• Snap Inc. / Facebook, Inc. et al. v. Palo Alto Research Center LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 24, 2023 · IPR2021-01294 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held all challenged claims 1–25 unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds and denied Patent Owner’s contingent motions to amend.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “2. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Snap proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’599 patent would have possessed “an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science or a related field along with at least two years of work experience in the field of content presentation and context-based systems/processes.” Snap Pet. 3 (citing Snap IPR, Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 30–32); Snap IPR, Ex. 1022 ¶ 32. Snap further asserts that additional “education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Id. In the Decision on Institution, we determined that Snap’s proposed description of the qualifications of a person of ordinary skill in the art aligned with the technology and claims of the ’599 patent. Snap Inst. Dec. 6–7. For this proceeding, Patent Owner and Dr. Martin apply this level of skill in the art. Snap PO Resp. 11–12; Snap IPR, Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 48–50. Accordingly, for the reasons given in the Decision on Institution, we adopt Snap’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. Snap Inst. Dec. 6–7.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Dr. Martin also provides consistent testimony on this issue. Snap IPR, Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 81–82. Put simply, the Specification’s disclosure is that the set of rules for multiple content packages includes an expected response, and actions are then performed based on whether an expected response is or is not provided. Moreover, as Dr. Almeroth testifies, neither the claims nor the Specification use the term “unexpected response”—rather the Specification only identifies an “expected response.” Snap IPR, Ex. 1022 ¶ 42. Accordingly, the disclosures in Table 1 and the Specification support Dr. Almeroth’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill would have understood that “the claimed ‘determin[e/ing]’ limitation requires what it plainly recites: ‘determin[e/ing] whether the received response matches the expected response[]’. . . . [i]t does not require an unexpected response not known to the system.” Snap IPR, Ex. 1022 ¶ 51.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “time,’ ‘type of location,’ and other contextual information to automatically determine whether users would like to undertake learning activities.” Twitter Pet. Reply 18 (citing Twitter IPR, Ex. 1005, 2 3, 5 (“A check . . . to see if the information from the database corresponds with the location sensor (i.e. a check on whether the learner is really keeping his/her schedule).”), Fig.1; Twitter IPR, Ex. 1025 ¶ 49; Twitter IPR, Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 85, 157–162, 238, 435, 451, 517; Twitter Pet. 20–21). Accordingly, the evidence of record support that Yau teaches that context triggers the display of a content piece, such as an exercise/test/quiz. Patent Owner also argues that Twitter asserts that PALLES’ content piece is “‘exercise[s],’ ‘test[s],’ and/or ‘MP Quiz[zes],’” but also contends that Yau’s “formal assessment” is the claimed content piece. Twitter PO Resp. 32. Patent Owner argues that “Twitter points back to its limitation 12.1 PALLAS evidence for the purported ‘content piece’” and also does not mention Yau for limitation 12.5 and 12.6 and “only conclusorily states that ‘PALLAS in view of Yau renders obvious triggering an exercise/test/quiz.’” Id. Patent Owner’s arguments overlook Twitter’s assertion, with Dr. Turnbull’s supporting testimony, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Yau’s formal assessments are “tests with answers for comparing against learner’s responses to assess knowledge/performance/skill (contrasting with ‘un-assessed’ exercises whose responses are unchecked).” Twitter Pet. 43; Twitter IPR, Ex. 1003 ¶ 154. Further, Patent Owner overlooks Petitioner’s assertion that it is implementing PALLAS’s context-triggerbased content display using Yau’s teachings of displaying assessments/questions based on context. Twitter Pet. 43. Patent Owner also asserts that in the PALLAS-Yau combination, Twitter does not explain how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the prior art in the manner Petitioner alleges. Twitter PO Resp. 42. Patent Owner argues that “PALLAS says nothing about forcing quizzes, tests, or exercises on its users without the users asking for such exercises,” and a person of skill would understand that the combined system still requires that a student select a learning activity and that PALLAS’s system should be unobtrusive because learners “may have small time slots to engage in learning.” Id. (citing Twitter IPR, Ex. 2013 ¶ 168; Twitter IPR, Ex. 1004, 54). Patent Owner further contends that “Twitter’s conclusory, hindsight-driven statements” do not suffice and PALLAS teaches away from the modifications suggested by Twitter. Id. at 42–43 (citing Twitter IPR, Ex. 2013 ¶ 144). Patent Owner argues that because a learner may not have time to complete a test, a person of ordinary skill in the art would not be motivated to change PALLAS to trigger exercises/tests/quizzes based on location or time. Id. at 43 (citing Twitter IPR, Ex. 2013 ¶¶ 142–144). The evidence of record does not support Patent Owner’s arguments.” slip op. at 115

  • ScopeMotion to amend, grantedGranted

    “2. Enlarging Scope of Claims Patent Owner asserts that it proposes narrowing limitations in direct response to the grounds of unpatentability involved in this proceeding. See, e.g., Snap Mot. 3–4. Facebook argues Patent Owner is “improperly attempting to enlarge the scope of the original claims.” Facebook Pet. Opp. 1. Facebook asserts, “[i]f ‘an expected response’ means one or more expected responses, therefore, determining whether the received response ‘matches the expected response’ means that the received response must match [all of] the one or more previously-recited expected responses in the content package.” Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted). Facebook then argues “the term ‘predefined response’ is broader than ‘expected response,’” because “an ‘expected response’ does not include any conceivable or possible response; it is a response that is expected.” Id. at 4–5 (emphasis omitted). Twitter argues that “‘predefined response’ is broader than ‘expected response’ because a ‘predefined response’ can include any possible response as long as that response has been somehow defined in advance.” Twitter Pet. Opp. 2. We consider the amendments in view of the claim as a whole. Although the term “one predefined response” may be broader than “an expected response,” we also consider the amended portion “wherein the received response is expected if the received response matches one or more of the at least one predefined response,” and “the received response is unexpected if the received response does not match any of the at least one predefined response.” Unless the response had been predefined within the content package, any “received response” could not be considered “expected” under the claims, and the additional clause requires a match of the response with the predefined response to be deemed “expected.” This equates to an equivalent scope to the original claim. This is consistent with Dr. Martin’s testimony, which we credit, that he is not aware of a situation where the substitute but not original claims are infringed because “[t]he substitute claims would only be satisfied when a ‘predefined response’ in the substitute claims is an ‘expected response’ in the original claims.” Facebook IPR, Ex. 2023 ¶ 59.” slip op. at 136

  Patent outcomesUS 8,489,599 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Electric Power · Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,489,599
• Metacluster LT, Uab v. Bright Data Ltd.Instituted
  PTAB · Mar 23, 2023 · PGR2022-00052 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · PGR · Institution

  Instituted PGR on claims 1–27; the Board found it more likely than not that the claims are obvious over Mithyantha, with claim 19 also challenged over Mithyantha and RFC 2616.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “We may not institute a post-grant review “unless . . . the information presented in the petition filed under section 321, if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of the challenged claims of the ’034 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “had at least a bachelor’s degree in Computer Science or related field (or equivalent experience), and at least two years’ experience working with and programming networked computer systems.” Pet. 13 (referencing Ex. 1002 ¶ 33).” slip op. at 8

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The district court considered the issue of whether a client device, for instance, should be construed in a role-based or structural manner, and the evaluation included whether a device could sometimes be operated as a client and at other times could operate as something else. Ex. 1018, 48–51. In support, the district pointed the patent disclosure that: Any network element in the system may be a dedicated device that assumes only a single role, and thus being only a client (using tunnels), a tunnel, a client (using agents/ peers), an agent, or a peer device. Alternatively or in addition, a network element may be capable of assuming two or more roles, either at different times or simultaneously, from the list of roles including a client (using tunnels), a tunnel, a client (using agents/peers), an agent, or a peer device. Alternatively or in addition, a device may be capable of assuming all of the above roles. Ex. 1018, 50 (quoting ’866 patent at 125:33–42, with identical disclosure in ’034 patent (Ex. 1001, 125:24–33)).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted

    “At this stage of the proceedings, we do not agree that Mithyantha’s second appliance 200’/200b cannot be considered the claimed “second client device” and its first appliance 200/200a cannot be considered the claimed “third server.” As discussed supra Section II.C, we have adopted the district court’s constructions of claim terms. More specifically, the district court determined, and we concur based on the present record, that “client device” is “a device that is operating in the role of a client by requesting services, functionalities, or resources from other devices” and a “first server” functions as “a server that is not the client device.” On this record, Petitioner has demonstrated that Mithyantha’s second appliance 200’/200b functions as the claimed “second client device,” as it operates as a client by requesting services, functionalities, or resources from other devices, that is, it transmits HTTP web requests over the network to a server. See Pet. 44– 45. Mithyantha also discloses that its first appliance 200/200a functions in a server role, with appliance 200/200a sending back responses to client 102a, that is, content from the web server, and it is a separate element from a client device. See id. at 41–42. Moreover, as discussed above, Petitioner’s assertions are consistent with the role-based nature of the elements as disclosed in the ’034 patent. Further, we do not find that Petitioner’s applications of the claim elements to Mithyantha are arbitrary because they are consistent with the district court’s claim construction of the respective claimed elements and the elements’ functions and roles, as discussed. Moreover, Mithyantha discloses that its appliances can provide different functions (see e.g. Ex. 1009, 5:31–33, 8:65–67, 9:8–21, 9:53–55; 23:58–64), and may be implemented in many forms. That is, the implementation of appliance 200 is generally described as being on any form of computing device such as “computing device 100,” and “computing device 100 can be any workstation, desktop computer, laptop or notebook computer, server, handheld computer, mobile telephone.” See id. at 13:65– 142, 16:58–64. We do not agree with Patent Owner’s allegations regarding a required architecture. Patent Owner does not explain how these requirements are recited in the limitations of claims. Instead, at this juncture, it appears that the arguments are an attempt to impermissibly introduce limitations into the claim that are not recited. Similarly, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments on required anonymity because this requirement is not recited in the claims.” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,272,034
• Hulu, LLC v. Sito Mobile R&D IP, LLC And Sito Mobile, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 11, 2022 · CBM2020-00028 · APJ Joni Y Chang · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–12, 39–41, 45–56, 68, and 98–126 are unpatentable under § 101 because they claim an abstract idea implemented with generic computer components.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “various HTTP-related technologies, or an equivalent amount of relevant work or research experience.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 35. Patent Owner’s declarant, Michael Sprenger, Ph.D., similarly testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a Bachelor of Science degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or computer engineering (or a related academic field), and at least two additional years of work experience in the design and development of distributed network systems and/or multimedia streaming.” Ex. 2009 ¶ 33; PO Resp. 4−5. Dr. Sprenger also testifies that, alternatively, such an artisan would have had “at least five years of work experience and training in the design and development of distributed network systems and/or multimedia streaming.” Ex. 2009 ¶ 33; PO Resp. 4−5. Neither party points out any meaningful difference between the parties’ assessments. Based on the evidence of record, we apply Patent Owner’s assessment on the level of ordinary skill in the art, as Dr. Sprenger provides an alternative to a college degree.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner. Patent Owner’s implicit claim construction improperly imports extraneous limitations into the claims—namely, excluding the entirety of the “requested media” or requiring that the “requested media” be broken up into portions. It is well-settled that if a feature is not necessary to give meaning to what the inventor means by a claim term, it would be “extraneous” and should not be read into the claim. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The plain and ordinary meaning of the term “at least one portion of the requested media” as used in the ’887 patent does not support Patent Owner’s implicit construction. In the context of the ’887 patent, the plain 4 For example, other variations include “at least a portion of the requested media” recited in claim 1 and “the at least the portion of the requested media” recited in claim 2. 10 and ordinary meaning of the term encompasses one or more portions of the “requested media,” as well as the entirety of the “requested media.” For example, the portions of the Specification relied upon by Patent Owner disclose that the viewer requests a media clip and receives the entirety of the requested media clip, not one portion at a time. Ex. 1001, 13:49−14:2. Patent Owner’s implicit construction ignores the modifiers “at least” and “requested” recited in the term.” slip op. at 10

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner submits that the District Court construed the claim term “settlement record” as “billable event record to be used for revenue 13 settlement.” PO Resp. 29−30; Ex. 2008, 2. This construction is consistent with the Specification. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 9:18−20 (“to generate the settlement rules that define who will be billed or credited”), 12:17−19 (“RTSMS 106 processes the logs, the billing data, and the state model data and creates a message sequence detail record (MSDR).”), 12:25−26 (“The MSDR represents a billable event record that will be used for revenue settlement purposes.”), 12:56−62. As such, we adopt the District Court’s claim construction, construing “settlement record” as “billable event record to be used for revenue settlement.”” slip op. at 13

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionDecided for petitioner

    “Upon review of this entire trial record, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s showing and find that the challenged claims recite a concept that falls within one of the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas—certain methods of organizing human activity, e.g., “commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations).” See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. The abstract idea here is not meaningfully different from the ideas found to be abstract in other cases before the Federal Circuit. Notably, each challenged claim recites a method in which a “computing device” generates a “communication” based on the characteristics of the user in response to a request for media to be streamed. The Federal Circuit has held that “the concept of delivering user-selected media content to portable devices is an abstract idea.” Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The Federal Circuit also has held that claims related to “customizing information based on (1) information known about the user and (2) [specific] data” are directed to abstract ideas. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1369−70 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting that “[a]n advertisement taking into account the time of day and tailoring the information presented to the user based on that information is another ‘fundamental . . . practice long prevalent in our system’” (quoting Alice, 573 U.S. 219)); see also British Telecommunications PLC v. IAC/InterActiveCorp, 813 F. App’x 584, 587 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (holding that the concept of “providing lists of 30 location-specific information sources to users based on their location” was an abstract idea). In addition, we find that the claim limitations involving a “revenue sharing rule” and “producing a settlement record” that reflects the revenue sharing do not remove the challenged claims from the realm of abstract ideas. See, e.g., Pet. 38−40. Notably, recording revenue sharing constitutes a practice of organizing human activity, which is rooted in assessing sales and economic interactions—a fundamental economic practice. The Supreme Court has held in Alice that “a method of exchanging financial obligations between two parties using a third-party intermediary to mitigate settlement risk” is “a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce” and that “the concept of intermediated settlement . . . [is] squarely within the realm of ‘abstract ideas.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 219−22.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 8,825,887 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,825,887
• Google LLC v. Videoshare LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Mar 24, 2021 · CBM2020-00027 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · CBM · Institution

  The Board denied institution of CBM review for claims 1–7 because the patent did not qualify as a covered business method patent; it did not reach the § 101 challenge.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “covered business method patent review, the focus is on the claims. Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (challenged patent eligible for review because the claims recited “an express financial component in the form of a subsidy” that was “central to the operation of the claimed invention”). Thus, “§ 18 (d)(1) directs us to examine the claims when deciding whether a patent is a CBM patent.” Blue Calypso, 815 F.3d at 1340. More specifically, the focus is on the claims to determine whether there is anything “explicitly or inherently financial in the construed claim language.” Id. The claims of the ’341 patent are directed to “[a] method for sharing video over a structured hierarchical network.” Ex. 1001, 25:14–15. We are not persuaded that this a financial activity. We agree with Patent Owner that the focus of the claims is video sharing technology. Prelim. Resp. 21. The claims describe a series of method steps for sharing video content involving servers and video files. Nowhere do the claims discuss or suggest obtaining payment or remuneration. Thus, the claims are unlike those in Blue Calypso, 815 F.3d 1331. In Blue Calypso, the claims expressly recited the term “subsidy,” which the Board construed as “financial assistance given by one to another.” Id. at 1339–40. The Federal Circuit explained that based on this understanding, the Board had concluded that the claims “were financial in nature” and instituted CBM review. Id. at 1340. The Federal Circuit agreed with the Board’s analysis and affirmed its decision to institute CBM patent review: “Significantly, Blue Calypso has not challenged the Board’s interpretation of subsidy as ‘financial assistance given by one to another.’” Id.” slip op. at 6

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “covered business method patent review, the focus is on the claims. Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (challenged patent eligible for review because the claims recited “an express financial component in the form of a subsidy” that was “central to the operation of the claimed invention”). Thus, “§ 18 (d)(1) directs us to examine the claims when deciding whether a patent is a CBM patent.” Blue Calypso, 815 F.3d at 1340. More specifically, the focus is on the claims to determine whether there is anything “explicitly or inherently financial in the construed claim language.” Id. The claims of the ’341 patent are directed to “[a] method for sharing video over a structured hierarchical network.” Ex. 1001, 25:14–15. We are not persuaded that this a financial activity. We agree with Patent Owner that the focus of the claims is video sharing technology. Prelim. Resp. 21. The claims describe a series of method steps for sharing video content involving servers and video files. Nowhere do the claims discuss or suggest obtaining payment or remuneration. Thus, the claims are unlike those in Blue Calypso, 815 F.3d 1331. In Blue Calypso, the claims expressly recited the term “subsidy,” which the Board construed as “financial assistance given by one to another.” Id. at 1339–40. The Federal Circuit explained that based on this understanding, the Board had concluded that the claims “were financial in nature” and instituted CBM review. Id. at 1340. The Federal Circuit agreed with the Board’s analysis and affirmed its decision to institute CBM patent review: “Significantly, Blue Calypso has not challenged the Board’s interpretation of subsidy as ‘financial assistance given by one to another.’” Id.” slip op. at 6

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Not reached

    “E. Subject Matter Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 Petitioner contends that the challenged claims are directed to an abstract idea that is not eligible subject matter for a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Pet. 77. According to Petitioner, “[t]he claims recite the abstract idea of including advertising with appropriately formatted video.” Id. at 80. Patent Owner responds that Petitioner has failed to show that the claims recite ineligible subject matter. Prelim. Resp. 64. According to Patent Owner, “[t]he ’341 Patent claims recite specific steps that improve the functioning of a video server providing shared video files.” Id. Because we have determined that the ’341 patent does not qualify for covered business method patent review, we do not address whether the claims recite eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” slip op. at 11

  § 101 eligibilityDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 10,362,341
• Yahoo! Inc. v. Almondnet, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Feb 5, 2018 · CBM2017-00047 · APJ Michael W Kim · CBM · Rehearing

  The Board denied Yahoo!’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution on the § 101 challenge to claims 1, 2-4, 11-13, 16-17, and 20-22.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “requesting party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “matter, resolution of this issue in Petitioner’s favor is not dispositive, as Petitioner still failed to account sufficiently for the terms “offsite” and “targeted” (to say nothing of “first Internet site,” “second Internet site,” and directing off-site advertisements to visitors of the second Internet site as a consequence of determining visits to the first Internet site “using the tags and the records,” as also recited in claim 1). See Decision 11–14. Moreover, Petitioner’s assertion is incorrect, as while certainly at times, an omission of “Internet” from an identification of what a claim is directed to is proper, our review of the case law cited by Petitioner does not support a blanket assertion that the term “Internet” should never be considered in this manner, under any circumstances. See, e.g., DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256–57 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (under Alice step one, the court held that “[a]lthough the claims address a business challenge (retaining website visitors), it is a challenge particular to the Internet”). We are unpersuaded that we could have misapprehended or overlooked that which is incorrect.” slip op. at 6

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 not directed to exceptionNot shown unpatentable

    “matter, resolution of this issue in Petitioner’s favor is not dispositive, as Petitioner still failed to account sufficiently for the terms “offsite” and “targeted” (to say nothing of “first Internet site,” “second Internet site,” and directing off-site advertisements to visitors of the second Internet site as a consequence of determining visits to the first Internet site “using the tags and the records,” as also recited in claim 1). See Decision 11–14. Moreover, Petitioner’s assertion is incorrect, as while certainly at times, an omission of “Internet” from an identification of what a claim is directed to is proper, our review of the case law cited by Petitioner does not support a blanket assertion that the term “Internet” should never be considered in this manner, under any circumstances. See, e.g., DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256–57 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (under Alice step one, the court held that “[a]lthough the claims address a business challenge (retaining website visitors), it is a challenge particular to the Internet”). We are unpersuaded that we could have misapprehended or overlooked that which is incorrect.” slip op. at 6

  § 101 eligibility
  Patents in suitUS 8,244,586
• Yahoo! Inc. v. Almondnet, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Feb 5, 2018 · CBM2017-00046 · APJ Michael W Kim · CBM · Rehearing

  The Board denied Yahoo!’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution on the § 101 challenge to claims 1–8, 10, 13–16, 24, 27–29, 31, 32, 36, 37, 39, and 41–47.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “II. ANALYSIS A request for rehearing must identify specifically all matters the requesting party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 not directed to exceptionNot shown unpatentable

    “targeted” (to say nothing of “first Internet site,” “second Internet site,” and directing off-site advertisements to visitors of the second Internet site as a consequence of determining visits to the first Internet site “using the tags and the records,” as also recited in claim 1). See Decision 11–14. Moreover, Petitioner’s assertion is incorrect, as while certainly at times, an omission of “Internet” from an identification of what a claim is directed to is proper, our review of the case law cited by Petitioner does not support a blanket assertion that the term “Internet” should never be considered in this manner, under any circumstances. See, e.g., DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256–57 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (under Alice step one, the court held that “[a]lthough the claims address a business challenge (retaining website visitors), it is a challenge particular to the Internet”). We are unpersuaded that we could have misapprehended or overlooked that which is incorrect. slip op. at 6

  § 101 eligibility
  Patents in suitUS 7,822,639
• Ebay, Inc. v. Paid, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 16, 2015 · CBM2014-00128 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–25 are unpatentable under § 101 as directed to an abstract idea and under § 103 over the asserted prior-art combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We are not persuaded that Patent Owner’s proposed construction is correct. Under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, the “claims should always be read in light of the specification and teachings in the underlying patent.” Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1297–98 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, we interpret the term “shipping rate” to mean “the overall or total cost of sending an auction item to a buyer.” This interpretation is consistent with the ’150 patent specification’s disclosure of shipping calculator system 1000 and its rate engine 1024 for calculating shipping rates based on various inputs, as illustrated in Figure 10, reproduced below. Ex. 1001, col. 6, ll. 38–42.” slip op. at 9

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “Despite Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary, we see little difference between determining shipping rates and tax rates for auctioned items and the type of fundamental economic practices considered to be abstract ideas in Alice Corp. and Bilski.3 As established by the record, both 2 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 3 In Alice Corp., the Supreme Court determined that the claims at issue were “drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement,” i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk. Id. at 2356. Furthermore, the Supreme Court determined that “[l]ike the risk hedging in Bilski, the concept of intermediated settlement is ‘a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce.’” Id. (citations omitted). With respect to the first step of the “Mayo framework,” the Supreme Court concluded in Alice Corp. that “there is no meaningful distinction between the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and the concept of intermediated settlement” in Alice Corp., and that “[b]oth are squarely within the realm of ‘abstract ideas’ as we have used that term.” Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2357. conventional auctions and shipping rate calculations existed long before the Internet. See, e.g., Rotman Decl. ¶¶ 4–8; Greenspun Decl. ¶¶ 31–37; Hearing Tr. 56:17–21. We conclude, therefore, that Petitioner has demonstrated that the ʼ150 patent claims, like the claims in Bilski and Alice, are directed to an abstract idea, namely, determining shipping rates for an online auction item.” slip op. at 17

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable

    “We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument for patentability under § 101. First, the claims of the ʼ150 patent do not reflect the asserted “inventive concept” identified by Patent Owner, namely, the ability to calculate shipping rates and tax rates in real time. Patent Owner asserts that the reference in the claims to an “online auction” accomplishes this. Hearing Tr. 62:18–20. But as Petitioner points out, the claims do not recite any form of real-time calculations. The claims simply recite steps that were routinely done manually before the filing date of the patent. Hearing Tr. 7:16–22; Rotman Dep. 127:19–128:5. More fundamentally, however, simply adding a computer limitation to claims covering an abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to render the claim patentable under § 101, even if the use of a computer enables faster operation. Bancorp Services, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In order for the addition of a machine to impose a meaningful limit on the scope of a claim, it must play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly, i.e., through the utilization of a computer for performing calculations. SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Likewise, “the use of the Internet is not sufficient to save an otherwise abstract claims from ineligibility under § 101.” Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014). For these reasons, Patent Owner’s argument based on meeting the asserted need for speed and other requirements of online auctions fails.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “We are persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments that it would have been obvious to combine Van Zandt and Illinois Sales Tax. Pet. 52–54. We are convinced by Petitioner’s arguments, supported by the testimony of Dr. Greenspun,5 that one of ordinary skill in the would have “readily appreciated the combinability of the sales tax calculation flow chart in Illinois Sales Tax to perform accurate tax calculations for the state of Illinois or another jurisdiction,” including the tax and duty calculations set forth in Van Zandt. Pet. 53 (citing Greenspun Decl. ¶¶ 42, 43, 63). We do not credit Patent Owner’s argument limiting Van Zandt’s teachings to international shipping. Van Zandt provides a comprehensive logistics services system and method, including providing landed cost 5 Dr. Greenspun holds a Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science from MIT. He has authored five computer science textbooks. He has taught at MIT and has over 20 years of experience in computer software engineering. Greenspun Decl. ¶¶ 3–16. We determine him to be an expert in the field relevant to this patent and credit his testimony. quoting (62), to integrate logistics vendors “across any industry, at any time, no matter what vendor carrier . . . or mode of transportation is to be used and no matter what country the shipment is being handled in or delivered to.” Ex. 1011, Abstract (emphasis added). More specifically, Van Zandt states that its system can calculate “any shipment duties and taxes.” Id. at 22:18 (emphasis added); see also id. at 32:11–17. Nothing in Van Zandt discredits or disallows the calculation of domestic taxes as a component of its calculation of “any shipment duties and taxes.” We credit Dr. Greenspun’s interpretation of the Van Zandt system as” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 8,635,150 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,635,150
• Ebay, Inc. v. Paid, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 16, 2015 · CBM2014-00126 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–21 are unpatentable under § 101 as directed to an abstract idea without an inventive concept, and under § 103 over the asserted combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “Despite Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary, we see little difference between determining shipping rates and tax rates for auctioned items and the type of fundamental economic practices considered to be abstract ideas in Alice Corp. and Bilski.3 As established by the record, both 2 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 3 In Alice Corp., the Supreme Court determined that the claims at issue were “drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement,” i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk. Id. at 2356. Furthermore, the Supreme Court determined that “[l]ike the risk hedging in Bilski, the concept of conventional auctions and shipping rate calculations existed long before the Internet. See, e.g., Rotman Decl. ¶¶ 4–8; Greenspun Decl. ¶¶ 31–37; Hearing Tr. 56:17–21. We conclude, therefore, that Petitioner has demonstrated that the ʼ642 patent claims, like the claims in Bilski and Alice, are directed to an abstract idea, namely, determining shipping rates for online sales.” slip op. at 17

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable

    “We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument for patentability under § 101. First, the claims of the ʼ642 patent do not reflect the asserted “inventive concept” identified by Patent Owner, namely, the ability to calculate shipping rates and tax rates in real time. Patent Owner asserts that the reference in the claims to an “online auction” accomplishes this. Hearing Tr. 62:18–20. But as Petitioner points out, the claims do not recite any form of real-time calculations. The claims simply recite steps that were routinely done manually before the filing date of the patent. Hearing Tr. 7:16–22; Rotman Dep. 127:19–128:5. The claims, moreover, do not even refer specifically to online auctions. More fundamentally, however, simply adding a computer limitation to claims covering an abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to render the claim patentable under § 101, even if the use of a computer enables faster operation. Bancorp Services, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In order for the addition of a machine to impose a meaningful limit on the scope of a claim, it must play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly, i.e., through the utilization of a computer for performing calculations. SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Likewise, “the use of the Internet is not sufficient to save otherwise abstract claims from ineligibility under § 101.” Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014). For these reasons, Patent Owner’s argument based on meeting the asserted need for speed and other requirements of online auctions fails.” slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “correct. Under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, the “claims should always be read in light of the specification and teachings in the underlying patent.” Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1297–98 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, we interpret the term “shipping rate” to mean “the overall or total cost of sending an auction item to a buyer.” This interpretation is consistent with the patent specification’s disclosure of shipping calculator system 1000 and its rate engine 1024 for calculating shipping rates based on various inputs, as illustrated in Figure 10, reproduced below. Ex. 1001, col. 6, ll. 38–42. Figure 10 shows a computer-based system with a shipping calculator. The ’642 patent discloses that rate engine 1024 may include modules for calculating factors that contribute to the overall shipping rate to include shipping rate engine 1028, tax rate engine 1030, insurance rate engine 1032, packaging algorithm engine 1033, and fee-based rate engine 1034. Id. at col. 7, ll. 45–50. Shipping rate engine 1028 calculates a basic shipping rate for an item based on the distance between seller and buyer locations, the weight of the item, the weight of any packaging, and method of shipment. Id. at col. 8, ll. 34–42. Tax rate engine 1030 determines what taxes may apply. Id. at col. 8, ll. 43–44. Insurance rate engine 1032 calculates a cost of insurance to be added to the overall shipping rate based on buyer and seller preferences. Id. at col. 8, ll. 51–55. Packaging is an important factor in shipping cost, so packaging algorithm engine 1033 determines appropriate packaging based on seller preferences and the size, weight, or shape of the item and applies a factor to the shipping rate. Id. at col. 8, ll. 6–14. Fee-based engine 1034 calculates rates based on seller inputs such as rates charged for shipping and handling above the rates from common carriers and may include a flat rate for shipping, or a flat rate per item shipped. Id. at col. 8, ll. 15–29. Rate engine 1024 integrates inputs from the calculations of these other modules and engines, and applies whatever discounts or other factors are required if the components are not simply added, “to obtain a shipping rate based on the various inputs.” Id. at col. 8, ll. 56–60 (emphasis added). The ’642 patent also discloses that the shipping rate may be a flat rate from feebased engine 1034, a rate calculated from the other engines, or a rate from a combination of different types of calculations. Id. at col. 8, ll. 60–63. Thus, the patent discloses that rate engine 1000 calculates a “shipping rate” that includes not only a basic transportation cost but also many other costs that contribute to the total cost to send an item to a buyer.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “the combinability of the sales tax calculation flow chart in Illinois Sales Tax to perform accurate tax calculations for the state of Illinois or another jurisdiction,” including the tax and duty calculations set forth in Van Zandt. Pet. 55 (citing Greenspun Decl. ¶ 56). We do not credit Patent Owner’s argument limiting Van Zandt’s teachings to international shipping. Van Zandt provides a comprehensive logistics services system and method, including providing landed cost quoting (62), to integrate logistics vendors “across any industry, at any time, no matter what vendor carrier [] or mode of transportation is to be used and no matter what country the shipment is being handled in or delivered to.” Ex. 1011, Abstract (emphasis added). More specifically, Van Zandt states that its system can calculate “any shipment duties and taxes.” Id. at 22:18 (emphasis added); see also id. at 32:11–17. Nothing in Van Zandt discredits or disallows the calculation of domestic taxes as a component of its calculation of “any shipment duties and taxes.” We credit Dr. Greenspun’s interpretation of the Van Zandt system as being “capable of handling the simpler task of calculating domestic taxes.” Greenspun Decl. ¶ 54. We further credit Dr. Greenspun’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Van Zandt with other references “whenever international shipping was potentially required,” and that references such as Illinois Sales Tax would allow one of ordinary skill in the art to figure sales tax on domestic sales. Id. at ¶ 56. The motivation to combine references can come from many sources, engineering. Greenspun Decl. ¶¶ 3–16. We determine him to be an expert in the field relevant to this patent and credit his testimony. including the nature of the problem to be solved. ABT Sys., LLC v. Emerson Elec. Co., Nos. 2014-1618, 2014-1700, 2015 WL 4924160, at *9 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2015) (citing Ruiz v. A.B. Chance, 357 F.3d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We determine, therefore, that Petitioner has presented sufficiently articulated and persuasive reasoning for combining the teachings of Van Zandt and Illinois Sales Tax that is supported by rational underpinnings. KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 8,521,642 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,521,642
• Ebay, Inc. v. Paid, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 16, 2015 · CBM2014-00125 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–24 are unpatentable under §§ 101 and 103(a), as directed to an abstract idea without an inventive concept and obvious over the asserted prior-art combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “patent does not claim an abstract idea simply because it is directed to online auctions. PO Resp. 22; Hearing Tr. 56:10–12. As the Federal Circuit recently reminded us, “[a]n abstract idea does not become nonabstract by limiting the invention to a particular field of use or technological environment such as the Internet.” Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (US), 792 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). We are, therefore, not convinced by Patent Owner’s argument that the claims are not abstract because they are limited to a specific application.” slip op. at 16

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable

    “under § 101. First, the claims of the ʼ357 patent do not reflect the asserted “inventive concept” identified by Patent Owner, namely, the ability to calculate shipping rates and tax rates in real time. Patent Owner asserts that the reference in the claims to an “online auction” accomplishes this. Hearing Tr. 62:18–20. But as Petitioner points out, the claims do not recite any form of real-time calculations. The claims simply recite steps that were routinely done manually before the filing date of the patent. Hearing Tr. 7:16–22; Rotman Dep. 127:19–128:5. More fundamentally, however, simply adding a computer limitation to claims covering an abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to render the claim patentable under § 101, even if the use of a computer enables faster operation. Bancorp Services, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In order for the addition of a machine to impose a meaningful limit on the scope of a claim, it must play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly, i.e., through the utilization of a computer for performing calculations. SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Likewise, “the use of the Internet is not sufficient to save otherwise abstract claims from ineligibility under § 101.” Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014). For these reasons, Patent Owner’s argument based on meeting the asserted need for speed and other requirements of online auctions fails.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “We are persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments that it would have been obvious to combine Van Zandt and Illinois Sales Tax. Pet. 58–59. We are convinced by Petitioner’s arguments, supported by the testimony of Dr. Greenspun,5 that one of ordinary skill in the would have “readily appreciated the combinability of the sales tax calculation flow chart in Illinois Sales Tax to perform accurate tax calculations for the state of Illinois or another jurisdiction,” including the tax and duty calculations set forth in Van Zandt. Pet. 58 (citing Greenspun Decl. ¶ 56). We do not credit Patent Owner’s argument limiting Van Zandt’s teachings to international shipping. Van Zandt provides a comprehensive logistics services system and method, including providing landed cost quoting (62), to integrate logistics vendors “across any industry, at any time, 5 Dr. Greenspun holds a Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science from MIT. He has authored five computer science textbooks. He has taught at MIT and has over 20 years of experience in computer software engineering. Greenspun Decl. ¶¶ 3–16. We determine him to be an expert in the field relevant to this patent and credit his testimony. no matter what vendor carrier [] or mode of transportation is to be used and no matter what country the shipment is being handled in or delivered to.” Ex. 1011, Abstract (emphasis added). More specifically, Van Zandt states that its system can calculate “any shipment duties and taxes.” Id. at 22:18 (emphasis added); see also id. at 32:11–17. Nothing in Van Zandt discredits or disallows the calculation of domestic taxes as a component of its calculation of “any shipment duties and taxes.” We credit Dr. Greenspun’s interpretation of the Van Zandt system as” slip op. at 26

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “reason to combine the references because they “teach away.” Hearing Tr. 94:13–14. But in response to questioning by the panel, Patent Owner’s counsel agreed that Hosey does not disparage the type of calculation being done in PriceGrabber.com, taking instead the position that the two are not “necessarily compatible.” Hearing Tr. 94:19–95:14. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s teaching away argument. Nowhere does Patent Owner demonstrate that Hosey criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages the use of its listing or Details page with a shipping interface. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (prior art’s disclosure did not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the claimed solution and therefore did not teach away). We do not agree, either, that the references are not “compatible.” See supra.” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 8,352,357 unpatentable
  § 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,352,357
• Ebay, Inc. v. Paid, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 16, 2015 · CBM2014-00127 · APJ James P Calve · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 are unpatentable under § 101 as directed to an abstract idea without an inventive concept, and under the asserted § 103 grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, the “claims should always be read in light of the specification and the teachings of the underlying patent.” Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1297–98 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We interpret the term “shipping rate” to mean “the overall or total cost of sending an auction item to a buyer.” This interpretation is consistent with the ’237 patent specification’s disclosure of shipping calculator system 1000 and its rate engine 1024 for calculating shipping rates as shown in Figure 10, reproduced below. Ex. 1001, 6:29–33. Figure 10 shows a computer-based system with a shipping calculator. The ’237 patent discloses that rate engine 1024 includes modules that calculate factors contributing to the “overall shipping rate” like shipping rate engine 1028, tax rate engine 1030, insurance rate engine 1032, packaging algorithm engine 1033, and fee-based rate engine 1034. Id. at 7:36–41. Shipping rate engine 1028 calculates a basic shipping rate for an item based on the distance between seller and buyer locations, the weight of the item, the weight of any packaging, and method of shipment. Id. at 8:25–33. Tax rate engine 1030 determines applicable taxes. Id. at 8:34–35. Insurance rate engine 1032 calculates a cost of insurance that is added to the shipping rate based on buyer and seller preferences. Id. at 8:42–46. Because packaging is an important factor in shipping cost, packaging algorithm engine 1033 determines the packaging based on seller preferences and the size, weight, or shape of the item and applies a factor to the shipping rate. Id. at 7:55–8:5. Fee-based engine 1034 calculates rates based on seller inputs such as rates charged for shipping and handling above the rates from common carriers and may include a flat rate for shipping, or per item shipped. Id. at 8:6–20. Rate engine 1024 integrates inputs from the calculations of these other modules and engines, and applies whatever discounts or other factors are required if the components are not simply added, “to obtain a shipping rate based on the various inputs.” Id. at 8:47–51 (emphasis added). The ’237 patent also discloses that the shipping rate may be a flat rate from fee-based engine 1034, a rate calculated from the other engines, or a rate from a combination of different types of calculations. Id. at 8:51–54. Thus, the ’237 patent discloses rate engine 1000 calculating a “shipping rate” that includes not only a basic transportation cost but also many other costs that contribute to the total cost to send an item to a buyer.” slip op. at 9

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionIneligibleUnpatentable

    “We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that the ʼ237 patent does not claim an abstract idea merely because it is directed to online auctions. PO Resp. 23; Hearing Tr. 56:10–12. As the Federal Circuit recently reminded us, “[a]n abstract idea does not become nonabstract by limiting the invention to a particular field of use or technological environment such as the Internet.” Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (US), 792 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). We are, therefore, not convinced by Patent Owner’s argument that the claims are not abstract because they are limited to a specific application. Patent Owner further contends that, unlike the claims in Bilski3 and Alice, the ʼ237 patent’s claims “had never before been achieved.” PO Resp. 23–24. As evidence of this, Patent Owner points to the fact that Petitioner’s prior art challenge relies on obviousness and not anticipation. Id. at 24, n.2 (“eBay has not been able to find or assert against the claims a single anticipatory reference.”). This argument is unavailing. As the Supreme Court observed in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 190 (1981), “[t]he 3 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). question therefore of whether a particular invention is novel is wholly apart from whether the invention falls into a category of statutory subject matter.” Despite Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary, we see little difference between determining shipping rates and tax rates for auctioned items and the type of fundamental economic practices considered to be abstract ideas in Alice Corp. and Bilski.4 As established by the record, both conventional auctions and shipping rate calculations existed long before the Internet. See, e.g., Rotman Decl. ¶¶ 4–8; Greenspun Decl. ¶¶ 31–40; Hearing Tr. 56:17–21. We conclude, therefore, that Petitioner has demonstrated that the ʼ237 patent claims, like the claims in Bilski and Alice, are directed to an abstract idea, namely, determining shipping rates for online auction sales.” slip op. at 16

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptIneligibleUnpatentable

    “We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument for patentability under § 101. First, the claims of the ʼ237 patent do not reflect the asserted “inventive concept” identified by Patent Owner, namely, the ability to calculate shipping rates and tax rates in real time. Patent Owner asserts that the reference in the claims to an “online auction” accomplishes this. Hearing Tr. 62:18–20. But, as Petitioner points out, the claims do not recite any form of real-time calculations. The claims simply recite steps that were done manually before the filing date of the patent. Hearing Tr. 7:16–22; Rotman Dep. 127:19–128:5; Rotman Decl. ¶¶ 21–25, 46. The claims of the ʼ237 patent specify that a shipping rate be calculated “at any time.” Patent Owner relies on this as evidence that the claims embody the asserted inventive concept of providing speedy shipping rate calculations. Hearing Tr. 69:9–22. We are not convinced by this argument. As Patent Owner’s counsel agreed, the language does not indicate how long the calculation takes, only when it may occur. Id. at 70:20–71:5. More fundamentally, however, simply adding a computer limitation to claims covering an abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to render the claim patentable under § 101, even if the use of a computer enables faster operation. Bancorp Services, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In order for the addition of a machine to impose a meaningful limit on the scope of a claim, it must play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly, i.e., through the utilization of a computer for performing calculations.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “First, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments, as supported by Dr. Greenspun’s6 testimony, that it would have been obvious to modify Van Zandt according to techniques of iShip.com because both references address the provision of a shipping rate calculator for online auctions so buyers can obtain a shipping estimate at any point during an online auction. Pet. 29–31. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments and Dr. Greenspun’s testimony that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to embed a link to shipping 6 Dr. Greenspun holds a Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science from MIT. He has authored five computer science textbooks. He has taught at MIT and has over 20 years of experience in computer software engineering. Greenspun Decl. ¶¶ 3–16. We determine that Dr. Greenspun is an expert in the field relevant to this patent and credit his testimony. information in Van Zandt’s interfaces, as taught by iShip.com’s unique URL that a seller pastes into item descriptions, to increase Van Zandt’s flexibility and provide multiple shipping options. Pet. 29–31; Pet. Reply 5; Greenspun Decl. ¶ 56 (iShip.com allows seller to add a form to another’s web site); Ex. 1020 ¶ 10c (user interfaces are freely borrowed from different websites).” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 7,930,237 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Bilski · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,930,237

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.