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  • PTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-00530 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–16 are unpatentable as obvious; the Board denied the contingent motion to amend proposing substitute claims 17–32.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Expert testimonyOther

      “iv. Claim 1 Conclusion Based on the complete record presented, Petitioner has shown that Gage teaches all limitations of claim 1. Thus, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over Gage. v. Independent claim 8 Independent claim 8 recites a method of “providing situation related information to a situation authority via a situational network,” wherein the method comprises “receiving, by a participant device, a roll call query soliciting a reply related to a status of a participant based on the participant being determined, by the situation authority, to be geographically proximate to the situation,” “receiving, by the participant device, a selection of a status response from the participant,” and “sending the status response to the central authority, wherein the status response is included in a roll call list.” Ex. 1001, 34:46–57. Petitioner generally refers to its contentions with respect to claim 1. Pet. 34–36. In particular, Petitioner contends that Gage teaches a subscriber device that communicates a status indicator to the disaster response system through a subscriber status reporting system that implements a “situational network” configured for use during disasters. Id. at 34 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 19, 25). Petitioner additionally contends that Gage’s “disaster response system” is a “situation authority” because the disaster response system detects an occurrence of a disaster affecting a region, receives and aggregates information related to the disaster, and then provides the information to various participants in the network. Id. (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 8–9, 21, 36, 45; Ex. 1003 ¶ 104). With respect to the “situational network” limitation, Patent Owner” slip op. at 39

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “1. “situational network” (claims 1, 8, 13) Patent Owner points out that the district court has already construed” slip op. at 12

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “viii. Ground 1 Conclusion In light of the above analysis, we determine that Petitioner’s evidence” slip op. at 46

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied

      “c. Conclusion on Petitioner’s Patentability Challenges based on Obviousness for Proposed Substitute Claims For the above reasons, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of evidence that the subject matter of proposed substitute claims 17–32 would have been unpatentable. IV. CONCLUSION9 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Petitioner has shown by a” slip op. at 82

    Patent outcomesUS 9,877,345 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,877,345
  • PTAB · Oct 15, 2015 · CBM2014-00116 · APJ Kevin F Turner · CBM · Final written decision

    Claims 39–44 are unpatentable under § 101 because they claim the abstract idea of relaying mailing address data without significantly more; anticipation by 1997 ACS was not shown.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “II. ANALYSIS A. Claim Construction We construe all terms, whether or not expressly discussed here, using the broadest reasonable construction in light of the ’548 Patent specification. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b); see also In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 93 F.3d 1268, 1278–80 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Congress implicitly approved the broadest reasonable interpretation standard in enacting the AIA,” and “the standard was properly adopted by PTO regulation.”). During the pre-trial stage of this proceeding, the parties submitted their constructions for specific claim terms and we adopted constructions consistent with the constructions adopted by the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (Ex. 1011). Dec. 8–10. Return Mail does not dispute the constructions adopted. PO Resp. 16–27. Upon review of the parties’ explanations and supporting evidence before us, we discern no reason to modify our claim constructions set forth in the Decision on Institution with respect to these claim terms. Dec. 8–10. For convenience, our claim constructions are reproduced in the table below:” slip op. at 6

    • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionIneligibleUnpatentable

      “USPS has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 39, as a whole, is directed to the processing of returned mail items, involving decoding information, obtaining an updated address, and electronically transmitting that updated address to a transferee. USPS has shown that the steps are directed to the abstract idea of relaying mailing address data, with the inclusion of an electrical transmission step. Regarding whether claim 39 includes limitations that amount to significantly more than the abstract idea of relaying mailing address data, per our claim construction, USPS has shown that the “decoding” step is “deciphering information into useable form,” but that does not necessarily bring it out of the realm of processes performed in the past by human beings. In fact, all of the claimed steps could be performed in the human mind, with the exception of the transmitting step. Additionally, USPS has shown that what the data might be deemed to represent to the human mind — e.g., “information indicating whether the sender wants a corrected address to be provided for the intended recipient” — does not substantially affect the underlying structure or function of the claim or any machine on which it is carried out. Consistent with USPS’s position, the ’548 Patent disclosure does not describe any particular hardware to perform the steps recited in claim 39, but refers merely in broad terms to generic computer hardware and software.” slip op. at 14

    • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptIneligibleUnpatentable

      “significantly more than the abstract idea of relaying mailing address data, per our claim construction, USPS has shown that the “decoding” step is “deciphering information into useable form,” but that does not necessarily bring it out of the realm of processes performed in the past by human beings. In fact, all of the claimed steps could be performed in the human mind, with the exception of the transmitting step. Additionally, USPS has shown that what the data might be deemed to represent to the human mind — e.g., “information indicating whether the sender wants a corrected address to be provided for the intended recipient” — does not substantially affect the underlying structure or function of the claim or any machine on which it is carried out. Consistent with USPS’s position, the ’548 Patent disclosure does not describe any particular hardware to perform the steps recited in claim 39, but refers merely in broad terms to generic computer hardware and software.” slip op. at 14

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “deciding between the proffered constructions of “[d]ecipher information into useable form” and “[c]onvert information into useable form,” the court concluded that “using the terms ‘decipher’ and ‘deciphered’ more closely follow the customary meaning of the terms and reflects the claim language. This is because decoding must operate on encoded data,” which is recognized in the term “decipher” but not in “convert.” Ex. 1011, 22–23. USPS contends that “the carrier converts into intelligible form the participant code and endorsement thereby performing the claimed ‘decoding.’” Pet. 45. However, we find no support within 1997 ACS that the carrier decodes or deciphers the participant code or endorsement because the carrier (a person) is merely reading those indicators. The indicator “ADRESS SERVICE REQUESTED” is merely read and there is no disclosure that the carrier decodes the participant code or the keyline. We disagree with Dr. Lubenow that the plain-English endorsements “meet the plain and ordinary meaning of the term ‘code.’” Ex. 1028 ¶ 18. As such, we are not persuaded that the carrier in 1997 ACS acts to decode encoded data on the returned mail items.” slip op. at 24

    Patent outcomesUS 6,826,548 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipationcites Alice · Mayo
    Patents in suitUS 6,826,548
  • PTAB · Mar 13, 2015 · CBM2014-00001 · APJ Howard B Blankenship · CBM · Final written decision

    Claims 2, 6, and 8 are unpatentable under §§ 101 and 103(a); Patent Owner’s motion to amend is denied.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

      “In this case, representative claim 2 recites eight steps for a search that is “associated with at least one travel related item,” and which include receiving the search results, communicating the results along with an advertisement, receiving an order for the item, and processing the order. See Ex. 1001, col. 145, ll. 33–61. Although the claimed process requires computer hardware and software (e.g., step (a) of claim 2, “receiving a Hypertext Transfer Protocol request from a client device”), we agree with Petitioner that the claim embraces 5 The Court’s decision is sometimes referenced as Ultramercial III. The Federal Circuit heard the second appeal from the U.S. District Court after the Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s first decision. 772 F.3d at 711–12. the abstract idea of marketing an item on a metasearch Web site with keyword ads and providing a way to order the item.” slip op. at 13

    • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptIneligibleUnpatentable

      “Next, or in step two of the analysis, we search for an “inventive concept”— i.e., an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. In this case, the claims recite, for the most part, an ordered combination of steps that contain Internet operations that were conventional at the time of invention. For example, the claims recite communicating with a client device using a Hypertext Transfer Protocol [HTTP]. Momma.com demonstrates that browsers on Internet client devices used such a protocol at the time of invention. See Ex. 1005, 10 (for “Microsoft Internet Explorer,” go to the address “http://www.mamma.com”). The claims further recite a “metasearch engine,” which also was conventional at the time of invention. See id. at 5 (“Mamma is a meta search engine”); see also Prelim. Resp. 3 (Patent Owner did not claim that “metasearching” was novel at the time of invention). Patent Owner argues that designing more than a “rudimentary” metasearch engine in the late 1990’s was not a trivial task. PO Resp. 44. The argument is premised on the assumption that the claims require more than “rudimentary” metasearching. The claims recite, however, as in claim 2, a “metasearch engine to send at least one search query to a plurality of unique hosts”—e.g., a metasearch engine capable of sending a single search query to a plurality (e.g., two) different hosts. The claims are drawn to implementing the abstract idea of marketing an item on a metasearch Web site with keyword ads and some way to order the item with routine, conventional activity. Such an implementation does not transform the abstract idea into patent eligible subject matter.” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “5. Combining Knowledge Broker and Mamma.com Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to combine the “disparate technologies” of Mamma.com and Knowledge Broker and would not have known how to do so “without complex, lengthy, and uncertain experimentation.” PO Resp. 62. According to Patent Owner, the “two technologies” of “metasearch engines and structured e-commerce comparison shopping services providing product purchase functionality and associated advertisements—were vastly different technologies during the late 1990s and in particular in 1999-2000.” Id. at 59. A person of ordinary skill in the art would “not have been motivated to combine metasearch engines with structured e-commerce comparison shopping sites due to numerous other technical challenges present at the time.” Id. at 63. We agree with Petitioner, however, that the claims do not require addressing the “technical challenges” submitted by Patent Owner. Pet. Reply 11–12. Adding advertisements to Knowledge Broker would not require combining a metasearch engine with other “technologies” such as “structured ecommerce comparison shopping sites.” For example, the advertisements could be supplied from the hosts. Patent Owner acknowledges there is no limitation as to where the advertisement comes from. Tr. 61:20–25.” slip op. at 26

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Long-felt need / failure of othersNot shown unpatentableDecided for petitioner

      “The Declaration does not point to any evidence in the record in support of the allegations. Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Moreover, Dr. Carbonell does not allege, let alone show, that others tried and failed to solve the problem allegedly solved by the ’924 patent. See Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[L]ong-felt need is analyzed as of the date of an articulated identified problem and evidence of efforts to solve that problem.”); In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (declarations that failed to show a long-felt need and failure of others to meet that need, and which offered only opinion evidence that has little value without sufficient support, were insufficient to establish nonobviousness). Further, on this record, the “desirability of combined search and shopping functionality” (Ex. 2006 ¶ 40) was not unmet at the time of invention. Patent Owner acknowledges that e-commerce services that allowed a user to query structured databases predated the invention. E.g., PO Reply 8–9, 12, 62 (discussing “SoftBot” and “ShopBot” e-commerce services). For the foregoing reasons, we find that Patent Owner’s evidence in support of a long-felt but unmet need is entitled to little weight in support of nonobviousness.” slip op. at 29

    Patent outcomesUS 8,326,924 unpatentable
    § 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Mayo · Bilski · Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,326,924

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.