions create a genuine issue of material fact that we weigh in favor of Petitioner on institution. See 37 C.F.R. 42.108(c).” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,849,061 - Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Dec 20, 2019 · IPR2018-01039 · APJ Scott R Boalick · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted rehearing on printed-publication accessibility, finding a reasonable likelihood Dougherty was publicly accessible before the critical date, and remanded for consideration of institution on obviousness.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“We grant Petitioner’s request for rehearing. We conclude that, based on the totality of the evidence currently in the record, Petitioner has submitted evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the Dougherty reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent, and, thus Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that the reference qualifies as a printed publication. In view of this holding, we remand to the merits panel to determine whether Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the Petition. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Not reached
“reasonable likelihood that a reference is a printed publication. If trial is instituted, the petitioner will ultimately have the burden to prove that the reference is a printed publication by a preponderance of the evidence. We conclude that, based on the totality of the evidence currently in the record, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that the Dougherty reference is a printed publication that was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent. V. ORDER It is hereby ORDERED that Request for Rehearing is granted to address the POP review issue; and FURTHER ORDERED that the matter is remanded to the original merits panel for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including consideration of whether to institute a trial on the merits of the obviousness ground presented in the Petition.” slip op. at 21
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedInstituted
“institution, and based on the totality of the evidence to date, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that Dougherty is a printed publication. The face of Dougherty bears a copyright date of 1990, a printing date of November 1992, and an ISBN date of 8/94. Ex. 1004, 4. In addition, the book is a textbook from an established publisher, O’Reilly, and a well-known book series. See Canon Br. 11–12 (quoting https://www.oreilly.com/about/history.html). As Canon asserts, the cover of Publisher’s Weekly stated (with respect to this series) that “The Internet Was Built With O’Reilly Books.” Id. Altogether, this is sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable likelihood that Dougherty is a printed publication that a publisher made available to the pertinent public prior to the October 1995 critical date.” slip op. at 19
§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 5,806,062 - Rust-Oleum Corporation / RPM International, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Jul 23, 2019 · IPR2017-02158 · APJ Christopher G Paulraj · IPR · Rehearing
The Board accepted Patent Owners’ rehearing request as timely but denied rehearing, finding no overlooked or misapprehended issue requiring modification of the final written decision.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“layer is being removed (i.e., Example 1). Id. at 2–3. We are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked the evidence of record regarding whether Baumgärtel requires the use of pigments for rejuvenation. As we noted in our Final Written Decision, Example 1 of Baumgärtel does not mention the use of any pigments yet discusses the removal of the yellowed/damaged surface layer of white siding using a composition containing 99% dichloromethane. Paper 29, 42. Although the amendment in the Proposed Substitute Claims required both color and luster to be restored, it did not otherwise modify our construction of “rejuvenating,” which encompasses either “remov[ing] or transform[ing] the chalky surface that develops on vinyl siding that is exposed to sunlight and other environmental conditions.” Id. at 15 (emphasis added). The teaching in Baumgärtel’s Example 1 of removing the surface layer using a 99% dichloromethane solution satisfies our construction of “rejuvenating.” We, therefore, did not misapprehend or overlook Patent Owners’ evidence and arguments in determining that Example 1 of Baumgärtel anticipates the Proposed Substitute Claims.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(c)(3), “[a] late action will be excused on a showing of good cause or upon a Board decision that consideration on the merits would be in the interests of justice.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(c)(3) (emphasis added). Patent Owners have presented evidence tending to show that their counsel believed that the Request for Rehearing was timely filed on May 8, 2019. See Exs. 2011–2013. It does not appear, however, that they attached any document with their filing before clicking the submit button on PTAB E2E. In this regard, we note that the email generated by the PTAB E2E system and sent to counsel of record on May 8, 2019 clearly stated “THERE WERE NO DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED WITH THIS REQUEST.” Ex. 3001. Patent Owners have not explained why they did not take immediate action after receiving that email to determine whether the Request for Rehearing was actually filed.1 Indeed, Patent Owners remained” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingDecided for petitioner
“http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/prps.jsp#heading-5 (emphasis added). 2 We are also not persuaded that the filing of a Notice of Appeal (Paper 33) by Patent Owners divested the Board of jurisdiction to decide the merits of the Request for Rehearing. The Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Graves, 69 F.3d 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1995), is instructive on this point. There, the applicant had filed a notice of appeal to the Federal Circuit after the Board entered its initial decision but before the Board’s decision on a request for reconsideration. Id. at 1150. Because the notice of appeal was filed too late if based on the initial decision, the court determined that the Board’s initial” slip op. at 5
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureNot reached
“misapprehended evidence and arguments showing that Dr. Storey’s experiment was not based on Example 1 of Baumgärtel, and thus insufficient for Petitioners to meet their burden of showing inherent anticipation. Ex. 2010, 4–6. But, as set forth in our Final Written Decision, we fully considered the evidence of record and determined that the experiments conducted by Dr. Storey further support a finding of inherent anticipation by Baumgärtel. Paper 29, 43 (citing Ex. 1022 ¶¶ 12–36). We recognized that the 99.5% pure dichloromethane used by Dr. Storey for his experiments did not include the 1% of additional ingredients identified in Example 1, but took into account Dr. Storey’s unrebutted testimony that those additional ingredients in such small proportions would not have materially affected the rejuvenation characteristics of dichloromethane. Id. at 43–44 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 81–82). As we noted, Patent Owners did not cross-examine Dr. Storey as to his declaration testimony in this proceeding; nor did Patent Owners’ expert Dr. Grulke address these points in his own declaration. Id. at 44. Thus, we are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked the cited testimony of Dr. Storey regarding inherent anticipation.” slip op. at 7
§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 6,669,991 - Yamaha Golf Car Company v. Club Car, LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Jun 26, 2018 · IPR2017-02144 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Rehearing
Rehearing was granted in all four proceedings, and review was instituted on all challenged claims and grounds, except claims 12 and 20, which were disclaimed.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The party challenging a decision in a request for rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” Id. Upon a request for rehearing, the decision on a petition will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be indicated if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“persuades us to grant Petitioner’s requests for rehearing and institute trial in IPR2017-02141 and IPR2017-02143. In the IPR2017-02142 and IPR2017- 02144 proceedings, which have already been instituted as to one claim, Petitioner’s requests for rehearing convince us to institute as to all claims and all grounds set forth in each petition. In particular, in order to deny institution, or partially institute, we were confronted with competing testimony of witnesses offered as experts, as well as competing prior art translations, and we resolved at least one disputed issue of material fact in favor of Patent Owner to deny each petition. See Dec. 17–20. Our own regulation, however, cautions against such an approach at the institution phase of a proceeding stating, “a genuine issue of material fact created by . . . testimonial evidence [filed by Patent Owner] will be viewed in the light most favorable to the petitioner solely for purposes of deciding whether to institute an inter partes review.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c).” slip op. at 4
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportNot reached
“’569 patent was entitled to priority and adequately disclosed by the ’894 Provisional.8 Claim 11 requires “disabling golf cart movement towards the predetermined area further comprises disabling golf cart movement except in a reverse direction,” and Petitioner contends that this limitation was not adequately supported in the ’894 Provisional. Petitioner argues that we improperly weighed competing expert testimony at this phase of the proceeding to resolve the disputed issue in favor of Patent Owner. Specifically, Petitioner argues:” slip op. at 8
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“9 On April 27, 2018, Club Car (Patent Owner) filed a statutory disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. § 253 for claim 12 of the ’569 patent. See IPR2017-02144, Paper 22, Exhibit B (Disclaimer of claim 12). Because claim 12 has been disclaimed, we need not issue a final written decision addressing the patentability of this claim.” slip op. at 10
§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 7,480,569 - PTAB · Nov 14, 2017 · IPR2015-01802 · APJ Matthew R Clements · IPR · Rehearing
Granted rehearing and held claims 2, 4, and 6 unpatentable as obvious over Rabinovich because the wireless-network limitation encompasses a connection through a wireless hub.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. With this in mind, we address the arguments presented by Petitioner.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Ex. 1002, 3:41–49. Thus, the ’680 patent itself does not limit the recited “wireless network” to an ad hoc network. Moreover, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that our construction of “computer unit” requires limiting the recited “wireless network” to an ad hoc network. Specifically, dependent claims 2 and 4 each recite “wherein the at least one computer unit and the at least two data storage units are connected over a wireless network.” Dependent claim 6 recites a similar limitation. We construed “computing unit” to encompass any computing device. Dec. 6. We did not, as Patent Owner contends, “construe[] both the ‘computer unit’ and ‘data storage units’ as hosts” (PO Br. 3). Although our construction encompasses Rabinovich’s hosts, it does not require the recited “computer unit” and “data storage units” to be hosts. Moreover, even assuming that both units are Rabinovich’s “hosts,” dependent claims 2, 4, and 6 require only that they be “connected over a wireless network,” not “between” or “directly connected to each other,” as Patent Owner contends (PO Br. 3). Thus, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that two hosts “connected over a wireless network” necessarily requires a wireless connection “between” two hosts. Id. Based on our review of the ’680 patent, we construe “connected over a wireless network” as broad enough to encompass a connection through a wireless hub.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“Ex. 1002, 3:41–49. Thus, the ’680 patent itself does not limit the recited “wireless network” to an ad hoc network. Moreover, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that our construction of “computer unit” requires limiting the recited “wireless network” to an ad hoc network. Specifically, dependent claims 2 and 4 each recite “wherein the at least one computer unit and the at least two data storage units are connected over a wireless network.” Dependent claim 6 recites a similar limitation. We construed “computing unit” to encompass any computing device. Dec. 6. We did not, as Patent Owner contends, “construe[] both the ‘computer unit’ and ‘data storage units’ as hosts” (PO Br. 3). Although our construction encompasses Rabinovich’s hosts, it does not require the recited “computer unit” and “data storage units” to be hosts. Moreover, even assuming that both units are Rabinovich’s “hosts,” dependent claims 2, 4, and 6 require only that they be “connected over a wireless network,” not “between” or “directly connected to each other,” as Patent Owner contends (PO Br. 3). Thus, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that two hosts “connected over a wireless network” necessarily requires a wireless connection “between” two hosts. Id. Based on our review of the ’680 patent, we construe “connected over a wireless network” as broad enough to encompass a connection through a wireless hub. Because we determine that the “wireless network” recited in dependent claims 2, 4, and 6 need not be an ad hoc network, Patent Owner’s argument that Rabinovich’s replication method would have been unsuitable for use over an ad hoc network does not persuasively rebut Petitioner’s showing. Having considered the arguments and evidence of both parties, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that dependent claims 2, 4, and 6 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Rabinovich.” slip op. at 7
- ExcludeNot reached
“We decline to assess the merits of Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude. Even without excluding the identified evidence, we have concluded that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 2, 4, and 6 are unpatentable. Accordingly, Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,904,680 - PTAB · Mar 29, 2017 · IPR2016-01492 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted rehearing in part to explain institution on Eizenhöfer and Miller anticipation grounds for claims 13–15 and require claim-interpretation briefing; it denied rehearing on § 325(d).
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedRehearing, deniedGranted in part
“decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The party challenging the decision has the burden of showing a decision should be modified, and the request for rehearing must specifically” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“terminal demand” in a single sentence supported by citations to portions of the Specification and testimony from Dr. Lomp. Id. at 15–16 (citing Ex. 1001, 7:8–11, 18:50–54, 19:1–4, Figure 15A; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 7, 16, 19–21). Based on our review of the cited portions of the Specification, it is not apparent how those sections support WPI’s proffered meaning of “subscriber terminal demand.” None of the cited portions explicitly defines “subscriber terminal demand” or uses the term, and WPI does not explain why those cited portions are relevant to the inquiry. The cited testimony from Dr. Lomp reflects his opinion but is not supported by any citations to other evidence, including the Specification itself. To the extent that WPI’s argument regarding the meaning of “subscriber terminal demand” relies upon Dr. Lomp’s testimony, we currently find that argument unpersuasive because it is unsupported by other evidence. TCT has not expressly argued the meaning of “subscriber terminal demand” but instead implies a meaning by identifying specific portions of Eizenhöfer that allegedly teach this limitation. Pet. 31–32 (citing Ex. 1004, 3:7–10, Abstract). Absent briefing with citations to relevant evidence, we decline to offer our own express interpretation of “subscriber terminal demand.” Rather, we determine that TCT’s implied interpretation and its argument based on that interpretation demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of establishing that Eizenhöfer describes the recited limitation. Because resolution of the dispute may require an express interpretation of “subscriber terminal demand,” we also direct the parties to address explicitly the meaning of this phrase at trial and cite relevant evidence from among at least other claims, the Specification, and the prosecution history.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“reasons. First, WPI has failed, as required under Rule 42.71(c), to identify an abuse of discretion stemming from our allegedly “unreasonable” failure to exercise discretion under § 325(d) and deny institution of challenges based on Miller. Second, WPI merely reiterates an argument already considered and rejected, and thus fails to meet its obligation under Rule 42.71(d) to “identify all matters . . . misapprehended or overlooked.” We disagree that WPI offered a “clear comparison” of the entirety of the claims that were allegedly previously considered by the Office during reexamination of the ’326 patent to the claims at issue in this proceeding. Describing claims in the ’326 patent as “closely related” or reciting “similar features” without providing the actual text of those claims fails to provide an adequate basis for comparing those claims to the claims at issue in this proceeding. The paraphrased comparison of claims in the ’326 patent to the claims here is similarly lacking in clarity. Third, even if we were to determine that WPI sufficiently compared the “orthogonal code generator” recited in claims of the ’326 patent to the one recited in the claims at issue, such a comparison fails to demonstrate enough similarity in the claims overall to justify a discretionary denial of TCT’s challenge based on Miller.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Not reached
“TCT has not expressly argued the meaning of “subscriber terminal demand” but instead implies a meaning by identifying specific portions of Eizenhöfer that allegedly teach this limitation. Pet. 31–32 (citing Ex. 1004, 3:7–10, Abstract). Absent briefing with citations to relevant evidence, we decline to offer our own express interpretation of “subscriber terminal demand.” Rather, we determine that TCT’s implied interpretation and its argument based on that interpretation demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of establishing that Eizenhöfer describes the recited limitation. Because resolution of the dispute may require an express interpretation of “subscriber terminal demand,” we also direct the parties to address explicitly the meaning of this phrase at trial and cite relevant evidence from among at least other claims, the Specification, and the prosecution history.” slip op. at 5
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,381,211 - Arctic Cat, Inc. v. Polaris Industries, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · May 3, 2016 · IPR2014-01427 · APJ Michael W Kim · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted rehearing only as to the assertions it addressed and denied the rest, finding no rehearing basis for the unbriefed “extending between” issue.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedRehearing, deniedGranted in part
“A request for rehearing can only point out that which the Board misapprehended or overlooked. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Moreover, as the moving party, the burden of persuasion falls on Patent Owner. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012).” slip op. at 2
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for petitioner
“proceeding that could plausibly be considered as being directed to “extending between.” Substantively, the only place in this proceeding where arguments and evidence were asserted concerning “extending between” was in the oral hearing transcript, which Patent Owner correctly identifies as being directed to both proceedings, and, thus, the contents of which are equally applicable to both proceedings. Paper 54, 3:18–23. As set forth expressly in our Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, however, “[n]o new evidence or arguments may be presented at the oral argument.” 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,768. See also Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, 2016 WL 1019075, *6, *7 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2016) (“the Board denied Acceleron its procedural rights by relying in its decision on a factual assertion introduced into the proceeding only at oral argument, after Acceleron could meaningfully respond.”). Accordingly, when the oral hearing transcript is excluded from consideration, there is no argument or asserted evidence concerning “extending between” in this proceeding. Of course, there is asserted evidence, along with arguments providing context to that evidence, in the substantive papers for the other proceeding. In asserting that the Board should consider those arguments, Patent Owner asserts that claim constructions should be consistent across proceedings. We would agree with Patent Owner if the evidence and arguments presented in the two proceedings were consistent. Such is not the case here. Indeed, even if we were to import some arguments from the other proceeding, they would be directed solely to a proper construction of “extending between,” with no explanation of the relevance of “extending between” to the combination of Denney and Furuhashi in the instant proceeding, as that combination was not at issue in the other proceeding.” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITANot reached
“claim construction of “extending between” in a Final Written Decision of related proceeding IPR2014-01428 (Ex. 2095, “other proceeding”). Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that if that claim construction of “extending between” from the other proceeding were applied in the instant proceeding, the record would show that the prior art asserted in the instant proceeding is missing a claim element recited in every challenged independent claim, and, thus, the Board’s determination that independent claims are unpatentable cannot be maintained. When considered in the confines of a request for rehearing, this is a straightforward case. By Patent Owner’s own acknowledgment, no proposed claim construction concerning “extending between,” much less any assertion concerning its relevance to proffered prior art, was considered in the Final Written Decision for the instant proceeding. This should come as no surprise, as it is undisputed that no argument or evidence has been advanced in any substantive paper, and, thus, no evaluation of any argument or evidence has been conducted, concerning this issue, in the instant proceeding. Absent such argument or evidence, Patent Owner has not, and cannot, identify that which the Board misapprehended or overlooked in the instant proceeding, as required by the Office Patent Trial Practice Guide. And without such identification, we are unpersuaded that there is any basis for a request for rehearing, in that it certainly cannot be said that the Board misapprehended or overlooked that which was not argued.” slip op. at 2
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 8,596,405 - Square, Inc. v. Think Computer CorporationRehearing grantedPTAB · Feb 9, 2016 · CBM2014-00159 · APJ Michael W Kim · CBM · Rehearing
The Board granted Patent Owner’s rehearing request insofar as it addressed the assertions in the decision, but denied it in all other respects; the prior analysis remained unchanged.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted in part
“A request for rehearing can only point out that which the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and will be reviewed for abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Moreover, as the moving party, the burden of persuasion falls on Patent Owner. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012).” slip op. at 1
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“are unpersuaded that they would alter our construction. For example, Patent Owner asserts that the claim limitation “any particular transaction” requires that “bidirectional account” be construed as allowing an account to function simultaneously as both a merchant account and a purchaser account under all transactions. We disagree, primarily because we are unclear as to what Patent Owner means by “under all transactions.” The relevant limitation of independent claim 1 reads “wherein the first account and the second account are adapted to selectively function as either a merchant or a purchaser account during any particular transaction.” We find that “[a]ny particular transaction” means any specific transaction, and is not necessarily limited to all transactions going forward, and find further that, logically, an account need only function in “merchant mode” or “purchaser mode” for that particular transaction; otherwise the account would be in the awkward position of performing a transaction with itself. Moreover, we are unclear as to why the same account cannot function as both, depending on the transaction, as an account is merely a repository within which funds are held, and whether the account is in “merchant mode” (i.e., the ability to send funds from the account) or “purchaser mode” (i.e., the ability to send funds to the account) does not alter the fundamental repository nature of the account itself. A similar analysis of the cited portions of the prosecution history and Specification yields similar conclusions. For example, Patent Owner’s discussion of the prosecution history on pages 4 and 5 of the Request for Rehearing do not amount to Patent Owner providing an explicit definition of “selectively function,” “during any particular transition,” or any other claim term as meaning “simultaneously”; nor do Patent Owner’s statements rise to the level of a clear and unmistakable disclaimer with respect to the meaning of the claim terms.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“2. whether Dalzell fails to meet the claims’ requirements Based on Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction of “bidirectional accounts,” Patent Owner asserts that Dalzell does not disclose “bidirectional accounts.” Req. 7‒10. As we are unpersuaded, however, that the Board misapprehended or overlooked the items identified by Patent Owner in construing “bidirectional accounts,” we are unpersuaded that our analysis of Dalzell and “bidirectional accounts” set forth on pages 28 to 29 of the Final Written Decision should be modified in any way. See Dec. 29 (“[W]e find that a more logical reading of paragraph 59 of Dalzell is that a buyer, from a particular account, can add a seller feature to that particular account, without the need to create a whole new account. Such a finding is supported by extensive analysis and testimony by Dr. Sadeh-Koniecpol, with explicit citations to Dalzell, which we find credible, reasonable, and persuasive. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 147-164 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 9, 27, 49, 57, 61, 82, 85, 87, 132, 163, Figs. 1A, 1B).”)” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,396,808 - Daicel Corporation v. Celanese International CorporationRehearing grantedPTAB · Jun 26, 2015 · IPR2015-00173 · APJ Linda M Gaudette · IPR · Rehearing
Rehearing was granted in part; IPR was instituted on claims 58–60, 67, 69, 71, and 72 for anticipation by the ’095 patent and claim 73 for obviousness over the ’095 patent and JP ’712.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted in part
“the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing that the decision should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“the Petition, and overlooked the fact that Mr. Cooper’s opinion is also based on his own calculations and data in two published articles. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 97. Specifically, Mr. Cooper approximates reactor DME equilibrium concentrations in the ’095 patent examples and explains how these approximations were obtained using readily available data, specifically identifying data in two published articles. Ex. 1003 ¶ 97 (citing Exs. 1029, 1030). Mr. Cooper goes on to explain why, based on the reactor contents and distillation conditions in the ’095 patent examples, DME and” slip op. at 4
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureReference is prior artInherency foundInstituted
“the Petition, and overlooked the fact that Mr. Cooper’s opinion is also based on his own calculations and data in two published articles. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 97. Specifically, Mr. Cooper approximates reactor DME equilibrium concentrations in the ’095 patent examples and explains how these approximations were obtained using readily available data, specifically identifying data in two published articles. Ex. 1003 ¶ 97 (citing Exs. 1029, 1030). Mr. Cooper goes on to explain why, based on the reactor contents and distillation conditions in the ’095 patent examples, DME and acetaldehyde would be present in the overhead distillation streams. Id. ¶¶ 99–100. Because Petitioner has shown Mr. Cooper’s testimony is supported by underlying factual evidence, and is not based solely on an unsupported assumption and the Miura Declaration, we determine Mr. Cooper’s testimony provides persuasive support for Petitioner’s contention that DME is inherently present in an overhead distillation stream of the ’095 patent process, and that claim 58 is anticipated by the ’095 patent. We have also reviewed the Petition’s analysis of dependent claims 59, 60, 67, 69, 71, and 72, and conclude Petitioner has provided sufficient explanation and evidence to support a reasonable likelihood that the additional limitations of these claims are described in the ’095 patent. See Pet. 25–30.” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“on the combination of the ’095 patent and Akinori, based on our determination in Section 1.A., above, that Petitioner had established a reasonable likelihood it would prevail on the merits in showing claim 58 was anticipated by the ’095 patent alone, and the Petition did not articulate a substantive difference between the two challenges. In the present challenge, the Petition fails to explain how Akinori is relied upon for a teaching of a claim 73 feature not described in the ’095 patent. See Pet. 47–51. The Petition does explain, however, why claim 73 would have been obvious over the combination of the ’095 patent and JP ’712. See id. at 50–51. Based on the record before us, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in showing claim 73 would have been obvious over the ’095 patent and JP ’712. Therefore, the Request for Rehearing is granted as to claim 73, and trial is instituted based on the combination of the ’095 patent and JP ’712.” slip op. at 11
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,076,507
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.