• Forte Labs, Inc. v. Pocketful Of Quarters, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Mar 23, 2023 · PGR2022-00058 · APJ Benjamin D M Wood · PGR · Institution

  The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–17 on all asserted grounds, finding it more likely than not that claim 1 is unpatentable under § 101.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “review. 35 U.S.C. § 324 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Section 324(a) provides that a post-grant review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the Petition (including its supporting testimonial evidence), the evidence and arguments in the Preliminary Response (including its supporting testimonial evidence), the Preliminary Reply, and the Preliminary Sur-reply, we determine that the information presented shows that it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute post-grant review on all” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art at this stage of the proceeding. See Prelim. Resp. 18 (“[f]or purposes of this Preliminary Response only, Patent Owner uses Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.”). We discern no reason, at this stage of the proceeding, to question Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, which is supported by the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 11

  • BurdenDecided for petitioner

    “Section 42.6(a)(3) states that “[a]rguments must not be incorporated by reference from one document into another document.” The purpose of this rule to prevent a party from circumventing page limits and to conserve Board resources. See Cisco, 10 (“incorporation by reference of numerous arguments from Dr. Roy’s 250-page Declaration into the Petition serves to circumvent the page limits imposed on petitions for inter partes review, while imposing on our time by asking us to sift through over 250 pages of Dr. Roy’s Declaration . . . to locate the specific arguments corresponding to the numerous paragraphs cited to support Petitioner’s assertions.”). Patent Owner does not identify specific arguments in Mr. Plunkett’s declaration that are not in the Petition, or specific conclusory statements within the Petition that are overly reliant on the Plunkett Declaration. Nor have we found any improper incorporation in the course of our own review. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that we should ignore any portion of the Plunkett Declaration on this basis.” slip op. at 28

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for petitioner

    “Claim terms using the word “means” are presumed to invoke § 112(f), and terms without the word “means” are presumed not to invoke this subsection. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Because “server gateway” does not include the word “means,” it is presumed not to be a means-plus-function claim term under § 112(f). This presumption can be rebutted, however, by demonstrating that the term fails to “recite sufficiently definite structure,” or recites “function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” Id. at 1349 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is Patent Owner’s burden to produce sufficient evidence to overcome this presumption. See Dyfan, LLC v. Target Corp., 28 F.4th 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“From a procedural standpoint, this presumption imposes on the party challenging the presumption the burden of going forward with evidence . . . that a person of ordinary skill in the art believes the term does not recite sufficiently definite structure.”) (internal citation, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). There does not appear to be a dispute, at this stage of the proceeding, that “server gateway” denotes at least some structure to persons of ordinary skill: a server connecting a game user computational device and a blockchain. Thus, we are not persuaded, on the current record, that “server gateway” is a “generic term[] or black box recitation[] of structure or abstractions.” MTD Prods. v. Iancu, 933 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Patent Owner nonetheless argues that although the term may recite some structure, the recited structure is insufficient to perform “the recited functions,” which Patent Owner asserts are: (1) “operating a blockchain” slip op. at 14

  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,189,131
• Ironsource Ltd. v. Digital Turbine Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Mar 17, 2023 · PGR2022-00053 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · PGR · Institution

  The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–22 under § 101, § 102(a) over Pasha, and § 103 over Pasha, Pasha and Yamada, and Pasha and Molinet.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), a post-grant review may not be instituted unless it is determined that it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Based on the information presented in the Petition and the supporting evidence, we are persuaded that the Petition demonstrates it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of the challenged claims on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “[t]he words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art when read in the context of the specification and prosecution history.” Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313). “There are only two exceptions to this general rule: 1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.” Id. (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Neither of those exceptions apply here, and for the reasons below, we find the plain and ordinary meaning of “invoke” or “invoking” to be to call or activate, as proposed by Petitioner. slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “to mean “to shift user interaction on the device,” and we disagree with Patent Owner that the claim term requires the shifting to take place without requiring a user interaction. We begin with the language of the independent claims. Claim 1 recites “redirect said device to an app store for downloading said first software application on said device.” Ex. 1001, 21:38–40. The claim language, therefore, does not recite any requirement relating to user interaction during the redirect.” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “3. Other Claim Terms We determine that we do not need to expressly construe any other terms in order to determine whether to institute. The parties are reminded claim terms will be based on the complete record developed during trial.” slip op. at 17

  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Alice · Enfish · Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,157,256
• Nabors Drilling Technologies USA, Inc. v. Motive Drilling Technologies, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Mar 13, 2023 · PGR2022-00055 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · PGR · Institution

  The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–4 and 10–13, finding the petition showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on § 101 and § 103 grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “We have authority to determine whether to institute a post-grant review. 35 U.S.C. § 324(c) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Institution of postgrant review is authorized by statute only when “the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). “When instituting post-grant review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.208(a)). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that it will prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute post-grant review of the challenged claims of the ’454 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s definition or offer a definition of its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. Based on the arguments presented and the cited references, we find Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill reasonable and, for purposes of this Decision, adopt it as our own.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Neither party presents arguments for the express construction of any term, instead interpreting the claim terms according to their ordinary and customary meaning. Pet. 18; Prelim. Resp. 15. For purposes of this Decision, and based on the record before us, we determine that no construction of any term is necessary. We note that this determination does not preclude the parties from arguing their proposed constructions of the claims during trial. Indeed, the parties are hereby given notice that claim construction, in general, is an issue to be addressed at trial. A final determination as to claim construction will be made at the close of the proceeding, after any hearing, based on all the evidence of record. slip op. at 11

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionInstituted

    “Claim 1 recites a system that performs the steps of receiving information (recitations 1.3, 1.8), using received information to generate a set of possible drilling paths (recitation 1.4), removing certain ones of the generated possible paths (recitations 1.5–1.6), selecting a desired one of the generated paths (recitation 1.7), and updating a plan to include the selected path (recitation 1.9). This collection and manipulation of data is similar to the data collection and management concepts that were held to be patent ineligible in previous cases. See Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 776 F.3d 1343, 1345, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 610, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1351–54 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Although the claim enumerates the type of information (i.e., BHA location, target path, and possible convergence paths) that is acquired and analyzed, the Federal Circuit has explained that the mere selection and manipulation of particular information by itself does not make an abstract concept any less abstract. Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353; Dig. Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Accordingly, on this record, Petitioner sufficiently shows that the claim recites an abstract idea that falls within the grouping of mental processes. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1355.” slip op. at 19

  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Electric Power · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,170,454
• Ironsource Ltd. v. Digital Turbine Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 4, 2023 · PGR2021-00096 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 are unpatentable; the contingent motion to amend proposing claims 19–36 is denied, and the parties’ motions to exclude are denied in part and granted in part.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'IneligibleUnpatentable

    “3. Analysis On the full record developed during trial, we are persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument. Petitioner’s analysis of the independent claims described above only loosely corresponds to the actual limitations recited in the claim. The Federal Circuit has “cautioned that courts ‘must be careful to avoid oversimplifying the claims’ by looking at them generally and failing to account for the specific requirements of the claims.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Petitioner’s analysis of the claim limitations appears to do. Petitioner’s argument that “the essence of all the claims” is captured by a single claim element (f3) not only ignores that that limitation recites performing two specific software tasks simultaneously—which we are not persuaded is an abstract idea—but also asks us to disregard multiple technical aspects recited in the claims, such as identifying a link, determining whether an installation client is available on the device, invoking the installation client, and redirecting to the device an app store. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 21:6–35. That is, under Step 2A of the Guidance, we are neither persuaded that limitation f3, which Petitioner points us to, recites an abstract idea (Prong 1), nor that the other limitations recited in the independent claims fail to integrate the alleged abstract idea into a practical application (Prong 2). Petitioner characterizes the claims as directed to multitasking, which Petitioner describes as representing a basic task in organizing human activity. Pet. 30. Although the Guidance recognizes certain methods of organizing human activity, including certain activity between a person and a computer, as constituting a patent-ineligible abstract idea, we are not persuaded that the claims here fall within the scope of such activity. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (listing fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or legal interactions, and managing personal behavior or relationships as organizing human activity); October 2019 Update at 5 (“this grouping is limited to activity that falls within the enumerated sub-groupings . . . , and is not to be expanded beyond these enumerated sub-groupings except in rare circumstances”). The claimed invention may result in multitasking on the device, but the claims are directed to downloading and installing an application in the background instead of directing the user to an application, and do not recite an abstract idea. And although that process does result in improving user experience, the claims recite more than that mere result; they recite specific steps—invoking, without exiting the foreground software application, the installation client for downloading and installing applications on the device to run in the background—that accomplish the desired result. See Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305–06 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding a method that employs a new kind of file in a computer security system directed to a non-abstract improvement in computer functionality, rather than the abstract idea of computer security writ large). Petitioner thus fails to establish sufficiently that the claims are directed patent ineligible subject matter under Step 2A of the Guidance. We also agree with Patent Owner that the challenged claims are somewhat similar to those that the Federal Circuit held patentable in DDR Holdings. The claims there were directed to a method of generating a composite webpage that combined visual elements of a host website with content from a third-party, e.g., by combining the logo, background color, and fonts of the host website with product information from a merchant. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1248. When a user clicked on a link on the host website, the system would construct the composite web page comprising a look and feel description from the host website along with content based on product information from the merchant’s product catalog. Id. at 1250. The court held those claims were not directed at an abstract idea because they addressed the problem of retaining website visitors that, absent the claimed invention, would be instantly transported away from a host’s website after clicking on an advertisement and activating a hyperlink. Id. at 1257.” slip op. at 29

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “1. Independent Claim 1 a) “A mobile device configured for running software applications, comprising:” Petitioner contends that Pasha discloses computer system 600, which” slip op. at 38

  • 112 supportMotion to amend, deniedDenied

    “4. Support in the Original Disclosure A motion to amend may not present substitute claims that introduce new subject matter. 35 U.S.C. § 326(d)(3); 37 C.F.R. § 42.221(a)(2)(ii) (“A motion to amend may be denied where . . . [t]he amendment seeks . . . introduce new subject matter.”). “Normally, a claim element without support in the original disclosure (i.e., the application as originally filed) merits a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112 for lack of written description support.” Lectrosonics, Paper 15, 7. Accordingly, a motion to amend must set forth written description support in the originally filed disclosure of the subject patent for each proposed substitute claim.” Id.” slip op. at 74

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted in part

    “CTPG at 73–74. Accordingly, Rule 42.23(b) prohibits filing of new evidence other than deposition transcripts of the cross-examination of any reply witness with a sur-reply. Patent Owner does not argue that the opinions presented in paragraphs 4–13 of Dr. Mao’s declaration are within the scope of §42.23(b). See generally PO MTE Opp. Nor do we find it in the interests of justice to allow this evidence in the case file. Accordingly, we grant in part Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude paragraphs 4–13 of Exhibit 2013 pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b).22” slip op. at 90

  Patent outcomesUS 10,782,951 unpatentable
  § 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipationcites Alice · Enfish · Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,782,951
• Kiosoft Technologies, LLC / Techtrex, Inc. v. Payrange Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 26, 2022 · PGR2021-00077 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · PGR · Final written decision

  Claim 1 is unpatentable under § 101; claims 2–27 were not shown unpatentable because the other challenges were deficient.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A person having ordinary skill in the art would have had an education background of, or practical experience providing an equivalent to, a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, or a related/equivalent field and at least four years of work experience in identity, transaction, and telecommunication solutions.” slip op. at 12

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “As can be seen from claim 1 above, all of the claimed method steps occur “at the mobile device” and the final step is to enable completion of a cashless transaction. Claim 1 does not recite completing the purchase. The ’833 patent describes that any commercial transaction is completed at the automatic retail machine, not at the mobile device. Ex. 1001, 11:5–9; see also id. at 21:4–11, 22:18–20, 23:53–61, 30:25–27. We, thus, agree with Patent Owner that the claimed method does not require completing or conducting the transaction, but only enabling the completion of the transaction. On this complete record, we are persuaded that the elements italicized above recite the concept of obtaining authorization for a purchase and enabling completion of a cashless transaction, prior to user selection of any items or services. See Pet. 22–23 (arguing that the claimed method “is effectively no different than a person entering a store, the store checking the customer’s available credit (or calling a bank to do so) and when the customer decides on the item, completing the purchase”); Pet. Reply 5–6 (arguing that the claim recites “obtaining payment authorization and performing a financial transaction, the same as a person entering a store, the store checking the customer’s available credit (or calling a bank to do so) and, when the customer decides on the item, allowing the purchase”). In particular, claim 1 recites steps for obtaining authorization prior to user selection of any items or services — steps of identifying the automatic retail machine, obtaining a request from the electronic payment device, sending the request to a server, and obtaining from the server an authorization grant. Claim 1 also recites steps for enabling the completion of a purchase (i.e., cashless transaction) — detecting a trigger condition and sending the authorization grant to the electronic payment device. Our slight revision of the abstract idea from what we previously stated in our Institution Decision does not impact the patentability analysis. Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 18

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable

    “We are not persuaded. Patent Owner’s arguments rest on the alleged novelty of the abstract idea itself, not the “specific limitation beyond the judicial exception,” i.e., the additional elements. “[A] claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.” BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018). A novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90. “The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89 (emphasis added). Patent Owner and Dr. Shamos do not identify, and we cannot find, anything in the claim suggesting that the mobile device, server, or automated retail device (i.e., the additional elements) are more than generic components. Indeed, the ’833 patent’s specification demonstrates that these elements were well-understood, routine, and conventional to the industry. Ex. 1001, 2:23–29, 37–42, 3:25–38 (explaining that Offer “teaches permitting the cashless utilization of a vending machines via a communications service, such as a cellular telephone;” Khan teaches an application on a user’s “personal trusted device” used to effectuate cashless purchases; and Carlson teaches “a system and a method for using a portable consumer device such as a mobile phone for payments and the like,” the method including prompting a user to select, from his mobile device, a product for purchase at a vending machine, after/if the user is authorized to make the purchase, and sending an authorization response to the vending machine from a “remote payment server”).” slip op. at 26

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “At the institution stage, we determined that no claim term required explicit construction. Inst. Dec. 35–37. Petitioner does not challenge our determination or otherwise advance its claim constructions in its Reply. See generally Pet. Reply. Patent Owner does not advance any explicit claim construction. PO Resp. 7–13. Regarding the identifying limitation, Patent Owner indicates that it is “undisputed between the parties that the claims require automatically determining the identity of the specific automatic retail machine based on an electronic transmission received from an electronic payment device of that automatic retail machine.” Id. at 7–8 (emphasis in original, citing Ex. 2018, 3; Ex. 2016 ¶ 68). Patent Owner submits that Petitioner’s constructions for each of the obtaining, authorization, and payment limitations should be rejected “for lacking accordance with the plain meaning of the claim in view of the specification” or “ignor[ing] the plain meaning of the term.” Id. at 9, 12, 13. As to the detecting limitation, Patent Owner argues that certain prior art asserted in the grounds in the Petition fails to teach the term as construed. Id. at 9. We determine that we need not expressly construe these claim terms” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 10,719,833 mixed
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Mayo · Bilski · Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 10,719,833
• Freedom To Operate, Inc. v. Compass Pathfinder LimitedInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jun 22, 2022 · PGR2022-00018 · APJ Tina E Hulse · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on claims 1–23 because Petitioner did not show it was more likely than not that any challenged claim was unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “post-grant review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . ., if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Upon considering the arguments and evidence presented by the parties, we determine Petitioner has not demonstrated that it is more likely than not that any of the claims challenged in the Petition are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityNot reached

    “G. Remaining Arguments Patent Owner also argues we should deny the Petition for failure to identify all real parties-in-interest in the Petition. Prelim. Resp. 31–44. Because we determine that Petitioner has not sufficiently established that in this Decision.” slip op. at 24

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “B. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had an advanced degree (i.e., a Master’s degree with two or more years of experience, or a Ph.D.) in inorganic or organic chemistry, chemical engineering, pharmacology, or a related discipline” and “would be familiar with medicinal chemistry or pharmaceutical chemistry, and with analytical methods to characterize and differentiate solid forms of compounds, (‘DSC’) and thermogravimetric analysis (‘TGA’).” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1106 ¶ 38). Petitioner further contends that “[a]lternatively, one of ordinary skill could have less education and approximately five or more years of relevant experience.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. Absent opposition from Patent Owner, we adopt Petitioner’s definition because it is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner’s proposed construction, as it is most consistent with the intrinsic evidence. The claim language makes clear that “Polymorph A” is “characterized by” the specific peaks set forth in the claims. Ex. 1101, claims 1, 8, 16. Thus, regardless of the alleged conventional definition of a “polymorph,” urged by Petitioner, the inventors are entitled to act as their own lexicographers to define “Polymorph A” according to the recited peaks on the XRPD diffractogram. See Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 493 F.3d 1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“When a patentee defines a claim term, the patentee’s definition governs, even if it is contrary to the conventional meaning of the term.”). That the Specification consistently refers to “Polymorph A” as a proper noun and describes Polymorph A as “characterized by” the recited peaks in an XRPD diffractogram further highlights the inventors’ clear intent to act as their own lexicographer. See, e.g., Ex. 1101, 4:4–5:36; Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, 395 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“When a patentee acts away from their ordinary meaning, he must clearly express that intent in the written description.”). Finally, we agree with Patent Owner that the prosecution history of the parent ’257 patent is relevant to the construction of the claims of the ’259 patent, which is a continuation of the ’257 patent. Prelim. Resp. 6 (citing Iridescent Networks, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 933 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Statements made during prosecution of a parent application are relevant to construing terms in a patent resulting from a continuation application if such statements relate to the subject matter of the claims being construed.”)). During prosecution of the parent ’257 patent application, the examiner rejected original claim 1 as indefinite because it did not define “Polymorph A,” and required one to “refer to the specification to determine what is Polymorph A.” Ex. 2133, 7. Patent Owner then amended the claims to define Polymorph A by adding the specific XRPD peaks recited in claim 1. Ex. 2134, 2; see also id. at 6. Thus, we find the intrinsic evidence supports Patent Owner’s proposed construction.” slip op. at 9

  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,954,259
• Freedom To Operate, Inc. v. Compass Pathfinder LimitedInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jun 22, 2022 · PGR2022-00012 · APJ Tina E Hulse · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of PGR on claims 1–23 because Petitioner did not show it was more likely than not that any challenged claim was unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “We have authority under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), which provides that a post-grant review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . ., if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Upon considering the arguments and evidence presented by the parties, we determine Petitioner has not demonstrated that it is more likely than not that any of the claims challenged in the Petition are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “had an advanced degree (i.e., a Master’s degree with two or more years of experience, or a Ph.D.) in inorganic or organic chemistry, chemical engineering, pharmacology, or a related discipline” and “would be familiar with medicinal chemistry or pharmaceutical chemistry, and with analytical methods to characterize and differentiate solid forms of compounds, particularly XRPD, but also including differential scanning calorimetry (‘DSC’) and thermogravimetric analysis (‘TGA’).” Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 35). Petitioner further contends that “[a]lternatively, one of ordinary skill could have less education and approximately five or more years of relevant experience.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. Absent opposition from Patent Owner, we adopt Petitioner’s definition because it is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner’s proposed construction, as it is most consistent with the intrinsic evidence. The claim language makes clear that “Polymorph A” is “characterized by” the specific peaks set forth in claim 1. Ex. 1001, claim 1. Thus, regardless of the alleged conventional definition of a “polymorph,” urged by Petitioner, the inventors are entitled to act as their own lexicographers to define “Polymorph A” according to the recited peaks on the XRPD diffractogram. See Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics a claim term, the patentee’s definition governs, even if it is contrary to the conventional meaning of the term.”). That the Specification consistently refers to “Polymorph A” as a proper noun and describes Polymorph A as “characterized by” the recited peaks in an XRPD diffractogram further highlights the inventors’ clear intent to act as their own lexicographer. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 4:4–5:36; Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, 395 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“When a patentee acts as his own lexicographer in redefining the meaning of particular claim terms away from their ordinary meaning, he must clearly express that intent in the written description.”). Finally, during prosecution of the ’257 patent application, the examiner rejected original claim 1 as indefinite because it did not define “Polymorph A,” and required one to “refer to the specification to determine what is Polymorph A.” Ex. 1060, 7. Patent Owner then amended the claims to define Polymorph A by adding the specific XRPD peaks recited in claim 1. Ex. 1062, 2; see also id. at 6. Thus, we find the intrinsic evidence supports Patent Owner’s proposed construction.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Having considered the parties’ respective arguments and evidence, we find Patent Owner has the better position. Although we agree with Petitioner that some degree of experimental error should be factored into the specific peaks of a diffractogram, the claim language already does so by expressly reciting a variance of “±0.1°2θ.” See Ex. 1001, claim 1. Construing the claims to include an additional degree of variance would effectively read out the “±0.1°2θ” limitation of the claims. See Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A claim construction that gives meaning to all the terms of the claim is preferred over one that does not do so.”). Moreover, we note that the express recitation of a specific variance distinguishes the ’257 patent claims from the claims of the Astrazeneca cases cited by Petitioner, which did not recite such a variance. See Pet. 11–12. In addition, the Specification consistently refers to a variance of ±0.1°2θ whenever it refers to peaks on a diffractogram. See generally Ex. 1001, 3:58–5:24. Petitioner acknowledges that the claims recite a range of peak locations, but argues that the Specification “does not explain the basis for the claimed range.” Pet. 10. Petitioner, however, does not explain why the Specification would need to explain that basis, particularly if a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that ±0.1°2θ is an acceptable variance for XRPD.” slip op. at 13

  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,947,257
• Tiz Inc. D/B/A Provi v. Jason K. SmithAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 23, 2022 · CBM2020-00029 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 are unpatentable under § 101 because they claim an abstract idea without integrating it into a practical application or adding an inventive concept.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenDecided for petitioner

    “For the reasons expressed below, we conclude that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence that claims 1–19 are unpatentable as being directed to ineligible subject matter.” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “C. Level of Skill in the Art Based on the full trial record, including our review of the ’585 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’585 patent and cited reference materials, we agree with Dr. Min that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “the equivalent of a Bachelor’s degree or higher in electrical engineering, computer science or computer networking, and at least 2 years working experience designing communication systems.” See Ex. 1008 ¶ 21. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proffered level of ordinary skill in the art.2 See generally PO Resp. 2 In opposing Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude, Patent Owner states that “the Board should modify its definition of person of ordinary skill in the art,” Opp. Exclude 5 n.1, but never proposes a different definition and does not dispute Petitioner’s definition in its Response or Sur-Reply.” slip op. at 19

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Petitioner does not propose any explicit constructions for any claim terms. See Pet. 44. Patent Owner also does not propose any explicit constructions for any claim terms. See PO. Resp. We determine that no explicit construction is necessary in order to resolve the issues before us.” slip op. at 19

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “items by collecting, analyzing, and transmitting information related to inventory, promotions, and particular sellers” is not an abstract idea because it “requires multiple steps that may or may not be implicated (collecting, analyzing, and transmitting) for information from multiple sources that may or may not be used (inventory, promotions, distributors, i.e., ‘particular sellers’).” PO Resp. 33–34. Contrary to Patent Owner’s position, we do not agree that this abstract idea (or the claims) requires a complex or complicated, multi-step process. Rather, the claims are directed to the collecting, analyzing, and transmitting of information. Claim 1, for example, requires only a list and inventory order of “one or more products” (i.e., the claim may be satisfied with only a single product). The Federal Circuit has explained that, generally, “claims focused on ‘collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis’ are directed to an abstract idea.” SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Electric Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). “Information as such is an intangible,” hence abstract, and “collecting information, including when limited to particular content (which does not change its character as information), [i]s within the realm of abstract ideas.” Electric Power, 830 F.3d at 1353 (citing cases). Thus, even assuming that different types of information may be implicated by a claim limitation, the fact remains that the type or source of information, e.g., inventory, promotions, distributors,” slip op. at 45

  Patent outcomesUS 10,467,585 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibilitycites Mayo · Bilski · Berkheimer · Enfish · Electric Power · Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 10,467,585
• Gain Capital Holdings, Inc. v. Oanda CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 16, 2022 · CBM2020-00023 · APJ Justin T Arbes · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–12 are unpatentable under § 101; proposed substitute claim 13 is unpatentable under §§ 101 and 103 over Pictet, and the revised motion to amend is denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “all directed to “time-based trade analysis” “improperly describes the claims at too high a level of abstraction, as warned against in” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016). PO Resp. 5–6. We disagree. Petitioner’s articulation of the abstract idea to which claim 1 is allegedly directed is appropriately focused and tied to the specific language of the limitations of the claim. Petitioner explains how the recited “price data” and “current system position information” are the key inputs for time-based trade analysis and how calculating a trade recommendation using sub-models based on different times of day constitutes such analysis. See Pet. 31–34. Further, “time-based trade analysis” is not a general field, but rather a particular practice, namely the analysis of potential trades based on time. That type of analysis is reflected expressly in claim 1 via the use of a plurality of sub-models where each is based on “a different time of day.” Petitioner’s analysis is persuasive, as it is consistent with the language of claim 1 and supported by the testimony of Mr. Donefer, which we credit.6 Based on the full record developed during trial, we are persuaded that claim 1 recites time-based trade analysis. Doing so is a fundamental economic practice, which is one of the certain methods of organizing human activity identified in the Guidance, and, thus, an abstract idea.” slip op. at 21

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable

    “We disagree. Claim 1 does not recite a distributed system architecture, sub-model calculations executed concurrently in parallel, or real-time operation for a large number of users, all of which Patent Owner relies on to show a patent-eligible application of the alleged abstract idea. See Reply 6, 8; Ex. 1038 ¶¶ 22, 25–26. Claim 1 broadly recites “calculating trade recommendation information from each of a plurality of trading sub-models,” each “based on a different time of day,” and “calculating a trade recommendation . . . based on said trade recommendation information from each of said trading sub-models.” The claim does not specify how, when, or by what component the calculations are performed. Thus, Patent Owner’s contention that steps (d) and (e) do not represent well-understood, routine, and conventional activity is not commensurate with the language of the claim. With respect to what is actually recited in the claim, we are persuaded based on the full trial record that the calculations are the abstract idea itself (i.e., the fundamental economic practice of “time-based trade analysis”), rather than additional elements that could transform the claim into a patent-eligible application of an abstract idea. See supra Section II.F.1.b; BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[A] claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.”). Regardless, though, Petitioner also has provided persuasive evidence regarding the conventionality of steps (d) and (e), particularly given the broad manner in which they are recited in the claim. See, e.g., Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 69–84; Ex. 1021, 115 (“It is widely documented that return volatility varies systematically over the trading day and that this pattern is highly correlated with the intraday variation of trading volume and bid-ask spreads.”); Ex. 1019, 13 (“Trading models offer a real-time analysis of foreign exchange movements and generate explicit trading recommendations. These models are based on the continuous collection and treatment of foreign exchange quotes by market makers around the clock at the tick-by-tick frequency level.”); Ex. 1031, 728–732 (describing modeling that accounts for time periods of different levels of activity, such as when particular FX markets are open, and using time intervals of “hours, days, weeks or years”). Petitioner also has provided a detailed explanation citing persuasive evidence that, even if claim 1 did require distributed parallel processing and real-time trading model calculations, both were well-understood, routine, and conventional at the time of the ’534 patent. See Reply 9–11, 15–17; Ex. 1038 ¶¶ 23 (citing, for example, Ex. 1031, 228–232), 29–35 (citing, for example, Ex. 1031, 718). We credit Mr. Donefer’s testimony, which is supported by evidence in the record and unrebutted—Patent Owner did not address the evidence discussed in the Petition and Mr. Donefer’s initial declaration in its Response, did not file a Sur-Reply addressing Mr. Donefer’s reply declaration and cited evidence, and did not provide any contrary evidence in the record. See Reply 1, 3.” slip op. at 30

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “testimony of Mr. Donefer, for why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine Pictet’s teachings and arrive at the method of proposed substitute claim 13. Id. at 24–25 (citing Ex. 1031, 716–723; Ex. 1038 ¶¶ 52–58, 75–77). Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have recognized that Pictet’s data collection and storage steps (i.e., steps (a)-(c)) provide inputs for the subsequent calculations (i.e., steps (d)-[(e)]),” “would have understood Pictet as teaching that the distributed parallel processing . . . applies to the implementation of the trading models performing those calculations,” and would have had “reason to use at least five of the parameters discussed [in Pictet] when configuring the rules governing the ‘grand’ model.” Id. at 24. Petitioner further contends that numerous types of parameters were routinely used when designing and evaluating trade models, and Pictet’s moving average . . . is no different. Moreover, Pictet describes two categories of threshold values (i.e., trend and overbought/oversold) and expressly teaches using “several threshold values of both types,” which at a minimum suggests four such parameters. The voting scheme is also an integral part of the weighted moving average Pictet describes. A [person of ordinary skill in the art] also had reason to incorporate a time parameter setting the amount of time in the past that is considered, since a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have understood that price data from the distant past is less 984, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (non-precedential) (recognizing that “the Board need not address issues that are not necessary to the resolution of the proceeding”). relevant to a moving average. Pictet also teaches using stop-loss and stop-profit parameters as part of its model implementation. Id. at 24–25 (citations omitted). We have reviewed Petitioner’s analysis and find it persuasive. Petitioner’s reasoning is consistent with the disclosure of Pictet and supported by the testimony of Mr. Donefer, which we credit. For the reasons stated by Petitioner and Mr. Donefer, we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the cited teachings of Pictet in the manner asserted with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 53

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied

    “3. Patentability Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.221(d)(2), Petitioner “bears the burden of persuasion to show, by a preponderance of the evidence,” that proposed substitute claim 13 is unpatentable. Petitioner argues that proposed substitute claim 13 fails to recite patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, and would have been obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Opp. 3–25. For the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has met its burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 13 is unpatentable as claiming patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), and need not reach Petitioner’s arguments regarding definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.” slip op. at 39

  Patent outcomesUS 7,496,534 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Berkheimer · Enfish · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,496,534
• Ironsource Ltd. v. Digital Turbine Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Jan 6, 2022 · PGR2021-00096 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · PGR · Institution

  Instituted PGR on claims 1–18 under § 101, claims 1, 3–12, and 14–18 under § 102(a) over Pasha, and the listed § 103 grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), a post-grant review may not be instituted unless it is determined that it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Based on the information presented in the Petition and the supporting evidence, we are persuaded that the Petition presents information demonstrating it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of the challenged claims on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “For the purposes of this Decision, we agree with Petitioner. Figure 7 of the ’951 patent shows the Downloader & Installer Module as a module within the “installation client,” not as the installation client itself. Ex. 1001, 14:4–45 (discussing “installation client 700” and its various modules); Fig. 7 (showing Download & Installer 720 as part of Installation Client 700). The ’951 patent states: Installation client 700 is represented as several modules performing separate functions. The division of functionality demonstrated in FIG. 7 is illustrative, and not intended to be limiting. Other embodiments of an installation client may organize the various functions performed by the installation client 700 in a different manner. Id. at 14:6–12. Accordingly, the proper construction of the term “installation client” does not limit the number or arrangement of components” slip op. at 11

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 not directed to exceptionNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner’s analysis of the independent claims described above only loosely corresponds to the actual limitations recited in the claim. The Federal Circuit has “cautioned that courts ‘must be careful to avoid oversimplifying the claims’ by looking at them generally and failing to account for the specific requirements of the claims.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). But “failing to account for the specific requirements of the claims” is what Petitioner’s analysis of the claim limitations appears to do. Petitioner’s argument that “the essence of all the claims” is captured by a single claim element not only ignores that that limitation recites installing software, which we are not persuaded is an abstract idea, but also asks us to disregard multiple technical aspects recited in the claims, such as identifying a link, determining whether an installation client is available on the device, invoking the installation client, and redirecting to the device an app store. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 21:6–35. Nor are we persuaded by Petitioner’s characterization of the claims as directed to multitasking, which Petitioner characterizes as representing a basic task in organizing human activity. Pet. 30. Although the Guidance recognizes certain methods of organizing human activity, including certain activity between a person and a computer, as constituting a patent-ineligible abstract idea, we are not persuaded that the claims here fall within the scope of such activity. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (listing fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or legal interactions, and managing personal behavior or relationships as organizing human activity); October 2019 Update at 5 (“this grouping is limited to activity that falls within the enumerated sub-groupings except in rare circumstances”). Although the claimed invention may result in multitasking on the device, the claims are directed to downloading and installing an application in the background instead of directing the user to an app store, thereby maintaining user experience with the foreground application, and do not recite an abstract idea. And although that process does result in improving user experience, the claims recite more than that mere result; they recite specific steps— invoking, without exiting the foreground software application, the installation client for downloading and installing applications on the device to run in the background—that accomplish the desired result. See Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305–06 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding a method that employs a new kind of file in a computer security system directed to a non-abstract improvement in computer functionality, rather than the abstract idea of computer security writ large); DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding claims that address the problem of retaining website visitors after clicking on an advertisement hyperlink not directed to an abstract idea). Accordingly, based on the current record, we question whether Petitioner establishes sufficiently that the claims are directed to a judicial exception under Step 2A of the Guidance. Nevertheless, because Petitioner has shown that it is more likely than not that challenged claims are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (see infra §§ III.F–I), we include this ground in the instituted post-grant review. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354, 1359–60 (2018); see also PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the statute to embracing all challenges included in the petition”).” slip op. at 17

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

    “As discussed above (supra Section II.C.1), at this preliminary stage, we do not construe “installation client” so narrowly as to limit the number or arrangement of components required to meet that claim element. Also, as discussed above (id.), the specification of the ’951 patent supports that multiple modules performing separate functions may comprise the installation client. Therefore, based on our review and consideration of the current record, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Pasha fails to disclose the claimed installation client. Petitioner’s arguments are inconsistent across the Petition. The Petition clearly alleges that “the App Manager 180 and Installer 182 disclose the claimed ‘installation client for downloading and installing applications on said device.’” Pet. 58. Petitioner’s description of Pasha’s App Manager is consistent with Pasha’s disclosure itself. For example, although Pasha discloses that “the host application 132 may use an App Manager component 180 and an Installer component 182,” it also states that “[t]he App Manager 180 may control portions of the application download and install process.” Ex. 1003, 17:22–26; Pet. 38. Pasha further discloses that “[t]he App Manager 180 [itself] may perform at least a portion of one or more of the steps 310–350 of FIG. 3,” i.e., including the step of “[i]nstalling the downloadable application on the computer system from the application package by executing program code having permission to install applications.” Ex. 1003, 17:35–36, Fig. 3. Patent Owner’s argument that Pasha’s “App Manager does not have the role of installing software applications,” is therefore contrary to Pasha’s disclosure. Also, Petitioner’s reasoning and evidentiary underpinnings here are based not so much on modifying Pasha, as Patent Owner suggests, as explaining how one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Pasha’s disclosure. Between its App Manager and Installer, Pasha discloses the claimed functionality of the “installation client,” but, similar to the ’951 patent, Pasha teaches flexibility between the use of those components to implement the claimed functionality. For the purposes of institution, we are unpersuaded that Petitioner fails to meet its threshold burden of showing anticipation under Net MoneyIN. See, e.g., Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that a reference need not always as it teaches that the disclosed components or functionalities may be combined and one of skill in the art would be able to implement the combination). Based on our review of the current record, we therefore determine that the information presented supports sufficiently, for the purpose of institution, Petitioner’s assertion that Pasha discloses this limitation.” slip op. at 26

  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Alice · Enfish · Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 10,782,951

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.