• Alliance Laundry Systems, LLC v. Payrange LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 19, 2026 · PGR2025-00027 · APJ George R Hoskins · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6 and 8–20 are unpatentable under § 101; claim 7 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Pet.”) pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–329 to institute a post-grant review of U.S. Patent No. 11,966,920 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’920 patent”), claims 1–20. We issued an Institution Decision (Paper 12) granting the petitioned review. slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelOther

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person having ordinary skill in the art pertaining” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “thereby supporting our conclusion that the plain and ordinary meaning of “affordance” in claim 1 refers to an interactive user interface element.” slip op. at 30

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Petitioner’s reliance on Low’s” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 11,966,920 mixed
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Berkheimer · Enfish · Electric Power · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 11,966,920
• Alliance Laundry Systems, LLC v. Payrange LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 19, 2026 · PGR2025-00028 · APJ George R Hoskins · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6 and 8–20 are unpatentable under § 102, § 103, or § 101; claim 7 was not shown unpatentable because the asserted grounds did not establish its limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “1. Legal Standards “Anticipation requires that every limitation of the claim in issue be” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundMixed

    “2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d at 1368). Further, an assertion of obviousness “cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)); accord In re NuVasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (stating that “conclusory statements” amount to an “insufficient articulation[] of motivation to combine”; “instead, the finding must be supported by a ‘reasoned explanation’” (quoting In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002))); In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“To satisfy its burden of proving obviousness, a petitioner cannot employ mere conclusory statements. The petitioner must instead articulate specific reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”).” slip op. at 36

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionMixed

    “because the “user interface” limitations merely apply the recited abstract idea on a generic mobile device without meaningfully limiting the abstract idea. See 2025 Guidance, at 4–5. For example, these limitations do not reflect an improvement to the functioning of the mobile device (or any other computer device), and instead are “mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on” the mobile device. Id. Indeed, the ’423 patent specification describes only a generic “swipe-to-pay” feature. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 7:13–33, Figs. 8C, 10A–10D. This supports our conclusion here that the claim 11 limitations do not integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application. See MPEP § 2106.04(d)(1) (“[T]he specification should be evaluated to determine if the disclosure provides sufficient details such that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize the claimed invention as providing an improvement,” and “it must describe” slip op. at 108

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptMixed

    “because the “user interface” limitations merely apply the recited abstract idea on a generic mobile device without meaningfully limiting the abstract idea. See 2025 Guidance, at 4–5. For example, these limitations do not reflect an improvement to the functioning of the mobile device (or any other computer device), and instead are “mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on” the mobile device. Id. Indeed, the ’423 patent specification describes only a generic “swipe-to-pay” feature. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 7:13–33, Figs. 8C, 10A–10D. This supports our conclusion here that the claim 11 limitations do not integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application. See MPEP § 2106.04(d)(1) (“[T]he specification should be evaluated to determine if the disclosure provides sufficient details such that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize the claimed invention as providing an improvement,” and “it must describe” slip op. at 108

  Patent outcomesUS 11,972,423 mixed
  § 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Enfish · Electric Power · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,972,423
• Kiosoft Technologies, LLC / Techtrex, Inc. v. Payrange Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 26, 2022 · PGR2021-00077 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · PGR · Final written decision

  Claim 1 is unpatentable under § 101; claims 2–27 were not shown unpatentable because the other challenges were deficient.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A person having ordinary skill in the art would have had an education background of, or practical experience providing an equivalent to, a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, or a related/equivalent field and at least four years of work experience in identity, transaction, and telecommunication solutions.” slip op. at 12

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “As can be seen from claim 1 above, all of the claimed method steps occur “at the mobile device” and the final step is to enable completion of a cashless transaction. Claim 1 does not recite completing the purchase. The ’833 patent describes that any commercial transaction is completed at the automatic retail machine, not at the mobile device. Ex. 1001, 11:5–9; see also id. at 21:4–11, 22:18–20, 23:53–61, 30:25–27. We, thus, agree with Patent Owner that the claimed method does not require completing or conducting the transaction, but only enabling the completion of the transaction. On this complete record, we are persuaded that the elements italicized above recite the concept of obtaining authorization for a purchase and enabling completion of a cashless transaction, prior to user selection of any items or services. See Pet. 22–23 (arguing that the claimed method “is effectively no different than a person entering a store, the store checking the customer’s available credit (or calling a bank to do so) and when the customer decides on the item, completing the purchase”); Pet. Reply 5–6 (arguing that the claim recites “obtaining payment authorization and performing a financial transaction, the same as a person entering a store, the store checking the customer’s available credit (or calling a bank to do so) and, when the customer decides on the item, allowing the purchase”). In particular, claim 1 recites steps for obtaining authorization prior to user selection of any items or services — steps of identifying the automatic retail machine, obtaining a request from the electronic payment device, sending the request to a server, and obtaining from the server an authorization grant. Claim 1 also recites steps for enabling the completion of a purchase (i.e., cashless transaction) — detecting a trigger condition and sending the authorization grant to the electronic payment device. Our slight revision of the abstract idea from what we previously stated in our Institution Decision does not impact the patentability analysis. Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 18

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable

    “We are not persuaded. Patent Owner’s arguments rest on the alleged novelty of the abstract idea itself, not the “specific limitation beyond the judicial exception,” i.e., the additional elements. “[A] claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.” BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018). A novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90. “The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89 (emphasis added). Patent Owner and Dr. Shamos do not identify, and we cannot find, anything in the claim suggesting that the mobile device, server, or automated retail device (i.e., the additional elements) are more than generic components. Indeed, the ’833 patent’s specification demonstrates that these elements were well-understood, routine, and conventional to the industry. Ex. 1001, 2:23–29, 37–42, 3:25–38 (explaining that Offer “teaches permitting the cashless utilization of a vending machines via a communications service, such as a cellular telephone;” Khan teaches an application on a user’s “personal trusted device” used to effectuate cashless purchases; and Carlson teaches “a system and a method for using a portable consumer device such as a mobile phone for payments and the like,” the method including prompting a user to select, from his mobile device, a product for purchase at a vending machine, after/if the user is authorized to make the purchase, and sending an authorization response to the vending machine from a “remote payment server”).” slip op. at 26

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “At the institution stage, we determined that no claim term required explicit construction. Inst. Dec. 35–37. Petitioner does not challenge our determination or otherwise advance its claim constructions in its Reply. See generally Pet. Reply. Patent Owner does not advance any explicit claim construction. PO Resp. 7–13. Regarding the identifying limitation, Patent Owner indicates that it is “undisputed between the parties that the claims require automatically determining the identity of the specific automatic retail machine based on an electronic transmission received from an electronic payment device of that automatic retail machine.” Id. at 7–8 (emphasis in original, citing Ex. 2018, 3; Ex. 2016 ¶ 68). Patent Owner submits that Petitioner’s constructions for each of the obtaining, authorization, and payment limitations should be rejected “for lacking accordance with the plain meaning of the claim in view of the specification” or “ignor[ing] the plain meaning of the term.” Id. at 9, 12, 13. As to the detecting limitation, Patent Owner argues that certain prior art asserted in the grounds in the Petition fails to teach the term as construed. Id. at 9. We determine that we need not expressly construe these claim terms” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 10,719,833 mixed
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Mayo · Bilski · Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 10,719,833
• Epicor Software Corporation v. Protegrity CorporationSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 20, 2016 · CBM2015-00002 · APJ Kevin F Turner · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 5, 19, and 20 are unpatentable under § 101; claims 27–31 were not shown unpatentable under that ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “e. Broadest Reasonable Construction of “Database” We determine that the broadest reasonable construction, in light of the specification of the ’201 Patent, and the proffered evidence, of “database” is “an organized collection of structured data.” As discussed above, this construction is consistent with the words of the claims, the disclosure of the ’201 Patent, the testimony of Mr. Schneier and Dr. Shamos and the position taken by Patent Owner in the related district court proceeding. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments, Patent Owner’s declarants’ testimony, database manual, or technical encyclopedia that this construction is unreasonably broad.” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Mr. Mattsson’s and Dr. Direen’s testimony is unpersuasive because it is inconsistent with the ’201 Patent. As discussed above, the ’201 Patent describes the O-DB as one database in a larger database management system. Ex. 1001, 5:49–6:12. The ’201 Patent describes the O-DB database as containing data and describes the modules of the larger database management system as performing data processing. Id. at 5:53–58, 6:13–45. The ’201 Patent does not describe the O-DB database as producing the compelling calling. See Ex. 1001, 10:44–58 (“is first collected by the system”); see id. at Abstract, 2:54–61, 3:51–65, 4:16–22, 7:57–61 (disclosing a compelling calling to a data protection catalogue, but failing to describe the compelling calling being produced by the O-DB database). The assertion that the compelling calling is produced by the O-DB database is only found in Patent Owner’s arguments, Mr. Mattsson’s testimony, and Dr. Direen’s testimony, and not the ’201 Patent. See, e.g., Ex. 2045 ¶¶ 12– 16, 22, 29; Ex. 2046 ¶ 57. Extraneous features should not be read into the claim. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In that regard, “extrinsic evidence may be used only to assist in the proper understanding of the disputed limitation; it may not be used to vary, contradict, expand, or limit the claim language from how it is defined, even by implication, in the specification or file history.” Bell Atl. Network Servs. v. Covad Commc'ns Grp., 262 F.3d 1258, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 (“expert testimony, which was inconsistent with the specification and file history, should have been accorded no weight”). Further, we give little weight to Mr. Mattsson’s testimony because Mr. Mattsson is not a disinterested witness. Mr. Mattsson is Patent Owner’s Chief Technology Officer (Ex. 2045 ¶ 1) and has an interest in the outcome of this proceeding.” slip op. at 11

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Mr. Schneier’s declaration should be excluded under FRE Rule 702 or 403. Patent Owner’s arguments attack the sufficiency and credibility of Mr. Schneier’s testimony. As the Board has noted in numerous cases, “the Board, sitting as a non-jury tribunal with administrative expertise, is well-positioned to determine and assign appropriate weight to the evidence presented in this trial, without resorting to formal exclusion that might later be held reversible error.” See, e.g., Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., CBM2012-00002, Paper 66 at 70 (PTAB Jan. 23, 2014); Gnosis S.P.A., et al. v. S. Alabama Medical Science Foundation, IPR2013-00118, Paper 64 at 43 (PTAB June 20, 2014); S.E.C. v. Guenthner, 395 F. Supp. 2d 835, 842 n.3 (D. Neb. 2005); Opp. to Mot. Exclude 4. We, thus, are not persuaded by Patent Owner to exclude Exhibit 1002 and Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is denied.” slip op. at 35

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedGranted

    “The scheduling order authorizes the filing of such a motion for observations regarding cross-examination of a reply witness by Due Date 4. Mr. Schneier cross-examination testimony was given on June 12, 2015, prior to Patent Owner filing its Patent Owner’s Response, on June 24, 2105. The cross-examination did not occur after Patent Owner filed its last substantive paper. Patent Owner’s Motion for Observation, thus, is improper. The Scheduling Order did not authorize Patent Owner to file a Motion for Observation of cross-examination that occurred prior to Patent Owner filing its last substantive paper on an issue, the Patent Owner’s Response and Patent Owner did not seek other authorization for such. The improper observations are akin to an unauthorized sur-reply to argument made in Petitioner’s Reply. We, thus, expunge Patent Owner’s unauthorized observations from the record. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.7(a). Additionally, we expunge Petitioner’s Opposition to that Observation (Paper 40) as being unnecessary.” slip op. at 37

  Patent outcomesUS 6,321,201 mixed
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski
  Patents in suitUS 6,321,201
• Epicor Software Corporation v. Protegrity CorporationSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 18, 2016 · CBM2015-00006 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 33–38, 41, 43–52, 55, and 57–60 are unpatentable under § 101; claims 39, 40, 42, 53, 54, and 56 were not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 61–68 were denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

    “B. Patent Owner’s Request to Cancel Claims 1–32 In the Patent Owner’s Response and the Motion to Amend, Patent Owner requests cancellation of claims 1–32 of the ’281 patent. PO Resp. 2– 3; Mot. Amend 1. Patent Owner’s request to cancel these claims is not contingent on the claims being determined to be unpatentable or on the entry of the proposed substitute claims. Patent Owner’s request to cancel claims 1–32 is granted and we need not address these claims further.” slip op. at 3

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “1998) (citing Bell Commc’ns Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Commc’ns Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 619–20 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). Independent claim 33 recites “[a] computer-implemented data processing method” that includes, among other steps, a step of “maintaining a database comprising a plurality of data portions.” Ex. 1001, 13:38–41. Similarly, independent claim 47 recites “[a] computer system” that includes, among other elements, “a database storing a plurality of data portions.” Id. at 14:47–48. As can be seen from the above, claims 33 and 47 recite that the database comprises or stores data portions. Neither of claims 33 and 47, nor any claims dependent therefrom, recites that the database performs any other function, such as producing a compelling calling to the data protection catalogue to retrieve the data processing rules. See id. at 13:38–16:29. Indeed, unlike the parent ’201 patent, none of the claims of the ’281 patent recite a compelling calling at all. See id.; Ex. 1004, Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate 1:24–51 (amended claim 8). Notably, independent claim 8 of the parent ’201 patent recite an apparatus having a database that stores data to be protected. Ex. 1004, Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate 1:24–51 (amended claim 8). Claim 8 of the parent ’201 patent was amended during reexamination to recite that the apparatus, not the database, controls the user’s processing of the data according to the data processing rules, and the apparatus, not the database, also produces the compelling calling to the data element protection catalogue. Id. at Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate 1:41–51. The words of the claims of the ’281 patent, thus, are consistent with Petitioner’s proposed construction as the broadest reasonable construction.” slip op. at 10

  • BurdenDecided for petitioner

    “We are persuaded by Petitioner that a preponderance of the evidence shows that at least claim 33 encompasses activities that are financial in nature, incidental to a financial activity, or complementary to a financial activity.” slip op. at 21

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionDecided for petitioner

    “Independent claim 33 recites a data processing method that grants access to a requested data portion if the rules associated with a data category that is associated with the requested data portion is satisfied. Ex. 1001, 13:38–54. Claim 33 requires a database that comprises the data portions and requires a separate data protection table comprising data processing rules that must be satisfied before the data portion can be accessed. Id. The data processing rules are associated with the data category. Id. Independent claim 47 recites a corresponding computer system. Id. at 14:47–63. Independent claims 33 and 47, thus, recite a method or system that grants access to a requested data portion if the rules associated with a data category that is associated with the requested data portion are satisfied. Ex. 1001, 13:38–54. Given the above, we are persuaded by Petitioner that the claims are directed to the abstract idea of determining whether access to data should be granted based on whether one or more rules are satisfied. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner that the claims are not directed to an abstract idea, because Patent Owner’s argument is based upon elements not required by the claims. See PO Resp. 29–38. Given our construction of “data portion” and “database” in section II (A) above, the claims do not require protection on the data element level based on rules stored in a separate database, where the first database calls out to the second database. Patent Owner’s argument is not commensurate with the scope of the claims.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 8,402,281 mixed
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo
  Patents in suitUS 8,402,281
• Apple, Inc. / Domino’S Pizza, Inc. et al. v. Ameranth, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 20, 2015 · CBM2014-00013 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, and 12 are unpatentable under § 101; claims 3, 6–9, 11, and 13–16 were not shown unpatentable because the petition did not establish their claimed features were conventional.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenMixed

    “We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument. Petitioner states that the claimed linking is a “classic example[] of manual tasks that cannot be rendered patent-eligible merely by performing them with a computer.” Reply 15. However, Petitioner fails to provide sufficient evidence to support its statement. See Pet. 49–66; Reply 9–15. Petitioner provides insufficient evidence to establish that a menu having the functionality to perform the claimed linking from a GUI on a hand-held device, was well-known or conventional and merely require a general purpose computer. See id. Upon review, we determine that Petitioner fails to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 3 and 11 recite patent-ineligible subject matter.” slip op. at 37

  • Skill levelOther

    “B. Claim Construction The Board interprets claims of unexpired patents using the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b). Under the broadest reasonable construction standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Any special definition for a claim term must be set forth with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In the absence of such a definition, limitations are not to be read from the specification into the claims. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Prior to construing the relevant claim limitations, we turn to some initial matters raised by Patent Owner. First, Patent Owner argues that we must construe “the entirety of the challenged claims” (PO Resp. 31), and proposes constructions for some, but not all, limitations of the challenged claims (see id. at 34–36). Claim construction, however, “is not an inviolable prerequisite to a validity determination under § 101.” Bancorp Servs. L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), L.L.C., 687 F.3d 1266, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2012). See, e.g., Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only those terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy). Below, we construe the limitations that are relevant to the issues of patent-eligibility discussed below. We determine that all other claim limitations need no explicit construction.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner

    “In general, a preamble limits the invention if it recites essential structure or steps, or if it is ‘necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality’ to the claim.” Catalina Mktg. Int'l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Pitney Bowes Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). A preamble, however, is not limiting where the claim body defines a structurally complete invention and the preamble only states a purpose or intended use for the invention. Id. slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We are persuaded by Petitioner that the broadest reasonable construction in light of the Specification of the term CPU is the computational and control unit of a computer. Petitioner’s construction is consistent with the Specification, which describes that the system of the ’733 patent uses typical hardware elements in the form of a computer workstation and that “a typical workstation platform includes hardware such as a central processing unit (‘CPU’), e.g., a Pentium® microprocessor.” Ex. 1033, col. 6, ll. 52–54; see also id. at col. 6, l. 65 (“a CPU, e.g., Pentium® microprocessor”). Further, Petitioner’s construction is consistent with the Specification, which as discussed above, discloses using a desktop PC to generate and download menus to a connected handheld device (see id. at col. 7, l. 38–col. 10, l. 15), as well as, discloses the use of a central back-office server (e.g., see id. at col. 2, ll. 37–40). Patent Owner’s proposed construction improperly reads into the claims the central back-office server. See Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249 (explaining that extraneous features should not be read into the claims). For these reasons, we determine that the broadest reasonable construction, in light of the Specification, of CPU is the computational and control unit of a computer.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 6,982,733 mixed
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo
  Patents in suitUS 6,982,733

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.