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  • PTAB · Nov 10, 2020 · PGR2019-00003 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · PGR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving in place its determination that claims 1–14 are unpatentable.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “public accessibility, . . . . which involves examining the evidence for proof that each non-patent reference was ‘disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.’” Req. Reh’g 3 (quoting Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 773 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). We do not agree. On the contrary, we addressed with particularity the substantial evidence tending to show that each of Petitioner’s References “was disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Dec. 12. Specifically, in our Decision, we properly credited indicia on the face of Petitioner’s References, such as printed dates and citation information, which are “part of the totality of the evidence” bearing on the issue of public accessibility. Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Using Varenna 2012 as an example, those indicia included details of the copyright notice, indicating publication of Varenna 2012 “by Oxford University Press on behalf of the British Society for Rheumatology” in “2012;” and also additional legends, including the statement “Advance Access publication 30 November 2012,” and a conventional edition identifier from the journal Rheumatology. Dec. 15–16 (quoting Ex. 1005). In the same manner, the totality of evidence supports our finding that each of Petitioner’s References was publicly available prior to the critical date of the invention. Id. at 15– 18.” slip op. at 3

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

      “public accessibility, . . . . which involves examining the evidence for proof that each non-patent reference was ‘disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.’” Req. Reh’g 3 (quoting Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 773 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). We do not agree. On the contrary, we addressed with particularity the substantial evidence tending to show that each of Petitioner’s References “was disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Dec. 12. Specifically, in our Decision, we properly credited indicia on the face of Petitioner’s References, such as printed dates and citation information, which are “part of the totality of the evidence” bearing on the issue of public accessibility. Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Using Varenna 2012 as an example, those indicia included details of the copyright notice, indicating publication of Varenna 2012 “by Oxford University Press on behalf of the British Society for Rheumatology” in “2012;” and also additional legends, including the statement “Advance Access publication 30 November 2012,” and a conventional edition identifier from the journal Rheumatology. Dec. 15–16 (quoting Ex. 1005). In the same manner, the totality of evidence supports our finding that each of Petitioner’s References was publicly available prior to the critical date of the invention. Id. at 15– 18.” slip op. at 3

    § 102 anticipation
    Patents in suitUS 9,867,839
  • PTAB · Nov 10, 2020 · PGR2018-00092 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · PGR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving unpatentable claims 1-4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16-18, 23-25, and 27-29 based on Varenna 2012 anticipation.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “The burden of showing that a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). In its request for rehearing, the dissatisfied party must (1) “specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked” and (2) identify the place “where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,768.” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

      “acknowledged Acceleration Bay and addressed with particularity the evidence of record tending to show that each of Petitioner’s References “was disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Dec. 15. Specifically, in our Decision, we credited indicia on the face of Verrena 2012, such as printed dates and citation information, which are “part of the totality of the evidence” bearing on the issue of public accessibility. Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Those indicia included details of the copyright notice, indicating publication of Varenna 2012 “by Oxford University Press on behalf of the British Society for Rheumatology” in “2012;” and also additional legends, including “the statement ‘Advance Access publication 30 November 2012,’” and a conventional edition identifier from the journal Rheumatology. Dec. 17 (quoting Ex. 1005). Patent Owner advanced no” slip op. at 4

    • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

      “We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contentions and note that we addressed these same arguments in our Order denying Patent Owner’s motion to strike. Paper 24; see also Paper 13, 1 (Patent Owner contending that “Exhibit 1044 and related argument are new evidence and argument regarding the alleged accessibility of Varenna 2012 (Ex. 1005) that Petitioner could have submitted with the Petition, but chose not to.”). Rather than pointing out any matters that the panel misapprehended or overlooked, Patent Owner expresses disagreement with that decision, and attempts to offer additional reasoning and argument not advanced during trial. Req. Reh’g, 12–15. That effort is ineffective to establish reversible error. Furthermore, in our Final Written Decision, we noted that Even if we set aside Dr. Robinson’s Declaration, . . . we are persuaded that the indicia of publication on the face of Varenna 2012 are sufficient to establish that Varenna 2012 was “sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art” and “disseminated or otherwise made available” to the interested public before the critical date, and consequently, a printed publication. Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Dec. 19 n.4. For that reason also, Patent Owner shows no reversible error in our Final Written Decision holding that Dr. Robinson’s testimony bolsters” slip op. at 8

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
    § 102 anticipation
    Patents in suitUS 9,820,999
  • PTAB · Nov 9, 2020 · IPR2020-00151 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Satco’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution on claims 1–7 because the petition did not adequately show Wang disclosed the different-shape limitation.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “Petition or rely only on Figure 8. Rather, after considering Petitioner’s citation to and cursory discussion of Figures 8, 9, and 11 in the Petition, we determined Petitioner’s evidence suffered from deficiencies that prevented Petitioner from satisfying its burden of proof in the Petition. Notably, in its Rehearing Request, Petitioner does not direct us to any actual comparison of the shapes of top and bottom portions of Wang’s separation region that we overlooked in the Petition. Instead, Petitioner presents new images and new arguments that these images represent the shape of the top and bottom portions of Wang’s separation regions, as derived from Figures 8, 9, and 11. Req. Reh’g 8–11. A request for rehearing, however, is not an opportunity to present new arguments or evidence. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 5

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “In our Decision, we determined that Petitioner failed to demonstrate adequately that Wang discloses the different shape limitation. Dec. 17–19. In particular, we noted that the images from Wang Petitioner relied upon offered insufficient information to determine whether the separation region between first and second top leads has a different shape than the separation region between the first and second bottom leads. Dec. 17–19. For example, we stated that Petitioner never presented views comparing the top and bottom portions of the separation region to demonstrate adequately that the top and bottom portions have different shapes. Dec. 19.” slip op. at 3

    • BurdenDecided for patent owner

      “Petition or rely only on Figure 8. Rather, after considering Petitioner’s citation to and cursory discussion of Figures 8, 9, and 11 in the Petition, we determined Petitioner’s evidence suffered from deficiencies that prevented Petitioner from satisfying its burden of proof in the Petition. Notably, in its Rehearing Request, Petitioner does not direct us to any actual comparison of the shapes of top and bottom portions of Wang’s separation region that we overlooked in the Petition. Instead, Petitioner presents new images and new arguments that these images represent the shape of the top and bottom portions of Wang’s separation regions, as derived from Figures 8, 9, and 11. Req. Reh’g 8–11. A request for rehearing, however, is not an opportunity to present new arguments or evidence. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 5

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

      “Wang’s figures to the claim language itself in our Decision. In doing so, we determined that Wang’s figures provided insufficient information to determine whether Wang discloses the “different shape” limitation. Dec. 17–19. Our discussion of the figures in the ’919 patent merely highlighted the deficiencies in Petitioner’s reliance on the figures in Wang by providing an example of information that could be used to determine whether the top and bottom portions of the separation regions have different shapes. At no point did we import any specific features from the Specification into the “different shape” limitation or “require shapes similar to the ‘exemplary embodiment’ of FIG. 5A of the ’919 patent.” Req. Reh’g 4. Rather, we merely compared the type of information presented in the ’919 patent with the type of information presented in Wang to reinforce our determination that Petitioner failed to direct us to evidence in Wang that would allow a person of ordinary skill in the art to determine that Wang discloses a separation region that has a different shape between the top leads and the bottom leads. In view of the foregoing, we are not persuaded that we committed any legal errors, or that we narrowed the plain meaning of “different shape.”” slip op. at 7

    Claim construction
    Patents in suitUS 9,978,919
  • PTAB · Nov 6, 2020 · IPR2019-01601 · APJ Hubert C Lorin · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied rehearing and maintained denial of institution for claims 9–16, finding the petition insufficient on anticipation by Maimoni and Jost and related obviousness grounds.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “A request for rehearing must identify specifically all matters that the requesting party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 3

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “the pH to an adjusted level of between 4.5 and 6.5. All that Dr. Gallup testifies to is that the “[g]iven the pH of the feed brine [i.e., between 5.2 and 6.1 (Table 1) or 5.6 (Table 2). EX 1004, at 9-10], pH values [as claimed] occur as a result of the air oxidation and introduction of calcium hydroxide.” Id. As we stated in the Decision, we do not see how this statement is anything but a “conclusory assertion[ ] backed up by no objective evidence, such as experimental results establishing the adjusted pH of Maimoni’s geothermal brine.” Dec. 24. Accordingly, we are unpersuaded as to error in our conclusion that “Petitioner insufficiently establishes that Maimoni anticipates, expressly or inherently, the claim 9 step of ‘maintaining the pH of the geothermal brine solution at an adjusted pH of between 4.5 and 6.5.’” (Dec. 26) based on reason (1); that is, Petitioner’s apparent inherency argument made in the Petition, as well as the Gallup Declaration upon which the argument relied, were inadequate (Dec. 21–25).” slip op. at 6

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “[u]nder these circumstances, where Jost raises the possibility of forming iron (III) hydroxide, while raising a doubt that iron (III) hydroxide even exists – we find that Jost does not describe, expressly or inherently, oxidizing to iron (III) hydroxide as claimed. At best, Jost is ambiguous about oxidizing to iron (III) hydroxide. But ambiguous references do not, as a matter of law, anticipate a claim See Wasica Finance GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (emphasis added) (“Anticipation requires that a single reference ‘describe the claimed invention with sufficient precision and detail to establish that the subject matter existed in the prior art.’ Verve, LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc., 311 F.3d 1116, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). For this reason, it has long been understood that ambiguous references do not, as a matter of law, anticipate a claim. See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (refusing to find claims anticipated when the prior art references were ‘unacceptably vague’); see also In re Hughes, 52 CCPA 1355, 345 F.2d 184, 188 (1965); In re Turlay, 49 CCPA 1288, 304 F.2d 893, 899 (1962) (‘It is well established that an anticipation rejection cannot be predicated on an ambiguous reference.’)”). Because Jost discloses only the possibility of iron (III) hydroxide and no other evidence has been provided to show that Jost nevertheless necessarily oxidizes to iron (III) hydroxide as claimed, based on the information, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that the Jost reference anticipates, expressly or inherently, the claim step of “oxidizing the iron (II) salt to iron (III) hydroxide.” “Inherency . . . may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (CCPA 1981).” slip op. at 11

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “an explanation as to how “the Hazen process discussed by Maimoni describes a step of maintaining and controlling the pH of the geothermal brine at an adjusted pH of between 4.5 and 6.5, as required by Claim 9” (Pet. 44). But “[t]here is no explanation” (Dec. 24). We reproduced ¶ 162 of the Gallup Declaration in the Decision (see Dec. 23–24), which states in full that The step in the Hazen process of sparging the brine with air (Stream 6) in the iron reactor will reduce the pH. The reduction of the pH is offset by the introduction of calcium hydroxide (Stream 5) to the iron reactor. In my opinion, the Hazen process discussed by Maimoni describes a step of maintaining and controlling the pH of the geothermal brine at an adjusted pH of between 4.5 and 6.5. Given the pH of the feed brine, these pH values occur as a result of the air oxidation and introduction of calcium hydroxide. We did not and still do not see Dr. Gallup providing any meaningful explanation as to why the steps of sparging and the addition of calcium hydroxide per the Hazen process set forth in Maimoni necessarily maintains the pH to an adjusted level of between 4.5 and 6.5. All that Dr. Gallup testifies to is that the “[g]iven the pH of the feed brine [i.e., between 5.2 and 6.1 (Table 1) or 5.6 (Table 2). EX 1004, at 9-10], pH values [as claimed] occur as a result of the air oxidation and introduction of calcium hydroxide.” Id. As we stated in the Decision, we do not see how this statement is anything but a “conclusory assertion[ ] backed up by no objective evidence, such as experimental results establishing the adjusted pH of Maimoni’s geothermal brine.” Dec. 24. Accordingly, we are unpersuaded as to error in our conclusion that “Petitioner insufficiently establishes that Maimoni anticipates, expressly or inherently, the claim 9 step of ‘maintaining the pH of the geothermal brine solution at an adjusted pH of between 4.5 and 6.5.’” (Dec. 26) based on reason (1); that is, Petitioner’s apparent inherency argument made in the Petition, as well as the Gallup Declaration upon which the argument relied, were inadequate (Dec. 21–25).” slip op. at 5

    § 102 anticipation
    Patents in suitUS 9,051,827
  • PTAB · Oct 30, 2020 · IPR2019-01069 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Amazon’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied for claims 9–21 because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its obviousness grounds.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed” in a paper of record. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2019) (emphasis added). When rehearing a decision on petition, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision: (1) is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; (2) is based on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3) rests on clearly erroneous fact findings; or (4) involves a record that contains no evidence on which the Board could rationally base its decision. Redline Detection, LLC v. Star Envirotech, Inc., 811 F.3d 435, 442 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted).” slip op. at 3

    • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “system, e.g. how the system interprets words or phrases.” Apple IPR 6. Thus, the Apple IPR Board adopted Patent Owner’s argument that as applied to the prior art, the term “case” in “case information” requires “uses of the system contemplated by the invention, not uses of any other natural language processing system.” Apple IPR 6. The Board rejected that such prior use was found in rules regarding how the system interprets current word or phrase input. Id. We find that the Apple IPR discussed a user’s selection among possible choices, but also addressed that the “case” required use of the system of the ’798 invention. Id. at 5–6. Thus, we do not agree we misapprehended the meaning of the claim language. Req. Reh’g 2.” slip op. at 5

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing, in showing that claims 9– 21 would have been obvious over Livowsky;1 claims 10–12 and 14–16 would have been obvious over Livowsky and Shwartz;2 claims 9–21 would have been obvious over Shwartz and Livowsky; claims 9–21 would have been obvious over Shwartz and Weber;3 and claims 9–21 would have been obvious over Meng4 and Zhang.5 Dec. 17–18, 21–22, 23–24. For the reasons below, the Request for Rehearing is denied.” slip op. at 2

    Claim construction
    Patents in suitUS 7,177,798
  • PTAB · Oct 30, 2020 · IPR2019-01068 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Amazon’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution on claims 1–8 because Petitioner did not show the Board misapprehended the construction or prior-art evidence.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed” in a paper of record. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2019) (emphasis added). When rehearing a decision on petition, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision: (1) is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; (2) is based on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3) rests on clearly erroneous fact findings; or (4) involves a record that contains no evidence on which the Board could rationally base its decision. Redline Detection, LLC v. Star Envirotech, Inc., 811 F.3d 435, 442 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted).” slip op. at 3

    • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “interpretation of the claim construction in the Apple IPR. See Req. Reh’g 3. The Apple IPR cites the embodiment from the ’798 patent specification (Ex. 1001, 5:36–38, 16:52–17:5). Apple IPR 5–6. The Board in the Apple IPR expressly clarified that in the case information construction “‘instances of use’ of the system [did not] mean indications cover instances of use of the system, e.g. how the system interprets words or phrases.” Apple IPR 6. Thus, the Apple IPR Board adopted Patent Owner’s argument that as applied to the prior art, the term “case” in “case information” requires “uses of the system contemplated by the invention, not uses of any other natural language processing system.” Apple IPR 6. The Board rejected that such prior use was found in rules regarding how the system interprets current word or phrase input. Id. We find that the Apple IPR discussed a user’s selection among possible choices, but also addressed that the “case” required use of the system of the ’798 invention. Id. at 5–6. Thus, we do not agree we misapprehended the meaning of the claim language. Req. Reh’g 2.” slip op. at 4

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “information” to exclude clarifications from users. Id. at 5–6, 7–11. Petitioner argues that our Institution Decision adopts Patent Owner’s narrow construction and finds that “clarifying prompts” in grounds including Weber are not “case information.” Id. at 7–8. Our Institution Decision found that Petitioner did not persuasively and sufficiently assert how the prior art disclosed the “case information.” Dec 19–20. Our determination was based on the sufficiency of Petitioner’s evidence and argument in the regarding whether Weber’s prompting the user for information, which was contested by Patent Owner, teaches or suggests “information about prior instances of use of the natural language processing method.” Dec. 19–20 (emphasis added). Petitioner’s arguments does not identify any evidence we overlooked or misapprehended. Req. Reh’g 7–8. Instead, Petitioner characterizes our Institution Decision as broadly excluding user prompts. Our determination was based on the full claim construction, which is supported by the Apple IPR’s emphasis of “prior instances of use of the natural language processing method.” Apple IPR 5–6; Dec. 19–20.” slip op. at 5

    Claim construction
    Patents in suitUS 7,177,798
  • PTAB · Oct 22, 2020 · IPR2019-01484 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Everstar’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution on claims 1–30 because it had not shown an abuse of discretion.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The party challenging a decision in a request for rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2019). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). When rehearing a decision on a petition, the decision will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 3

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “As Petitioner points out, the ’097 patent characterizes reinforcing strands 102a–c as “extend[ing] axially through the center portion of wire 10[0].” Ex. 1001, 14:59–60. Our construction of “disposed at a central portion,” which requires strands to be positioned in the wire so as to occupy at least the center of the wire, is consistent with both the description of strands 102a–c as extending through the center portion of the wire in the ’097 patent specification and the depiction of strands 102a–c in the center of wire 100 in Figure 5. Petitioner appears to argue that because reinforcing strands 102a–c occupy a space that is larger than “simply the central axis of the wire,” any strands disposed inside the wire (i.e., within the outer insulating layer of the wire) are also “disposed at a central portion of the wire.” Req. Reh’g 5. Nothing in Figure 5 or the ’097 patent’s description of Figure 5, however, supports a construction of “disposed at a central portion” that means simply “disposed inside the wire.” To the contrary, Petitioner’s argument is undermined by the fact that the ’097 patent expressly refers to the reinforcing strands 102a–c as extending through the central portion, but does not use the same language to characterize the position of conducting strands 104.” slip op. at 5

    • Expert testimonyDecided for patent owner

      “We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that a genuine dispute of material fact exists with regard to the parties’ proposed construction of “disposed at a central portion.” Petitioner acknowledges that its declarant, Dr. Fantone, testified that none of the claim terms required a specific construction and that the claim terms “would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.” Req. Reh’g 13–14 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 22). As Petitioner points out, Dr. Brown, Patent Owner’s declarant, did not offer any “statement of disagreement with Petitioner’s position that the terms should be afforded their ordinary and customary meaning.” Req. Reh’g 14. As a result, there is no “conflicting” testimony from the declarants on this point. Nor is there any conflicting testimony from the declarants regarding the ordinary and customary meaning of “disposed at a central portion.” Although Dr. Fantone testified generally that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand what “disposed at a central portion” means, Dr. Fantone never explained what that understanding would be. Thus, there is no dispute of material fact on this record regarding the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim term.” slip op. at 9

    Claim construction
    Patents in suitUS 9,671,097
  • PTAB · Oct 5, 2020 · IPR2018-00497 · APJ Christa P Zado · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving in place its final decision that claims 9–11, 16, and 17 are unpatentable as anticipated by Grinfas.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), “[t]he burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” For the reasons discussed below, we deny the Rehearing Request.” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “We decline to reconsider our construction. In the Final Decision, we declined to use the phrase “pleated folds” in our construction—a phrase that is not used anywhere in the ’031 patent—and instead adopted the terminology actually used in the patent, i.e., hinges, flexural hinges, and flexural membranes. Final Dec. 21–22. We cited portions of the ’031 patent that use the term “accordion,” noting the patent consistently describes an “accordion” as having “flexural hinges or flexural membranes that include hinges that facilitate extending/expanding and collapsing the accordion.” Id. at 20 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:50–53, 5:56–67, 6:7–16). As discussed in the Final Decision, Patent Owner provided insufficient basis to “replace the term actually used in the Specification [to describe accordions] . . . with a term that is not used in the Specification.” Id. at 20–21. Consistent with the use of the term “accordion” in the ’031 patent, we interpreted “accordion” as “a structure that has hinges, such as flexural hinges or flexural membranes, that fold so as to facilitate extending/expanding and collapsing of the accordion.” Id. at 19. We are not persuaded we erred in adopting a construction that uses the phrase “flexural hinges or flexural membranes” rather than one that uses the phrase “pleated folds.” See id. at 19–24 (explaining that the intrinsic evidence supports our adopted construction of “accordion”).” slip op. at 4

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency foundDecided for petitioner

      “inherently discloses the recited use in the claim limitation “a securing element for attaching the socket to the back of the portable media player or portable media player case.” Req. Reh’g 4 (citing Final Dec. 59–60). Patent Owner suggests that we arrived at this conclusion based on our understanding that “Patent Owner did not dispute that this element is inherently disclosed.” Id. (citing Final Dec. 59–60).1 Contrary to Patent Owner’s suggestion, our finding that Grinfas provides inherent disclosure was not based on whether Patent Owner disputed this issue. Rather, it was based on the evidence and arguments provided by Petitioner. Final Dec. 60– 64. For example, we credited the testimony of Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Glenn E. Vallee, Ph.D., that the securing structures in Grinfas were inherently capable of attaching to the back of a telephone because it was supported by 1 We note that the cited portion of our Final Decision addressed whether certain elements in Grinfas (e.g., adhesive pad 46, fastenable straps 54, and attachment portion 92) are “securing elements”—i.e., whether they are securing or fastening—but it did not address whether Grinfas inherently discloses how such elements are used—i.e., whether they are inherently capable of fastening to the back of a portable media player. That issue is addressed at pages 62–68 of our Final Decision. the record. Final Dec. 63–64 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 67; Ex. 1005, 8:3–9, Figs. 4A–B). The Rehearing Request does not acknowledge or address the explanation provided in the Final Decision, much less identify what we might have misapprehended or overlooked in finding Dr. Vallee’s testimony to be credible and supported by the record. Req. Reh’g 4. For the foregoing reasons, Patent Owner has not shown that we misapprehended or overlooked any matter in finding Grinfas discloses a securing element inherently capable of being attached to the back of a portable media player.” slip op. at 9

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Constitutional / APA (Arthrex, Oil States, due process)Decided for petitioner

      “We did not provide an express construction of the term “accordion” in the Decision Instituting Inter Partes Review, finding that no terms required express construction at that time. Paper 8, 8 (“Inst. Dec.” or “Institution Decision”). However, we rejected Patent Owner’s preliminary proposal that an “accordion” must be a “structure with pleated folds so as to collapse like the bellows of a musical accordion,” explaining the ’031 patent describes accordions as having flexural hinges that allow the walls of the accordion to fold up generally in parallel to each other, rather than stacking on top of one another. Inst. Dec. 22–26. Citing numerous disclosures in the ’031 patent describing an “accordion” as a structure having flexural hinges, we preliminarily determined “the term ‘accordion’ includes structures that have flexural hinges.’” Id. at 24 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:45–48, 5:50–53, 6:7–31, Fig. 3A, Fig. 3B, Fig. 5). Accordingly, we determined on the preliminary record that the term “accordion” did not preclude the structure in Grinfas, which has flexural hinges that flex and fold. Id. at 24–25. Therefore, our Decision on Institution gave Patent Owner notice and the opportunity to address our interpretation of an “accordion” as including structures that have flexural hinges. Id. at 24. During trial, although Patent Owner maintained its position that “accordion” should be construed as having “pleated folds,” PO Resp. 5, Patent Owner agreed with our preliminary determination that the term “accordion” may include structures with flexural hinges, id. at 19–20. However, Patent Owner argued that not all structures with flexural hinges are “accordions,” because there were well-known non-accordion structures that have flexural hinges. Id. at 20. In accordance with Patent Owner’s argument that not all structures having flexural hinges are “accordions,” in the Final Decision we clarified that the flexural hinges fold “so as to facilitate extending/expanding and collapsing of the accordion.” Final Dec. 20, 22–23. This clarification did not violate the APA or due process because it did not alter any requirements in the claims, which recite that the accordion is capable of extending (i.e., extending/expanding) and retracting (i.e., collapsing). See Ex. 1001, 7:65–8:3 (claim 9). Moreover, the outcome of the Final Decision would have been the same regardless of the clarification that not all structures with flexural hinges are an “accordion.” The clarifying language in our construction in the Final Decision clarifies that structures not present in Grinfas would not meet our construction of “accordion.” Accordingly, had we not included the clarification, the outcome of our Final Decision would have been the same.” slip op. at 11

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation
    Patents in suitUS 8,560,031
  • PTAB · Sep 17, 2020 · IPR2019-00338 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Cooler Master’s rehearing request, leaving intact the determination that claim 8 was not shown obvious over Morikawa and Takahashi because the petition did not establish the claimed top shoulder.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “II. ANALYSIS A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “that “Petitioner has not demonstrated that Morikawa discloses the recited [top shoulder limitation].” Final Dec. 45. In other words, our determination was that Petitioner had not met its burden of proving that a limitation was taught by the prior art, and therefore had not met its burden of proving that the challenged claim is unpatentable.” slip op. at 3

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “In the Final Decision, we stated: Petitioner’s implied construction is that the claimed “shoulder” is the top end of a column. This is inconsistent with the claim language which recites that the “hollow column . . . has a top shoulder disposed near a top end” thus indicating that the top shoulder is not merely the top end of the column but a structure “near” and discernable from the top end of the hollow column.” slip op. at 8

    • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

      “based on a misapprehension of the arguments associated with a figure . . . [from page 57] in the Petition,” and that “the Board incorrectly inferred Petitioner’s ‘implied construction’ for the term, ‘[a top] shoulder,’ in claim 8 of the ’680 patent as ‘the top end of a column.’” Req. Reh’g 1 (citing Final Dec. 45). Petitioner further argues that it “has always and consistently pointed to the corner portions located around the top outer rim of the hollow column as meeting the limitation of ‘a top shoulder,’ as shown [in the two figures from pages 56 and 57 of Petition and reproduced above].” Id. at 5–6.” slip op. at 8

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 7,100,680
  • PTAB · Sep 16, 2020 · IPR2018-00755 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving claims 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, and 25 unpatentable under each of three §103 combinations; claim 8 was not shown unpatentable.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “the burden of showing a decision should be modified, and the request for rehearing must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked and the place where each matter was previously addressed in its papers. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); see also Req. Reh’g 1 (quoting from the rule). Therefore, Patent Owner bears the burden of establishing that we misapprehended or overlooked the matters that it requests that we review.” slip op. at 3

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner

      “Also, the body of independent claims 1 and 25 recite structurally complete inventions, and do not rely on the word “token,” from the preamble, for any antecedent basis of terms in the body of the claim. The deletion of this preamble language would not affect the structure of the claimed inventions and confirms that the language of the preamble, which names the machine or manufacture claimed as a token, and states its intended use, is not limiting. See Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biolitec, Inc., 618 F.3d 1354, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Further, because the bodies of the claims, reciting an “integrated circuit chip” (claim 1) and “storage section” (claim 25), fully define the structure of the claimed tokens and do not rely on the “token” name of the invention to recite the limitations of their structural components, the term the meaning of the claims. Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Because the term “token” does not require construction, and is of no significance in determining the meaning of the claim language, we did not adopt Patent Owner’s additional limitation of a token being required to begin play of a game. B. Whether the Board misapprehended Lee and the showing that the Board” slip op. at 5

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentableDecided for petitioner

      “Final Written Decision, which finds that each of the combinations (Levy and Lee, Katoh and Lee, and Mawle and Lee) discloses the limitations of claims 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, and 25 (Final Dec. 19–33, 36–48, 50–62, 64–65), that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the references in the manner asserted by Petitioner and as claimed (id. at 34–35, 48–49, 62–65), and thus,” slip op. at 6

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 7,338,377

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.