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  • Emerson Electric Co. v. Sipco, LLCAll claims unpatentable
    PTAB · Jan 16, 2018 · CBM2016-00095 · APJ Joni Y Chang · CBM · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 7, 9, 16, and 17 are unpatentable under § 101 and § 103(a) over Tymes; unpatentability under § 112, ¶ 1 was not shown.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “Upon consideration of the parties’ contentions, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments, as they conflate “power” with “transmission range”—the claim term recites “low-power,” not “low-transmission range.” We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s proposed construction would import improperly a limitation into the claims, and we credit Mr. James T. Geier’s testimony (Ex. 1038 ¶¶ 34−39) as it consistent with the other evidence of record before us. We address below each of Patent Owner’s arguments in turn. First, Patent Owner argues that “the claim language itself indicates that the claimed low-power transceiver transmits low-power signals,” citing the language of claim 2, “wherein the low-power signal comprises a logical IP address.” PO Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 1001, 14:60–61). However, “the low-power signal” does not necessarily require a transceiver to transmit signals having a limited transmission range. Patent Owner does not explain meaningfully, or provide persuasive evidence to show, how a “low-power signal” is necessarily related to the transmission range of a transceiver. Consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term, “a low-power transceiver” refers to a transceiver that consumes less power, e.g., by transmitting and receiving low power signals. Ex. 1038 ¶¶ 34−39.” slip op. at 23

    • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

      “However, Patent Owner’s arguments are not commensurate in scope with the claims. The purported problems that arose with the development of networks hosting wireless device—unlawful interruption of that data, interference, and contention—are addressed by using an extremely low-power transmitter. Ex. 1001, 5:65−6:11. As discussed above, the challenged claims recite a generic “low-power transceiver,” not an extremely low-power transmitter. Additionally, the alleged problem of transforming data to a different protocol is addressed by an unclaimed feature, as the ’842 patent itself recognizes that the invention is not necessarily limited to certain protocol or requires a protocol conversion. Id. at 13:55−14:5. Moreover, the challenged claims do not requires a protocol conversion or recite a device for converting data from one protocol to a different protocol. Rather, they recite generically a “network of addressable devices.” Patent Owner’s argument that the claims are “directed to an improvement in communication technology between remote devices that are accessible by wireless communication and a central location via a circuit interface” is unavailing. Significantly, the claims are not directed to a new type of transceiver, interface circuit, or controller to establish a communication link between a remote device and the central location. Instead, the claims are directed to transmitting data between locations using conventional or generic computer components. The challenged claims essentially recite a device for communicating information that comprises: (1) a low-power transceiver for transmitting or receiving data; (2) an interface circuit for communicating with a central 33 location; and (3) a controller for establishing a communication link. The Specification confirms that these features were known in the art. Ex. 1001, 5:23–25, 6:62–64 (“As is well known by those skilled in the art, a variety of transducers can perform this functionality adequately.”), 10:13–15 (“[T]he controller 256 may be a general purpose microprocessor or microcontroller.”), 10:21–23 (“The interface 258 within the transceiver 270 is designed to interface with this typical/standard telephone circuitry 263.”), 10:23–26 (“The specific implementation of the circuitry of [interface] 258 will be appreciated by persons skilled in the art and need not be described in detail herein.”). Indeed, the FCC Bulletin also confirms that low-power wireless transmitters were “used virtually everywhere,” noting that “[c]ordless phones, baby monitors, garage door openers, wireless home security systems, keyless automobile entry systems and hundreds of other types of common electronic equipment rely on such transmitters to function.” Ex. 2001, 1. Moreover, the ’842 patent itself recognizes that the communication link between the remote device and central location can be established by initiating a phone call over a telephone line that is part of the public-switched telephone network. Ex. 1001, 2:34−38. There is no dispute that such a communication link was known in the art. Id. at 10:21−26.” slip op. at 33

    • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable

      “38 For the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently that claims 1, 7, 9, 16, and 17 of the ’842 patent are directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea. Whether the challenged claims lack a patent-eligible inventive concept Turning to the second step in the analysis, we look for additional elements that can “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible application of an abstract idea. That is, we determine whether the claims include an “inventive concept,” i.e., an element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent on the abstract idea itself. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357. The additional elements must be more than “well-understood, routine, conventional activity.” Mayo, 768 S. Ct. at 1297−98. Here, Petitioner argues that claims 1, 7, 9, 16, and 17 are unpatentable because they are “directed only to an abstract idea with nothing more added than generic computing components and ‘well-understood, routine, conventional activity’ previously performed in the field (both individually and as an ordered combination in the claims).” Pet. 23–24 (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294). According to Petitioner, the challenged claims “recite the concept of establishing a communication route between two points ‘as performed by a generic computer,’ without disclosing any ‘novel or unusual’ improvement to ‘the functioning of the computer itself’ or any ‘advance in computer technology that makes the performance of [routine] functions more effective.” Id. at 24 (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358–60). 39” slip op. at 38

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “As Petitioner notes (Pet. 66−68; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 353−366), Tymes discloses “an improved, low-cost, low-power, data communication network in which a number of remote terminal units are able to send packets of data to a central station, and . . . to receive acknowledge signals and data from the central station.” Ex. 1005, 2:36−56 (emphasis added). Tymes describes that the central station includes a number of base stations connected to a central computer. Id. at 3:21−25. As shown in Figure 1, the network includes base stations 12−14, each of which “is coupled by an RF link to a number of remote units.” Id. at 4:61−5:44. The RF link is used for sending “data packets from the remote terminals to the base stations and return.” Id. at 3:48−51 (emphasis added), 6:66–7:2. In fact, Tymes teaches that the “advantage of this type of RF data link is that a band may be used which does not require site licensing by the F.C.C.” Id. at 3:55−59. Contrary to Patent Owner’s assertion that “low-power” refers to only the remote terminals, Tymes describes a low-power network that includes base stations. As Petitioner also notes (Pet. 66–67, n.38), Tymes teaches an “indoor” limited range network and an RF data link “usable without site licensing under F.C.C. regulations, so that the expense and delays incident to such licensing are eliminated or minimized.” Ex. 1005, 2:36–56. Significantly, Tymes discloses that the optimum frequency is in the 902−928 MHz range 54 for the RF transceivers in the base stations. Id. at 6:66–7:2, 13:58–61, 18:1−3. The FCC limits the power for unlicensed transmitters, and the power limit under the FCC regulations is less than or equal to one watt for the disclosed 902–928 MHz range. Ex. 1010, 217; Ex. 1017, 7:9–11, 31–34. Mr. Geier testifies that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have understood that an indoor communications network as taught by Tymes requires only a limited range (e.g., 1 mile or less (the length of a storage facility)), so that high-powered transceivers would be unnecessary and disfavored,” and that such an artisan “would have considered a transmission of 1 Watt to be a ‘low-power’ transmission, with a limited range of approximately 1 mile.” Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 358−359. Mr. Geier also testifies that such an artisan would have had a reason to use low-power transceivers in the base stations so that they are usable indoors without licensing under the FCC regulations. Id. We credit Mr. Geier’s testimony as it is consistent with Tymes’ teachings and other evidence. Ex. 1005, 2:36–56, 6:66–7:2, 13:58−61, 18:1−3, Figs. 1, 3, 10; Ex. 1010, 21; Ex. 1017, 7:9−11, 29−34 (explaining that “unlicensed systems using conventional modulation techniques attain ranges on the order of 500−1000 feet” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 54

    Patent outcomesUS 8,908,842 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Enfish · Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,908,842
  • PTAB · Apr 19, 2016 · CBM2015-00002 · APJ Kevin F Turner · CBM · Rehearing

    The Board denied both rehearing requests, leaving the institution of § 101 review of claims 1, 5, 8, 19, 20, and 27–31 and denial of prior art grounds unchanged.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “D. Conclusion We are not persuaded of an abuse of discretion either by Patent Owner or Petitioner. III. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that each Request for Rehearing is denied.” slip op. at 18

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “The Board instituted covered business method patent review of the ’201 Patent based upon the following ground, combined from both proceedings: Ground Prior Art Challenged Claims § 101 n/a 1, 5, 8, 19, 20, and 27–31 Papers 17 and 13 (’02 Decision and ’30 Decision, respectively). The Board did not institute covered business method patent review upon any prior art grounds. See ’02 Decision 6 and ’30 Decision 4–5 (listing grounds proffered by Petitioner).” slip op. at 2

    • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionDecided for petitioner

      “Response, Patent Owner argues that the claims are directed toward protection of data in a database on a more granular level, namely at the data element level. Prelim. Resp. 27 (“the ’201 Patent is not directed to some abstract idea, but rather a specific improvement in computing technologies to protect data in a database at the date element level”). However, the abstract idea we identified is that of “determining whether access to a given data element value in a database should be granted based on whether one or more rules are satisfied.” ’02 Decision 20. See also Pet. 20. As such, the abstract idea goes directly to the concept of protecting data at the data element level.” slip op. at 13

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “Although Atalla discloses authorization to a file based on information about the file, Ex. 1007, 3:27–58, Petitioner has not shown that the information about the file is individual data element types. Overall, Atalla addresses accessing files, in part, based on whether the files were previously accessed, but a file in not the same as an individual data element value. The section of Atalla cited in Petitioner’s Rehearing Request discloses the need for a correct key code, but that key code is for the entire file and not specific to the data element type. Pet. Req. 6 (citing Ex. 1007, 3:27–58). Although “information about the file” could include information about individual data element types, Petitioner has not demonstrated any such teaching or suggestion in Atalla. As stated in the ’02 Decision, Atalla “does not describe that access authorization file 15 comprises ‘a data element protection catalogue (DPC), which contains each individual data element type (DT) and one or more protection attributes stating processing rules for data element values’ as requires by claim 1.” ’02 Decision 28. Thus, we are not persuaded by Petitioner that we abused our discretion in denying institution of covered business method patent review of claims 1, 5, 19, 20, and 27–31 over the anticipation ground of Atalla provided in the Petition.” slip op. at 16

    § 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 6,321,201
  • PTAB · Oct 15, 2015 · CBM2014-00116 · APJ Kevin F Turner · CBM · Final written decision

    Claims 39–44 are unpatentable under § 101 because they claim the abstract idea of relaying mailing address data without significantly more; anticipation by 1997 ACS was not shown.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “II. ANALYSIS A. Claim Construction We construe all terms, whether or not expressly discussed here, using the broadest reasonable construction in light of the ’548 Patent specification. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b); see also In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 93 F.3d 1268, 1278–80 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Congress implicitly approved the broadest reasonable interpretation standard in enacting the AIA,” and “the standard was properly adopted by PTO regulation.”). During the pre-trial stage of this proceeding, the parties submitted their constructions for specific claim terms and we adopted constructions consistent with the constructions adopted by the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (Ex. 1011). Dec. 8–10. Return Mail does not dispute the constructions adopted. PO Resp. 16–27. Upon review of the parties’ explanations and supporting evidence before us, we discern no reason to modify our claim constructions set forth in the Decision on Institution with respect to these claim terms. Dec. 8–10. For convenience, our claim constructions are reproduced in the table below:” slip op. at 6

    • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionIneligibleUnpatentable

      “USPS has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 39, as a whole, is directed to the processing of returned mail items, involving decoding information, obtaining an updated address, and electronically transmitting that updated address to a transferee. USPS has shown that the steps are directed to the abstract idea of relaying mailing address data, with the inclusion of an electrical transmission step. Regarding whether claim 39 includes limitations that amount to significantly more than the abstract idea of relaying mailing address data, per our claim construction, USPS has shown that the “decoding” step is “deciphering information into useable form,” but that does not necessarily bring it out of the realm of processes performed in the past by human beings. In fact, all of the claimed steps could be performed in the human mind, with the exception of the transmitting step. Additionally, USPS has shown that what the data might be deemed to represent to the human mind — e.g., “information indicating whether the sender wants a corrected address to be provided for the intended recipient” — does not substantially affect the underlying structure or function of the claim or any machine on which it is carried out. Consistent with USPS’s position, the ’548 Patent disclosure does not describe any particular hardware to perform the steps recited in claim 39, but refers merely in broad terms to generic computer hardware and software.” slip op. at 14

    • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptIneligibleUnpatentable

      “significantly more than the abstract idea of relaying mailing address data, per our claim construction, USPS has shown that the “decoding” step is “deciphering information into useable form,” but that does not necessarily bring it out of the realm of processes performed in the past by human beings. In fact, all of the claimed steps could be performed in the human mind, with the exception of the transmitting step. Additionally, USPS has shown that what the data might be deemed to represent to the human mind — e.g., “information indicating whether the sender wants a corrected address to be provided for the intended recipient” — does not substantially affect the underlying structure or function of the claim or any machine on which it is carried out. Consistent with USPS’s position, the ’548 Patent disclosure does not describe any particular hardware to perform the steps recited in claim 39, but refers merely in broad terms to generic computer hardware and software.” slip op. at 14

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “deciding between the proffered constructions of “[d]ecipher information into useable form” and “[c]onvert information into useable form,” the court concluded that “using the terms ‘decipher’ and ‘deciphered’ more closely follow the customary meaning of the terms and reflects the claim language. This is because decoding must operate on encoded data,” which is recognized in the term “decipher” but not in “convert.” Ex. 1011, 22–23. USPS contends that “the carrier converts into intelligible form the participant code and endorsement thereby performing the claimed ‘decoding.’” Pet. 45. However, we find no support within 1997 ACS that the carrier decodes or deciphers the participant code or endorsement because the carrier (a person) is merely reading those indicators. The indicator “ADRESS SERVICE REQUESTED” is merely read and there is no disclosure that the carrier decodes the participant code or the keyline. We disagree with Dr. Lubenow that the plain-English endorsements “meet the plain and ordinary meaning of the term ‘code.’” Ex. 1028 ¶ 18. As such, we are not persuaded that the carrier in 1997 ACS acts to decode encoded data on the returned mail items.” slip op. at 24

    Patent outcomesUS 6,826,548 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipationcites Alice · Mayo
    Patents in suitUS 6,826,548

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.