- Inari Agriculture, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 24, 2024 · PGR2024-00019 · APJ Ulrike W Jenks · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution of PGR on claims 1–20 because the Petition did not show they were more likely than not unpatentable on any asserted ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Institution of a post-grant review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 321 . . . demonstrates that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that claims 1–20 of the ’803 patent are unpatentable. Accordingly, we deny institution of a post-grant review of claims 1–20 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Patent Owner states that it “does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the qualifications of person of skill in the art” and “reserves its right to challenge Petitioner’s definition and to provide its own definition, should trial be instituted.” Prelim. Resp. 24. Petitioner’s unopposed proposed definition is consistent with the cited prior art and the disclosure of the ’803 patent, and we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that the prior art itself may “reflect[] an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that “[b]ecause Petitioner’s grounds plainly render the claims unpatentable under any plausible construction, no outer boundary constructions are necessary.” Pet. 20. Patent Owner also does not construe and based on the record before us, we determine that none of the claim terms requires an explicit construction to determine whether to institute post-grant review. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“their cross ultimately resulted in the inbred variety 1PFLQ21. The ’803 patent explains that after the initial crossing of the parental lines, the selection of the progeny was based on genetic analysis predicting disease, insect, and agronomic phenotypic performance. Id. 37:64–66. “Inbred 1PFLQ21 was developed by producing a doubled haploid from the F1 plants, selfing and using pedigree selection amongst the D1 lines, and selfing and bulking from the subsequent generations.” Id. 37:66–38:3. The ’803 patent specification, therefore, makes it clear that simply crossing both parental inbred maize lines is not reasonably expected to result in the claimed inbred maize variety; rather, it explains that more plant breeding work is required to arrive at the 1PFLQ21 inbred maize line than just having both parental inbred maize lines available.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,659,803 - Inari Agriculture, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 24, 2024 · PGR2024-00020 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · PGR · Institution
Denied institution of PGR on claims 1–20 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood equivalent under § 324 that any challenged claim was unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Institution of a post-grant review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 321 . . . demonstrates that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least one of claims 1–20 of the ’020 patent is unpatentable. Accordingly, we deny institution of a postgrant review of claims 1–20 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “had a high level of skill, with a doctoral degree in plant breeding or a related field, at least five years of experience with corn breeding, and additional experience interfacing with laboratory-side personnel (including a computational biologist . . . along with genetics specialists) and field-side personnel.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–21). Petitioner also states that, “[a]lternatively, additional experience could take the place of an advanced degree.” Pet. 15. Patent Owner states that it “does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the qualifications of person of skill in the art,” but “reserves its right to challenge Petitioner’s definition and to provide its own definition, should trial be instituted.” Prelim. Resp. 25. Petitioner’s unopposed proposed definition is consistent with the cited prior art and the disclosure of the ’020 patent, and we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that the prior art itself may “reflect[] an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that “[b]ecause Petitioner’s grounds plainly render the claims unpatentable under any plausible construction, no outer boundary constructions are necessary.” Pet. 22. Patent Owner also does not construe any claim terms. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, and based on the record before us, we determine that none of the claim terms require an explicit construction to determine whether to institute post-grant review. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Based on these disclosures in Smalley, we agree with Petitioner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the parental line PH1D84 could have been used as a starting point to arrive at other inbred lines. See Pet. 41. Petitioner, however, fails to demonstrate sufficiently how or why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in developing 1PFHC43 specifically, when its other parent was not known in the art at the relevant time. As Dr. Schnable explains, 1PFHC43’s genome is derived from its parents. Ex. 2004 ¶ 115. Petitioner does not address how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to produce the claimed seed, including its unique genotype, without having access to PH1VNA or its genomic and phenotypic information.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,666,020 - Hum Industrial Technology, Inc. v. Amsted Rail Company, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 18, 2024 · IPR2023-00539 · APJ James P Calve · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held original claims 1–18 and 20–22 unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds, denied the revised motion to amend, and held substitute claims 23–43 ineligible and unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“f. Conclusion We determine that Petitioner has established by a preponderance of” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“2. Motivation to combine a. Petitioner’s contentions Petitioner contends that a skilled artisan would have combined the teachings of LeFebvre and Barone to monitor the condition of railcar wheels and bearings using sensors connected over a wireless mesh network and to analyze collected data to determine if a wheel bearing failure is imminent and issue an alert to the locomotive or central station. Pet. 42–43 (citing Ex. 1007, code (57), Abstr., ¶¶ 45, 86, 201–220; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 157–162). b. Patent Owner’s arguments Patent Owner does not contest these assertions regarding a motivation to combine LeFebvre and Barone. See generally PO Resp.; Sur-reply. c. Conclusion We determine a skilled artisan would have combined the teachings of” slip op. at 51
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“(4) Conclusion We determine that Patent Owner has demonstrated that the inventors” slip op. at 59
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“(4) Conclusion We determine that the above-described lack of clarity in the meaning” slip op. at 72
Patent outcomesUS 9,981,673 unpatentable§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Enfish · Electric Power · Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,981,673 - PTAB · Mar 11, 2024 · PGR2023-00053 · APJ James P Calve · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds because the petition showed it was more likely than not that at least one challenged claim was unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 324; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Section 324(a) provides that a post-grant review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the Petition (including its supporting testimonial evidence) and the evidence and arguments in the Preliminary Response, we determine that the information presented shows that it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute post-grant review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.208(a) (“When instituting post-grant review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- BurdenInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 324; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Section 324(a) provides that a post-grant review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the Petition (including its supporting testimonial evidence) and the evidence and arguments in the Preliminary Response, we determine that the information presented shows that it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute post-grant review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.208(a) (“When instituting post-grant review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science or a similar discipline, with at least two years of relevant industry or research experience, including experience designing, planning, or implementing sensor networks using LIDAR, radar and/or cameras and corresponding data analysis” and “[a]dditional work or research experience can substitute for less or different education, and vice versa.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 18– 23). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art. On the present record, we find that Petitioner’s uncontested level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the ’349 patent and the prior art of record, and we adopt it for consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner asserts that “[n]o terms require construction to determine that claims 1–20 are invalid under §§ 101, 102, 103.” Pet. 9. At this stage, Patent Owner does not address the construction of any term or phrase. On the present record, we determine that we do not need to construe any claim terms to reach our decision. See Realtime Data, LLC. v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019).” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,538,349 - Entain Corporate Services Ltd. / MGM Resorts International et al. v. Gan (UK) LimitedAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 29, 2024 · IPR2023-00027 · APJ James P Calve · IPR · Final written decision
Original claims 11–18, 21, and 22 and proposed substitute claims 23–39 were held unpatentable; the revised motion to amend was granted in part and otherwise denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“For reasons discussed below, we grant in-part Patent Owner’s RMTA and cancel original claims 1 and 3–10. We otherwise deny Patent Owner’s RMTA to enter revised substitute claims 23–31, which non-contingently amend original claims 1 and 3–10, and we deny Patent Owner’s RMTA to enter revised substitute claims 32–39, which contingently amend original claims 12–14, 16–18, 21, and 22.” slip op. at 3
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedOther
“V. PETITIONER’S MOTION TO STRIKE Because our findings and determinations do not rely on the paragraphs of Dr. Shamos’ declaration that Petitioner’s Motion to Strike seeks to strike, we dismiss Petitioner’s Motion to Strike as moot.” slip op. at 104
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Having reviewed the arguments and evidence, we determine Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that original claims 11–18, 21, and 22 of the challenged claims of the ’296 patent are unpatentable.” slip op. at 3
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'IneligibleStep1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable
“We determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that revised substitute claims 23–39 are unpatentable. Specifically, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that revised substitute claims 23–39 are not eligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, and claims 23–39 are unpatentable under prior art asserted under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as discussed below. See Opp. RMTA 4–6, 8–28.” slip op. at 3
Patent outcomesUS 8,821,296 unpatentable§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Berkheimer · Enfish · Electric PowerPatents in suitUS 8,821,296 - Nabors Drilling Technologies USA, Inc. v. Motive Drilling Technologies, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 22, 2024 · PGR2022-00055 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4 and 10–13 are unpatentable under § 101; claims 1–4 and 11–13 are also unpatentable as obvious over Pirovolou, Panchal, and Budiman, and claim 10 over those references plus Downton.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The level of ordinary skill in the art is “a prism or lens” through which we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, we may consider certain factors, including: “(1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.” Best Med. Int’l, Inc. v. Elekta Inc., 46 F.4th 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). “The patent’s purpose can also be informative.” Id. (citation omitted).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Neither party presents arguments for the express construction of any term, instead interpreting the claim terms according to their ordinary and customary meaning. Pet. 18; PO Resp. 29. For purposes of this Decision, and based on the record before us, we determine that no construction of any term is necessary. slip op. at 10
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable
“information (recitations 1.3, 1.8), using received information to generate a set of possible drilling paths (recitation 1.4), removing certain ones of the generated possible paths (recitations 1.5–1.6), selecting a desired one of the generated paths (recitation 1.7), and updating a plan to include the selected path (recitation 1.9). This collection and manipulation of data is similar to the data collection and management concepts that were held to be patent ineligible in previous cases. See Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 776 F.3d 1343, 1345, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 610, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1351–54 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Although the claim enumerates the type of information (i.e., BHA location, target path, and possible convergence paths) that is acquired and analyzed, the Federal Circuit has explained that the mere selection and manipulation of particular information by itself does not make an abstract concept any less abstract. Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353; Dig. Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014).” slip op. at 20
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable
“removing illogical options as the “pruning” step, rather than both of the “removing” steps as asserted by Patent Owner. See Ex. 1001, 6:21–34, 6:42–43, 6:50. The two “removing” steps noted by Patent Owner reduce the number of cost considerations that the computer must perform (by increasing the number of other comparisons (regarding illogical options and rule violations)), but do not change the way in which the computer performs the cost analyses. And, as explained above, neither the “removing” steps nor any other recitation alters the way in which drilling is performed. Moreover, as also noted above, the “removing” steps relied upon by Patent Owner are part of the abstract idea itself and, therefore, cannot evidence an inventive concept. See Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring); BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290–91 (Fed. Cir. 2018). As noted above, the additional elements of the processor and memory are recited at a high level of generality, i.e., as a generic processor performing a generic computer function of processing data. The ’454 patent also describes the processor and memory as generic computer components. See Ex. 1001, 4:50–5:29. The claim includes the additional recitations of a memory and processor to send a control signal. A memory for storing data and a processor for processing data and sending signals are well‐understood, routine, and conventional computer components, which in this claim are recited at a high level of generality and perform generic computer functions (e.g., storing, processing, and transmitting information). See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 104–105 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 22, Fig. 2, code (57)). Generic computer components performing generic computer functions, alone, do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea, as the Supreme Court has explained that “the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 223. Viewing the limitations in combination also fails to amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. The claimed system seeks to use a processor and memory to generate possible convergence paths, remove certain ones of the generated possible paths, select a desired one of the generated paths, update a plan to include the selected path, and send a signal, but these functions reflect ordinary usage typically performed by a generic computer, as would be recognized by those of ordinary skill in the field of mining. See, e.g., Ex. 1006 ¶ 22, code (57). The claim here does not invoke any of the considerations that courts have identified as providing significantly more than an exception; the combination of elements is no more than the sum of their parts. Additionally, as the Federal Circuit has explained, claims that do not include a requirement for performing “claimed functions of [data] gathering, analyzing, and [transmitting] by use of anything [other than] conventional, generic technology” fail to provide an inventive concept. Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1356. Accordingly, on this record, Petitioner sufficiently shows that the claim as a whole does not amount to significantly more than the recited exception.” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 11,170,454 unpatentableClaim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Electric Power · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,170,454 - Profrac Holding Corporation / U.S. Well Services, LLC v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Nov 1, 2023 · PGR2023-00023 · APJ Brent M Dougal · PGR · Institution
Instituted PGR of claims 1–20 because at least one challenged claim was more likely than not unpatentable under the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate unpatentability under the more likely than not standard. 35 U.S.C. § 324(a); Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). A claim is unpatentable “if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103; see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). We resolve the question of obviousness based on underlying factual determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the prior art and the claims; (3) the level of skill in the art; and (4) when in evidence,” slip op. at 4
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Id. at 13, 17. Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA): would have had a B.S. in Chemical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Materials Science, or Metallurgical Engineering or an equivalent field and at least two years of academic or industry experience in the oil and gas industry, including experience with process control systems. Further, a person with additional education but less professional experience, and vice-versa, may qualify. Pet. 23–24 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 4). Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s definition. Prelim. Resp. 15. We are persuaded, on the present record, that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’058 patent and prior art of record. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b) (2022). claim terms. Pet. 25; Prelim. Resp 15–16. We determine that no terms need to be construed at this time. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Petitioner also relies on Pankaj Figure 11 to disclose the preamble and the final limitation, with the exception of the fracturing pump/fracturing equipment being electrical. See Pet. 38–40 (discussing e.g., Pankaj’s control method in Figure 11, teachings of computer implementation), 49–51 (discussing e.g., Pankaj’s controlling of production operations, including a fracturing pump). As previously noted, Petitioner relies on Payne for teaching that the fracturing pump can be electrical. Id. at 31, 49–51. Petitioner also provides reasons why one of skill in the art would combine Payne’s electrical fracturing pump with Pankaj’s fracturing system. Id. at 31–38, 51. Patent Owner does not contest that the combination of Pankaj and Payne teaches the above noted limitations. See generally, Prelim. Resp. 50– 57.” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Berkheimer · Enfish · KSRPatents in suitUS 11,373,058 - PTAB · Aug 11, 2023 · PGR2023-00013 · APJ Sharon Fenick · PGR · Institution
Instituted PGR on claims 1–27 on all asserted grounds; the Board found it more likely than not that at least one claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“A post-grant review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 321, if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). For the reasons below, Petitioner has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of the challenged claims of the ’286 patent on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that: A person of ordinary skill in the art . . . would have had (1) a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field, and (2) one to two years of experience working with payment processing and/or digital authentication systems, including familiarity with short-range wireless technologies.” slip op. at 9
- Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner
“The Trial Practice Guide states that “one petition should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations.” CTPG 59. “Two or more petitions filed against the same patent at or about the same time . . . may place a substantial and unnecessary burden on the Board and the patent owner and could raise fairness, timing, and efficiency concerns.” Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 316(b), which is identical to 35 U.S.C. § 326(b)). Although rare circumstances may necessitate two petitions, “the Board finds it unlikely that circumstances will arise where three or more petitions by a petitioner with respect to a particular patent will be appropriate.” Id. To help the Board determine whether multiple petitions are necessary, the Trial Practice Guide further instructs a petitioner filing multiple petitions challenging the same patent to explain “the differences between the petitions, why the issues addressed by the differences are material, and why identifies one petition that satisfies petitioner's burden under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” CTPG 59–60. Additionally, the Trial Practice Guide instructs the patent owner to “clearly proffer any necessary stipulations,” where the patent owner asserts that “the differences identified by the petitioner are directed to an issue that is not material or not in dispute.” Id. at 61. The patent owner may, for example, “seek to avoid additional petitions by proffering a stipulation that certain claim limitations are not disputed or that certain references qualify as prior art.” Id. In light of the particular facts before us, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny the Petition pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) on the basis of the filing of two parallel petitions. In particular, we recognize that the two petitions do not include duplicate attacks on the basis of unpatentability over prior art, but rather break the issues into two distinct parts—prior-art based unpatentability challenges, in PGR2023-00012, and 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 112 challenges here. The usual considerations of fairness, timing, and efficiency do not weigh in favor of exercising our discretion to deny institution. In particular, the petitions were filed concurrently, which means that Petitioner did not gain a timing advantage that might otherwise occur if the petitions were filed serially. Additionally, the proceedings can be coordinated, and a similar or common schedule can be adopted. To the extent that Patent Owner argues (see Prelim. Resp. 55–56) that Petitioner was attempting to avoid providing a single stipulation that (upon institution) Petitioner will pursue neither section 103 grounds on certain art, as per the stipulation offered in PGR2023-00012, nor section 101 and 112 grounds as per the stipulation here (see Pet. 49), discretionary denial of this Petition would not provide such a stipulation. Because we institute both here and in is equivalent to our best understanding of Patent Owner’s desired stipulation “tak[ing] into account” the two Petitions. Accordingly, based on the particular facts and circumstances before us, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny the instant Petition under § 324(a) on the basis of the Petitioner’s filing of multiple petitions.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“2. Conclusion We have considered the circumstances and facts before us in view of the first five Fintiv factors. Because our analysis is fact-driven, no single factor is determinative of our conclusion. Considering these five Fintiv factors together, we determine that they do not favor a discretionary denial. As we do not find that the first five Fintiv factors favor discretionary denial, we therefore do not make a determination regarding compelling merits under Fintiv factor 6, and our consideration ends with this conclusion. CommScope, 4–5.” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Enfish · Phillips · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,328,286 - Snap Inc. / Facebook, Inc. et al. v. Palo Alto Research Center LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 24, 2023 · IPR2021-01294 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held all challenged claims 1–25 unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds and denied Patent Owner’s contingent motions to amend.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“2. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Snap proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’599 patent would have possessed “an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science or a related field along with at least two years of work experience in the field of content presentation and context-based systems/processes.” Snap Pet. 3 (citing Snap IPR, Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 30–32); Snap IPR, Ex. 1022 ¶ 32. Snap further asserts that additional “education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Id. In the Decision on Institution, we determined that Snap’s proposed description of the qualifications of a person of ordinary skill in the art aligned with the technology and claims of the ’599 patent. Snap Inst. Dec. 6–7. For this proceeding, Patent Owner and Dr. Martin apply this level of skill in the art. Snap PO Resp. 11–12; Snap IPR, Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 48–50. Accordingly, for the reasons given in the Decision on Institution, we adopt Snap’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. Snap Inst. Dec. 6–7.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Dr. Martin also provides consistent testimony on this issue. Snap IPR, Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 81–82. Put simply, the Specification’s disclosure is that the set of rules for multiple content packages includes an expected response, and actions are then performed based on whether an expected response is or is not provided. Moreover, as Dr. Almeroth testifies, neither the claims nor the Specification use the term “unexpected response”—rather the Specification only identifies an “expected response.” Snap IPR, Ex. 1022 ¶ 42. Accordingly, the disclosures in Table 1 and the Specification support Dr. Almeroth’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill would have understood that “the claimed ‘determin[e/ing]’ limitation requires what it plainly recites: ‘determin[e/ing] whether the received response matches the expected response[]’. . . . [i]t does not require an unexpected response not known to the system.” Snap IPR, Ex. 1022 ¶ 51.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“time,’ ‘type of location,’ and other contextual information to automatically determine whether users would like to undertake learning activities.” Twitter Pet. Reply 18 (citing Twitter IPR, Ex. 1005, 2 3, 5 (“A check . . . to see if the information from the database corresponds with the location sensor (i.e. a check on whether the learner is really keeping his/her schedule).”), Fig.1; Twitter IPR, Ex. 1025 ¶ 49; Twitter IPR, Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 85, 157–162, 238, 435, 451, 517; Twitter Pet. 20–21). Accordingly, the evidence of record support that Yau teaches that context triggers the display of a content piece, such as an exercise/test/quiz. Patent Owner also argues that Twitter asserts that PALLES’ content piece is “‘exercise[s],’ ‘test[s],’ and/or ‘MP Quiz[zes],’” but also contends that Yau’s “formal assessment” is the claimed content piece. Twitter PO Resp. 32. Patent Owner argues that “Twitter points back to its limitation 12.1 PALLAS evidence for the purported ‘content piece’” and also does not mention Yau for limitation 12.5 and 12.6 and “only conclusorily states that ‘PALLAS in view of Yau renders obvious triggering an exercise/test/quiz.’” Id. Patent Owner’s arguments overlook Twitter’s assertion, with Dr. Turnbull’s supporting testimony, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Yau’s formal assessments are “tests with answers for comparing against learner’s responses to assess knowledge/performance/skill (contrasting with ‘un-assessed’ exercises whose responses are unchecked).” Twitter Pet. 43; Twitter IPR, Ex. 1003 ¶ 154. Further, Patent Owner overlooks Petitioner’s assertion that it is implementing PALLAS’s context-triggerbased content display using Yau’s teachings of displaying assessments/questions based on context. Twitter Pet. 43. Patent Owner also asserts that in the PALLAS-Yau combination, Twitter does not explain how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the prior art in the manner Petitioner alleges. Twitter PO Resp. 42. Patent Owner argues that “PALLAS says nothing about forcing quizzes, tests, or exercises on its users without the users asking for such exercises,” and a person of skill would understand that the combined system still requires that a student select a learning activity and that PALLAS’s system should be unobtrusive because learners “may have small time slots to engage in learning.” Id. (citing Twitter IPR, Ex. 2013 ¶ 168; Twitter IPR, Ex. 1004, 54). Patent Owner further contends that “Twitter’s conclusory, hindsight-driven statements” do not suffice and PALLAS teaches away from the modifications suggested by Twitter. Id. at 42–43 (citing Twitter IPR, Ex. 2013 ¶ 144). Patent Owner argues that because a learner may not have time to complete a test, a person of ordinary skill in the art would not be motivated to change PALLAS to trigger exercises/tests/quizzes based on location or time. Id. at 43 (citing Twitter IPR, Ex. 2013 ¶¶ 142–144). The evidence of record does not support Patent Owner’s arguments.” slip op. at 115
- ScopeMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“2. Enlarging Scope of Claims Patent Owner asserts that it proposes narrowing limitations in direct response to the grounds of unpatentability involved in this proceeding. See, e.g., Snap Mot. 3–4. Facebook argues Patent Owner is “improperly attempting to enlarge the scope of the original claims.” Facebook Pet. Opp. 1. Facebook asserts, “[i]f ‘an expected response’ means one or more expected responses, therefore, determining whether the received response ‘matches the expected response’ means that the received response must match [all of] the one or more previously-recited expected responses in the content package.” Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted). Facebook then argues “the term ‘predefined response’ is broader than ‘expected response,’” because “an ‘expected response’ does not include any conceivable or possible response; it is a response that is expected.” Id. at 4–5 (emphasis omitted). Twitter argues that “‘predefined response’ is broader than ‘expected response’ because a ‘predefined response’ can include any possible response as long as that response has been somehow defined in advance.” Twitter Pet. Opp. 2. We consider the amendments in view of the claim as a whole. Although the term “one predefined response” may be broader than “an expected response,” we also consider the amended portion “wherein the received response is expected if the received response matches one or more of the at least one predefined response,” and “the received response is unexpected if the received response does not match any of the at least one predefined response.” Unless the response had been predefined within the content package, any “received response” could not be considered “expected” under the claims, and the additional clause requires a match of the response with the predefined response to be deemed “expected.” This equates to an equivalent scope to the original claim. This is consistent with Dr. Martin’s testimony, which we credit, that he is not aware of a situation where the substitute but not original claims are infringed because “[t]he substitute claims would only be satisfied when a ‘predefined response’ in the substitute claims is an ‘expected response’ in the original claims.” Facebook IPR, Ex. 2023 ¶ 59.” slip op. at 136
Patent outcomesUS 8,489,599 unpatentableClaim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Electric Power · Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,489,599 - Metacluster LT, Uab v. Bright Data Ltd.InstitutedPTAB · Mar 23, 2023 · PGR2022-00052 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · PGR · Institution
Instituted PGR on claims 1–27; the Board found it more likely than not that the claims are obvious over Mithyantha, with claim 19 also challenged over Mithyantha and RFC 2616.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We may not institute a post-grant review “unless . . . the information presented in the petition filed under section 321, if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of the challenged claims of the ’034 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had at least a bachelor’s degree in Computer Science or related field (or equivalent experience), and at least two years’ experience working with and programming networked computer systems.” Pet. 13 (referencing Ex. 1002 ¶ 33).” slip op. at 8
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The district court considered the issue of whether a client device, for instance, should be construed in a role-based or structural manner, and the evaluation included whether a device could sometimes be operated as a client and at other times could operate as something else. Ex. 1018, 48–51. In support, the district pointed the patent disclosure that: Any network element in the system may be a dedicated device that assumes only a single role, and thus being only a client (using tunnels), a tunnel, a client (using agents/ peers), an agent, or a peer device. Alternatively or in addition, a network element may be capable of assuming two or more roles, either at different times or simultaneously, from the list of roles including a client (using tunnels), a tunnel, a client (using agents/peers), an agent, or a peer device. Alternatively or in addition, a device may be capable of assuming all of the above roles. Ex. 1018, 50 (quoting ’866 patent at 125:33–42, with identical disclosure in ’034 patent (Ex. 1001, 125:24–33)).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“At this stage of the proceedings, we do not agree that Mithyantha’s second appliance 200’/200b cannot be considered the claimed “second client device” and its first appliance 200/200a cannot be considered the claimed “third server.” As discussed supra Section II.C, we have adopted the district court’s constructions of claim terms. More specifically, the district court determined, and we concur based on the present record, that “client device” is “a device that is operating in the role of a client by requesting services, functionalities, or resources from other devices” and a “first server” functions as “a server that is not the client device.” On this record, Petitioner has demonstrated that Mithyantha’s second appliance 200’/200b functions as the claimed “second client device,” as it operates as a client by requesting services, functionalities, or resources from other devices, that is, it transmits HTTP web requests over the network to a server. See Pet. 44– 45. Mithyantha also discloses that its first appliance 200/200a functions in a server role, with appliance 200/200a sending back responses to client 102a, that is, content from the web server, and it is a separate element from a client device. See id. at 41–42. Moreover, as discussed above, Petitioner’s assertions are consistent with the role-based nature of the elements as disclosed in the ’034 patent. Further, we do not find that Petitioner’s applications of the claim elements to Mithyantha are arbitrary because they are consistent with the district court’s claim construction of the respective claimed elements and the elements’ functions and roles, as discussed. Moreover, Mithyantha discloses that its appliances can provide different functions (see e.g. Ex. 1009, 5:31–33, 8:65–67, 9:8–21, 9:53–55; 23:58–64), and may be implemented in many forms. That is, the implementation of appliance 200 is generally described as being on any form of computing device such as “computing device 100,” and “computing device 100 can be any workstation, desktop computer, laptop or notebook computer, server, handheld computer, mobile telephone.” See id. at 13:65– 142, 16:58–64. We do not agree with Patent Owner’s allegations regarding a required architecture. Patent Owner does not explain how these requirements are recited in the limitations of claims. Instead, at this juncture, it appears that the arguments are an attempt to impermissibly introduce limitations into the claim that are not recited. Similarly, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments on required anonymity because this requirement is not recited in the claims.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,272,034
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.