• Riverbed Technology, Inc. v. Silver Peak Systems, Inc.Other
  PTAB · Dec 30, 2014 · IPR2013-00402 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board canceled claims 1–12 and granted the motion to amend for substitute claims 13 and 15, but denied it for claims 14 and 16–18 based on unmet amendment and eligibility requirements.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part

    “In a motion to amend, the patent owner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate patentability of its proposed substitute claims over the prior art and, thus, entitlement to the claims. Idle Free at 7. This does not mean that the patent owner is assumed to be aware of every item of prior art known to a person of ordinary skill in the art. However, the patent owner should explain in its motion why the proposed substitute claims are patentable over not just the prior art of record, but also prior art not of record but known to the patent owner: A patent owner should identify specifically the feature or features added to each substitute claim, as compared to the challenged claim it replaces, and come forward with technical facts and reasoning about those feature(s), including construction of new claim terms, sufficient to persuade the Board that the proposed substitute claim is patentable over the prior art of record, and over prior art not of record but known to the patent owner. The burden is not on the petitioner to show unpatentability, but on the patent owner to show patentable distinction over the prior art of record and also prior art known to the patent owner. Some representation should be made about the specific technical disclosure of the closest prior art known to the patent owner, and not just a conclusory remark that no prior art known to the patent owner renders obvious the proposed substitute claims. Id. This includes addressing the basic knowledge and skill set possessed by a person of ordinary skill in the art even without reliance on any particular item of prior art. Id. at 7–8; Toyota at 4–5. The petitioner then has the opportunity, in its opposition, to argue any deficiency in the patent owner’s motion and “come forward with specific evidence and reasoning, including citation and submission of any applicable prior art,” to rebut the patent owner’s position on patentability. Idle Free at 8.” slip op. at 16

  • ScopeMotion to amend, grantedGranted

    “1. No Broadening of Scope Proposed substitute claims in an inter partes review “may not enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(3); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)(2)(ii). In its Motion to Amend, Patent Owner proposes claim 13 as a substitute for claim 4, claim 14 as a substitute for claim 3, claim 15 as a substitute for claim 8, claim 16 as a substitute for claim 7, claim 17 as a substitute for claim 12, and claim 18 as a substitute for claim 11. Mot. 1–6. Each claim includes all of the limitations of the corresponding claim for which it is a substitute, and adds additional limitations. No limitations are removed. Petitioner in its Opposition does not dispute Patent Owner’s assertion that the proposed substitute claims do not enlarge the scope of the claims of the ’226 patent. See Mot. 8–9. We are persuaded that the proposed substitute claims do not enlarge the scope of the original patent claims.” slip op. at 11

  • 112 supportGranted

    “2. Written Description Support Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(b), a motion to amend in an inter partes review must set forth “[t]he support in the original disclosure of the patent for each claim that is added or amended,” and “[t]he support in an earlier-filed disclosure for each claim for which benefit of the filing date of the earlier filed disclosure is sought.”” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner argues that it would not have been obvious to incorporate the technique of Spring into a network data de-duplication system, as recited in the proposed substitute claims, because Spring “had very limited practical application in the network memory context.” Mot. 12. Patent Owner’s position is supported by the statement in McCanne ’376 that due to Spring’s small cache and first-in first-out replacement policy, “the efficacy of [Spring’s] approach is limited to detecting and exploiting communication redundancies that are fairly localized in time.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 20; see Mot. 12. The proposed substitute claims, which identify sync points from which forward and backward memory comparisons are performed, are not limited to only recently transmitted data. Patent Owner also asserts that the specific combination of “fine and coarse filtering of hash values” and “forward and backward memory comparison” limitations recited in the proposed substitute claims represents a practical solution to the “tradeoff” that exists with data de-duplication systems, and is not solved by any of the prior art of record. Mot. 12–13. Specifically, Patent Owner states that there is a “tradeoff” between the size of an index and the likelihood that an indexed segment will be matched. Id. Spring uses a small fixed-size cache and small packets, and, thus, works best for only recently transmitted data. Id. By contrast, according to Patent Owner, the proposed substitute claims provide a practical solution to the tradeoff by operating at the byte-level and using a combination of fine and coarse filters to identify sync points from which forward and backward memory comparisons are performed. Id. Patent Owner’s explanations regarding the prior art and why the proposed substitute claims allegedly would not have been obvious are supported by the record and are persuasive. We also note that although Petitioner addresses the “fine and coarse filtering of hash values” limitations in its Opposition (arguing that they are taught by Hsu), Petitioner does not argue that Hsu—or any other reference— teaches or suggests the “forward and backward memory comparison” limitations. Nor does Petitioner propose any specific combination of references that allegedly would have rendered obvious the proposed substitute claims as a whole. Thus, Patent Owner’s assertions regarding key aspects of the prior art, such as Spring, essentially are unrebutted.” slip op. at 23

  § 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,312,226
• Fidelity National Information Services, Inc. v. Checkfree CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 22, 2014 · CBM2013-00030 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–21 are unpatentable under § 101 because they claim an abstract payment-intermediation concept implemented with generic computer functions.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “BACKGROUND On December 23, 2013, we entered a Decision to Institute a covered business method patent review, Paper 16 (“Dec. to Inst.”), of U.S. Patent No. 7,853,524 B2 (“the ’524 Patent”) on the grounds that claims 1–21 do not recite patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “terms “electronic bill” and “EBP” do not even appear in the specification, Petitioner argues that Patent Owner is attempting to recast abstract ideas recited in the ’524 Patent claims in a manner that requires machines or transformations. Pet. Reply 2, 6. We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s construction arguments attempt to read into the claims features that are not recited in them. For example, although there is no EBP system mentioned in the claims, citing the testimony of its expert, Dr. John Kelly, Patent Owner argues that a payment request is captured through an automated interaction with a user over a telephone or is conveyed by transferring data to the EBP system over a data network from a computer. PO Resp. 21–22. As discussed below, we decline to alter any of the constructions we applied in our Decision to Institute.” slip op. at 4

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Merchant credit limit associated with a payee Patent Owner contends that our construction of the “merchant credit limit associated with a payee” as the maximum amount of credit a merchant extends to a payer is contrary to the plain language of the claims because the limit is associated with the payee. PO Resp. 51. Our construction is consistent with the limit being associated with the payee, i.e., the party to whom the payment is made. Patent Owner’s proposed construction, “a value reflecting the credit limit used by the EBP system which is associated with a particular payee,” PO Resp. 52, reads into the claim an extrinsic EBP system not discussed in the specification. In addition, the value reflecting the credit limit is the amount of credit a payee, i.e., a merchant, extends to a payer. Claims 1, 11, and 21 each recite comparing a payment amount associated with the received request, i.e., the request received on behalf of the payer, to a merchant credit limit associated with the payee. The only credit limits described in the specification are limits on the amount of credit extended to a payer. Although the specification describes a merchant credit limit, it does not describe specifically such a limit associated with the payee. The specification describes comparing the payment amount to a merchant credit limit, and making the payment as an electronic payment or a service provider check, if the payment amount is under a specified amount. Ex. 1001, col. 5, l. 65–col. 6, l. 5. Any amount within the merchant’s (i.e., the payee’s) credit limit is added to the consumer’s (i.e., payer’s) monthly ACH balance, and any transaction can be compared to the consumer’s credit limit parameters stored in a database. Id. at col. 6, ll. 5–10. The specification also describes releasing the payment as a draft written on the consumer’s account, rather than the service provider’s account, if the payment amount exceeds the consumer’s, i.e., the payer’s, credit limit. Id. at col. 6, ll. 10– 16. Because the consumer’s credit limit described in the specification protects the service provider, id. at col. 5, ll. 35–37, 65–66, it is a limit associated with the service provider rather than the payee. Claims 1, 11, and 21, however, recite the merchant credit limit associated with the payee. Because each merchant may extend a different amount of credit to each customer, the merchant credit limit associated with the payee limitation appears to require the service provider computer to select a payment means based on comparing the requested payment amount to the amount of credit the merchant, i.e., the payee, extends to the payer. That is, the amount of the payment is compared to the payer’s credit limit with the payee. In any case, as discussed below, this limitation is not material to our determination of the issues under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” slip op. at 8

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “and 21 of the ’524 Patent recites a method or apparatus in which a service provider receives a request to pay a payee, selects a form of crediting the payee based on comparing the payer’s account number to the payee’s merchant account scheme and the payment amount to a merchant credit limit associated with the payee, and directs the payment to the payee in the selected form. Thus, each of the independent claims is drawn to a computer-implemented process or apparatus in which a third party intermediary, i.e., the payment service provider, receives a request to make payment, applies certain criteria to determine what form of payment to use, and then directs the payment to the payee in that form. In Alice, the Supreme Court considered claims that, on their face, were drawn to the fundamental economic concept of exchanging financial obligations between two parties using a third-party intermediary to mitigate settlement risk. The Court, concluded that, like the hedging in Bilski, the claims were drawn to an “abstract idea” beyond the scope of § 101. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2355–57.1 In the ’524 Patent, the service provider intermediates payment between the payer and the payee, acting much like the third party intermediary in Alice. The payment service provider mitigates settlement risk by crediting the payee or issuing a check to the payee drawn on the service provider’s funds, or in other circumstances, issuing a draft drawn on the payer’s funds, i.e., determining the form of payments based on the comparisons recited in the claims. Ex. 1001, col. 5, l. 25–col. 6, l. 15. The computer implementation associated with comparing the account number and 1 In Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) the Court found upatentable, as abstract ideas, claims drawn to hedging against the financial risk of commodity price fluctuations where the claims recited the steps of initiating a series of financial transactions between commodity providers and consumers, identifying market participants with a counterrisk for the same commodity and initiating a series of risk balancing transactions between those market participants and the commodity provider. the credit limit are incidental to the fundamental economic concept of having a third party intermediate a settlement either by crediting the payee from the third party’s funds (as in a credit transaction) or from the payer’s funds (as when the amounts exceed the payer’s credit limit with the service provider). Thus, we conclude that each of independent claims 1, 11, and 21 is directed to an abstract concept.” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 7,853,524 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · Bilski
  Patents in suitUS 7,853,524
• Fidelity National Information Services, Inc. v. Checkfree CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 22, 2014 · CBM2013-00031 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable under § 101 because they claim the abstract concept of modifying account numbers to match a payee’s format using generic computer implementation.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionDecided for petitioner

    “Claims 1 and 15 of the ’311 Patent are drawn to executing instructions on a computer. In response to receiving an account number in a format not expected by a payee, the instructions act to retrieve from a database a rule that causes the received account number to be altered into the expected format before transmitting the account number to the payee. Thus, claims 1 and 15 are directed to the abstract concept of comparing a received account number to a payee’s format, applying a rule, and modifying the account number in accordance with that rule to the expected format before transmitting it to the payee. As evidence that the computer is not a meaningful limitation and that the claims are drawn to an abstract concept, Petitioner cites testimony of inventor David Garrison demonstrating that the steps of the claimed invention could be performed manually. Pet. 12–16. (citing Ex. 1008, 175:25–180:14, 185:11– 189:25; Ex. 1009; Ex. 1010. Patent Owner’s argument that the claimed automatically performed method precludes the need for human intervention, PO Resp. 68, essentially concedes that the process could be performed manually. We conclude that the recitation of a computer in the method or system claims is not a meaningful limitation and does not change the abstract nature of the claimed subject matter. The limitations recited in claims 2–14, which depend from claim 1, and claims 16–20, which depend from claim 15, relate to the abstract concept recited in claims 1 and 15 and are not meaningful limitations that provide patent-eligible subject matter. See, e.g., claims 2 and 16, which recite receiving the consumer account number in association with the payment request. Thus, the method and system claims of the ’311 Patent are drawn to the abstract concept of establishing compatibility between account numbers by applying appropriate rules to modify an account number.” slip op. at 7

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptDecided for petitioner

    “We also agree with Petitioner that, by transforming a consumer account number into a modified account number, the claims of the ’311 Patent do not cause a physical transformation of a data structure, as argued by Patent Owner. PO Resp. 48–49. As previously discussed, the claims of the ’311 Patent do not recite data structures that are physically transformed. In addition, Petitioner points out that Patent Owner’s expert, Mr. McEntee, testified that the claims of the ’311 Patent do not require any physical transformation. Pet. Reply 11 (citing Ex. 2028, 472:19– 428:2). We further note that satisfying the machine-or-transformation test, by itself, is not sufficient to render a claim patent-eligible, as not all transformations or machine implementations infuse an otherwise ineligible claim with an inventive concept. DDR Holdings, LLC, 2014 WL 6845152, at *9. We conclude that altering an account number to be compatible with the requirements of a payee’s system, as recited in the claims of the ’311 Patent, is not the type of transformation that rises to the level of patent-eligible subject matter. Patent Owner contends that in our Decision to Institute we did not evaluate the claims as a whole to determine whether they contain additional substantive limitations that narrow, confine, or otherwise tie down the claims so that, in practical terms, they do not cover the full abstract idea itself. PO Resp. 61. According to Patent Owner, the claims include several concrete and tangible limitations that limit the use of the “putative abstract idea” to a specific application within an electronic bill payment system. Id.  As discussed above, relying on intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, Patent Owner attempts to read into the claims structures that they do not recite. Independent claims 1 and 15 recite only executing instructions to receive an account number, applying a rule to alter the account number to an expected form, and transmitting the altered account number. The specification notes that the claimed steps can be implemented using a general purpose computer, or other processing device capable of executing programmed instructions. Ex. 1001, col. 3. ll. 58–65. Thus, the limitations recited in claims concerning the payment processor and the payment processor computer are generic computer limitations. Generic computer limitations do not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible. DDR Holdings, 2014 WL 6845152, at *9.” slip op. at 12

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedOther

    “of the rebuttal testimony of Petitioner’s expert Michael Shamos, Ex. 1021 (“Shamos Decl.”), as beyond the scope of the testimony of Patent Owner’s experts. Paper 40 (“Mot. to Exclude”). Petitioner identifies subject matter the challenged paragraphs of the Shamos Declaration rebut. Paper 41 (“Opp. to Mot. to Exclude”). In reaching our decisions in this proceeding, we do not cite or rely on the portions of the testimony in the Shamos Declaration that Patent Owner moves to exclude. Therefore, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is dismissed.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 7,996,311 unpatentable
  § 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · Bilski
  Patents in suitUS 7,996,311
• Metavante Corporation / Fidelity National Information Services, Inc. v. Checkfree CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 22, 2014 · CBM2013-00032 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–60 are unpatentable under § 101 because they claim an abstract intermediary function implemented with routine computer activity.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “Petitioner’s expert Michael Shamos. Paper 41 (“Mot. to Exclude”). Petitioner opposes Patent Owner's Motion to Exclude on the basis that these statements Patent Owner moves to exclude are proper rebuttal to Patent Owner's experts. Paper 42 (“Opp. to Mot. to Exclude”). Our Final Written Decision does not cite or rely on any of the subject matter Patent Owner seeks to exclude. Therefore, we dismiss Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude.” slip op. at 23

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner. Claim 1 recites the single step of executing computer implemented instructions with one or more processors. Claim 1 recites that those instructions include ones in which the clearinghouse receives a payment request (or a request to add a payee to a payer’s pick list), accesses billing information stored in a database, identifies payee bill presentment information from the accessed information, and generates and transmits to the payer a notification of the bill presentment information.1 Although the one or more processors may also execute instructions to perform routine ancillary functions for the central clearinghouse to receive the request, access the database and transmit the information, there are no such instructions or structures recited in claim 1. Claim 1 of the ’749 Patent does not recite any structure for the bill presentment and payment central clearinghouse—nor does claim 1 recite any particular software instructions, any particular processors, any particular configuration or interconnection of the recited “one or more processors,” or any other structure to execute the claimed functions called for in the instructions. Thus, the bill presentment and payment central clearinghouse in claim 1 must be construed without structural limitations, other than being programmed to carry out the recited functions.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “The ’749 Patent describes the payee-pick-list as a list of payees the user may plan to pay electronically and states that each user’s individual list is stored in the form of a database in a memory associated with the central clearinghouse station. Ex. 1001, col. 16, ll. 49–54. We disagree with Patent Owner’s characterization of the payee-pick-list as a data structure merely because it is used directly by the programmed central clearinghouse computer system. PO Resp. 40. Claim 1 recites receiving a request to add a payee to a pick-list associated with the payer, but does not recite any limitations concerning the pick-list. The specification refers to a database known as a payee-pick-list that includes certain information such as payee identifiers, street addresses, cities, states, zip codes, phone numbers and consumer account numbers. Ex. 1001, col. 16, 61–65. Nothing in this list of common information associated with the payee requires any particular data structure. Thus, we do not import a data structure limitation into the construction of "payee-pick-list” or "pick-list."” slip op. at 7

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “patentable subject matter. First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one or more patent-ineligible concepts, i.e., laws of nature, natural phenomenon and abstract ideas. Id. at 2355 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296–96 (2012)). If so, we then consider whether the elements of each claim, both individually and as an ordered combination, transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself. Id. Thus, the first step in our analysis is to consider whether the claims of the ’749 Patent recite a patent-ineligible concept. Patent Owner describes the central clearinghouse as a necessary intermediary between payers and payees interacting with each user station and handling EBPP interactions between thousands, if not millions, of such stations, which themselves are computers. Id. at 22. In Alice, the Supreme Court considered claims drawn to a method of exchanging financial obligations between two parties using a third-party intermediary to mitigate settlement risk and concluded that on their face, claims drawn to the concept of an intermediated settlement, like the hedging in Bilski, is an “abstract idea” beyond the scope of § 101. Id. at 2355–57.2 We conclude that the claims of the ’749 Patent, which are directed to a clearinghouse that acts as an intermediary between a payer and the payee by notifying the payer about payee bill presentment information, are not directed to patent-eligible subject matter. The steps recited in claim 1, and in each 2 In Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010), the Supreme Court found unpatentable, as abstract ideas, claims drawn to hedging against the financial risk of commodity price fluctuations where the claims recited the steps of initiating a series of financial transactions between commodity providers and consumers, identifying market participants with a counter-risk for the same commodity and initiating a series of risk balancing transactions between those market participants and the commodity provider. of independent claims 20, 40, 59, and 60, are carried out by a clearinghouse that receives a request from a payer to provide payee information or add a payee to the payer’s pick-list. The claims recite receiving a request and are not limited to any particular number of such requests. The clearinghouse retrieves the payee information from a database and generates and transmits a responsive notification message to the payer. Thus, independent claims 1, 20, 40, 59, and 60 are drawn to the patent-ineligible concept of executing instructions in which an intermediary receives a request, retrieves information from a database, and transmits the information to the requester.” slip op. at 9

  Patent outcomesUS 7,792,749 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · Bilski
  Patents in suitUS 7,792,749
• Linkedin Corp. v. Avmarkets Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 10, 2014 · CBM2013-00025 · APJ Michael P Tierney · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5–7, 9–11, and 13–15 are unpatentable under § 101 because they claim an abstract product catalog using routine computer technology.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “While a Motion to Exclude may raise issues related to admissibility of evidence, it is not an opportunity to file a Sur-Reply, and also is not a mechanism to argue that a Reply contains new arguments or relies on evidence that should have been included in the prima facie case. Here, AvMarkets’ Motion to Exclude contains such improper arguments, and is in the nature of a Sur-Reply. Moreover, as discussed below, AvMarkets’ arguments also are without merit.” slip op. at 5

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We also hold that both Mr. Pollastro and Dr. Freedman are qualified to testify as to the level and knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art as of 2007, the time of the invention. Specifically, one of ordinary skill in the art would have at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science or equivalent experience in the art of software and hardware development, including the development of Web applications. Ex. 1012 ¶ 3; Ex. 2001 ¶ 4. Mr. Pollastro is qualified to testify as, at the time of the invention, he was a Microsoft Certified Professional who had years of experience building and managing servers for an in-house network. Ex 2001 ¶¶ 2–3. Dr. Freedman is qualified to testify as, at the time of the invention, he possessed a Bachelor’s degree and Master’s degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Computer Science and Engineering, and a Ph.D. in Computer Science from New York University. Ex. 1012 ¶ 3.” slip op. at 7

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “We find that the claimed invention merely requires the use of a general-purpose computer. This finding is based on the teachings of the ’430 patent Specification and Dr. Freedman’s testimony. We credit the testimony of Dr. Freedman over that of Mr. Pollastro, as Dr. Freedman’s testimony is consistent with the teachings of the ’430 Specification and provides a thorough, well-reasoned analysis as to why the ’430 claims require nothing more than a general-purpose computer.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

    “See Dec. on Inst. 4–6. The parties do not dispute these interpretations in their Patent Owner Response and Reply. We adopt the above claim constructions based on our previous analysis, and see no reason to deviate from those constructions for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 8

  Patent outcomesUS 7,856,430 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 7,856,430
• SAP America, Inc. v. Lakshmi ArunachalamAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 18, 2014 · CBM2013-00013 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3 and 11 are unpatentable under §§ 101 and 103, and claims 1–6 and 11 are unpatentable under § 112, second paragraph.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “Under Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) 901(b)(1) a proponent may authenticate evidence through testimony that the evidence is what it is claimed to be. In Loraine v. Markel American Insurance Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, (D. Md. 2007), the court noted that a witness authenticating electronic evidence must “provide factual specificity about the process by which the electronically stored information is created, acquired, maintained, and preserved without alteration or change, or the process by which it is produced if the result of a system or process that does so.” Id. at 545. The inventor’s statements do not meet these criteria. However, under FRE 901(b)(4) a party may authenticate evidence using circumstantial evidence in conjunction with the appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the evidence. Although Patent Owner has not provided evidence such as hash values or metadata (see Lorraine at 547), the contents and substance of the documents indicate that they are what they purport to be. Given their technical nature of the documents, this panel can assign them appropriate weight.” slip op. at 28

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “As discussed further in this decision, based on Patent Owner’s contentions and the language of the Specification, we conclude that the term “routed transactional data structure” fails to inform a person of ordinary skill in the art of the scope of the claim with reasonable certainty and is therefore indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112 , second paragraph. See, Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig, Insts., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129–30 (2014) . However, to the extent that the claim can be construed in order to analyze its relationship to the prior art in this proceeding and whether the claim recites patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, we have reconsidered our use of the expression “switching a user” in the construction we applied in our Decision to Institute. Dec. to Inst. 15-16. Claim 1 recites that the “routed transactional data structure” is specific to a POSvc application, which is a software program that facilitates execution of transactions requested by a user. Upon reconsideration, we conclude that “utilizing a routed transaction data structure” encompasses using a data structure that facilitates switching the processing of information associated with a user selected transactional application that provides immediate processing.” slip op. at 11

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “In our Decision to Institute, we noted that “object routing” requires the use of individual networked objects to route a user from a selected transactional application to the processing provided by the service provider. In contrast, the limitation “routed transactional data structure,” does not impose a meaningful limit on the scope of claims 1–3 and 11 because it does not play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed. See SiRF Tech. Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm., 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010). For example, as explained below in our 35 U.S.C. § 112 , second paragraph analysis, the Specification does not describe clearly how a data structure is transactional, as opposed to non-transactional, or routed, as opposed to non-routed. As discussed above, to the extent that “utilizing a routed transactional data structure that is both complete and non-deferred,” can be construed, we have interpreted it to mean using a data structure that facilitates switching the processing of information associated with a user– selected a transactional application that provides immediate processing. Switching the processing of information from one resource to another, such as from one program or data base to another, is a well-known abstract concept that is not limited to any particular technical approach, such as object routing, as recited in claim 4. The remaining limitations in claim 1 do not contribute any patent– eligible subject matter. The service network atop the Web, which we have construed to mean a network on which services other than underlying network communications services are provided over the Web, is an abstract concept under which customers and service providers communicate over a network so that the service provider can service the customer, in this case to allow the user to transfer funds between checking and savings accounts. This does not impose a meaningful limitation on the scope of the claim. See SiRF Tech, 601 F.3d at 1333. Thus, we conclude that claim 1 does not recite patent–eligible subject matter.” slip op. at 16

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable

    “The remaining limitations in claim 1 do not contribute any patent– eligible subject matter. The service network atop the Web, which we have construed to mean a network on which services other than underlying network communications services are provided over the Web, is an abstract concept under which customers and service providers communicate over a network so that the service provider can service the customer, in this case to allow the user to transfer funds between checking and savings accounts. This does not impose a meaningful limitation on the scope of the claim. See SiRF Tech, 601 F.3d at 1333. Thus, we conclude that claim 1 does not recite patent–eligible subject matter. Claims 2, 3, and 11 do not add limitations that contribute to patent eligibility. Thus, we conclude that Petitioner has demonstrated that claims 1–3 and 11 do not recite patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 8,037,158 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Alice · Mayo · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 8,037,158
• Salesforce.Com, Inc. v. Virtualagility, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 16, 2014 · CBM2013-00024 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–21 are unpatentable under §§ 101 and 102 over Ito; the contingent motion to amend with substitute claims 22–30 is denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelOther
  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notTerm construed board ownPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “1. “system being implemented using a processor and a storage device accessible to the processor” The preamble of claim 1 recites a “system being implemented using a processor and a storage device.” Petitioner contends that the recited processor and storage device need not be components of the claimed system because they are not positively recited elements. Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 39). We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s reasoning, because the processor and storage device recited in the preamble of each independent claim of the ’413 patent serve as the antecedent basis for “said processor” and “the storage device” recited in the body of each claim. Dec. to Inst. 18– 19 (citing C.W. Zumbiel Co., Inc., v. Kappos & Graphic Packaging Int’l, 702 F.3d 1371, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (noting that a preamble constitutes a limitation when the elements in the body of a claim depend on it for antecedent basis)). Furthermore, if the plain language of a claim indicates that a system is implemented by certain components, then those components constitute required parts of the system. “Implemented,” in that setting, can mean “constituted” or “formed.” Therefore, we construe the clause as setting forth that the processor and the storage device are both components of the claimed system.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the specification of the ’413 patent teaches that “model entity” is a set of assembled computer data or data item that represents fundamental components of a model. See Ex. 1001, col. 2, ll. 37–42. Patent Owner, however, does not (1) point to any disclosure in the specification that requires a data object to provide the capability for a user to perform specified operations on the model in order for the data object to qualify as a “model entity,” or (2) offer any persuasive evidence regarding the meaning of “model entity.” Therefore, we construe the phrase “model entity” as “a set of assembled computer data or data item that represents fundamental components of a model.”” slip op. at 14

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, such as an abstract idea. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. “[I]t is important at the outset to identify and define whatever fundamental concept appears wrapped up in the claim so that the subsequent analytical steps can proceed on a consistent footing.” CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (plurality opinion). Here, the challenged claims are directed to a representation of a model for use in processing management information of a collaborative activity. Ex. 1001, col. 2, ll. 37–47. To aid in the management of a collaborative activity (e.g., developing customer relationships), a computer database is created that represents a model of the collaborative activity. Ex. 1004, 116. The model includes model entities (e.g., goals and projects) organized into a plurality of hierarchies (e.g., goals to be done and project hierarchy for doing them, or domain hierarchy of functional areas) having a plurality of types. Id.; see also Ex. 1001, Fig. 3 (hierarchy of goals and projects), Fig. 8 (hierarchy of domains). The model may contain data such as the customer segment, products, needs, etc. Ex. 1001, col. 2, l. 60– col. 3, l. 16. A processor provides a graphical user interface (“GUI”) for interaction with a user. Ex. 1004, p. 0116; see Ex. 1001, Fig. 9 (GUI displaying goals belonging to a domain). Therefore, given this disclosure, we find that the challenged claims are directed to an abstract idea, the creation and use of models to aid in processing management information by organizing and making the information readily accessible by the collaborators of the project. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, col. 2, l. 9–col. 5, l. 8. The model, as described by the specification, is a disembodied concept that is not tied to a specific algorithm or specialized computer. Thus, at the first step of the analysis, we determine the claims at issue here are directed to a patent-ineligible concept: an abstract idea.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 8,095,413 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipationcites Alice · Mayo
  Patents in suitUS 8,095,413
• U.S. Bancorp v. Retirement Capital Access Management CompanyAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 22, 2014 · CBM2013-00014 · APJ Trenton A Ward · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 13, 14, 18, 30, and 31 are unpatentable under § 101 because they claim an abstract economic concept without meaningful additional limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Decided for patent owner

    “To construe means-plus-function language in a claim, one “must look to the specification and interpret that language in light of the corresponding structure, material, or acts described therein, and equivalents thereof, to the extent that the specification provides such disclosure.” In re Donaldson Co., Inc., 16 F.3d 1189, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). More particularly, to construe properly the limitations in claims 13 and 30 reciting a “means for causing said future retirement payments . . . to be deposited into said account,” the limitations “shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.3 As noted by Patent Owner (PO Resp. 29), the corresponding structure within the specification supporting the means-plus-function limitation states the following: “[b]enefits source 12 of system 10 disburses retirement payments directly to an individual direct deposit account 14 in a designated depository 16. Preferably, this is accomplished utilizing the well-known technique of electronic funds transfer.” Ex. 1003, col. 5, ll. 18–22. Accordingly, we construe “means for causing . . . to be deposited into said account,” recited in claims 13 and 30, to mean “disbursing directly to said account utilizing an electronic funds transfer.”” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Unlike the means-plus function claims, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that the term “deposited” in method claims 1 and 18 should similarly be interpreted to mean “deposited via direct deposit.” PO Resp. 30–33. Patent Owner fails to point to any support in the specification of the ’582 patent that would require the construction of the term “deposited” to mean a direct deposit or electronic funds transfer. If an inventor acts as his or her own lexicographer, the definition must be set forth in the specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The specification of the ’582 patent does not set forth expressly a definition of “deposited.” In fact, as cited above, the ’582 patent states that deposits are “[p]referably” conducted with the “well-known technique of electronic funds transfer,” but the specification does not limit the term “deposited” to this implementation. Ex. 1003, col. 5, ll. 20–22 (emphasis added). Even in cases where the specification describes only a single embodiment, the claims are not necessarily limited to that embodiment. Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (It is not enough that the only embodiment, or all of the embodiments, contain a particular limitation to limit a claim to that particular limitation.). Here, the specification itself indicates that electronic deposits are preferable, but not required. Therefore, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “deposited” recited in claims 1 and 18 as limited to “deposited via direct deposit.”” slip op. at 8

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “In accordance with the Supreme Court’s “framework for distinguishing patents that claim . . . abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts,” we must first “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Alice Corp., 132 S.Ct. at 2355. In Alice Corp., the Supreme Court determined that the claims at issue were “drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement,” i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk. Id. Furthermore, the Supreme Court determined that “[l]ike the risk hedging in Bilski [v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010)], the concept of intermediated settlement is ‘a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce.’” Alice Corp., 132 S.Ct. at 2356 (citations omitted). With respect to the first step of the “Mayo framework,” the Supreme Court concluded in Alice Corp. that “there is no meaningful distinction between the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and the concept of intermediated settlement” in Alice Corp. and that “[b]oth are squarely within the realm of ‘abstract ideas’ as we have used that term.” Alice Corp., 132 S.Ct. at 2357. Here, Petitioner argues that Patent Owner’s claims are directed to the abstract concept of advancing funds based on future retirement payments. Reply 4. Patent Owner does not disagree. Tr. 40 (Patent Owner’s counsel stated at the oral hearing that Patent Owner is “happy to accept what [Petitioner] claim[s] is the abstract concept.”). Similar to the concept of intermediated settlement in Alice Corp. and the concept of risk hedging in Bilski, we find that the concept of advancing funds based on future retirement payments is an economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce and squarely within the realm of abstract ideas.” slip op. at 12

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable

  Patent outcomesUS 6,625,582 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,625,582
• Interthinx, Inc. v. Corelogic Solutions, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 30, 2014 · CBM2012-00007 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 6, 9, and 10 are unpatentable under § 101 and anticipated by or obvious over Jensen-1; the Board did not reach the remaining prior-art challenges.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel does not applyDecided for petitioner

    “determinations are pure questions of law, not subject to the clear and convincing evidence standard, is not supported by the Federal Circuit. “[T]he analysis under [35 U.S.C.] § 101, while ultimately a legal determination, is rife with underlying factual issues.” Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing, e.g., CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1304–05 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc)) (Chief Judge Rader, and Judges Linn, Moore, and O'Malley, concluding that “any attack on an issued patent based on a challenge to the eligibility of the subject matter must be proven by clear and convincing evidence,” and Judges Lourie, Dyk, Prost, Reyna, and Wallach, concluding that a statutory presumption of validity applies when § 101 is raised as a basis for invalidity in district court proceedings.)). In denying Petitioner’s motion for judgment as a matter of law under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the District Court stated only that Petitioner failed to show that claims 1 and 10 of the ’201 Patent do not cover a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” Ex. 2039, 2. The District Court’s decision applied the clear and convincing evidence standard to the facts underlying its determination of law when denying Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment and motion for judgment as a matter of law that the claims of the ’201 Patent do not recite eligible subject matter. In contrast, the Board reviews the patentability of a claim, rather than its validity, and applies a preponderance of the evidence standard to the underlying factual determinations, e.g., whether the claims contain limitations that narrow or tie them to specific applications of an otherwise abstract concept. 35 U.S.C. § 326(e); Ultramercial, 722 F.3d at 1339. Because the Board applies to the underlying facts an evidentiary standard that is different from the standard applied by the courts, the issue decided by the Board is not identical to the one decided or litigated in the first action and could not have been essential to the final judgment in the first action. See In re Freeman, 30 F.3d, 1459, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Petitioner did not have an opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action. Id. Therefore, we conclude that Petitioner’s challenge under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel.” slip op. at 5

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “abstract idea, the claim instead is drawn to the abstract idea itself. Ultramercial, 722 F.3d at 1343. Inventor, Dr. Jost considers his invention to be the process for predicting the selling price of a home (a point estimate) using statistical analysis to develop the point estimate, and a co-inventor’s error model, which was also developed using statistical analysis. Ex. 1022, 72-73, 81-82. Dr. Jost’s testimony is consistent with claims 1 and 10, which recite appraising real estate by developing and storing a predictive model and generating a signal indicative of the appraised (predicted) value, and developing and storing an error model and generating a signal indicative of the error range for the appraised (predicted) value. Patent Owner’s expert Dr. Lipscomb characterizes the invention as “a way to determine the sales price of a property that may not have a recent sales transaction” and that predictive models “have been around a long time.” Ex. 1024, 42-43. Determining a price has been found to be abstract as a method of calculating. See, SAP America, Inc. v. Versata Dev. Group, Inc., CBM2012- 00001, 2013 WL 3167735, at *16 (PTAB, June 11 2013). Dr. Jost testified that it was common in statistics to provide a confidence interval around estimates. Ex. 1022, 102. The testimony of Dr. Jost and Dr. Lipscomb indicates that determining an error can be accomplished using the same well known techniques as those applied to the predictive model and that bounding a price estimate by an error range is an abstract concept. Therefore, we find the claimed development of a model to predict a value and an error model to assess the error range around the predicted value, as recited in claims 1 and 10, is an abstract concept. Similarly, claims 6 and 9 recite limitations that bound the geographic area from which data is obtained to develop the model. The limitations in claims 6 and 9 recite the abstract and well known concept of examining the geographic area around the subject property so that relevant samples can be obtained to predict the price of the property.” slip op. at 10

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptIneligibleUnpatentable
  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “54-55. Patent Owner’s argument is similar to its underlying theme that CAMA prior art does not apply to the claimed AVM system. As discussed above, we do not find this argument persuasive because the ultimate objective of each system is to determine a value for each individual parcel. The same sentence in Jensen-1 that refers to a model estimating the sales price of all the properties also refers to adjustments necessary to correct the actual sales prices of selected recent comparable sales for the property characteristic differences between the subject property being valued and each comparable sale, in order to ascertain what each comparable property would have sold for had it been identical to the subject property in a physical descriptive sense on the valuation date. Ex. 1014, p. 194. (Emphasis added). Thus, as recited in claims 1, 6, 9 and 10, Jensen-1 obtains individual property data and recognizes a relationship between individual property data and the training data. Jensen-1 also discloses using the training data to predict the individual property value, as recited in claims 1, 6, 9 and 10. Jensen-1 discusses a model in which the value of a property is based on the land value qualified by a set of adjustments. Ex. 1014, p. 198. The adjustments reflect specific property characteristics. For example, up to a point, the value of a property can be expected to increase with increasing frontage. Id. Thus, specific properties with different frontage are valued differently. Jensen-1 discloses other modeling approaches that determine various per unit rates within a market model using regression analysis, Longini and Carbone’s adaptive estimation, and Carlson’s iterative correlative estimation procedure. Id. at 200. Jensen-1’s discussion of interactive correlative estimation specifically states that, within each iteration, “the model estimate and then the residual error (the actual sale price minus the model estimate) are computed on a per parcel basis.” Ex. 1014, p. 220. Thus, Jensen-1 discloses generating an appraised value responsive to the application of individual property data to the predictive error model. Jensen-1 specifically states that “[o]nce meaningful market models have been developed from the available sales, they can be used to estimate the fair market values of all of the parcels in the jurisdiction whether recently sold or not.” Ex. 2014, p. 224. As discussed above, the reference to all parcels in the jurisdiction does not imply that all the parcels are evaluated the same. Jensen discloses that the market models take into account the various characteristics of each parcel and determine a value for each parcel. Jensen-1 notes that the model estimate, i.e., the fair market value of each parcel as determined by the market models, is an abstract number and its reliability as an approximation of true market value depends on the quality of the individual estimates. Ex. 1014, p. 224. Jensen-1 specifically notes that when an actual sale price falls below the value estimate, it may or may not indicate a problem with the appraisal. Id. Thus, Jensen-1 applies to individual appraisals and attempts to assess an error in the appraisal of each parcel.” slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 5,361,201 unpatentable
  § 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Mayo
  Patents in suitUS 5,361,201
• CRS Advanced Technologies, Inc. v. Frontline Technologies, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 21, 2014 · CBM2012-00005 · APJ Jennifer S Bisk · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 3, 6, 7, 16, 24, and 33 are unpatentable under § 101 because they claim abstract substitute fulfillment using generic computing technology without meaningful limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “the act of conveying or supplying for use making information available For each of the claim terms discussed above, we conclude that either definition would result in the same § 101 analysis. In other words, each of the challenged claims is unpatentable under § 101 whether or not we adopt CRS’s proposed claim constructions. Therefore, we conclude that each of the claim terms is given its ordinary and customary meaning and the issue of claim construction will not be addressed further.” slip op. at 8

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “We conclude that claims 3, 16, 24, and 33 are directed to abstract, and, therefore, unpatentable, methods for substitute fulfillment. The claims are directed to concepts for taking the preexisting process of substitute fulfillment and implementing it in a networked computing environment. We do not agree with Frontline’s argument that the computer technology is integral to the claimed subject matter. As we explained in the Decision to Institute, the “one or more computers,” “Internet communication link,” and “website” recited in claim 3 are not analogous to the GPS receiver in SiRF. Decision to Institute 10-11. Frontline has not directed us to anything in the record at trial to cause us to change our position. Frontline asserts that because the claimed limitations “generating and posting by one or more computers a list of one or more positions of one or more absent workers that need to be filed by one or more substitute workers on a website” and “receiving via at least one communication link absentee information” are required for the claimed process to work as intended, they, like the GPS receiver in SiRF, are integral to the claimed subject matter. PO Resp. 25-26. We, however, disagree. We find these additions of generic computer technology to be more akin to the addition of “computer-aided” to the claims of Dealertrack, and the additions of “transaction database” and “transmitting information” to the claims of Accenture. Accenture, 728 F.3d at 1339; Dealertrack, 674 F. 3d at 1333. Like the terms “computer-aided” in Dealertrack, and “transaction database” in Accenture, the terms “one or more computers,” “website,” and “communication link” at issue in this case do not impose meaningful limits on the challenged claims’ scope. This particular technology is employed only for the purposes of creating more efficient communication and data storage—basic functions of those components. Ex. 1001, col. 4, ll. 46-58 (stating that the advantages of the present invention are “to provide a reliable, efficient system . . . . that has low overhead and requires little . . . oversight. . . . includ[ing] an interface to the Internet . . . .[and] a central database”); see also col. 3, ll. 36-64 (describing the prior art automated systems). In other words, the claims here, even with the recitation of computing technology, are not part of a “technological advance” of any sort. See Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1279.” slip op. at 13

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable

    “Like the terms “computer-aided” in Dealertrack, and “transaction database” in Accenture, the terms “one or more computers,” “website,” and “communication link” at issue in this case do not impose meaningful limits on the challenged claims’ scope. This particular technology is employed only for the purposes of creating more efficient communication and data storage—basic functions of those components. Ex. 1001, col. 4, ll. 46-58 (stating that the advantages of the present invention are “to provide a reliable, efficient system . . . . that has low overhead and requires little . . . oversight. . . . includ[ing] an interface to the Internet . . . .[and] a central database”); see also col. 3, ll. 36-64 (describing the prior art automated systems). In other words, the claims here, even with the recitation of computing technology, are not part of a “technological advance” of any sort. See Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1279.” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 6,675,151 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility
  Patents in suitUS 6,675,151

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.