- PTAB · Jul 15, 2024 · IPR2024-00377 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 19–36 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. We institute an inter partes review of claims 19–36 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). Petitioner contends that if it is necessary to define further, “a [person of ordinary skill in the art] for the ’107 Patent in the relevant field in 2007 would have a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a related study and two years of experience with financial trading systems or an equivalent combination of education and experience.” Id. at 29 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 71–74). For purposes of deciding whether Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. At this stage of the proceeding, we find Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art consistent with the ’107 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We do not need to construe any terms expressly to reach our decision. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“been obvious to a [person of ordinary skill in the art] to combine teachings of Calo, Rude and Sellberg.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 95–124, 178–185, 257– 260, 578, 583–584). Petitioner asserts that “Calo and Rude each discloses the basic features of the claims of the ’107 patent” and “[t]o the extent that the Calo-Rude combination fails to disclose using the prevailing rate ‘right before the transaction takes place,’ this is clearly disclosed by Sellberg.” Id. (citing Ex. 1019 ¶¶ 23–25; Ex. 1002 ¶ 181). Petitioner argues that “[a]dding the currency exchange features from Sellberg to the Calo-Rude combination would have been a simple task for a [person of ordinary skill in the art].” Id. at 42–43 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 185, 234). In sum, Petitioner contends that “[c]laims 19-25, 27-31, and 34-36 are invalid as obvious.” Id. at 43 (citing Ex. 1002, Section VII.19–25, 27–31, and 34–36; KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415–416 (Fed. Cir. 2007) for the proposition that “[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”).” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,062,107 - PTAB · Jul 15, 2024 · IPR2024-00376 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–18 on all grounds in the Petition, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Calo, Rude, and Sellberg.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. We institute an inter partes review of claims 1‒18 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that “the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record.” Pet. 29 (citing Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). Petitioner contends that if it is necessary to define further, “a person of ordinary skill in the art for the ’107 Patent in the relevant field in 2007 would have a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a related study and two years of experience with financial trading systems or an equivalent combination of education and experience.” Id. at 30 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 71–74). For purposes of deciding whether Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. At this stage of the proceeding, we find Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art consistent with the ’107 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). According to the applicable standard, claim terms “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citations omitted). Only those terms that are in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. America Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Although Petitioner asserts that “the terms of Claims 1-18 should be given their ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the field of electronic trading in the 2007 time frame,” Petitioner proposes construction for the claim terms “prevailing exchange rate” and “prevailing currency exchange rate.” Pet. 28–29. We do not find express construction of any claim language necessary to resolve whether Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence regarding how the cited prior art allegedly would have rendered obvious claims 1–7, 9–13, and 16–18. E.g., Pet. 30–45, 56–61. Based on our review, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of establishing that independent claim 1 would have been obvious over the combination of Calo, Rude, and Sellberg. Given this, the merits of Petitioner’s currently undisputed challenges to claims 8, 14, and 15 over Calo, Rude, Sellberg, and either Davidowitz or Kedia are best addressed after institution of inter partes review. We turn now to a detailed discussion of Petitioner’s challenge of independent claim 1 as allegedly obvious over Calo, Rude, and Sellberg.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,062,107 - PTAB · Jul 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00378 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–15 and all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any response thereto shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Considering the arguments presented, we conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in challenging at least one of claims 1–15 of the ’930 patent as unpatentable under the grounds presented in the Petition. Pursuant to § 314, we hereby institute an inter partes review as to these claims of the ’930 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner asserts that for the term “prevailing exchange rate,” as recited in claims 1, 4, 6, 12, and 15, “[t]he term prevailing commonly means ‘current.’” Pet. 26. According to Petitioner, this is consistent with the ’930 patent. Id. Petitioner asserts that “[t]he only rates the Specification describes using are a ‘forward’ rate or a ‘spot’ rate – in other words, a selected current exchange rate.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 33). Petitioner thus asserts that “‘prevailing exchange rate’ means ‘a selected current rate.’” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 67, 70, 75). Petitioner further contends that the term “prevailing currency exchange rate” as recited in claims 2, 3, 6–11, 13, and 14, should “be any selected current currency exchange rate such as a ‘spot’ rate or a ‘forward’ rate.” Id. at 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 67). We do not need to construe any terms expressly to reach our decision. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes “that a [person of ordinary skill in the art] for the ’930 Patent in the relevant field in 2007 would have a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a related study and two years of experience with financial trading systems or an equivalent combination of education and experience.” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 73–74). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, reiterated by the proposal of Petitioner’s expert, which comports with the teachings of the ’930 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 11
Claim constructioncites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,449,930 - PTAB · Jul 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00375 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–12 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any response thereto shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Considering the arguments presented, we conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in challenging at least one of claims 1–12 of the ’863 patent as unpatentable under the grounds presented in the Petition. Pursuant to § 314, we hereby institute an inter partes review as to these claims of the ’863 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner asserts that for the term “prevailing exchange rate,” as recited in claims 1, 4, and 6, “[t]he term prevailing commonly means ‘current.’” Pet. 27. According to Petitioner, this is consistent with the ’863 patent. Id. Petitioner asserts that “[t]he only rates the Specification describes using are a ‘forward’ rate or a ‘spot’ rate – in other words, a selected current exchange rate.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 200). Petitioner thus asserts that “‘prevailing exchange rate’ means ‘a selected current exchange rate.’” Id. Petitioner further contends that the term “prevailing currency exchange rate” as recited in claims 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8 and 11, “should be given the same meaning as ‘prevailing exchange rate.’” Id. We do not need to construe any terms expressly to reach our decision. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of skill in the art, we consider the type of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus. Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. U.S., 702 F.2d 1005, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Petitioner proposes “that a [person of ordinary skill in the art] for the ’863 Patent in the relevant field in 2007 would have a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a related study and two years of experience with financial trading systems or an equivalent combination of education and experience.” Pet. 27–28 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 60–61). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the proposal of Petitioner’s expert, which comports with the teachings of the ’863 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted
“Petitioner further contends that to the extent Rude is considered not to teach “the prevailing exchange rate,” using a prevailing exchange rate was disclosed by both Calo and Sellberg. Pet. 41 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 88, 161, 201–202, 204). Petitioner asserts that Calo discloses the price in the native currency may be provided, with this price based on both the real-time quote for price on the U.S. equity, as well as a real-time conversion from the foreign exchange rates. See Pet. 53 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 30). Additionally, Petitioner asserts that Sellberg uses “an updated exchange rate, preferabl[y] the last exchange rate just prior to the submitting the order, for performing the transaction.” Id. (citing Ex. 1019 ¶¶ 23–25). Petitioner’s declarant, Mr. Reid, further directs us to Calo’s teaching that E*TRADE Global FX facility is responsible for the foreign exchange procedures and therefore receives global foreign exchange rates from E*TRADE Market Data Services (which in turn receives foreign exchange quotes from a provider). The E*TRADE Global FX facility also maintains FX Margin management data, and can receive[] a contingency foreign exchange contribution via a Web Server connected to the internet. The E*TRADE Global FX facility communicates retail foreign exchange rates to each local affiliate through E*TRADE global affiliate interface. Ex. 1002 ¶ 202 (quoting Ex. 1005 ¶ 50). With respect to the combination of the references, Mr. Reid testifies that “[i]t was well known in the art that there was a benefit to using multiple currency exchange rates and/or a favorable rate.” Id. ¶ 205. Additionally, “Sellberg also describes benefits of adding currency exchange features to a trading system, such as increasing liquidity in the system . . . . Thus, the skilled person would have known that adding currency exchange to a trading system would be a desired improvement.” Id. ¶ 162 (citing Ex. 1019 ¶ 12). Based on the preliminary record, we are persuaded that the” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,776,863 - PTAB · Jun 5, 2024 · IPR2024-00053 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 10–14 on all presented obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Court Litigation” (“Director’s Memo”). The Director’s Memo states that “the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Director’s Memo 3; see also id. at 7–8. Thus, we will not exercise our discretion to deny institution if a petitioner makes a stipulation similar to that provided in Sotera. We agree with Petitioner that Fintiv does not apply to Google and, even if applied, the Fintiv factors weight against denial. Pet. 71–74. As for Samsung, it states that it “will not pursue as to the challenged claims any ground raised or that could have been reasonably raised in the IPR in the [related] district court Case 2:22-cv-00462-JRG-RSP,” thereby making a stipulation similar to that provided in Sotera. Ex. 1047, 1 (citing Sotera). Accordingly, pursuant to the Director’s Memo, we decline to exercise” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“h) Petitioner Shows a Reasonable Likelihood of Prevailing Based on the record before us, Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenge to independent claim 10. Petitioner cites to portions of Mumick and Bengtsson that, on the present record, teach, suggest, or would have been understood to disclose the limitations of claim 10. Pet. 23–38. At this stage, Petitioner also presents sufficient reasons with support from the record that would have motivated one of ordinary skill in the art to make Petitioner’s proposed combination with a reasonable expectation of success. Id. at 21–23, 29, 35, 38–39.” slip op. at 25
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, computer engineering, or a related field, and two-three years of experience with multimedia and Internet-related communications technologies, or the equivalent, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa. Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 28–30). in the art “[f]or purposes of th[e] Preliminary Response only.” Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing Pet. 7). “Patent Owner does not believe that minor deviations from this level of skill in the art would materially change the analysis.” Id. Based on the preliminary record, we adopt Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“Based on the preliminary record, we adopt the parties’ agreed-to interpretation of “memory storage means on said mobile device for storing a list of addresses of recipients.” Pet. 8–9; Prelim. Resp. 4–5; Ex. 1021, 47. Specifically, we adopt a means-plus-function interpretation wherein the function is “storing a list of addresses of recipients” and the corresponding structure includes: a floppy disk, a flexible disk, hard disk, magnetic tape, any other magnetic medium, a Compact Disc-Read Only Memory (CD- ROM), Digital Versatile Disc (DVD), any other optical medium, punch cards, paper tape, any other physical medium with patterns of holes, a Random Access Memory (RAM), a Programmable Read-Only Memory (PROM), an Erasable Programmable Read- Only Memory (EPROM), an Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM), a flash memory, any other memory chip or cartridge, a carrier wave as described hereinafter, or any other medium from which a computer can read, “and equivalents.” Pet. 8–9; Prelim. Resp. 4–5; Ex. 1021, 47.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,107,978 - PTAB · May 17, 2024 · IPR2024-00083 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–4, 6–13, 15, and 16 under all asserted §103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over Socwell, Magid, and Sclater.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“be considered only if . . . the petition identified all real parties in interest.” Under our precedent, the Board may, under 35 U.S.C. § 312(a), accept updated mandatory notices as long as the petition would not have been timebarred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) if it had included the real party in interest. Proppant Express Investments, Paper 86, 7. see also Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1374 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (“For § 312(a)(2), the Director can, and does, allow the petitioner to add a real party in interest.”). To determine whether to accept Petitioner’s updated mandatory notices, we look to “whether there have been (1) attempts to circumvent the § 315 bar or estoppel rules, (2) bad faith by the petitioner, (3) prejudice to the patent owner caused by the delay, or (4) gamesmanship by the petitioner.” Proppant Express, Paper 86, 6.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“an Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (“Director’s Memo”)5 to clarify “the [Board’s] current application of Fintiv to discretionary institutions where there is parallel litigation” and to “confirm[ ] that the precedential import of Fintiv is limited to facts of that case.” Director’s Memo 2. The Director’s Memorandum explains that, “[c]onsistent with Sotera Wireless, Inc., the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Id. at 3 (footnote omitted) (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“the following two-part framework: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6, 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). The Becton, Dickinson factors provide useful insight into how to apply the framework under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Id. at 9 (referencing Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8, 17– 18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to § III.C.5, first paragraph) (“Becton”)). Under the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework, we consider “whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to previously were presented to the Office.” Id. at 8. We evaluate Becton, Dickinson factors (a), (b), and (d) to determine whether Petitioner has demonstrated material error. Id. at 10. Those factors are: (a) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; (b) the cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated during examination; and (d) the extent of the overlap between the arguments made during examination and the manner in which Petitioner relies on the prior art or Patent Owner distinguishes the prior art. Becton, Paper 8, 17–18. Previously presented art includes art made of record by the Examiner, and art provided to the Office by an applicant, such as on an Information Disclosure Statement (“IDS”), in the prosecution history of the challenged patent. Id. at 7–8.” slip op. at 20
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Petitioner argues: “It would have been obvious to a POSA to combine Socwell’s treadmill with Magid’s control means to permit only unidirectional movement of the running belt to reduce the risk of a user stepping onto the running belt of the treadmill and losing their balance when the belt moves in the forward direction.” Pet. 24 (citing Ex.1003 ¶ 137); see also Pet. 20–26 (explaining that it was known that injury could occur if a treadmill belt moved in an unexpected direction (citing Ex. 1011, 1:32–67, 2:45–48; Ex. 1013, 1:30–37; Ex. 1019, 3–4; Ex. 1020, 8; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 71–73, 131–137). Petitioner asserts that Sclater teaches a sprag-type one-way bearing assembly that has an outer race (i.e., first element) that substantially surrounds an inner race (i.e., second element), with a plurality of sprags and rolling elements between the inner race and outer race. Pet. 42–43 (citing Ex. 1017, 312). The sprags act as wedges so that torque is transmitted from one race to another in one direction but not the other direction. Ex. 1017, 312, 318; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 171–175. Petitioner argues: “A POSA would have been motivated to substitute Sclater’s one-way sprag-type bearing assembly for Magid’s ratchet-and-pawl one-way clutch mechanism to obtain predictable results, e.g., reduced noise and improved durability, while maintaining the backstopping functionality and resultant safety benefits of Magid.” Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 141); see also Pet. 27–33 (explaining that ratchet-and-pawl mechanism was known to be noisy and less durable (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 142– 151; Ex. 1017, 303, 316, 320; Ex. 1018, 38–43, 52–53)). and evidence sufficiently disclose limitations 1(f)–(g). d) Conclusion as to claim 1 After considering Petitioner’s evidence and analysis based on the” slip op. at 36
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,465,005 - Entain Corporate Services Ltd. / Betmgm, LLC et al. v. Beteiro, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · May 6, 2024 · IPR2023-00094 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Final written decision
Petitioner failed to prove claims 1–22 and 24–40 unpatentable; the obviousness grounds fail to show the claimed communication-link initiation and location information in a bet message.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“The ՚266 patent only uses the terms “initiates” and “initiate” in the Abstract and the claims. The Abstract discloses that “the computer initiates a communication link with, and transmits the notification message to,” a communication device. Ex. 1001, code (57). In describing the methods depicted in Figures 9 and 10, the ՚266 patent provides that after detecting a posting for which the user would like to be notified, in step 904 gaming facility computer 30 generates a user notification message and transmits that message to user communication device 20, in real-time or otherwise, as a pager, beeper, pre-recorded, instant, facsimile, and/or email message and/or a telephone call. Ex. 1001, 57:29–35, 58:62–59:15. A general dictionary definition of “initiate” is “to cause or facilitate the beginning of: set going.” Merriam-Webster On-line Dictionary, available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/initiate (last visited April 3, 2024). Thus, after evaluating the Parties’ claim construction arguments regarding the term, we agree with Patent Owner and construe the term causing or facilitating the beginning of a communication link.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering or Computer Engineering or equivalent, and at least two years of experience in the design and development of video game-related hardware and software.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 43–44). Patent Owner, as noted above, did not file a Preliminary Response in this proceeding and, therefore, has not contested Petitioner’s proposed definition. For purposes of this Decision, we find that the ’266 patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of appropriate skill reflected in these references and in the ’266 patent is consistent with the level of skill proposed by Petitioner. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Although Mr. Kitchen testified that it was old and well known as the time of the ՚266 patent to initiate a communication link and that there would have been a reasonable expectation of success to configure Garahi’s system to do so, Mr. Kitchen does not explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to or would have benefited from such a modification of Garahi’s system. Mr. Kitchen testifies that “[h]aving the TPSMS establish the communication link would have been obvious because doing so would allow the sending of wagering information to a user.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 139. Yet, Garahi’s system already allows for the sending of wagering information to the user in posting the generated notification message to a “Message Board.” Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 89, 107, 110. The existence of a new message is indicated by a display icon 318 next to the option “Message Board” in an interface 300 having multiple options. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 89, 107, 110, Figs. 3, 12, 13. In order to receive the message, the user must first access the Message Board by selecting the related option, after which the information is displayed to the user. Id. That it was well-known in the art to have initiated a communication link does not explain how or why a skilled artisan would have modified Garahi’s system that notifies a user of wagering information by posting on a message board to notify a user by initiating a communication to the user. Simply because a skilled artisan could have modified Garahi’s system to incorporate initiating the communication link does not explain why they would have had reason to do so. See In re NuVasive, 842 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015). posting or transmitting race information to the user’s Message Board, alone or in combination with the well-known technique of initiating a communication link, would have made it obvious to have the claimed computer initiate a communication link with a first communication device in response to generating the notification message.” slip op. at 28
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Although Mr. Kitchen testified that it was old and well known as the time of the ՚266 patent to initiate a communication link and that there would have been a reasonable expectation of success to configure Garahi’s system to do so, Mr. Kitchen does not explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to or would have benefited from such a modification of Garahi’s system. Mr. Kitchen testifies that “[h]aving the TPSMS establish the communication link would have been obvious because doing so would allow the sending of wagering information to a user.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 139. Yet, Garahi’s system already allows for the sending of wagering information to the user in posting the generated notification message to a “Message Board.” Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 89, 107, 110. The existence of a new message is indicated by a display icon 318 next to the option “Message Board” in an interface 300 having multiple options. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 89, 107, 110, Figs. 3, 12, 13. In order to receive the message, the user must first access the Message Board by selecting the related option, after which the information is displayed to the user. Id. That it was well-known in the art to have initiated a communication link does not explain how or why a skilled artisan would have modified Garahi’s system that notifies a user of wagering information by posting on a message board to notify a user by initiating a communication to the user. Simply because a skilled artisan could have modified Garahi’s system to incorporate initiating the communication link does not explain why they would have had reason to do so. See In re NuVasive, 842 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015). posting or transmitting race information to the user’s Message Board, alone or in combination with the well-known technique of initiating a communication link, would have made it obvious to have the claimed computer initiate a communication link with a first communication device in response to generating the notification message.” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 10,147,266 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,147,266 - Entain Corporate Services Ltd. / Betmgm, LLC et al. v. Beteiro, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · May 6, 2024 · IPR2023-00093 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1–20 not unpatentable because Petitioner did not show that the asserted combinations rendered the claims obvious, including the required location information in a bet message.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSITA,” “PHOSITA,” or “skilled artisan”) “would be a person having a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering or Computer Engineering or equivalent, and at least two years of experience in the design and development of video game-related hardware and software.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 45). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp. We find that the ’341 patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of appropriate skill reflected in these references and in the ’341 patent is consistent with the level of skill proposed by Petitioner. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the definition we adopted in our Decision to Institute. See Inst. Dec. 12–13.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). In applying this standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. See id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The Parties construe certain claim language. Pet. 5–7; PO Resp. 14–18; Pet. Reply 1–5. In this proceeding, resolving the Parties’ patentability dispute does not require construing any claim language. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner contends it would have been obvious to include McNutt’s location data “with” Garahi’s bet message, i.e., wagering data comprising the type and desired amount of wager. Pet. 30. However, Petitioner has not explained why a skilled artisan would modify Garahi’s bet message to include the location data of McNutt. Petitioner contends that a skilled artisan would do so “to be able to discern the legality of a placed bet as McNutt discloses if a user of Garahi’s system moves to a wager-prohibitive location, e.g., the state of Oklahoma.” Pet. Reply 14 (citing Pet. 29–30; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 154–156; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 111, 114). We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to persuasively identify any “deficiency in Garahi which McNutt purportedly solves, inasmuch as Garahi already discloses obtaining” and using the location of the user to discern the legality of a placed bet at the user’s location. PO Resp. 40; Ex. 1004 ¶ 50. Petitioner has not provided any further benefit to add location information into Garahi’s bet message having wagering data. Further, Petitioner has not shown a reason outside of hindsight. The ՚341 patent specifically provides that transmitting “information regarding the position or location of the first device or second device” is for “determin[ing] if the bet is allowed or disallowed using position or location information of the first device or the second device.” Ex. 1001 code (57); see also id. at 6:59–66, 16:22–31, 80:10–81:4, Fig. 20A (discussing process for determining whether the bet is allowed based on the user’s location). To the extent that Garahi teaches transmitting a message with wagering data, and McNutt teaches location information may be obtained “when the user initiates the wager,” Petitioner has shown no persuasive reason why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to include the location information of McNutt with the wagering data of Garahi in a single bet message, as required by claim 1. Thus, the preponderance of evidence does not show that the prior art would have made it obvious to have the bet message comprise the location information.” slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 10,043,341 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,043,341 - Entain Corporate Services Ltd. / Betmgm, LLC et al. v. Beteiro, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · May 6, 2024 · IPR2023-00092 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–14 and 16–20 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted obviousness combinations did not establish the claimed location information in a bet message or a sufficient reason to combine.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering or Computer Engineering or equivalent, and at least two years of experience in the design and development of video game-related hardware and software.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 43–44). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp. We find that the ’920 patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of appropriate skill reflected in these references and in the ’920 patent is consistent with the level of skill proposed by Petitioner. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the definition we adopted in our Decision to Institute. See Inst. Dec. 10–11.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We find no claim term requires express construction, because, for the reasons provided below, resolving the Parties’ patentability dispute in this case does not require construing any claim language. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 16
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“information of the user telephone equipment to verify that the user is located in a geographic area where wagering is legal,” but Petitioner acknowledges that “Garahi does not specify exactly how or when this verification [that the user is located in a geographic area where wagering is legal] occurs or whether the location information is transmitted to the TPSMS with the wagering data.” Id. at 40. Notwithstanding Petitioner’s suggestion that there is ambiguity as to whether Garahi may include position or location information in its “wagering data,” the evidence advanced by Petitioner is unequivocal on this point. When asked whether Garahi, alone, discloses a bet message that contains position or location information, Mr. Kitchen testified on behalf of Petitioner that “Garahi certainly doesn’t.” Ex. 2001, 140:19–141:8; see also Pet. Reply 18 (stating that Mr. Kitchen testified “only that ‘Garahi certainly doesn’t’ disclose the transmission of location information with a bet”) (citing Ex. 2001, 139:12–141:5); Ex. 2001, 124:3–7 (Mr. Kitchen confirming that Garahi does not disclose everything in “element 1(c)(iii)”). Petitioner, accordingly, relies on McNutt, in combination with Garahi, and asserts that “it would have been obvious” to a person of ordinary skill in the art to have configured “Garahi to include the user communication device’s location information in the wagering data (i.e., the bet message) as provides no persuasive evidence that McNutt teaches including “location information” in “wagering data” that corresponds to a “bet message.” To the contrary, Mr. Kitchen testified that “McNutt does not disclose a bet message,” and therefore, does not, alone, teach including location information in the wagering data as a part of a bet message. Instead, as Mr. Kitchen explains, Petitioner’s argument is premised on combining “location which is obtained by McNutt at the institution of the bet” with the wagering data transmitted by Garahi. See Ex. 2001, 136:8–24.” slip op. at 33
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“combination in regard to the bet message limitation, and we recognize that asserted prior art must not be considered in isolation, but for all that it teaches in the asserted combination, missing from Petitioner’s contentions is any persuasive evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to include position or location information based on McNutt in the wagering data of Garahi that Petitioner contends corresponds to a “bet message.” There is no persuasive evidence that the mere fact that McNutt teaches that location information may be obtained “when the user initiates the wager” would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art to have taught or suggested including that location information with the wagering data of Garahi in a single “bet message,” as required by the Challenged Claims. To the contrary both Garahi and McNutt describe systems that first determine whether a bet may be placed from a location before allowing a user to transmit wagering data corresponding to “information regarding a bet to be place.” See, e.g., Ex. 1004 ¶ 50; Ex. 1006 ¶ 111, Fig. 12; Ex. 2001, 135:3–25, 137:11–22 (Mr. Kitchen testifying that in McNutt, the location information is obtained at the creation of the bet, i.e., when the user initiates the wager creation process, and allows or prevents access to the gambling apparatus). Petitioner contends that a skilled artisan would have done so to have been able to “discern the legality of a placed bet as McNutt discloses if a user of Garahi’s system moves to a wager-prohibitive location.” Pet. Reply 17 (citing Pet. 40–41; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 173, 175, 176; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 111, persuasively identify any “deficiency in Garahi which McNutt purportedly solves, inasmuch as Garahi already discloses obtaining location information” and using that information to discern the legality of a placed bet at the user’s location. PO Resp. 44; Ex. 1004 ¶ 50. Petitioner has not provided any further benefit to be obtained by adding location information into Garahi’s bet message having wagering data. Petitioner has not shown a sufficient reason supported by a preponderance of the evidence to modify Garahi based on the teachings of McNutt, outside of hindsight based on the disclosures of the ’920 patent, which, itself, explains that a determination of whether a bet is allowed or disallowed is based on the position or location of the user communication device having been transmitted as part of a bet message with information regarding a bet to be placed. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 59:16–47, 94:53–95:5. In sum, we find that a preponderance of the evidence fails to show that Garahi and McNutt, in combination with Stadelmann, teaches or suggests including position or location information in a bet message, as required by the Challenged Claims. To the extent that Garahi teaches transmitting a message with wagering data, and McNutt teaches that location information may be obtained “when the user initiates the wager,” Petitioner has shown no persuasive reason why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to include the location information of McNutt with the wagering data of Garahi in a single bet message, as required by the Challenged Claims.” slip op. at 41
Patent outcomesUS 9,965,920 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,965,920 - Entain Corporate Services Ltd. / Betmgm, LLC et al. v. Beteiro, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · May 6, 2024 · IPR2023-00095 · APJ Amee A Shah · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–13 and 16–20 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner did not establish the asserted obviousness combinations or adequate reasons to combine.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner asserts that “the phrase ‘initiates a communication link’ should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, which includes a construction of ‘initiates’ to mean simply: ‘to cause a process or action to begin.’” PO Resp. 13. Patent Owner disagrees with the construction provided by Petitioner “which would suggest ‘initiates a communication link’ is satisfied by the mere joining of a communication network.” Id. (citing Ex. 2001, 115:15–23).” slip op. at 19
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSITA,” “PHOSITA,” or “skilled artisan”) “would be a person having a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering or Computer Engineering or equivalent, and at least two years of experience in the design and development of video game-related hardware and software.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 45–46). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp. We find that the ’755 patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of appropriate skill reflected in these references and in the ’755 patent is consistent with the level of skill proposed by Petitioner. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the definition we adopted in our Decision to Institute. See Inst. Dec. 15.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“To the extent Petitioner argues it would have been obvious to modify Garahi’s system to initiate a communication link (Pet. 19–20; Pet. Reply 9), Petitioner does not provide adequate evidence or reasoning to establish how or why a skilled artisan would have modified Garahi’s system to initiate a communication link and transmit the message to the user’s device. Although Mr. Kitchen testified that it was old and well known at the time of the ՚755 patent to initiate a communication link and that there would have been a reasonable expectation of success to configure Garahi’s system to do so, Mr. Kitchen does not explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to or would have benefited from such a modification of Garahi’s system. Mr. Kitchen testifies that “[h]aving the TPSMS establish the communication link would have been obvious because doing so would allow the sending of wagering information to a user.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 127. Yet, Garahi’s system already allows for the sending of wagering information to the user in posting the generated notification message to a “Message Board.” Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 89, 107, 110. The existence of a new message is indicated by a display icon 318 next to the option “Message Board” in interface 300 having multiple options. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 89, 107, 110, Figs. 3, 12, 13. In order to receive the message, the user must first access the Message Board by selecting the related option, after which the information is displayed to the user. Id. That it was well-known in the art to have initiated a communication link does not explain how or why a skilled artisan would have modified Garahi’s system that notifies a user of wagering information by posting on a message board to notify a user by initiating a communication link to the user. Simply because a skilled artisan could have modified Garahi’s system to incorporate initiating the communication link does not explain why they would have had reason to do so. See In re NuVasive, 842 F.3d at 1382; Belden, 805 F.3d at 1073. Thus, the preponderance of evidence does not show that Garahi’s posting or transmitting race information to the user’s Message Board, alone or in combination with the well-known technique of initiating a communication link, would have made it obvious to have the claimed computer initiate a communication link with a first communication device in response to generating the notification message.” slip op. at 42
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to persuasively identify any “deficiency in Garahi which McNutt purportedly solves in as much as Garahi already discloses obtaining” and using the location of the user to discern the legality of a placed bet at the user’s location. PO Resp. 33; Ex. 1004 ¶ 50. Petitioner has not provided any further benefit to add location information into Garahi’s bet message having wagering data. Further, Petitioner has not shown a sufficient reason supported by a preponderance of the evidence to modify Garahi based on the teachings of McNutt outside of hindsight based on the disclosure of the ՚755 patent. The ՚755 patent specifically provides that transmitting “information regarding the position or location of the first communication device or second communication device” is for “determining whether the bet is allowed or disallowed using the position or location information.” Ex. 1001 code (57); see also id. at 7:8–15, 80:24–81–18, Fig. 20A (discussing a process for determining whether the bet is allowed based on the user’s location). To the extent that Garahi teaches transmitting a message with wagering data, and that McNutt teaches location information may be obtained “when the user initiates the wager,” Petitioner has shown no persuasive reason why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to include the location information of McNutt with the wagering data of Garahi in a single bet message, as required by the Challenged Claims. 2. Conclusion for Alleged Obviousness over Garahi and McNutt Based on our review and consideration of Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, we find that based on the record, Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the asserted combination of Garahi and McNutt teaches every limitation of claims 1, 2, and 18 and why one of ordinary skill in the art would have had sufficient reason to combine Garahi and McNutt, with a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” slip op. at 48
Patent outcomesUS 10,255,755 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,255,755
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.