• Square, Inc. v. Electronic Receipts Delivery Systems, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 29, 2021 · CBM2020-00015 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable under § 101 and the asserted Moran-based anticipation and obviousness grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “been “charged with infringement,” Pet. 10, but that statement does not foreclose reading that allegation as a charge of infringement against Petitioner. Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a), “[c]harged with infringement means a real and substantial controversy regarding infringement of a covered business method patent exists such that the petitioner would have standing to bring a declaratory judgment action in Federal court.” “[W]here a patent holder accuses customers of direct infringement based on the sale or use of a supplier’s equipment, the supplier has standing to commence a declaratory judgment action if,” for instance, “there is a controversy between the patentee and the supplier as to the supplier’s liability for induced or contributory infringement based on acts of direct infringement by its customers.” Arris Group, Inc. v. British Telecomm. PLC, 639 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also ABB Inc. v. Cooper Indus., LLC, 635 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding federal court had subject matter jurisdiction over claim for declaratory judgment of noninfringement where the plaintiff “had an interest in determining whether it would be liable for indemnification, which turned on whether [its contractor] would be liable for infringement”). Further, an allegation of direct infringement of a U.S. patent against the manufacturer’s customers may amount to an implicit allegation of indirect infringement against the manufacturer. Arris Group, 638 F.3d at 1375–76. Petitioner has shown persuasively that it sought to intervene in the district court litigation against its customers to “seek a declaratory judgement that [the] Square Register and Square’s other products and services do not infringe any valid claim of the ’551 [p]atent.” Ex. 1034, 3; Reply 1011. Patent Owner, the plaintiff in that suit, consented to the motion. Ex. 1034, 7; Reply 11. The district court granted Petitioner’s motion to intervene and Petitioner filed its Complaint in Intervention in district court, deeming Petitioner the “true defendant” in the dispute. See Reply 6; Ex. 1018. There is no question that the underlying district court litigation in which Petitioner seeks to assert non-infringement of the ’551 patent stems from Patent Owner’s allegations that Petitioner’s products directly or indirectly infringe the ’551 patent. These facts prove that Petitioner’s involvement in the district court litigation as an intervenor, together with Patent Owner’s accusation of infringement in its Answer and Affirmative Defenses, show a real and substantial controversy between Patent Owner and Petitioner. And the record shows that a federal court indeed has exercised jurisdiction over Patent Owner’s claim of infringement against Petitioner as intervenor, with Petitioner actually defending such a claim. This is sufficient to conclude that at the time of the filing of the Petition, Petitioner had been charged with infringement, and, therefore, had standing to file the Petition in this proceeding.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The parties do not identify claim constructions necessary for the Board to resolve the issues in this proceeding. Pet. 12; see generally Prelim. Resp.; PO Resp. We determine that it is unnecessary to expressly construe any claim term. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only terms in controversy must be construed and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelOther

    “Petitioner proffers that [a] person of ordinary skill in the art . . . would have a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, Data Science or Electrical Engineering or any undergraduate degree plus three to five years of professional experience in software development, computer programming, or network engineering or equivalent additional formal education such as graduate studies, or work experience to replace formal education. Pet. 13 (citing Hochman Decl. ¶¶ 16–22). There is no dispute as to whether Petitioner’s proffered level of ordinary skill in the art is appropriate in this case. We do not find it necessary to define the level of skill with specificity save to note that the level of ordinary skill is evidenced by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that the absence of specific findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown).” slip op. at 23

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “components “implemented in a generic computer environment” for performing that abstract idea. Pet. 68. Petitioner further annotates claim 1 to provide identifiers for each limitation. Id. For this part of the analysis, we address specifically limitation [vi], which recites “automatically transmitting a digital receipt for the transaction to the destination associated with the first customer without input from the first customer.” Limitation [vi] recites transmission of a credit card receipt according to instructions previously provided by the credit card user, which constitutes a fundamental economic practice, one of the certain methods of organizing human activity identified in the Guidance as a judicial exception. See Pet. 74 (arguing that issuing receipts for a purchase transaction is “nothing more than the organization of a fundamental and economic activity”). The claim’s recitation of an “automatic[]” transmission does not alter the fundamental business transaction recited in the claim: providing a customer a receipt for a credit card charge. The limitation provides no technological detail of how to automate the transmission of such a receipt or how to effectuate the delivery to a “destination.” See OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“At best, the claims describe the automation of the fundamental economic concept of offer-based price optimization through the use of generic-computer functions.”). The recitation of a “digital” receipt does not alter our analysis either. The modifier adds only that the receipt is in electronic form. The claim language, however, is silent as to how such a receipt is generated or otherwise prepared for transmission to the credit card user. There is no technological detail that would place the “digital” receipt outside of an abstract idea of a fundamental economic practice of providing a credit card receipt to a customer. The other recited limitations also support our determination that the claims are directed to an abstract idea of a fundamental economic practice. For instance, in its simplest form the claimed process includes three basic steps: registering a customer e-mail address for receiving credit card digital receipts (steps [i]—[ii]), initiating a credit card transaction for a sales transaction of the customer (steps [iii]—[v]), and transmitting the digital receipt in accordance with the information received and stored in steps [i] and [ii]. Thus, the claim explains the basic concept of providing a credit card receipt to a customer. These recited steps place no meaningful limit on the claim scope, as the claim lacks specificity as to how any computer or database is specially programmed to perform the claimed steps. See Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Simply adding a ‘computer aided’ limitation to a claim covering an abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to render the claim patent eligible.”). Each of claims 11 and 16 also recites the automatic transmission of a digital receipt for a credit card transaction to a user. Petitioner provides an explanation accounting for those claims, see id. at 93–94, and our analysis of claim 1 concerning the determination of an abstract idea equally applies to those claims. We determine that Petitioner has shown that claims 1, 11, and 16 recite a fundamental economic practice, which is one of certain methods of organizing human activity identified in the Guidance as a judicially excepted abstract idea.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 8,534,551 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,534,551
• Nautilus Hyosung Inc. v. Diebold Nixdorf, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 14, 2017 · CBM2016-00034 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–24 are unpatentable under § 101; claims 1–3 and 5 are also anticipated by Riach, and specified claims are obvious over combinations of Riach, Graf, Gustin, and Anderson.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “For these reasons, we determine that claim 20—its focus and its” slip op. at 37

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable

    “For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that claim 20 is directed to an” slip op. at 52

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “encompasses Riach’s process that copies a portion (but not all) of the original check image data to produce the required modified check image data. Accordingly, we agree that the portion of Riach on which Petitioner relies discloses step (b) of claim 1 that requires, among other limitations, the modified check image data not include at least some visual feature data included in the check image data. Pet. 30 (relying on Ex. 1008, 5:16–30, Figs. 4, 7).” slip op. at 73

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Rather, “it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does.” Apple, 839 F.3d at 1058 (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 418–19); see also KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (“[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).” slip op. at 89

  Patent outcomesUS 7,314,163 unpatentable
  § 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Enfish · Electric Power · Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,314,163
• Ultratec, Inc. v. Captioncall, L.L.C.Institution denied
  PTAB · Feb 22, 2017 · PGR2016-00037 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because the petition did not show that any claim was more likely than not unpatentable under § 101 or § 103.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review of claims 1–23 of U.S. Patent No. 9,197,745 B1 (Ex. 1001, “the ’745 patent” or “the challenged patent”). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). Patent Owner, CaptionCall, L.L.C., filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 9 (“Prelim. Resp.”). We have authority to determine whether to institute a post-grant review. 35 U.S.C. § 324; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting a post-grant review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), which provides that a post-grant review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). After considering the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine that the information presented in the Petition does not demonstrate it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we do not institute a post-grant review.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “interpreted according to their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b); see Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016) (upholding the use of broadest reasonable construction standard in inter partes review9). Consistent with the broadest reasonable construction standard, claim terms are presumed to have their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire patent disclosure at the time of the invention. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Petitioner proposes constructions for “message” recited in claims 2, 4–8, and 12 and for “module” recited in claims 2–6 and 8. Pet. 9–11. Patent Owner challenges Petitioner’s proposed claim constructions as overly narrow. Prelim. Resp. 8–9. We determine, however, that no claim terms need express construction for this decision.” slip op. at 9

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 not directed to exceptionNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 12) that claim 1, as a whole, is directed to an apparatus that facilitates voice communication and captioned text communication using a relay for hearing-impaired users over one or more communications networks and, under specified circumstances— when captioning has been enabled by the hearing-impaired user and the system determines that an attempted connection has failed—automatically reconnects to a captioning communication service. In other words, the claim is directed to a communication device that automatically reconnects to a captioning communication service following an unwanted interruption to the 12 captioning communication service in certain circumstances. See Ex. 1001, 1:13–16 (describing the field of the disclosure as relating to a communication device that automatically reconnects to the captioning communication service “following an unwanted interruption to the captioning communication session”). We determine that claim 1 as a whole is not directed to redialing a telephone as “callers have performed for as long as there have been telephones.” See Pet. 20. Moreover, the claim is directed to an apparatus having communication elements and a processor, and requires two connections and captioning, which, taken as a whole, distinguish claim 1 from a conventional telephone and further supports our determination that the claim merely involves, but is not directed to, the concept of reconnection or redialing. Moreover, looking at the elements individually, claim 1 requires communication elements coupled with a processor configured to able to connect a communication device and connect with a captioning session over two connections. Claim 1 recites a function—“automatically connect with the captioning communication service through a second connection to establish a captioning communication session during the voice communication session responsive to a determination that an attempted connection to the captioning communication service failed during a time in which a caption select option has been enabled by the hearing-impaired user, wherein the attempted automatic connection through the second connection is not made during a time in which the caption select option has been 13 disabled by the hearing-impaired user”—which requires more than “redialing” a telephone. See Prelim. Resp. 11–12. Specifically, the claimed apparatus only performs the “automatically connect” function if three conditions are met: (i) responsive to a determination that an attempted connection to the captioning communication service failed (ii) during a time in which a caption select option has been enabled by the hearing-impaired user, and (iii) “the attempted automatic connection through the second connection is not made during a time in which the caption select option has been disabled by the hearing-impaired user.”” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “excerpts from Parker as purportedly describing aspects of the automatically reconnect limitation. Id. at 40–42. Petitioner does not assert that either the Ultratec User Guide or Parker alone would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill in the art the automatically connect function with the three conditional limitations (id.), nor is such an assertion required under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Petitioner is required under 35 U.S.C. § 103, however, to explain how the combination of the references would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill 25 in the art the recited automatically connect function with its three conditional limitations. Petitioner has not provided such an explanation, much less adequate analysis by Mr. Zatkovich or factual support as to how one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the separate disclosures of the references to teach the automatically connect limitations. Specifically absent from the Petition is any discussion as to how Petitioner’s combination of references would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill in the art the limitations of automatically connecting under the required conditions—the failed attempt limitation, the when-enabled limitation, and the when-not-disabled limitation. Petitioner’s combination relies on Parker’s reconnection function to establish a lost persistent connection, but Parker’s reconnection function does not do so conditionally, much less under the specific conditions required by claim 1. Petitioner does not explain how the combination of Parker’s unconditional reconnection function would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to retry conditionally based on whether the Ultratec User Guide’s caption button was enabling captioning and had not been disabled by the caption telephone user. Furthermore, Petitioner contends that “adding an auto-retry and/or auto-reconnect feature as in Parker to a captioned telephone device as disclosed in [the Ultratec User Guide and Engelke] would amount to simply adding a known technique to a known system, wherein the technique operates in the same way as it was already known to operate and dos not have any unpredictable result.” Pet. 34. As such, Petitioner’s combination 26 expressly relies on Parker’s auto-retry and/or auto-reconnect feature “as in Parker,” which is an unconditional retry in the event of a lost connection. In sum, neither reference by itself describes the automatically reconnect limitation and Petitioner fails to articulate how one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the claimed automatic reconnect in view of the cited disparate disclosures from the references. “[A] patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Petitioner asserts in a conclusory manner that the combination of a teaching of a button to enable or disable captioning with a teaching of automatic reconnection unrelated to whether captioning is enabled or disabled would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill in the art the automatic reconnection limitation. Petitioner fails to provide adequate explanation or factual support. This flaw of the Petition is particularly problematic when the threshold for institution is “more likely than not,” as here, rather than the threshold of “a reasonable likelihood” required to institute an inter partes review. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), with 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 25

  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Enfish · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 9,197,745
• Washington Inventory Services D/B/A Wis International v. Rgis, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 30, 2015 · CBM2014-00158 · APJ James T Moore · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 are unpatentable under § 101 as directed to abstract inventory verification implemented with conventional technology, and under § 103 over Whitehouse and ordinary skill in the art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We must not import unrecited elements into the claim from the specification. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319–20 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The specification observes its own exemplary nature—“[i]t should be understood that the description and specific examples are intended for purposes of illustration only and are not intended to limit the scope of the present disclosure.” Ex. 1001, 2:16–19.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “During prosecution, in a responsive amendment, Patent Owner proffered that “mode” implied a device: Amended claim 1 recites “selecting a verification mode, which includes a set of rules that define a methodology for verifying the inventory dataset, from a plurality of verification modes” and “acquiring verification data in the completed area with the remote verification device based on the selected verification mode.” The McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms, 6th Edition, defines the word “mode” as “one of several alternative conditions or methods of operation of a device.” The portion regarding the “set of rules that define a methodology for verifying the inventory dataset” further clarifies what is meant by verification mode. Ex. 1002, 180–81. Claim 1, however, broadly interpreted, can reasonably refer to either “mode”—the verification mode, or the device mode. Moreover, the specification itself, in describing manual processing of prior art printed inventory sheets, also refers to that method of inventory verification as a “mode.” Ex. 1001, 1:31–38 (see in particular line 35). We, therefore, decline to limit the term “mode” to only “on a device” when inventory checking alone can have different “modes” of being” slip op. at 17

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Mr. Melucci opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’658 patent “would have at least two years [of] experience related to collecting and verifying inventory data.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 27. Dr. Jagannathan testifies that “a person of ordinary skill in the art of the [’]658 Patent would have had: (1) a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or related field; (2) one year of related professional experience; and (3) a basic understanding of inventory processes and the use of UPCs and other product identifiers. The professional experience may include, for example, work related to use of bar codes, stock keeping units, and the like. It is further my opinion that relevant professional or practical experience with computer systems and software may substitute for academic credentials.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 40. Based on our review of the ’658 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’658 patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of the parties’ Declarants, we conclude that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention would have had at least two years of experience in computerized inventory management. We further note that the applied prior art reflects the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 18

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “imports limitations into the claims from the specification. See, e.g., PO Resp. 35 (discussing the claims jointly). For example, Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner “ignores the actual claim language that requires the verification mode selection to be made on and with the device.” PO Resp. 37. The defect in this argument is that the language of “selecting a particular verification mode on the verification device” is absent from claim 1. See Ex. 1001, 6:2–14. Furthermore, the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term “mode” does not limit the step to a device. Claim 1 positively recites the device in the downloading, deploying, acquiring, computing, and displaying steps, but the term “device” is specifically omitted from the selecting step. Accordingly, we do not interpret claim 1 as requiring the step of selecting a verification mode on the device. Contrary to Patent Owner’s position, we are persuaded by Petitioner that each of challenged claims 1–14, and 18, as a whole, is directed to the fundamental concept of providing inventory verification. Pet. 23. In the Abstract, the ’658 patent states: “[a] system and method of verifying the completeness and accuracy of inventory records is disclosed.” Ex. 1001, Abst. Additionally, in the Background section, the ’658 patent states: Prior methods of verification require that the inventory records be printed out in a predetermined format which is then taken to a specific area in the facility for comparison to the inventory physically located there. These methods are inflexible, tedious and time consuming because the mode of verification is strictly depend[e]nt on the predetermined format of the printed reports and requires a repeated reference to the report and comparison with the actual inventory. Ex. 1001, 1:31–38. The only technological features recited in claims 1–14 and 18 are a computer performing conventional computer functions. Ex. 1001, 6:2–22. Specifically, those include downloading data from a computer to a device, deploying the device, acquiring data with the device, computing, and displaying.” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 8,606,658 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,606,658
• The United States Postal Service (Usps) / The United States Of America, As Represented By The Postmaster General v. Return Mail, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 15, 2015 · CBM2014-00116 · APJ Kevin F Turner · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 39–44 are unpatentable under § 101 because they claim the abstract idea of relaying mailing address data without significantly more; anticipation by 1997 ACS was not shown.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “II. ANALYSIS A. Claim Construction We construe all terms, whether or not expressly discussed here, using the broadest reasonable construction in light of the ’548 Patent specification. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b); see also In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 93 F.3d 1268, 1278–80 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Congress implicitly approved the broadest reasonable interpretation standard in enacting the AIA,” and “the standard was properly adopted by PTO regulation.”). During the pre-trial stage of this proceeding, the parties submitted their constructions for specific claim terms and we adopted constructions consistent with the constructions adopted by the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (Ex. 1011). Dec. 8–10. Return Mail does not dispute the constructions adopted. PO Resp. 16–27. Upon review of the parties’ explanations and supporting evidence before us, we discern no reason to modify our claim constructions set forth in the Decision on Institution with respect to these claim terms. Dec. 8–10. For convenience, our claim constructions are reproduced in the table below:” slip op. at 6

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionIneligibleUnpatentable

    “USPS has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 39, as a whole, is directed to the processing of returned mail items, involving decoding information, obtaining an updated address, and electronically transmitting that updated address to a transferee. USPS has shown that the steps are directed to the abstract idea of relaying mailing address data, with the inclusion of an electrical transmission step. Regarding whether claim 39 includes limitations that amount to significantly more than the abstract idea of relaying mailing address data, per our claim construction, USPS has shown that the “decoding” step is “deciphering information into useable form,” but that does not necessarily bring it out of the realm of processes performed in the past by human beings. In fact, all of the claimed steps could be performed in the human mind, with the exception of the transmitting step. Additionally, USPS has shown that what the data might be deemed to represent to the human mind — e.g., “information indicating whether the sender wants a corrected address to be provided for the intended recipient” — does not substantially affect the underlying structure or function of the claim or any machine on which it is carried out. Consistent with USPS’s position, the ’548 Patent disclosure does not describe any particular hardware to perform the steps recited in claim 39, but refers merely in broad terms to generic computer hardware and software.” slip op. at 14

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptIneligibleUnpatentable

    “significantly more than the abstract idea of relaying mailing address data, per our claim construction, USPS has shown that the “decoding” step is “deciphering information into useable form,” but that does not necessarily bring it out of the realm of processes performed in the past by human beings. In fact, all of the claimed steps could be performed in the human mind, with the exception of the transmitting step. Additionally, USPS has shown that what the data might be deemed to represent to the human mind — e.g., “information indicating whether the sender wants a corrected address to be provided for the intended recipient” — does not substantially affect the underlying structure or function of the claim or any machine on which it is carried out. Consistent with USPS’s position, the ’548 Patent disclosure does not describe any particular hardware to perform the steps recited in claim 39, but refers merely in broad terms to generic computer hardware and software.” slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “deciding between the proffered constructions of “[d]ecipher information into useable form” and “[c]onvert information into useable form,” the court concluded that “using the terms ‘decipher’ and ‘deciphered’ more closely follow the customary meaning of the terms and reflects the claim language. This is because decoding must operate on encoded data,” which is recognized in the term “decipher” but not in “convert.” Ex. 1011, 22–23. USPS contends that “the carrier converts into intelligible form the participant code and endorsement thereby performing the claimed ‘decoding.’” Pet. 45. However, we find no support within 1997 ACS that the carrier decodes or deciphers the participant code or endorsement because the carrier (a person) is merely reading those indicators. The indicator “ADRESS SERVICE REQUESTED” is merely read and there is no disclosure that the carrier decodes the participant code or the keyline. We disagree with Dr. Lubenow that the plain-English endorsements “meet the plain and ordinary meaning of the term ‘code.’” Ex. 1028 ¶ 18. As such, we are not persuaded that the carrier in 1997 ACS acts to decode encoded data on the returned mail items.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 6,826,548 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipationcites Alice · Mayo
  Patents in suitUS 6,826,548
• American Express Company / American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. et al. v. Metasearch Systems, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 13, 2015 · CBM2014-00001 · APJ Howard B Blankenship · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 2, 6, and 8 are unpatentable under §§ 101 and 103(a); Patent Owner’s motion to amend is denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “In this case, representative claim 2 recites eight steps for a search that is “associated with at least one travel related item,” and which include receiving the search results, communicating the results along with an advertisement, receiving an order for the item, and processing the order. See Ex. 1001, col. 145, ll. 33–61. Although the claimed process requires computer hardware and software (e.g., step (a) of claim 2, “receiving a Hypertext Transfer Protocol request from a client device”), we agree with Petitioner that the claim embraces 5 The Court’s decision is sometimes referenced as Ultramercial III. The Federal Circuit heard the second appeal from the U.S. District Court after the Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s first decision. 772 F.3d at 711–12. the abstract idea of marketing an item on a metasearch Web site with keyword ads and providing a way to order the item.” slip op. at 13

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptIneligibleUnpatentable

    “Next, or in step two of the analysis, we search for an “inventive concept”— i.e., an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. In this case, the claims recite, for the most part, an ordered combination of steps that contain Internet operations that were conventional at the time of invention. For example, the claims recite communicating with a client device using a Hypertext Transfer Protocol [HTTP]. Momma.com demonstrates that browsers on Internet client devices used such a protocol at the time of invention. See Ex. 1005, 10 (for “Microsoft Internet Explorer,” go to the address “http://www.mamma.com”). The claims further recite a “metasearch engine,” which also was conventional at the time of invention. See id. at 5 (“Mamma is a meta search engine”); see also Prelim. Resp. 3 (Patent Owner did not claim that “metasearching” was novel at the time of invention). Patent Owner argues that designing more than a “rudimentary” metasearch engine in the late 1990’s was not a trivial task. PO Resp. 44. The argument is premised on the assumption that the claims require more than “rudimentary” metasearching. The claims recite, however, as in claim 2, a “metasearch engine to send at least one search query to a plurality of unique hosts”—e.g., a metasearch engine capable of sending a single search query to a plurality (e.g., two) different hosts. The claims are drawn to implementing the abstract idea of marketing an item on a metasearch Web site with keyword ads and some way to order the item with routine, conventional activity. Such an implementation does not transform the abstract idea into patent eligible subject matter.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “5. Combining Knowledge Broker and Mamma.com Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to combine the “disparate technologies” of Mamma.com and Knowledge Broker and would not have known how to do so “without complex, lengthy, and uncertain experimentation.” PO Resp. 62. According to Patent Owner, the “two technologies” of “metasearch engines and structured e-commerce comparison shopping services providing product purchase functionality and associated advertisements—were vastly different technologies during the late 1990s and in particular in 1999-2000.” Id. at 59. A person of ordinary skill in the art would “not have been motivated to combine metasearch engines with structured e-commerce comparison shopping sites due to numerous other technical challenges present at the time.” Id. at 63. We agree with Petitioner, however, that the claims do not require addressing the “technical challenges” submitted by Patent Owner. Pet. Reply 11–12. Adding advertisements to Knowledge Broker would not require combining a metasearch engine with other “technologies” such as “structured ecommerce comparison shopping sites.” For example, the advertisements could be supplied from the hosts. Patent Owner acknowledges there is no limitation as to where the advertisement comes from. Tr. 61:20–25.” slip op. at 26

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Long-felt need / failure of othersNot shown unpatentableDecided for petitioner

    “The Declaration does not point to any evidence in the record in support of the allegations. Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Moreover, Dr. Carbonell does not allege, let alone show, that others tried and failed to solve the problem allegedly solved by the ’924 patent. See Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[L]ong-felt need is analyzed as of the date of an articulated identified problem and evidence of efforts to solve that problem.”); In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (declarations that failed to show a long-felt need and failure of others to meet that need, and which offered only opinion evidence that has little value without sufficient support, were insufficient to establish nonobviousness). Further, on this record, the “desirability of combined search and shopping functionality” (Ex. 2006 ¶ 40) was not unmet at the time of invention. Patent Owner acknowledges that e-commerce services that allowed a user to query structured databases predated the invention. E.g., PO Reply 8–9, 12, 62 (discussing “SoftBot” and “ShopBot” e-commerce services). For the foregoing reasons, we find that Patent Owner’s evidence in support of a long-felt but unmet need is entitled to little weight in support of nonobviousness.” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 8,326,924 unpatentable
  § 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Mayo · Bilski · Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,326,924
• Fidelity National Information Services, Inc. v. Checkfree CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 22, 2014 · CBM2013-00030 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–21 are unpatentable under § 101 because they claim an abstract payment-intermediation concept implemented with generic computer functions.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “BACKGROUND On December 23, 2013, we entered a Decision to Institute a covered business method patent review, Paper 16 (“Dec. to Inst.”), of U.S. Patent No. 7,853,524 B2 (“the ’524 Patent”) on the grounds that claims 1–21 do not recite patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “terms “electronic bill” and “EBP” do not even appear in the specification, Petitioner argues that Patent Owner is attempting to recast abstract ideas recited in the ’524 Patent claims in a manner that requires machines or transformations. Pet. Reply 2, 6. We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s construction arguments attempt to read into the claims features that are not recited in them. For example, although there is no EBP system mentioned in the claims, citing the testimony of its expert, Dr. John Kelly, Patent Owner argues that a payment request is captured through an automated interaction with a user over a telephone or is conveyed by transferring data to the EBP system over a data network from a computer. PO Resp. 21–22. As discussed below, we decline to alter any of the constructions we applied in our Decision to Institute.” slip op. at 4

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Merchant credit limit associated with a payee Patent Owner contends that our construction of the “merchant credit limit associated with a payee” as the maximum amount of credit a merchant extends to a payer is contrary to the plain language of the claims because the limit is associated with the payee. PO Resp. 51. Our construction is consistent with the limit being associated with the payee, i.e., the party to whom the payment is made. Patent Owner’s proposed construction, “a value reflecting the credit limit used by the EBP system which is associated with a particular payee,” PO Resp. 52, reads into the claim an extrinsic EBP system not discussed in the specification. In addition, the value reflecting the credit limit is the amount of credit a payee, i.e., a merchant, extends to a payer. Claims 1, 11, and 21 each recite comparing a payment amount associated with the received request, i.e., the request received on behalf of the payer, to a merchant credit limit associated with the payee. The only credit limits described in the specification are limits on the amount of credit extended to a payer. Although the specification describes a merchant credit limit, it does not describe specifically such a limit associated with the payee. The specification describes comparing the payment amount to a merchant credit limit, and making the payment as an electronic payment or a service provider check, if the payment amount is under a specified amount. Ex. 1001, col. 5, l. 65–col. 6, l. 5. Any amount within the merchant’s (i.e., the payee’s) credit limit is added to the consumer’s (i.e., payer’s) monthly ACH balance, and any transaction can be compared to the consumer’s credit limit parameters stored in a database. Id. at col. 6, ll. 5–10. The specification also describes releasing the payment as a draft written on the consumer’s account, rather than the service provider’s account, if the payment amount exceeds the consumer’s, i.e., the payer’s, credit limit. Id. at col. 6, ll. 10– 16. Because the consumer’s credit limit described in the specification protects the service provider, id. at col. 5, ll. 35–37, 65–66, it is a limit associated with the service provider rather than the payee. Claims 1, 11, and 21, however, recite the merchant credit limit associated with the payee. Because each merchant may extend a different amount of credit to each customer, the merchant credit limit associated with the payee limitation appears to require the service provider computer to select a payment means based on comparing the requested payment amount to the amount of credit the merchant, i.e., the payee, extends to the payer. That is, the amount of the payment is compared to the payer’s credit limit with the payee. In any case, as discussed below, this limitation is not material to our determination of the issues under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” slip op. at 8

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “and 21 of the ’524 Patent recites a method or apparatus in which a service provider receives a request to pay a payee, selects a form of crediting the payee based on comparing the payer’s account number to the payee’s merchant account scheme and the payment amount to a merchant credit limit associated with the payee, and directs the payment to the payee in the selected form. Thus, each of the independent claims is drawn to a computer-implemented process or apparatus in which a third party intermediary, i.e., the payment service provider, receives a request to make payment, applies certain criteria to determine what form of payment to use, and then directs the payment to the payee in that form. In Alice, the Supreme Court considered claims that, on their face, were drawn to the fundamental economic concept of exchanging financial obligations between two parties using a third-party intermediary to mitigate settlement risk. The Court, concluded that, like the hedging in Bilski, the claims were drawn to an “abstract idea” beyond the scope of § 101. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2355–57.1 In the ’524 Patent, the service provider intermediates payment between the payer and the payee, acting much like the third party intermediary in Alice. The payment service provider mitigates settlement risk by crediting the payee or issuing a check to the payee drawn on the service provider’s funds, or in other circumstances, issuing a draft drawn on the payer’s funds, i.e., determining the form of payments based on the comparisons recited in the claims. Ex. 1001, col. 5, l. 25–col. 6, l. 15. The computer implementation associated with comparing the account number and 1 In Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) the Court found upatentable, as abstract ideas, claims drawn to hedging against the financial risk of commodity price fluctuations where the claims recited the steps of initiating a series of financial transactions between commodity providers and consumers, identifying market participants with a counterrisk for the same commodity and initiating a series of risk balancing transactions between those market participants and the commodity provider. the credit limit are incidental to the fundamental economic concept of having a third party intermediate a settlement either by crediting the payee from the third party’s funds (as in a credit transaction) or from the payer’s funds (as when the amounts exceed the payer’s credit limit with the service provider). Thus, we conclude that each of independent claims 1, 11, and 21 is directed to an abstract concept.” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 7,853,524 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · Bilski
  Patents in suitUS 7,853,524
• Fidelity National Information Services, Inc. v. Checkfree CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 22, 2014 · CBM2013-00031 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable under § 101 because they claim the abstract concept of modifying account numbers to match a payee’s format using generic computer implementation.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionDecided for petitioner

    “Claims 1 and 15 of the ’311 Patent are drawn to executing instructions on a computer. In response to receiving an account number in a format not expected by a payee, the instructions act to retrieve from a database a rule that causes the received account number to be altered into the expected format before transmitting the account number to the payee. Thus, claims 1 and 15 are directed to the abstract concept of comparing a received account number to a payee’s format, applying a rule, and modifying the account number in accordance with that rule to the expected format before transmitting it to the payee. As evidence that the computer is not a meaningful limitation and that the claims are drawn to an abstract concept, Petitioner cites testimony of inventor David Garrison demonstrating that the steps of the claimed invention could be performed manually. Pet. 12–16. (citing Ex. 1008, 175:25–180:14, 185:11– 189:25; Ex. 1009; Ex. 1010. Patent Owner’s argument that the claimed automatically performed method precludes the need for human intervention, PO Resp. 68, essentially concedes that the process could be performed manually. We conclude that the recitation of a computer in the method or system claims is not a meaningful limitation and does not change the abstract nature of the claimed subject matter. The limitations recited in claims 2–14, which depend from claim 1, and claims 16–20, which depend from claim 15, relate to the abstract concept recited in claims 1 and 15 and are not meaningful limitations that provide patent-eligible subject matter. See, e.g., claims 2 and 16, which recite receiving the consumer account number in association with the payment request. Thus, the method and system claims of the ’311 Patent are drawn to the abstract concept of establishing compatibility between account numbers by applying appropriate rules to modify an account number.” slip op. at 7

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptDecided for petitioner

    “We also agree with Petitioner that, by transforming a consumer account number into a modified account number, the claims of the ’311 Patent do not cause a physical transformation of a data structure, as argued by Patent Owner. PO Resp. 48–49. As previously discussed, the claims of the ’311 Patent do not recite data structures that are physically transformed. In addition, Petitioner points out that Patent Owner’s expert, Mr. McEntee, testified that the claims of the ’311 Patent do not require any physical transformation. Pet. Reply 11 (citing Ex. 2028, 472:19– 428:2). We further note that satisfying the machine-or-transformation test, by itself, is not sufficient to render a claim patent-eligible, as not all transformations or machine implementations infuse an otherwise ineligible claim with an inventive concept. DDR Holdings, LLC, 2014 WL 6845152, at *9. We conclude that altering an account number to be compatible with the requirements of a payee’s system, as recited in the claims of the ’311 Patent, is not the type of transformation that rises to the level of patent-eligible subject matter. Patent Owner contends that in our Decision to Institute we did not evaluate the claims as a whole to determine whether they contain additional substantive limitations that narrow, confine, or otherwise tie down the claims so that, in practical terms, they do not cover the full abstract idea itself. PO Resp. 61. According to Patent Owner, the claims include several concrete and tangible limitations that limit the use of the “putative abstract idea” to a specific application within an electronic bill payment system. Id.  As discussed above, relying on intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, Patent Owner attempts to read into the claims structures that they do not recite. Independent claims 1 and 15 recite only executing instructions to receive an account number, applying a rule to alter the account number to an expected form, and transmitting the altered account number. The specification notes that the claimed steps can be implemented using a general purpose computer, or other processing device capable of executing programmed instructions. Ex. 1001, col. 3. ll. 58–65. Thus, the limitations recited in claims concerning the payment processor and the payment processor computer are generic computer limitations. Generic computer limitations do not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible. DDR Holdings, 2014 WL 6845152, at *9.” slip op. at 12

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedOther

    “of the rebuttal testimony of Petitioner’s expert Michael Shamos, Ex. 1021 (“Shamos Decl.”), as beyond the scope of the testimony of Patent Owner’s experts. Paper 40 (“Mot. to Exclude”). Petitioner identifies subject matter the challenged paragraphs of the Shamos Declaration rebut. Paper 41 (“Opp. to Mot. to Exclude”). In reaching our decisions in this proceeding, we do not cite or rely on the portions of the testimony in the Shamos Declaration that Patent Owner moves to exclude. Therefore, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is dismissed.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 7,996,311 unpatentable
  § 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · Bilski
  Patents in suitUS 7,996,311
• Metavante Corporation / Fidelity National Information Services, Inc. v. Checkfree CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 22, 2014 · CBM2013-00032 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–60 are unpatentable under § 101 because they claim an abstract intermediary function implemented with routine computer activity.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “Petitioner’s expert Michael Shamos. Paper 41 (“Mot. to Exclude”). Petitioner opposes Patent Owner's Motion to Exclude on the basis that these statements Patent Owner moves to exclude are proper rebuttal to Patent Owner's experts. Paper 42 (“Opp. to Mot. to Exclude”). Our Final Written Decision does not cite or rely on any of the subject matter Patent Owner seeks to exclude. Therefore, we dismiss Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude.” slip op. at 23

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner. Claim 1 recites the single step of executing computer implemented instructions with one or more processors. Claim 1 recites that those instructions include ones in which the clearinghouse receives a payment request (or a request to add a payee to a payer’s pick list), accesses billing information stored in a database, identifies payee bill presentment information from the accessed information, and generates and transmits to the payer a notification of the bill presentment information.1 Although the one or more processors may also execute instructions to perform routine ancillary functions for the central clearinghouse to receive the request, access the database and transmit the information, there are no such instructions or structures recited in claim 1. Claim 1 of the ’749 Patent does not recite any structure for the bill presentment and payment central clearinghouse—nor does claim 1 recite any particular software instructions, any particular processors, any particular configuration or interconnection of the recited “one or more processors,” or any other structure to execute the claimed functions called for in the instructions. Thus, the bill presentment and payment central clearinghouse in claim 1 must be construed without structural limitations, other than being programmed to carry out the recited functions.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “The ’749 Patent describes the payee-pick-list as a list of payees the user may plan to pay electronically and states that each user’s individual list is stored in the form of a database in a memory associated with the central clearinghouse station. Ex. 1001, col. 16, ll. 49–54. We disagree with Patent Owner’s characterization of the payee-pick-list as a data structure merely because it is used directly by the programmed central clearinghouse computer system. PO Resp. 40. Claim 1 recites receiving a request to add a payee to a pick-list associated with the payer, but does not recite any limitations concerning the pick-list. The specification refers to a database known as a payee-pick-list that includes certain information such as payee identifiers, street addresses, cities, states, zip codes, phone numbers and consumer account numbers. Ex. 1001, col. 16, 61–65. Nothing in this list of common information associated with the payee requires any particular data structure. Thus, we do not import a data structure limitation into the construction of "payee-pick-list” or "pick-list."” slip op. at 7

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “patentable subject matter. First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one or more patent-ineligible concepts, i.e., laws of nature, natural phenomenon and abstract ideas. Id. at 2355 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296–96 (2012)). If so, we then consider whether the elements of each claim, both individually and as an ordered combination, transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself. Id. Thus, the first step in our analysis is to consider whether the claims of the ’749 Patent recite a patent-ineligible concept. Patent Owner describes the central clearinghouse as a necessary intermediary between payers and payees interacting with each user station and handling EBPP interactions between thousands, if not millions, of such stations, which themselves are computers. Id. at 22. In Alice, the Supreme Court considered claims drawn to a method of exchanging financial obligations between two parties using a third-party intermediary to mitigate settlement risk and concluded that on their face, claims drawn to the concept of an intermediated settlement, like the hedging in Bilski, is an “abstract idea” beyond the scope of § 101. Id. at 2355–57.2 We conclude that the claims of the ’749 Patent, which are directed to a clearinghouse that acts as an intermediary between a payer and the payee by notifying the payer about payee bill presentment information, are not directed to patent-eligible subject matter. The steps recited in claim 1, and in each 2 In Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010), the Supreme Court found unpatentable, as abstract ideas, claims drawn to hedging against the financial risk of commodity price fluctuations where the claims recited the steps of initiating a series of financial transactions between commodity providers and consumers, identifying market participants with a counter-risk for the same commodity and initiating a series of risk balancing transactions between those market participants and the commodity provider. of independent claims 20, 40, 59, and 60, are carried out by a clearinghouse that receives a request from a payer to provide payee information or add a payee to the payer’s pick-list. The claims recite receiving a request and are not limited to any particular number of such requests. The clearinghouse retrieves the payee information from a database and generates and transmits a responsive notification message to the payer. Thus, independent claims 1, 20, 40, 59, and 60 are drawn to the patent-ineligible concept of executing instructions in which an intermediary receives a request, retrieves information from a database, and transmits the information to the requester.” slip op. at 9

  Patent outcomesUS 7,792,749 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · Bilski
  Patents in suitUS 7,792,749

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.