- Apple Inc. v. Smartflash LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 27, 2017 · CBM2015-00121 · APJ Gregg I Anderson · CBM · Rehearing
The Board denied Smartflash’s rehearing request, leaving in place its determination that claims 1–28 are patent-ineligible under § 101.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“showing unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 326(e). The standard of review for rehearing requests is set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which states: The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” slip op. at 3
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionDecided for petitioner
“Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 1001, 26:35–37 (claim 1), 28:3–9 (claim 14)). But McRO does not stand for the general proposition that payment validation to achieve an improved technological result, alone, removes claims from the realm of abstract ideas. In McRO, the Court explained that “the claimed improvement [was] allowing computers to produce ‘accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated characters’ that previously could only be produced by human animators.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1313 (citation omitted). The Court explained that the claimed rules in McRO transformed a traditionally subjective process performed by human artists into a mathematically automated process executed on computers (i.e., the processes were fundamentally different). Id. at 1314. The Court” slip op. at 5
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptDecided for petitioner
“because it contains a sufficient ‘inventive concept.’” Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300. The claim at issue recited “computer code for using the accounting information with which the first network accounting record is correlated to enhance the first network accounting record.” Id. The Court explained that the “claim entails an unconventional technological solution (enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a technological problem (massive record flows which previously required massive databases).” Id. The Court noted that, although the solution requires generic computer components, “the claim’s enhancing limitation necessarily requires that these generic components operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality.” Id. at 1300–1301. When determining that the claim was patent-eligible, the Court explained that the “enhancing limitation necessarily involves the arguably generic gatherers, network devices, and other components working in an unconventional distributed fashion to solve a particular technological problem.” Id. at 1301. The Court distinguished the claim from the claim held unpatentable in Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014) on the grounds that the “enhancing limitation . . . necessarily 7 This is the only instance where one of Patent Owner’s papers is cited in the Request. incorporates the invention’s distributed architecture—an architecture providing a technological solution to a technological problem,” which “provides the requisite ‘something more’ than the performance of ‘well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities previously known to the industry.’” Id. (citations omitted). We are not persuaded that we misapprehended Amdocs. As noted in our Final Decision, “[t]he ’516 patent treats as well-known all potentially technical aspects of the challenged claims, which simply require generic computer components.” Final Dec. 15. Unlike the generic components at issue in Amdocs, the generic components recited in claims 1–28 of the ’516 patent do not operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality. See Final Dec. 20–22. Claims 1– 28 of the ’516 patent simply recite generic memories, processors, and “code to” perform well-known functions with no description of the underlying implementation or programming.” slip op. at 7
§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Bilski · EnfishPatents in suitUS 8,794,516 - Apple Inc. v. Smartflash LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 27, 2017 · CBM2015-00131 · APJ Jeremy M Plenzler · CBM · Rehearing
The Board denied Smartflash’s rehearing request, leaving in place its determination that challenged claims 3–6, 8–14, 16–25, 27–30, and 32–41 are ineligible under § 101.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” slip op. at 3
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Not reached
“Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 1001, 26:5–11 (claim 3)). But McRO does not stand for the general proposition that use of rules or conditions to achieve an improved technological result, alone, removes claims from the realm of abstract ideas. In McRO, the Court explained that “the claimed improvement [was] allowing computers to produce ‘accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated characters’ that previously could only be produced by human animators.” Id. at 1313 (citation omitted). The Court explained that the claimed rules in McRO transformed a traditionally subjective process performed by human artists into a mathematically automated process executed on computers (i.e., the processes were fundamentally different). Id. at 1314. The Court explained” slip op. at 5
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptNot reached
“In Amdocs, the Court held that “[claim 1] is eligible under step two because it contains a sufficient ‘inventive concept.’” Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300. The claim at issue recited “computer code for using the accounting information with which the first network accounting record is correlated to enhance the first network accounting record.” Id. The Court explained that the “claim entails an unconventional technological solution (enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a technological problem (massive record flows which previously required massive databases).” Id. The Court noted that, although the solution requires generic computer components, “the claim’s enhancing limitation necessarily requires that these generic components operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality.” Id. at 1300–1301. When determining that the claim was patent-eligible, the Court explained that the “enhancing limitation necessarily involves the arguably generic gatherers, network devices, and other components working in an unconventional distributed fashion to solve a particular technological problem.” Id. at 1301. The Court distinguished the claim from the claim held unpatentable in Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014) on the grounds that the “enhancing limitation . . . necessarily incorporates the invention’s distributed architecture—an architecture providing a technological solution to a technological problem,” which “provides the requisite ‘something more’ than the performance of ‘well-” slip op. at 7
§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Bilski · EnfishPatents in suitUS 8,061,598 - Apple Inc. / Google, Inc. v. Smartflash LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 27, 2017 · CBM2015-00133 · APJ Jeremy M Plenzler · CBM · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request and left intact its determination that challenged claims 2–4, 6, 7, 9, 11–13, 15–18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27–29, 31, and 33–36 are patent-ineligible under § 101.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“showing unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 326(e). The standard of review for rehearing requests is set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which states: The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” slip op. at 4
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionDecided for petitioner
“Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 1001, 26:35–37 (claim 1)). But McRO does not stand for the general proposition that use of rules or conditions to achieve an improved technological result, alone, removes claims from the realm of abstract ideas. In McRO, the Court explained that “the claimed improvement [was] allowing computers to produce ‘accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated characters’ that previously could only be produced by human animators.” Id. at 1313 (citation omitted). The Court explained that the claimed rules in McRO transformed a traditionally subjective process performed by human artists into a mathematically automated process executed on computers (i.e., the processes were fundamentally different). Id. at 1314. The Court explained 7 Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016). that “it [was] the incorporation of the claimed rules, not the use of the computer, that ‘improved [the] existing technological process’ by allowing the automation of further tasks.” Id. at 1314 (alteration in original) (quoting Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014)). The Court distinguished this from situations “where the claimed computer-automated process and the prior method were carried out in the same way.” Id. (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585–86 (1978); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010); Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356)). As explained in our Final Decision, the challenged claims “merely implement an old practice in a new environment.” Final Dec. 12–13 (quoting FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). The challenged claims are similar to the claims found ineligible in FairWarning, which the Court distinguished from those at issue McRO. FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1094–95. In FairWarning, the Court explained that “[t]he claimed rules ask . . . the same questions . . . that humans in analogous situations . . . have asked for decades, if not centuries” and that it is the “incorporation of a computer, not the claimed rule, that purportedly ‘improve[s] [the] existing technological process.’” Id. at 1095 (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358). This is similar to the challenged claims, where the “payment validation data” in claim 2, for example, is merely a condition for “enabl[ing] access to . . . multimedia content” that the ’772 patent explains “will normally be dependent upon payments made for data stored on the data carrier” (i.e., allowing access when the data has been purchased). Ex. 1001, 9:28–30.” slip op. at 6
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptDecided for petitioner
“In Amdocs, the Court held that “[claim 1] is eligible under step two because it contains a sufficient ‘inventive concept.’” Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300. The claim at issue recited “computer code for using the accounting information with which the first network accounting record is correlated to enhance the first network accounting record.” Id. The Court explained that the “claim entails an unconventional technological solution (enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a technological problem (massive record flows which previously required massive databases).” Id. The Court noted that, although the solution requires generic computer components, “the claim’s enhancing limitation necessarily requires that these generic components operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality.” Id. at 1300–1301. When determining that the claim was patent-eligible, the Court explained that the “enhancing limitation necessarily involves the arguably generic gatherers, network devices, and other components working in an unconventional distributed fashion to solve a particular technological problem.” Id. at 1301. The Court distinguished the claim from the claim held unpatentable in Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014) on the grounds that the “enhancing limitation . . . necessarily incorporates the invention’s distributed architecture—an architecture providing a technological solution to a technological problem,” which 8 This is the only instance where one of Patent Owner’s papers is cited in the Request. “provides the requisite ‘something more’ than the performance of ‘well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities previously known to the industry.’” Id. (citations omitted). We are not persuaded that we misapprehended Amdocs. As noted in our Final Decision, “[t]he ’772 patent treats as well-known all potentially technical aspects of the challenged claims, which simply require generic computer components.” Final Dec. 15. Unlike the generic components at issue in Amdocs, the generic components recited in claims 2–4, 6, 7, 9, 11– 13, 15–18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27–29, 31, and 33–36 of the ’772 patent do not operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality. See Final Dec. 20–24. Claims 2–5, 7, 9, and 12 of the ’772 patent simply recite generic memories and data types with no description of the underlying implementation or programming.” slip op. at 8
§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Bilski · EnfishPatents in suitUS 8,336,772 - Apple Inc. / Google, Inc. v. Smartflash LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 10, 2016 · CBM2015-00132 · APJ Matthew R Clements · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 2–4, 6, 7, 9, 11–13, 15–18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27–29, 31, and 33–36 are unpatentable under § 101 as directed to an abstract idea without an inventive concept.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Patent Owner has not articulated a persuasive reason for excluding Dr. Kelly’s Declaration. Because Exhibit 1019 relates to the underlying factual issues related to patent eligibility, we are not persuaded that it is irrelevant under FRE 401 and 402. It is within our discretion to determine the appropriate weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, including the weight accorded to expert opinion, based on the disclosure of the underlying facts or data upon which the opinion is based. Our discretion includes determining whether the expert testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods and whether the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. See FRE 702. Accordingly, we decline to exclude Exhibit 1019 in its entirety or any paragraph therein.” slip op. at 32
- BurdenUnpatentable
“ineligible abstract idea. Specifically, the challenged claims are directed to performing the fundamental economic practice of conditioning and controlling access to content. For example, claim 35 recites “code responsive to the payment validation data to retrieve data from the data supplier and to write the retrieved data into the data carrier.” Claim 36 recites “code to evaluate the use status data using the use rules data to determine whether access is permitted to the stored data” and “code to access the stored data when access is permitted.”” slip op. at 9
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable
“We are persuaded that the challenged claims are drawn to a patent- ineligible abstract idea. Specifically, the challenged claims are directed to performing the fundamental economic practice of conditioning and controlling access to content. For example, claim 35 recites “code responsive to the payment validation data to retrieve data from the data supplier and to write the retrieved data into the data carrier.” Claim 36 recites “code to evaluate the use status data using the use rules data to determine whether access is permitted to the stored data” and “code to access the stored data when access is permitted.” As discussed above, the ’772 patent discusses addressing recording industry concerns of data pirates offering unauthorized access to widely available compressed audio recordings. Ex. 1001, 1:23–57. The Specification explains that these pirates obtain data either by unauthorized or legitimate means and then make the data available over the Internet without authorization. Id. The Specification further explains that once data has been published on the Internet, it is difficult to police access to and use of that data by internet users who may not even realize that it is pirated. Id. The ’772 patent proposes to solve this problem by restricting access to data on a portable data carrier based upon payment validation. Id. at 1:61–2:3. The ’772 patent makes clear that the crux of the claimed subject matter is restricting access to stored data based on supplier-defined access rules and validation of payment. Id. at 1:59–2:19. Although the Specification refers to data piracy on the Internet, the challenged claims are not limited to the Internet. The underlying concept of the challenged claims, particularly when viewed in light of the Specification, is paying for and/or controlling access to content, as Petitioner contends. As discussed further below, this is a fundamental economic practice long in existence in commerce. See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611.” slip op. at 9
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable
“recite only well-known, routine, and conventional computer components and activities, which is insufficient to establish an inventive concept.” Pet. Reply 5. We are persuaded that claims 2–4, 6, 7, 9, 11–13, 15–18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27–29, 31, and 33–36 of the ’772 patent do not add an inventive concept sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent on the abstract idea itself. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355; see also Accenture Global Servs., 728 F.3d at 1344 (holding claims directed to the abstract idea of “generating tasks [based on] rules . . . to be completed upon the occurrence of an event” to be unpatentable even when applied in a computer environment and within the insurance industry). Specifically, we agree with and adopt the rationale articulated in the Petition that the additional elements of the challenged claims are either field of use limitations and/or generic features of a computer that do not bring the challenged claims within § 101 patent eligibility. Pet. 50–76.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 8,336,772 unpatentable§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · EnfishPatents in suitUS 8,336,772 - Apple Inc. / Google, Inc. v. Smartflash LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 10, 2016 · CBM2015-00133 · APJ Matthew R Clements · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 2–4, 6, 7, 9, 11–13, 15–18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27–29, 31, and 33–36 are unpatentable under § 101 as directed to an abstract idea without an inventive concept.
RulingsFinal written decision- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable
“We are persuaded that the challenged claims are drawn to a patent- ineligible abstract idea. Specifically, the challenged claims are directed to performing the fundamental economic practice of conditioning and controlling access to content. For example, claim 35 recites “code responsive to the payment validation data to retrieve data from the data supplier and to write the retrieved data into the data carrier.” Claim 36 recites “code to evaluate the use status data using the use rules data to determine whether access is permitted to the stored data” and “code to access the stored data when access is permitted.”” slip op. at 9
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable
“recite only well-known, routine, and conventional computer components and activities, which is insufficient to establish an inventive concept.” Pet. Reply 5. We are persuaded that claims 2–4, 6, 7, 9, 11–13, 15–18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27–29, 31, and 33–36 of the ’772 patent do not add an inventive concept sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent on the abstract idea itself. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355; see also Accenture Global Servs., 728 F.3d at 1344 (holding claims directed to the abstract idea of “generating tasks [based on] rules . . . to be completed upon the occurrence of an event” to be unpatentable even when applied in a computer environment and within the insurance industry). Specifically, we agree with and adopt the rationale articulated in the Petition that the additional elements of the challenged claims are either field of use limitations and/or generic features of a computer that do not bring the challenged claims within § 101 patent eligibility. Pet. 50–76.” slip op. at 14
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Patent Owner has not articulated a persuasive reason for excluding Dr. Kelly’s Declaration. Because Exhibit 1019 relates to the underlying factual issues related to patent eligibility, we are not persuaded that it is irrelevant under FRE 401 and 402. It is within our discretion to determine the appropriate weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, including the weight accorded to expert opinion, based on the disclosure of the underlying facts or data upon which the opinion is based. Our discretion includes determining whether the expert testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods and whether the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. See FRE 702. Accordingly, we decline to exclude Exhibit 1019 in its entirety or any paragraph therein.” slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 8,336,772 unpatentable§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · EnfishPatents in suitUS 8,336,772 - Apple Inc. / Samsung Electronics Ltd et al. v. Smartflash LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 24, 2016 · CBM2015-00033 · APJ Matthew R Clements · CBM · Rehearing
The Board denied Smartflash’s rehearing request, leaving claims 25, 26, 30, and 32 unpatentable under § 101 because the request did not show the Board misapprehended or overlooked a matter.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” slip op. at 3
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Other
“Smartflash’s arguments are either new or were addressed in our Final Decision. For example, Smartflash’s argument that the challenged claims are not directed to an abstract idea (Req. Reh’g 11–13) is new, and therefore, improper in a request for rehearing, because Smartflash did not argue the first step of the analysis articulated in Mayo and Alice in its Patent Owner Response. See PO Resp. 15–29 (Patent Owner Response argues that claims are statutory under only the second step of Mayo and Alice); see also Paper 38 (transcript of oral hearing), 6:13–16 (Petitioner stating that “Patent Owner has presented no argument whatsoever to contest that its claims are directed to abstract ideas under the first prong of Mayo and Alice.”), id. at 6:17–18 (Petitioner also stating “It [] also never disputed the articulation of those abstract ideas”).” slip op. at 4
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptNot reached
§ 101 eligibilitycites AlicePatents in suitUS 8,336,772 - Apple Inc. / Samsung Electronics Ltd et al. v. Smartflash LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 24, 2016 · CBM2015-00032 · APJ Gregg I Anderson · CBM · Rehearing
The Board denied Smartflash’s rehearing request, leaving its determination that claims 14, 19, and 22 are patent ineligible under § 101 unchanged.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“burden of showing unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 326(e). The standard of review for rehearing requests is set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which states: The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” slip op. at 3
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Not reached
“determination that claims 14, 19, and 22 (“the challenged claims”) are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Req. Reh’g 5. In its Request, Smartflash presents arguments directed to alleged similarities between the challenged claims and those at issue in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Req. Reh’g 5–10) and Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2015-2044 (Fed. Cir. May 12, 2016), and alleged differences between the challenged claims and those at issue in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (id. at 10–15).” slip op. at 4
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptDecided for patent owner
“As we stated in our Final Written Decision and Petitioner argues, the ’772 patent specification treats as well-known and conventional all potentially technical elements of claims 14, 19, and 22, the claimed code performs generic computer functions, and the claims recite several generic and conventional data types. Final Dec. 15–17; Notice Resp. 1–2. These limitations of claims 14, 19, and 22 “do not yield a result that overrides the routine and conventional manner in which this technology operates.” Final Dec. 20. Rather, each of the challenged claims is “an abstract-idea-based solution implemented with generic technical components in a conventional way,” making it patent ineligible. See BASCOM, 2016 WL 3514158, at *6, 3 We note that U.S. Patent No. 7,334,720 B2 is not at issue in this proceeding. *7. Also, “[t]he concept of storing two different types of information4 in the same place or on the same device is an age old practice.” Final Dec. 22. For example, “the prior art discloses products, such as electronic data, that could store both the content and conditions for providing access to the content, such as ‘a time bomb or other disabling device which will disable the product at the end of the rental period.’” Id. at 22–23 (citing Ex. 1315, Abstract, 10:24–30).” slip op. at 7
§ 101 eligibilitycites AlicePatents in suitUS 8,336,772 - Apple Inc. / Samsung Electronics Ltd et al. v. Smartflash LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 24, 2016 · CBM2015-00031 · APJ Gregg I Anderson · CBM · Rehearing
The Board denied Smartflash’s rehearing request and left its decision that claims 1, 5, 8, and 10 are unpatentable under § 101 unchanged.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” slip op. at 3
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable
“As we stated in our Final Written Decision and Petitioners argue, the ’772 patent specification treats as well-known and conventional all potentially technical elements of claims 1, 5, 8, and 10 the claimed code performs generic computer functions, and the claims recite several generic and conventional data types. Final Dec. 14–17; Notice Resp. 1–2. These limitations of claims 1, 5, 8, and 10 “do not yield a result that overrides the routine and conventional manner in which this technology operates.” Final Dec. 20. Rather, each of the challenged claims is “an abstract-idea-based solution implemented with generic technical components in a conventional way,” making it patent ineligible. See BASCOM, 2016 WL 3514158, at *6, 3 We note that U.S. Patent No. 7,334,720 B2 is not at issue in this proceeding. *7. Also, “[t]he concept of storing two different types of information4 in the same place or on the same device is an age old practice.” Final Dec. 22. For example, “the prior art discloses products, such as electronic data, that could store both the content and conditions for providing access to the content, such as ‘a time bomb or other disabling device which will disable the product at the end of the rental period.’” Id. at 22–23 (citing Ex. 1215, Abstract, 10:24–30).” slip op. at 7
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for petitioner
“Rather than providing a proper request for rehearing, addressing particular matters that we previously misapprehended or overlooked, Smartflash’s Request provides new briefing by expounding on argument already made. Smartflash cannot simply allege that an “issue” (e.g., whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea) was previously addressed, generally, and proceed to present new argument on that issue in a request for rehearing. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71. Smartflash’s arguments are either new or were addressed in our Final Decision. For example, Smartflash’s argument that the challenged claims are not directed to an abstract idea (Req. Reh’g 10–12) is new, and therefore, improper in a request for rehearing, because Smartflash did not argue the first step of the analysis articulated in Mayo and Alice in its Patent Owner Response. See PO Resp. 16–25 (Patent Owner Response argues that claims are statutory under only the second step of Mayo and Alice); see also Paper 42 (transcript of oral hearing), 6:13–16 (Petitioner stating that “Patent Owner has presented no argument whatsoever to contest that its claims are directed to abstract ideas under the first prong of Mayo and Alice.”), id. at 6:17–18 (Petitioner also stating “It [] also never disputed the articulation of those abstract ideas”).” slip op. at 5
§ 101 eligibilitycites AlicePatents in suitUS 8,336,772 - Epicor Software Corporation v. Protegrity CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 2, 2016 · CBM2015-00030 · APJ Kevin F Turner · CBM · Final written decision
Claim 8 is unpatentable under § 101 because it is directed to an abstract idea and lacks an inventive concept.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“III. MOTION TO EXCLUDE Patent Owner moves to exclude Exhibit 1002, Declaration of Mr. Bruce Schneier, from the record. Mot. Exclude. This filing is largely identical to a similar filing in CBM2015-00002, with the exception that the instant Motion to Exclude also seeks to exclude Ex. 1014 as well, in addition to Ex. 1002, by the same affiant on the same basis. Compare CBM2015- 00030, Paper 30, with CBM2015-00002, Paper 37. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Mr. Schneier’s declarations should be excluded for the same reasons provided previously. See ’02 FWD 35–36.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Other
“Similar to the CBM2015-00002 proceeding, we find that the cross- examination of Mr. Bruce Schneier occurred before Patent Owner filed its last substantive paper, making Patent Owner’s Motion for Observation improper. See ’02 FWD 36-38. We, thus, expunge Patent Owner’s unauthorized observations from the record. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.7(a). Additionally, we expunge Petitioner’s Opposition to that Observation (Paper 40) as being unnecessary.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“In addition, Patent Owner argues that the claim term in claim 8, “initially produc[ing] a calling,” should be read as “the database itself that produces the calling to the data element protection catalogue,” as compared to the operating system or the individual field producing the calling. Resp. 23 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:53–61; Ex. 2047 ¶ 22; Ex. 2046 ¶ 40). We do not agree. As discussed in ’02 FWD and incorporated above, we are persuaded that the application 40, control module 20, and program module 30 handle system calls in the ’201 Patent, and the calling need not be produced by the first database itself.” slip op. at 5
- BurdenUnpatentable
“Upon review of Petitioner’s analysis and supporting evidence and taking into account Patent Owner’s arguments, discussed below, we are persuaded by Petitioner that claim 8 does not recite additional elements that transform the claim into a patent-eligible application of an abstract idea. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments that the claims require additional elements that transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible application (Resp. 43–49) because they are based upon an overly narrow construction of the claimed elements, as discussed in section II(A)(i) above, i.e., the ability of the first database calling out to the data protection catalogue, and based on additional elements not recited or required by the claims, as discussed previously.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 6,321,201 unpatentableClaim construction§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,321,201 - Informatica Corporation v. Protegrity CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 31, 2016 · CBM2015-00021 · APJ Kevin F Turner · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1–8 and 18–53 are unpatentable under § 101; claims 1, 2, 8, 19–26, 29, 31–35, 37–44, and 47–53 are also unpatentable under § 103.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“claim, and “it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The written description of the ’201 Patent provides specific definitions of many terms (Ex. 1001, 2:64–3:43) but does not contain a definition of “database.” The claimed database for storing a plurality of data element values corresponds to the O-DB database disclosed in the ’201 Patent. The O-DB database is part of a larger “database management system” that includes multiple databases. Id. at 5:49–6:12, Fig. 3. Similar to the other databases, the O-DB database is described as containing data and, in particular, data to be protected. Id. at 5:53–58. Contrary to Patent Owner’s argument (Resp. 20), the ’201 Patent does not describe the O-DB database, or any other database, as performing any other data processing or managing functions. In particular, the ’201 Patent does not describe that the O-DB database produces the compelling calling to the data protection catalogue. See Ex. 1001, 10:44–58 (“is first collected by the system”); see id. at Abstract, 2:54– 61, 3:51–65, 4:16–22, 7:57–61 (describing a compelling calling to a data protection catalogue, but failing to describe the compelling calling being produced by the O-DB database).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther
“Claims 1 and 8 do not recite unencrypted data element values, and only recites “encrypted data element values.” Those claims do not specify that the “given data element value” should be encrypted or unencrypted. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s declarants (Ex. 2063 ¶ 33; Ex. 2064 ¶ 48) as their testimonies are conclusory and are unsupported by the Specification or claims of the ’201 Patent. Although the “given data element value” could be the unencrypted data element value, it need not be in the context of claim 1.” slip op. at 15
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“As the Board has noted in numerous cases, “the Board, sitting as a non-jury tribunal with administrative expertise, is well-positioned to determine and assign appropriate weight to the evidence presented in this trial, without resorting to formal exclusion that might later be held reversible error.” See, e.g., Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., CBM2012-00002, Paper 66 at 70 (PTAB Jan. 23, 2014); Gnosis S.P.A., et al. v. S. Alabama Medical Science Foundation, IPR2013- 00118, Paper 64 at 43 (PTAB June 20, 2014); S.E.C. v. Guenthner, 395 F. Supp. 2d 835, 842 n.3 (D. Neb. 2005); Opp. to Mot. Exclude 4. We, thus, are not persuaded by Petitioner to exclude Exhibits 2064, 2089, and 2093 and Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude is denied. Additionally, we are also not persuaded that Dr. Direen is unqualified to testify as an expert. As Petitioner points out, Dr. Direen has knowledge, skill, experience, and training beyond degrees and is the holder of several patents. Opp. to Mot. Exclude 3–8; See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 1–7 (discussing additional credentials and qualifications). Given this, we are persuaded that Dr. Direen is qualified to testify as an expert as to what a person of ordinary skill in the art would know or understand during the relevant time frame.” slip op. at 52
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedGranted
“The scheduling order states “[a] motion for observation on cross- examination provides the parties with a mechanism to draw the Board’s attention to relevant cross-examination testimony of a reply witness because no further substantive paper is permitted after the reply” and refers to the Office Patent Trial Practice Guide. Paper 15, 4–5. The Trial Practice Guide states: In the event that cross-examination occurs after a party has filed its last substantive paper on an issue, such cross-examination may result in testimony that should be called to the Board’s attention, but the party does not believe a motion to exclude the testimony is warranted. The Board may authorize the filing of observations to identify such testimony and responses to observations, as defined below. 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,767–68 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 53
Patent outcomesUS 6,321,201 unpatentableClaim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Bilski · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,321,201
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.