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  • PTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-00531 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Burfeind and Crowley; the Board did not reach the Smith/Sinha or Smith/Sinha/Gage grounds.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Relying on the Declaration of Dr. Cooperstock, Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) at the time of the invention of the ’682 patent would have had a bachelor’s degree in Computer or Electrical Engineering or equivalent discipline, and approximately two years’ experience in telecommunications or computer networking, whereby additional education could substitute for professional 6 U.S. Patent Appl. Publication No. 2008/0139165 A1, published June 12, 2008, filed December 11, 2006 (Ex. 1009, “Gage”). experience, and significant work experience could substitute for formal education. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 62–63). We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the problems addressed in the ’682 patent and the prior art. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1354–55 (holding that absent evidence to the contrary, “the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “B. Claim Construction We construe each claim “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2020). Under this standard, claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by a POSITA at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). In the Decision on Institution, we determined that no terms of the challenged claims require explicit construction.7 We discern no reason to further discuss construction of any claim terms in this Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “would have found it obvious to combine the teachings of Burfeind and Crowley (Pet. 15–22), citing Dr. Cooperstock’s supporting testimony (Ex. 1003). In particular, Petitioner posits that a POSITA would have sought references for improving upon “Burfeind’s burdensome and imprecise manual participant selection process,” wherein Crowley is such a reference. Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1005, Abstract, ¶¶ 4, 7–8, 45; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 81–82). Petitioner contends that Crowley’s system provides numerous advantages, such as “enabling ‘spontaneous socializing’ and ‘convenient communication among friends,’” and “help[s] avoid the problem of friends who were out near each other, but never realized it until later.” Id. at 18–19 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 6, 35). According to Petitioner, “Crowley thus provides express motivation for implementing its location-based features in Burfeind.” Id. at 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 84–86). Petitioner further contends that a POSITA would have a reasonable expectation of success in implementing the features of Crowley in Burfeind. Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 89–92). In particular, a POSITA would have readily been able to adapt Crowley’s location-tracking features “to identify user locations for the purpose of inviting individuals who are located near the event location.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 89–90). According to Petitioner, Burfeind and Crowley disclose similar systems for organizing meetings between individuals (id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1004, Abstract; Ex. 1005 ¶ 5)), and because Burfeind “already contemplates techniques for grouping individuals in order to more conveniently select those individuals,” a POSITA “would have thus readily been able to modify Burfeind to determine the event organizer’s contacts that are located proximate to selected event venue.” Id. at 21–22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 89–92). Thus, according to Petitioner, the POSITA: would have understood that implementing Crowley’s techniques in Burfeind would merely amount to the use of a known technique (Crowley’s location-based messaging) to improve similar systems in the same way (enabling the system to automatically send messages/invitations to nearby individuals), as well as applying a known technique to a known system ready for improvement to yield predictable results. Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 93).” slip op. at 28

    • BurdenUnpatentable

      “would have been obvious in view of Burfeind and Crowley (Pet. 15–51), starting with the contentions with respect to the limitations of independent claims 1 and 11. With respect to each of the limitations, Patent Owner does not respond.8 Nonetheless, the burden remains on Petitioner to demonstrate unpatentability. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015).” slip op. at 18

    Patent outcomesUS 11,470,682 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,470,682
  • PTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-00530 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–16 are unpatentable as obvious; the Board denied the contingent motion to amend proposing substitute claims 17–32.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Expert testimonyOther

      “iv. Claim 1 Conclusion Based on the complete record presented, Petitioner has shown that Gage teaches all limitations of claim 1. Thus, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over Gage. v. Independent claim 8 Independent claim 8 recites a method of “providing situation related information to a situation authority via a situational network,” wherein the method comprises “receiving, by a participant device, a roll call query soliciting a reply related to a status of a participant based on the participant being determined, by the situation authority, to be geographically proximate to the situation,” “receiving, by the participant device, a selection of a status response from the participant,” and “sending the status response to the central authority, wherein the status response is included in a roll call list.” Ex. 1001, 34:46–57. Petitioner generally refers to its contentions with respect to claim 1. Pet. 34–36. In particular, Petitioner contends that Gage teaches a subscriber device that communicates a status indicator to the disaster response system through a subscriber status reporting system that implements a “situational network” configured for use during disasters. Id. at 34 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 19, 25). Petitioner additionally contends that Gage’s “disaster response system” is a “situation authority” because the disaster response system detects an occurrence of a disaster affecting a region, receives and aggregates information related to the disaster, and then provides the information to various participants in the network. Id. (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 8–9, 21, 36, 45; Ex. 1003 ¶ 104). With respect to the “situational network” limitation, Patent Owner” slip op. at 39

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “1. “situational network” (claims 1, 8, 13) Patent Owner points out that the district court has already construed” slip op. at 12

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “viii. Ground 1 Conclusion In light of the above analysis, we determine that Petitioner’s evidence” slip op. at 46

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied

      “c. Conclusion on Petitioner’s Patentability Challenges based on Obviousness for Proposed Substitute Claims For the above reasons, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of evidence that the subject matter of proposed substitute claims 17–32 would have been unpatentable. IV. CONCLUSION9 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Petitioner has shown by a” slip op. at 82

    Patent outcomesUS 9,877,345 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,877,345
  • PTAB · Aug 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01270 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Google’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that Belanger-Halevy teaches limitation [1C] of claims 1–26.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “II. ANALYSIS A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, a reply or sur-reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party challenging a decision bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. Id. We address Petitioner’s rehearing arguments below.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “[m]issing, however, from Halevy’s disclosure is any teaching or suggestion that a ‘plurality of computer-readable field identifiers’ are mapped ‘to one another’ as required by claim 1.” Dec. 22. We discussed and quoted extensively from Petitioner’s expert declaration of Dr. Fox and Patent Owner’s expert declaration of Dr. Malek. Id. at 22–26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 104; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 69, 71). In reviewing the parties’ submissions, we found that: Halevy’s disclosures are consistent with Patent Owner’s arguments and Dr. Malek’s testimony that Halevy does not teach mapping fields to one another or mapping of fields to one another through SO-properties. For example, as described, in Figure 6 and Halevy as a whole, Halevy does not teach or suggest mapping or linking different keywords to one another, rather the keywords are mapped to SO-properties. slip op. at 5

    • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “Dr. Fox states that “Halevy’s disclosure of a form database in which corresponding fields from different forms on different websites map to the same SO-properties would have been recognized by a POSA as what the ’378 patent refers to as a universal variable map.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 108 (citing Ex. 1001, 17:42–46). Based on this conclusory opinion, Dr. Fox reasons that Halevy’s form database is a “universal variable map” that must also link computer-readable field identifiers (including parameter names) from multiple different websites to each other in the form database, because the field identifiers are mapped to the same SO-properties associated with an SO-class. Id. We observe first that Dr. Fox’s conclusion is not supported by the cited portions of the ’378 patent. In column 17, lines 42–46, the ’378 patent explains that fields or variables may be part of forms and variations of these data fields or variables “may include a source form, a destination form, a single source to many destination form, many sources to one destination form, cascading forms (e.g., a first form links to a second form which links to a third form, etc.) and so on.” Ex. 1001, 17:42–46. While this portion of the ’378 patent indicates that forms may include variations on fields or variables, it does not describe any linking or mapping of variables to one another. Ex. 2001 ¶ 76 (“[T]hat portion of the specification does not have anything to do with the definition of a “universal variable map.” Rather, it merely discusses different types of variables and fields that might appear in different types of forms.”). Dec. 28–29. We again referred to the disclosure of the ’378 patent to address evidence in the Petition relied upon by Dr. Fox to support Petitioner’s position. Id. We credited Dr. Malek’s testimony over Dr. Fox’s testimony because Dr. Malek underlined the distinctions between the asserted Belanger-Halevy prior art combination and limitation [1C]. Dec. 28–31. In short, any confusion applying the prior art Belanger-Halevy references to the claim limitation is rooted in the Petition. The Board denied the Petition because the Petition did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of showing that Belanger-Halevy discloses or teaches limitation [1C] of the ’378 patent.” slip op. at 5

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

      “Finally, with regard to the Reply and Sur-Reply submitted by the parties (Req. 9), we note that our Decision on Institution reviewed the parties’ discussion of claim construction, but ultimately determined that “[b]ased on our review of the preliminary record, we do not need to construe any terms expressly to reach our decision.” Dec. 11. Thus, we disagree with Petitioner that we misconstrued the mapping limitation where we did not find it necessary to construe any claim term for the purposes of our institution decision because we determined the Petition deficient for failing to meet our threshold requirements as discussed above and in detail in the Decision on Institution. See Req. 1–11.” slip op. at 7

    Claim construction
    Patents in suitUS 9,633,378
  • PTAB · Aug 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00068 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Remand

    On remand, the Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–21, applying the construction of “association” used in the parallel petition.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • RemandOther

      “The Director Review Decision determined that we should not have instituted inter partes review in both proceedings. DR 1. Instead, we “should have construed [‘association’] and instituted review of, at most, one of the petitions.” Id. at 3. Given this, the Director Review Decision vacated this proceeding’s Institution Decision and the 70 Institution Decision, remanding “to the Board panel to determine which of the two proceedings, if Board should construe the term ‘association,’” the Director Review Decision instructed us to “consider the parties’ claim construction arguments in making [our] determination.” Id. at 4. As we explain in a concurrently issued decision in IPR2025-00070, the parties have persuaded us that the correct construction of the ’872 patent claims’ recitation of “association” is the construction advanced and applied in the 70 Petition, not the narrower, possible construction addressed in this proceeding’s Petition. IPR2025-00070, Paper 28. Accordingly, we deny institution of inter partes review in this proceeding.” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “As we explain in a concurrently issued decision in IPR2025-00070, the parties have persuaded us that the correct construction of the ’872 patent claims’ recitation of “association” is the construction advanced and applied in the 70 Petition, not the narrower, possible construction addressed in this proceeding’s Petition. IPR2025-00070, Paper 28. Accordingly, we deny institution of inter partes review in this proceeding.” slip op. at 3

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied

      “As we explain in a concurrently issued decision in IPR2025-00070, the parties have persuaded us that the correct construction of the ’872 patent claims’ recitation of “association” is the construction advanced and applied in the 70 Petition, not the narrower, possible construction addressed in this proceeding’s Petition. IPR2025-00070, Paper 28. Accordingly, we deny institution of inter partes review in this proceeding. II. ORDER It is: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), the petitioned institution of inter partes review of the ’872 patent is denied.” slip op. at 3

    Claim construction
    Patents in suitUS 9,954,872
  • PTAB · Aug 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00070 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Remand

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–21 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least claim 1 is unpatentable over Capalik.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • Director reviewOther

      “Patent Owner then filed a Request for Director Review, arguing that Petitioner did not need two petitions to challenge the ’872 patent’s claims. Paper 19. Acting Director Coke Morgan Stewart granted Director Review. Paper 25 (“Director Review Decision” or “DR Dec.”); IPR2025-00068, Paper 25. The Director Review Decision vacated this proceeding’s Institution Decision and the 68 Institution Decision, remanding “to the Board panel to Authorizing the parties to brief “how the Board should construe the term ‘association,’” the Director Review Decision instructed us to “consider the parties’ claim construction arguments in making [our] determination.” Id.” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “Thus, the parties agree on the correct construction of “association.” And the parties persuade us to adopt their construction: “association” does not require any classification as authorized or unauthorized. Pet. 4–8; PO Remand Br. 1–3; Pet. Resp. Br. 1–2. This construction of “association” is the one applied in this Petition’s claim challenges, which comports with (1) our earlier determination that the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing and (2) Petitioner’s preference for this Petition over the 68 Petition. Pet. 4–8, 13–74; Dec. 10–22; Paper 3, 2; Pet. Resp. Br. 2, 5.” slip op. at 13

    • BurdenDecided for petitioner

      “D. The Merits of Petitioner’s Claim Challenges In our Institution Decision, after weighing the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determined that the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of establishing unpatentability of at least claim 1 of the ’872 patent as obvious over Capalik. E.g., Dec. 16–22. Based on all of the arguments and evidence currently of record, we remain persuaded that the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least claim 1 of the ’872 patent. Indeed, as discussed above in Section II.A, the parties’ agreement on the correct construction of “association” reinforces this determination. III. CONCLUSION In view of the foregoing, having determined that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of establishing at least claim 1 of the ’872 patent is unpatentable, we institute trial as to all challenged claims on all grounds stated in the Petition IV. ORDER It is: ORDERED that inter partes review of claims 1–21 of the ’872 patent is instituted on all grounds presented in the Petition; and” slip op. at 18

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner

      “institution under § 325(d). Prior to our Institution Decision, Patent Owner did not argue we should deny under § 325(d). See generally Prelim. Resp.; Pet. Resp. Br. 4. Patent Owner first raised § 325(d) while its Request for Director Review was pending, emailing the Office with a request to brief § 325(d) in view of Ecto World. Ex. 3101, 4–5. The Office did not grant that request. Id. at 1. Nor did the Director Review Decision authorize Patent Owner to brief § 325(d). It only authorized Patent Owner “to file a ten-page brief explaining how the Board should construe the term ‘association.’” DR Dec. 4. In sum, Patent Owner’s unauthorized § 325(d) arguments are waived. Moreover, even if Patent Owner had not waived its § 325(d) arguments, we find Petitioner’s § 325(d) arguments more persuasive.” slip op. at 16

    Claim constructionDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 9,954,872
  • PTAB · Aug 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00147 · APJ Linda E Horner · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–6 and 8–20 after finding a reasonable likelihood that Samsung would prove at least one challenged claim unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition and the preliminary response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and the Preliminary Response, and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we grant the Petition and institute an inter partes review of claims 1‒6 and 8‒20 of the ’124 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

      “At this stage of the proceeding, there is no dispute about the level of ordinary skill in the art.7 Based on the testimony of Dr. Anthony, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, biomedical engineering, optical engineering, or related field of study, or equivalent experience, and at least two years’ experience in academia or industry studying or developing physiological monitoring devices such as non-invasive biosensors. A person of ordinary skill in the art would have also been familiar with, for example, sensor system design, including inertial and other motion sensor system design, signal processing, and human-machine interfaces. A higher level of education or skill can substitute for less experience, and vice versa. Ex. 1002 ¶ 29. We determine that the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted above is consistent with the level of technical understanding and competence reflected in the ’124 patent Specification and the asserted prior art references, based on our review of the limited record.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notNot reached

      “We need not reach the issue of whether the preamble is limiting for purposes of determining institution. Even were we to agree with Patent Owner that the preamble is limiting and the claims are limited to a fingerworn ring, at this stage Petitioner has demonstrated that the cited art teaches or suggests such a limitation. That is, Petitioner relies on the fingerring of Schroder for the claimed form factor of a “wearable computing device configured to be worn around a finger of a wearer.” Pet. 22 (Ground 1), 45 (Ground 2, relying on Yuen for adding the functionality of light sources with a photodetector, temperature sensors, and varying the sampling frequency of sensor data acquisition), 56 (Ground 3). Further, to the extent Petitioner contends that Yuen’s toe band or earring is structurally and functionally equivalent to a finger-ring (Pet. 45, 57), Patent Owner has not, at this stage of the proceeding, structurally distinguished a device configured to worn around a finger from a toe band or earring. For instance, Patent Owner has not explained how a device to be worn around a finger differs in size, configuration, or design from a toe band or earring. And the ’124 patent recognizes that “a human being’s finger can come in various different sizes and so should the [wearable computing device].” Ex. 1001, 12:64‒65. For instance, challenged dependent claim 10 recites that the width of the external housing of the wearable computing device is within a range of 3 mm to 8 mm and a thickness of the device is within a range of 1.5 to 3 mm. Id. at 35:8‒12. Should Patent Owner pursue this argument during the proceeding, the record would benefit from further development on the structural similarities and dissimilarities between a fingerworn ring and a toe band.” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that Petitioner’s showing of reasons to combine Mestas and Schröder is sufficient for purposes of granting institution of an inter partes review. Although general similarities between the references are usually not by themselves sufficient to show a reason to combine particular teachings, Petitioner here also provides more particularized contentions, such as “[i]mplementing Mestas’s device in Schröder’s ‘finger-ring’ form factor would ensure a tighter fit than a device worn, e.g., on the user’s arm or wrist, reducing motion artifacts, providing better shielding against ambient light, and permitting higher quality reading from device sensors (e.g., accelerometer, heart rate, temperature)” and that Mestas’s concern with “slippage around a user’s wrist or other body part” would have motivated a person of ordinary skill in the art “to consider placing the device on the finger, as in Schröder, to improve traction and prevent slippage.” Pet. 19‒20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 169; Ex. 1010 ¶ 152). These reasons are sufficient to present a reasonable likelihood of prevailing as to at least one challenged claim based on the proposed combination of Mestas and Schroder for purposes of institution. Patent Owner will have an opportunity to further address Petitioner’s reasoning during the proceeding.” slip op. at 21

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,188,124
  • PTAB · Jul 30, 2025 · IPR2025-00247 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–19 on all six asserted obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that ResMed would prevail on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “(citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). Petitioner ultimately bears the burden of persuasion to prove unpatentability of each challenged claim by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). This burden never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The Board may authorize an inter partes review if we determine that the information presented in the briefing of record shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 9

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.10 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art (sometimes referred to herein as “POSITA”) would have had: at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, biomedical engineering, or a similar technical field, with at least two years of relevant product design experience working with diagnostic sensor systems and network data systems, such as networked PAP machines. Additional experience could substitute for less education, and additional education could likewise substitute for less experience. Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1003 (Kirkness Decl.) ¶ 44). At this stage, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal or offer an alternative proposal. See generally Prelim. Resp. Because the proposed level of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 10 For purposes of this Decision, we apply a priority date of November 4, 2005. See supra n.3. 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level).” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Beginning with the language of the claims themselves, Patent Owner does not point to anything that suggests this narrowing construction, and indeed we see nothing there that describes or requires a “quantitative determination[] or estimation[]” or requires use of “one or more algorithms.” See generally Ex. 1001, 23:6–26:59. Patent Owner provides only a single citation to the Specification, which discusses a “quantitative method for estimating or determining the severity of the subject’s sleeping disorder or symptoms” and states that “[v]arious algorithms known to those skilled in the art . . . quantify the level of severity of the subject’s sleeping disorder or symptoms.” See Ex. 1001, 19:61–20:23, cited at Prelim. Resp. 19. The cited portion of the Specification does not purport to expressly define the claim term “data of a severity of the symptoms of the subject.” See, e.g., Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted) (“To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term other than its plain and ordinary meaning.”). Patent Owner also does not presently demonstrate that we should read into the claim term “data of a severity of the symptoms of the subject” a requirement of a “quantitative determination[] or estimation[]” or use of an “algorithm[].” Prelim. Resp. 19. To be sure, the ’029 patent discloses embodiments that use known algorithms to “quantify the level of severity of the subject’s sleeping disorder or symptoms.” See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 20:11–19. But the Specification also appears to indicate that quantification is merely “preferable” (i.e., not required), and is merely one embodiment. See, e.g., id. at 19:8–12 (“The signals from the one or more sensors used in various embodiments of the present invention are preferably analyzed using a processor and software that can quantitatively estimate or determine the severity of the subject’s sleeping disorder or symptoms.”) (emphasis added), 4:51–59 (“Finally, in still another embodiment, the present invention includes a sleeping disorder treatment system comprising a device for diagnosing and creating a quantitative output of a level of severity of a subject’s sleeping disorder or symptoms . . . .”) (emphasis added). Elsewhere, the Specification more generally states that signals from sensors are “analyzed to determine the level of severity of the symptoms,” without specifying that such analysis must be “quantitative” or performed by an algorithm. See id. at 3:41–44. In view of such disclosures, Patent Owner does not persuade us on this record to adopt its narrowing claim construction. Indeed, our reviewing court has “repeatedly warned against confining the claims” to specific embodiments disclosed in the Specification. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).” slip op. at 28

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “Regarding Patent Owner’s argument that “a POSITA reading Kumar and Truitt would not be motivated to add that functionality to Truitt’s PAP device,” we find that this argument does not respond to Petitioner’s contentions. As discussed, Petitioner argues that Truitt’s PAP device already calculates severity or index data (see Pet. 17–21), and thus we do not presently understand Petitioner to be arguing that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have added this functionality to Truitt’s PAP device. Thus, Patent Owner’s argument that “a POSITA reading Kumar and Truitt would not be motivated to add that functionality to Truitt’s PAP device” is inapposite in view of Petitioner’s contentions. Even if the proposed combination requires adding an ability to calculate severity or index data, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that a skilled artisan would have added it to Kumar, not Truitt, given that “Kumar’s computing device already has the necessary computational resources” to “receive multiple streams of data from the patient’s device and analyze the data before sending it to a remote site.” Prelim. Resp. 18, 17. This argument takes too narrow a view of Kumar. Kumar’s system “allows for the real-time streaming” of not only “raw” physiological data, but also of data that has already been “interpreted” or “processed.” Ex. 1008 (Kumar) ¶ 10. Accordingly, for purposes of institution, we find that Petitioner adequately demonstrates that “a POSITA would have been motivated to combine teachings of Truitt and Kumar such that the PAP device would wirelessly transmit to a patient’s cell phone data associated the patient’s treatment, including . . . the data of a severity of the sleep disorder symptoms of the subject.” Pet. 29–30 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 31

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,872,029
  • PTAB · Jul 30, 2025 · IPR2025-00246 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on all asserted grounds against claims 15–29, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the Toge–Kumar and Toge–Kumar–Norman obviousness grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). Petitioner ultimately bears the burden of persuasion to prove unpatentability of each challenged claim by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). This burden never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The Board may authorize an inter partes review if we determine that the information presented in the briefing of record shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 7

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

      “understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.9 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. At this stage, the parties agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art (sometimes referred to herein as “POSITA”) would have had: at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, biomedical engineering, or a similar technical field, with at least two years of relevant product design experience working with diagnostic sensor systems and network data systems, such as networked PAP machines. Additional experience could substitute for less education, and additional education could likewise substitute for less experience.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “We find it unnecessary to construe any claim term to decide whether Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Any final written decision entered in this case may include express claim constructions, or may include discussion of claim scope that differs from that provided in our analysis below. Any final claim constructions will be based on the full trial record.” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Motivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “At this stage, Petitioner has the better argument. Toge teaches that control unit 250 analyzes collected data (e.g., the flow rate) and calculates tidal volume. Ex. 1044 (Toge) ¶¶ 34–38. On this record, we agree with Petitioner that the calculated tidal volume is “a quantified level of severity data based on the subject’s sleep apnea symptoms during the therapy” because it represents, e.g., the “level of airway obstruction the patient experiences during the sleep apnea treatment using the PAP device.” Pet. 15. On this record, Patent Owner’s assertion that the tidal volume is a “breathing metric” instead of “a quantified level of severity data” is unavailing in view of Toge’s teaching that control unit 250 calculates the tidal volume, and its teaching that the tidal volume is used to assess the patient’s condition and determine whether system adjustments are needed. See id. at 15–16; Ex. 1044 (Toge) ¶ 39; Ex. 1003 (Kirkness Decl.) ¶ 157. In other words, on this record, the calculated tidal volume indicates severity because it is used to adjust the PAP system, e.g., in the case of decreasing tidal volume, a medical professional can change the airflow settings “to counter/treat the more severe level of airway obstruction observed from the decreasing tidal volume.” Ex. 1003 (Kirkness Decl.) ¶ 158.” slip op. at 20

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,857,333
  • PTAB · Jul 24, 2025 · IPR2025-00472 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 10, and 19 are obvious over Nicholas, Laidlaw, Mayadas, and Error.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Considering the subject matter of the ’898 patent, the background technical field, the prior art, and Petitioner’s proposed and unopposed definition of the skilled artisan (Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 9–12), we apply the level of skill set forth above.” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

      “Petitioner submits that all terms in the Challenged Claims should be given their plain and ordinary meaning in this proceeding, and that no specific construction of any claim term is required to resolve this case. Pet. 6 (“Petitioner does not believe express claim construction is necessary to resolve this Petition.”). Patent Owner has not submitted a preliminary response, and thus does not propose any terms for construction at this stage. In determining that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of establishing unpatentability of at least one Challenged Claim, we need not and do not construe expressly any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “Petitioner argues the skilled artisan would have had various rational reasons for combining the teachings of these four references, and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. See, e.g., Pet. 18–21 (discussing reasons to combine Nicholas and Laidlaw and expectation of success in doing so), 33–37 (discussing reasons to combine Nicholas and Mayadas and expectation of success in doing so), 44–45 (discussing reasons to combine Nicholas, Laidlaw, Mayadas, and Error and expectation of success in doing so). Based on the record before us, we find Petitioner sufficiently shows that the combination of Nicholas, Laidlaw, Mayadas, and Error would have taught or at least fairly suggested to the skilled artisan the limitations of claim 1.4 Thus, for the reasons stated in the Petition (Pet. 8–51), we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that independent claim 1 would have been unpatentable as obvious over the combination of Nicholas, Laidlaw, Mayadas, and Error.” slip op. at 21

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,416,898
  • PTAB · Jul 15, 2025 · IPR2024-00779 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–27 are unpatentable as obvious over the listed combinations of Curry, Rabu, and Katayama, with additional references for certain claims.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “The level of ordinary skill in the art is “a prism or lens” through which we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, we may consider certain factors, including: “(1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.” Best Med. Int’l, Inc. v. Elekta Inc., 46 F.4th 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (quoting Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). “The patent’s purpose can also be informative.” Id.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
    • BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable

      “Based on the evidence of record and Petitioner’s arguments, Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1–27 of the ’878 patent are unpatentable. In summary,” slip op. at 37

    Patent outcomesUS 10,198,878 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,198,878

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.