- Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Advanced Coding Technologies, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · May 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00062 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that the prior art disclosed or taught the construed “emphasis level” limitation in any challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“which the amplitude of the high frequency components of the video signal is increased,” as required by the construction of “emphasis level.”7 See Prelim. Resp. 9 (“the Petition’s analysis of the claim limitations containing these terms against the cited references does not indicate that those references disclose these limitations under Petitioner’s proposed constructions in the District Court Action”). Thus, without Petitioner mapping the constructions to the prior art in a clear and identifiable way, we determine the Petition itself does not satisfy Petitioner’s burden. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.104(b)(3)– (4).” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“the terms “emphasis processing” and “emphasis level.” In the Petition, Petitioner states that no constructions are necessary (Pet. 2), but after filing 2 US 5,491,514; issued Feb. 13, 1996. Ex. 1005. 3 US 5,241,387; issued Aug. 31, 1993. Ex. 1006. 4 US 6,801,665 B1; published Sept. 30, 1999. Ex. 1007. the Petition, Petitioner proposed constructions of those terms in the parties’ district-court litigation, stating that: (i) the claim term “emphasis processing” means “increasing the amplitude of the high frequency components of a video signal;” and (ii) the claim term “emphasis level” means “a value that represents the amount by which the amplitude of the high frequency components of the video signal is increased.” Ex. 2003, 10– 11. After Patent Owner relied on those constructions in its Preliminary Response (see, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 8–10),5 Petitioner requested (Ex. 3001), and the Board authorized (Paper 8), additional briefing to address how the analysis in the Petition applies under those constructions.6 Because we determine Petitioner’s showings with respect to those constructions are inadequate to carry Petitioner’s burden, our discussion below focuses primarily on those aspects of the parties’ briefing.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialNot reached
“Discretionary Denial Because we determine Petitioner has not carried its burden on the merits, we do not reach the parties’ arguments relating to discretionary denial. See Pet. 98–99; Prelim. Resp. 26–32.” slip op. at 11
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,845,128 - Mediatek Inc. v. Parkervision, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · May 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00150 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–5 on all four asserted obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the Gibson and Schiltz combination.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“As set forth in the Director’s Memorandum, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (dated June 21, 2022), at 7, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretion ary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf, the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR . . . in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition. Petitioner’s stipulation (Ex. 1025) satisfies the language from the Director’s Memorandum quoted above. Therefore, we need not analyze each Fintiv factor to reach the determination that we will not exercise our discretion to deny institution in view of the parallel Western District of Texas Litigation.” slip op. at 14
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“We disagree. The Petition is clear that it presents alternative challenges where Goldberg, Thacker, ITU-T J.83, and/or AAPA are added to the combination of Gibson and Schiltz or are added to Crols, if the term “cable modem,” recited in the preamble of claim 1, is determined to be limiting. Pet. 6–7. In the context presented here, “and/or” clearly means one or more of the four additional references. And Petitioner’s reliance on one or more of the additional references is clear in the context of the issues before us based on Petitioner’s analysis of the preamble of claim 1, where Petitioner clearly states, “[a]nd to the extent that the preamble is limiting and requires a ‘cable modem,’ it would have been obvious to use the modem of Gibson (as modified by Schiltz, discussed below) as a cable modem, in view of Thacker, Goldberg, ITU-T J.83, and/or AAPA.” Pet. 42 (Ground 1); see id. at 66–67 (similarly asserting, in the context of Ground 2, that, “[t]o the extent that the preamble is limiting and requires a ‘cable modem,’ it would have been obvious to use the modem of Crols as a cable modem, in view of Thacker, Goldberg, ITU-T J.83, and/or AAPA”). Petitioner also includes a discussion as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to “use the modems of Gibson modified with Schiltz (Ground 1), and Crols (Ground 2), as ‘cable modems,’ in view of the DOCSIS References (Thacker and Goldberg), ITU-T J.83, and AAPA,” and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in so doing. Id. at 37–40. Thus, we do not agree with Patent Owner that the Petition lacks particularity and we find that the Petition clearly sets forth the alternative combinations discussed above such that Patent Owner has a fair opportunity to respond.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“l. Summary as to Claim 1 For the reasons discussed above, on the present record we find that Petitioner has established that the combination of Gibson and Schiltz teaches each of the elements of claim 1 and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of these two references as proposed by Petitioner with a reasonable expectation of success in so doing.” slip op. at 40
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is identical to the level of skill that we found applicable in the final written decision in the TCL IPR. See IPR2021-00985, Paper 44 at 13. We see no reason to deviate from our previous finding, which is now further supported by Dr. Larson’s testimony. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 26. Accordingly, at this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which we find consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’835 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,292,835 - Netflix Inc. v. Divx, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 17, 2024 · IPR2020-00646 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board held claims 1, 5, 8, 9, 13–15, 18, and 21–23 unpatentable as obvious over Zetts and Kaku, with claims 5, 18, and 21 also obvious over Zetts, Kaku, and Seo.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandDecided for petitioner
“the Federal Circuit. Paper 49. On September 11, 2023, the Federal Circuit issued a decision in the appeal vacating our Final Written Decision and remanding for further proceedings consistent with its decision. Netflix, 80 F.4th at 1362. The Federal Circuit determined that we abused our discretion in finding that Petitioner had failed to articulate a field of endeavor. Id. at 1359. The Federal Circuit remanded to allow us to decide the “factual question of whether Kaku is directed to the same field of endeavor as the patent-in-suit.” Id. at 1361. The Federal Circuit, however, did not address the other three issues raised by Patent Owner since we did not decide those issues in the Final Written Decision and they were not presented for appeal. See generally Netflix.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In the Final Written Decision, we stated the following:” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner has not shown that one of the prior art references is analogous to the claimed invention.” Final Dec. 9. On remand, the construction of this claim is an issue that must be decided to reach a conclusion on the patentability of the Challenged Claims of the ’792 patent.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“1. Analogous Art – Field of Endeavor Before turning to Petitioner’s analysis of the claims, we address” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 8,472,792 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,472,792 - PTAB · Apr 15, 2024 · IPR2023-01409 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–30 and all eight asserted obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Stafford and Cote render at least one challenged claim obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“that if “the record of the Office’s previous consideration of the art is not well developed or silent, then a petitioner may show the Office erred by overlooking something persuasive.” Advanced Bionics, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 10. Although Petitioner did not specifically state that the Examiner erred in not rejecting the claims over the prior art asserted here, under the second part of the Advanced Bionics framework, based on our analysis of the current record as a whole, we find that Petitioner has “ma[d]e a showing of material error,” in fact, the Petition is premised on it. Advanced Bionics, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8–9. In particular, Petitioner shows that the Office erred by overlooking something persuasive, namely, the teachings of at least Stafford and Cote, as highlighted in Petitioner’s unpatentability grounds. See Pet. 5 (arguing that each of Cote and Brenneman “provides express teachings on inserters for on-body units that were not considered by the Examiner”), 20–84 (Ground 1). In the Reasons for Allowance, the Examiner stated that “[w]hile Brister (US 2006/0016700) teaches the bulk of the claimed limitations, it fails to teach a housing . . . and an inserter with a sharp” that extends through the housing as claimed. Ex. 1002, 977. Petitioner, however, sufficiently demonstrates for purposes of institution that Stafford and Cote disclose these limitations. See Pet. 33–84 (explaining why Stafford and Cote teach or suggest the limitations of the challenged claims); see also infra Section III.E (determining that, on the current record, Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood that the claims challenged in Ground 1 are unpatentable as obvious over Stafford and Cote). Based on the circumstances elucidated by the current record, we find that Petitioner adequately shows that the Examiner “misapprehend[ed] or overlook[ed] specific teachings” of at least Stafford and Cote that “impact patentability of the challenged claims.” Advanced Bionics, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 n.9. That is, Petitioner shows that the Examiner materially erred by not applying at least Stafford and Cote in the manner Petitioner argues and as supported by Dr. Fletcher.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“After considering the arguments and cited evidence of record, we find that for purposes of institution, Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that Stafford and Cote would have rendered claim 1 obvious. We have reviewed the arguments and evidence of record for claims 2–6, 9–14, 16–24, 27, 29, and 30 in Ground 1, and similarly find that for purposes of institution, Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that Stafford and Cote would have rendered these claims obvious. See Pet. 20–84; Ex. 1003 (Fletcher Decl.) ¶¶ 44–155. On this basis, we institute inter partes review of all challenged claims on all grounds in the Petition. See SAS Institute Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1358; 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 30
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.11 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had: a bachelor’s degree in bioengineering, mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or a related subject, and one or more years of experience researching, developing, and/or designing insertable medical devices, including, e.g., systems for implanting wearable medical devices such as cannulas, infusion sets, and analyte sensors, or equivalent experience. Less work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education, such as a master’s degree, and vice versa. Pet. 10–11 (citing Ex. 1003 (Fletcher Decl.) ¶ 28). Patent Owner does not presently dispute Petitioner’s proposal or offer an alternative definition. See generally Prelim. Resp. 10 The record does not presently include any objective indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness. See generally Pet.; Prelim. Resp. 11 For purposes of this Decision, we apply a priority date of February 3, 2009. See supra 8 n.2. Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level).” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither party proposes that any claim term requires an express construction. See Pet. 19; see generally Prelim. Resp. We find it unnecessary to construe any claim term to decide whether Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Any final written decision entered in this case may include express claim constructions, or may include discussion of claim scope that differs from that provided in our analysis below. Any final claim constructions will be based on the full trial record.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,202,591 - Netflix, Inc. v. Divx, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 21, 2024 · IPR2020-00511 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board held claims 1–3, 5, 6, 10–12, 14, and 15 unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of Chen and Grab-333 with Candelore or Kocher.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“I. INTRODUCTION This case is on remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to address the patentability of claims 1–3, 5, 6, 10–12, 14, and 15 (“the Challenged Claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 9,184,920 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’920 patent). Netflix, Inc. v. DivX, LLC, No. 2022-1043, 2023 WL 3115576 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 27, 2023) (nonprecedential). For the reasons discussed herein, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Challenged Claims are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978)). As neither party challenges our preliminary finding regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art, we see no reason to disturb that finding. Accordingly, we maintain and reaffirm that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field with at least two years of experience in video encryption and cryptography or . . . a master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field with a specialization in video encryption and cryptography.” See Inst. Dec. 9–10 (finding the same).” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“In the Response, Patent Owner does not propose a construction for any claim term or contest our preliminary findings regarding limitations 1[a] and 1[b]. See generally PO Resp. Accordingly, we maintain and reaffirm our preliminary determinations regarding the meaning of the recited “user encryption key” and “content encryption key.” [Inst.] Dec. 12– 15. Additionally, we need not construe other claim terms to resolve the present controversy before us.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“obviousness] involves the weighing of the fact findings to conclude whether the claimed combination would have been obvious to an ordinary artisan.” Arctic Cat, 876 F.3d at 1361. On balance, considering the complete record before us, Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 3, 5, 6, 10, 12, 14, and 15 of the ’920 patent would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 103
Patent outcomesUS 9,184,920 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,184,920 - Amphenol Corp. v. PPC Broadband, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Mar 20, 2024 · IPR2023-01363 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, and 10–13 because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim, including obviousness over Holmberg and Battey.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that the information presented in the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one of the Challenged Claims of the ’483 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all the Challenged Claims of the ’483 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends claim 1 should be construed to require that “the drop cable retain its external jacket as it is routed internally.” Pet. 10. Petitioner contends this construction differs from Patent Owner’s apparent construction in the district court, “which allows the external jacket to be removed as the drop cable enters the DIB and the fibers routed inside the box without the external jacket.” Id. at 10–11. Patent Owner contends Petitioner’s narrower construction requiring the “drop cable” retain its external jacket is incorrect, but contends “the Board need not resolve this claim construction dispute to deny institution because Petitioner’s proposed Grounds 1–5 are all insufficient under” either party’s construction. Prelim. Resp. 9. Upon review of the parties’ arguments and the prior art of record, we determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). We address below, however, whether the recited cable types themselves constitute claim limitations.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“slack fiber. Prelim. Resp. 33–37. These arguments are not persuasive. First, Petitioner does not propose a bodily incorporation of Battey’s shelf into the device of Holmberg. Rather, Petitioner’s proposed combination retains splice tray 230 of Holmberg and relies on Battey for its disclosure of using a hinge connection for the splice tray. Pet. 40 (asserting that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have found it obvious to modify Holmberg pursuant to Battey, resulting in splice tray 230 moveable relative to main body 216”), 43 (“Such a modification would have been a simple substitution of a hinged connection instead of a fastener.”). Second, although Battey utilizes a fixedly mounted slack basket to store excess cable, we are directed to no disclosure or teaching in Battey that teaches away from using other means of storing slack fiber.” slip op. at 23
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“For the reasons set forth below, we determine that part two of the Advanced Bionics framework has not been satisfied. Thus, we need not address whether part one of the framework is satisfied in view of the alleged cumulative nature of Laporte and Battey.” slip op. at 30
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,008,483 - PTAB · Feb 26, 2024 · IPR2023-01275 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 5, 6, and 8 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Clark and Manner.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). See 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2021) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s argument that Industrial Design does not have a set definition is supported by Dr. Ben-Tzvi’s testimony. Nonetheless, we give little weight to his testimony on this point because he does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Ex. 2001 ¶ 22. Based on the present record, we do not exclude Industrial Design from the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, although the parties are free to address this issue further during trial. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s level of skill in the art because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’650 patent and the prior art. Our Decision would be not be affected if we were to apply Patent Owner’s definition.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“C. Mr. Kemnitzer’s Testimony Patent Owner contends that we should give little to no weight to Mr. Kemnitzer’s testimony because his “education and experience is in industrial design, rather than mechanical engineering.” Prelim. Resp. 57 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 4–6). According to Patent Owner, “[s]uch qualifications are directed more toward aesthetics than hard science,” while “[m]echanical engineering concerns are at the core of certain deficiencies in Mr. Kemnitzer’s analysis.” Id. (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 58). Regardless of the precise contours of industrial design, Mr. Kemnitzer testifies that he has “substantial direct experience in designing products that utilize the manufacturing processes, components, and materials of the designs at issue in this matter” and “in designing fully adjustable products for the commercial furniture, computer, and healthcare industries.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 5. Thus, on the present record at this stage of the proceeding, we decline to minimize the weight given to his testimony for this reason. The parties, however, are free to address this issue further during trial.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner contends that “the ’650 patent is obvious under any reasonable construction of the claims.” Pet. 9. Petitioner points out that it contends in district court that the term “an actuator for controlling the driver” is indefinite for invoking means-plus-function claiming without providing corresponding structure. Id. (citing Ex. 1023, 36–40; Ex. 1024, 28–32). Petitioner, however, adopts Patent Owner’s construction of this term for the purposes of this proceeding—“a mechanism to activate or control equipment, e.g., by use of pneumatic, hydraulic, or electronic signals.” Id. at 10 (quoting Ex. 1012, 3–4). Petitioner also points out that in the district court, the parties’ proposed constructions of “work surface” also differ. Id. Specifically, Petitioner advocates that the term should be construed as “a curved surface at the top of a cart large enough to dispense medication or hold work papers,” while Petitioner characterizes Patent Owner’s position as advocating “for a broader ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ construction. Id. (citing Ex. 1012, 8–9). Petitioner, however, states that it “includes alternate grounds using Gillis to demonstrate how the claims are invalid under either Petitioner or Patent Owner’s construction.” Id. Patent Owner contends that Petitioner fails to expressly adopt or set forth any claim definitions aside from the term “work surface.” Prelim. Resp. 17. Patent Owner, however, contends that the claimed invention is valid under any reasonable construction. Id. Patent Owner also contends that the term “compartment” should be construed as “an enclosed space for containing an item” and that the construction of “work surface” is not dispositive here. Id. at 18–20. We agree with Patent Owner that it is not necessary to construe “work surface” at this stage of the proceeding because the construction of the term does not resolve the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,215,650 - PTAB · Feb 26, 2024 · IPR2023-01274 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 3 and 4 on all grounds; the Board found a reasonable likelihood that claims 3 and 4 would be unpatentable as obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). See 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2021) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, Preliminary Reply, Preliminary Sur-reply as well as all supporting evidence, we conclude that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing at least one claim of the ’668 patent is unpatentable. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we hereby institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims of the ’668 patent on all grounds stated in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42 (“When instituting . . . review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”); PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the relevant statutory provisions, in light of SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018), to require “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s argument that Industrial Design does not have a set definition is supported by Dr. Ben-Tzvi’s testimony. Ex. 2001 ¶ 22. Nonetheless, we give little weight to his testimony on this point because it 9 Patent Owner is reminded that arguments may not be incorporated by reference from one document into another document. 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3). does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Based on the present record, we do not exclude Industrial Design from the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, although the parties are free to address this issue further during trial. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s level of skill in the art because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’668 patent and the prior art. Our Decision would not be affected if we were to apply Patent Owner’s definition.” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Regardless of the precise contours of industrial design, Mr. Kemnitzer testifies that he has “substantial direct experience in designing products that utilize the manufacturing processes, components, and materials of the designs at issue in this matter” and “in designing fully adjustable products for the commercial furniture, computer, and healthcare industries.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 5. Thus, on the present record and at this stage of the proceeding, we decline to minimize the weight given to his testimony for this reason. The parties, however, are free to address this issue further during trial.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We determine that it is not necessary to construe “work surface” expressly at this stage of the proceeding because the construction of the term does not resolve the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,594,668 - Netflix, Inc. v. Divx, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 22, 2024 · IPR2020-00558 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Remand
The majority determined claims 1–24 were not shown unpatentable over Chen, Lindahl, and Hurst; the dissent would have found them obvious.
RulingsRemand decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We determine Patent Owner’s reading of the claim limitation is the better one. The limitation begins with the verb “locating,” and it therefore makes sense that the clause would recite what is located (i.e., encryption information) and where it is located (i.e., within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video). In other words, it is reasonable that the second and third clauses of the limitation both modify the first clause (for example, as could perhaps be expressed through the use of commas as “locating encryption information, that identifies encrypted portions of frames of video, within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video”).10 On the other hand, Petitioner’s reading of the limitation, 10 In general, we recognize that the use of commas to set off phrases in claim drafting is not consistent. We included commas above to illustrate Patent Owner’s understanding of the claim limitation. allowing only the second clause to modify the first, while not unreasonable, makes less sense. That is, the encrypted information identifies the encrypted portions of frames, which in turn are within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video. Reading the claim in its entirety, the encrypted portions of frames would be understood to be located within the requested portions of the stream; it does not seem necessary for the claim to expressly recite that aspect. For example, the very next limitation— limitation [m] of claim 1—refers to “each encrypted portion of the frames of video” but does not expressly recite “within the requested portions of the selected stream.” Ex. 1001, 27:58–60. Thus, when limitation [l] recites “within the requested portions of the selected stream,” it seems more likely that the clause refers to where that encrypted information is located rather than simply to indicate the obvious location of the encrypted portion of the frames of video. We therefore view Patent Owner’s reading of the claim language as the better one.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundMixed
“I am persuaded that the Petition demonstrates that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a motivation to combine Chen, Lindahl, and Hurst, as asserted by Petitioner. As the Federal Circuit found, the Petition pointed to and relied upon the portions in Chen describing pre-Chen art, without scalability or FEC features that were part of what Chen describes as aspects of its own inventive system. Netflix, slip op. at 9–10 (citing Pet. 17– 19, 69–70). I agree with Petitioner that “Chen-924 teaches several embodiments that adaptively stream alternative representations of a video using partially encrypted container files.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1010, 14:41– 15:60). I determine that Chen-924 provides support for the rationale provided in the Petition, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Chen and Lindahl in view of the disclosure of Chen-924. As discussed above, the Petition does not rely solely on privacy concerns and improvements to efficiency as its motivation to combine the references. See Pet. 18–19 (specifying piracy concerns, improvements to the efficiency of adaptive streaming, optimization of the balance between bitrate and bandwidth, and improvements to the end-user experience with fast startup and seek). With respect to whether one of ordinary skill in the art would have” slip op. at 52
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for petitioner
“I agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s Remand Brief, specifically pages 1–7, attempt to address aspects of claim 1 for the first time on remand. I also agree that Patent Owner’s arguments attempt to recharacterize limitations [j] and [k] to raise issues that Patent Owner did not raise previously, in contravention of our Order that issues raised needed support from “where those issues were raised in previous briefings by the parties.” Paper 56, 2. I have addressed whether scalability and FEC are integral to how Chen operates above, as well as whether the Petition relies on those aspects, supra. The questions about how Chen operates and what portions of Chen are asserted in the ground of unpatentability were previously raised, but now are being considered or reconsidered, based on the Federal Circuit’s decision. In Patent Owner’s Remand Brief, pages 1–7, the citations to argument previously raised do not support the arguments now presented by Patent Owner on remand. As such, I determine Patent Owner’s new arguments fall outside the scope of remand, and I dismiss these arguments seeking to distinguish limitations [j] and [k] from the cited prior art combination.24” slip op. at 62
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMixed
“7 Patent Owner’s Brief on Remand recognizes that there are two arguments Patent Owner raised in its Patent Owner Response that were not addressed in the Final Written Decision. See PO Remand Br. 1 (citing PO Resp. 24–37 (the construction of “locating encrypted information . . . within requested portions”), 38–58 (referring to Patent Owner’s “common keys” argument)). 8 The Final Decision also addressed Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude (Paper 42). See Final Dec. 28–37 (granting-in-part, denying-in-part, and dismissing-in-part Petitioner’s Motion). Our determinations on that Motion were part of Petitioner’s appeal to the Federal Circuit. See Paper 52. Because the Federal Circuit did not address this aspect of the Final Written Decision and the Federal Circuit’s decision does not impact our previous rulings on the Motion, we maintain those rulings here. Additionally, on remand, Petitioner requested authorization to file a motion for sanctions, which we held in abeyance until the parties’ briefing on remand was complete. See Ex. 3003, 1. Petitioner requests sanctions because of the impropriety of Patent Owner’s remand brief, including new claim construction arguments for limitations [1j] and [1k], and prejudice to Petitioner. Id. at 3, 5. Although we reserved further consideration of Petitioner’s request, we expanded both the time and pages allowed for Petitioner’s responsive brief, and also allowed Petitioner to address any related issues in its responsive brief. Id. at 1. Having considered the parties’ briefing on remand, and given that we do not reach the claim construction arguments that Petitioner objected to in its request for authorization to file a motion for sanctions, we deny Petitioner’s request.” slip op. at 5
Patent outcomesUS 10,225,588 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,225,588 - Edwards Lifesciences Corporation / Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Aortic Innovations LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 22, 2024 · IPR2023-01325 · APJ Timothy G Majors · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 2, and 4–6 were unpatentable under any asserted obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), inter partes review may not be instituted unless the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For reasons discussed below, we do not institute review of claims 1, 4, and 4–6 of the ’033 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“concerning the ’834 patent, the intrinsic evidence is minimally helpful in revealing an affirmative meaning for the claims’ “spacing(s)” terms. IPR2023-01151, Paper 12, 39–41. The Specification does not use the term “spacings” in relation to the positioning of adjacent fibers; the drawings might be helpful, but neither party proposes a specific construction that is reliant on them. And, portions of the prosecution record are arguably confounding. For example, the applicant distinguished claimed “spacings” from “tightly knitted fibers.” Ex. 2140, 1001 (suggesting a more “loosely defined fiber structure” may be covered); see also Ex. 1002, 29–30 (asserting the claimed design has “a lesser [fiber] density construction” compared to Walther). This begs the question, at what point does a cloth of “tightly knitted fibers” convert to a cloth having a “loosely defined” fiber structure that would come within the scope of the claimed “spacings?” The record does not answer. Applicant’s suggestion during prosecution that the claimed spacings between fibers are “intentionally placed” about the frame and not simply “the spacing that may be inherent” in fibrous cloths is also unavailing on this record in clearly defining the metes and bounds of the term. Ex. 1002, 28–29. Whether the alleged absence of “objective boundaries” for the term “spacings” supports a conclusion that the claims are invalid as indefinite would be a question for the court. Paper 11, 5 (arguing There is insufficient technical detail available to determine whether the SAPIEN 3 Ultra does or does not include “spacings” as claimed and we take no position on whether such device infringes any claim of the ’033 patent. that a conclusion that the claims are indefinite is “outside the Board’s [IPR] jurisdiction”).12 Notwithstanding the lack of any express claim construction for the “spacings” term from either party, claim 1 of the ’033 patent requires something more than just “spacings.” Claim 1 requires “spacings extending through a thickness of the sealing assembly that allow fluid to pass therethrough when the prosthetic heart valve assembly is in an undeployed state.” Ex. 1001, 22:11–15 (emphasis added). In other words, the spacings must allow fluid to pass through the sealing assembly’s thickness when the valve is undeployed. For reasons discussed below, we are not persuaded on this record that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail in showing that this limitation is met—particularly the fluid-passing element—in the proposed combinations of Spenser or Levi with Spenser II.” slip op. at 31
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“We, thus, find Dr. Brecker’s testimony more credible that “[i]t would, accordingly, be counterintuitive for a [POSA] to look to a device designed to occlude a blood vessel when designing a TAVR.” Id. ¶¶ 119–120 (testifying “[n]o [POSA] would look to this [occluder] design when considering a TAVR valve and . . . would further have concerns about the pro-thrombotic potential of the arrangement of fibers in Chuter”). Where a proposed combination would run counter to the primary reference’s stated purpose, the POSA would not generally be motivated to make that combination. Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1069–70 (Fed. Cir. 2018).” slip op. at 43
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightDecided for patent owner
“Grounds 1 and 2 is based on the combination of either Levi and Spenser II, or Spenser and Spenser II. Yet Petitioner purports to modify Spenser II’s compressible material, or supplant it with something else, based on “porous” fabrics allegedly known elsewhere in the art, which art is not identified in the Petition itself as part of any asserted combination. Pet. 49. To see what specific modifications or combinations Petitioner might be suggesting, requires we look to three paragraphs of Dr. Buller’s Declaration, cited but not discussed by Petitioner, where eight additional references are mentioned. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 157–159 (identifying Exs. 1106–1112, and 1129). This format is an improper incorporation-by-reference of argument and evidence that, had Petitioner wanted to pursue some other combination of asserted art beyond Levi, Spenser, and Spenser II, needed to be set forth explicitly in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3). Moreover, it leaves the record unclear and forces Patent Owner, the Board, and the public to guess at what combination(s) are, in fact, being urged. We also find that Petitioner’s position reveals a hindsight bias insofar as it suggests, with the aim of arriving at the claimed subject matter, removing Spenser II’s “sufficiently dense” and fluid impermeable compressible material (Ex. 2128 ¶ 222) in favor of some other sufficiently “porous” and fluid permeable material. Hindsight is further evidenced because Spenser II’s cited material is already described as being compressible and adapted to allow coagulation and tissue ingrowth—factors cited by Patent Owner as allegedly motivating a change to some other material. Ex. 1011 ¶ 145. Altogether, we find unpersuasive Petitioner’s position based on unspecified combinations of unasserted prior art to achieve benefits that Spenser II’s existing compressible material already provides.” slip op. at 36
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,491,033
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.