- The Kroger Company / Brookshire Grocery Company v. Nexuscard, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 27, 2017 · CBM2015-00183 · APJ Minn Chung · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1–11 are unpatentable under § 101 because they claim the abstract idea of collecting, storing, and processing membership discount information without an inventive concept.
RulingsFinal written decision- Burden
“Upon considering all of the evidence of record, we are persuaded Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence that claims 1 and 11 fail to recite any elements that individually or as an ordered combination transform the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” slip op. at 34
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesOther
“communication means” Claimed Function: “providing real time (1, 8, 11) 2, 3 communication between [a point of purchase] member merchant’s computer terminal and [a centralized] provider’s computer” Corresponding Structure: a cash register with a communication capability, a credit card verification machine, a terminal, or a scanner, and equivalents “memory storage means” Claimed Function: “containing at least . . . (1, 11) consumer identification code” Corresponding Structure: a magnetic stripe on a card, and equivalents slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“real time “communication without intentional delay, communication” (1, 7, 11) given the processing limitations of the system and the time required to effect the communication” See Dec. on Inst. 8–11. The parties do not dispute these interpretations in their Patent Owner Response and Reply. For this Final Written Decision, after considering the complete record, we see no reason to deviate from those constructions and, therefore, maintain our constructions as set forth above. slip op. at 9
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable
“Under the approach described in Alice and further explained in Enfish, Internet Patents, and Electric Power Group, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument and evidence that claims 1 and 11 are directed to an abstract idea. As discussed above, Petitioner has shown that the claims recite a process to “collect, store, and process information about consumer memberships, merchants, manufacturers, and sales transactions” (Pet. 34), a process that qualifies as an “abstract idea” (id. at 71) of “conventional information processing” in the retail industry (id. at 72), for which conventional components, such as a magnetic stripe scanner, computers, and databases, are merely invoked as tools used in their ordinary and conventional manner (Pet. Reply 8–11). In Electric Power Group, the Federal Circuit explained that the “the realm of abstract ideas” includes “collecting information, including when limited to particular content.” Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353. The court determined, therefore, that the claims at issue were directed to an abstract idea because “the focus of the asserted claims” is “on collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis.” Id. We are persuaded that claims 1 and 11 in this case are similarly directed to an abstract idea because Petitioner’s argument and evidence shows that the focus of the claims, the claims’ “character as a whole,” is on conventional information processing in the context of membership discount programs that use generic computers and conventional devices as tools to provide discounts without coupons.” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 5,924,080 unpatentableClaim construction§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Enfish · Electric PowerPatents in suitUS 5,924,080 - Ibg LLC / Interactive Brokers LLC et al. v. Trading Technologies International, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 3, 2017 · CBM2015-00181 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1–28 are patent-ineligible under § 101 and unpatentable under § 103 over TSE, Belden, and Togher.
RulingsFinal written decision- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable
“3. Abstract Idea “The ‘abstract idea’ step of the inquiry calls upon us to look at the ‘focus of the claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the claim’s ‘character as a whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.” Affinity Labs of Texas v. DirectTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016). According to Petitioner, the claims are directed to the abstract idea of” slip op. at 23
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptIneligibleUnpatentable
“4. Inventive Concept To be patent eligible, a claim directed to an abstract idea must recite additional elements that constitute an inventive concept. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357. One looks to “[t]he elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297–98). The additional elements must be more than “well-understood, routine, conventional, activity.” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298. Petitioner contends that claim 1 does not recite an inventive concept.” slip op. at 30
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“1. TSE Printed Publication Status Petitioner argues that TSE is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). Pet. 11. In support of its showing that TSE qualifies as prior art, Petitioner relies on the November 21, 2005, deposition testimony of Atsushi Kawashima taken during litigation between Patent Owner and a third party, eSpeed, Inc. Id.; Ex. 1010. Whether a document qualifies as a printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) is a question of law based on underlying findings of fact. In re Enhanced Sec. Research, LLC, 739 F.3d 1347, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). The Federal Circuit “has interpreted § 102 broadly, explaining that even relatively obscure documents qualify as prior art so long as the public has a means of accessing them.” Id. (citing Hall, 781 F.2d at 899).” slip op. at 34
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“2. TSE, Belden, and Togher a. Claims 1 and 26 With respect to claims 1 and 26, Petitioner cites TSE as teaching the majority of limitations of the claims. Pet. 64–69. Petitioner cites Belden for the “single action” limitation in the claims, including the “setting” and “sending” via the “single action,” and cites Togher as teaching an order being for a “default quantity.” Id. at 69–73. Petitioner proposes modifying TSE based on the teachings of Belden and Togher. Id. at 62–64. TSE describes a trading system that facilitates trading with an electronic exchange by receiving bid and offer information, displaying it to a user, and accepting and sending bid and offer orders. Ex. 1007, 6–13, 35. A trading terminal displays a GUI for depicting market information on a Board Screen, which is shown in the figure reproduced below (“TSE’s Board Screen”).” slip op. at 43
Patent outcomesUS 7,676,411 unpatentable§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Enfish · Electric PowerPatents in suitUS 7,676,411 - Ibg LLC / Interactive Brokers LLC et al. v. Trading Technologies International, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 17, 2017 · CBM2015-00179 · APJ Sally C Medley · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1–15 are unpatentable under § 101 and § 103 over TSE, Togher, Schott, and Cooper, and over Silverman, Togher, Cooper, and Hogan.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenUnpatentable
“The individual elements of the claims do not transform the nature of the claims into a patent-eligible application. They do not add significantly more to the abstract idea or fundamental economic practice. Contrary to Patent Owner’s argument, the claims simply recite the use of a generic computer with routine and conventional functions. Further, considering all of the elements as an ordered combination, we determine that the combined elements also do not transform the nature of the claims into a patent-eligible application. For all of the above reasons, Petitioner has shown sufficiently that claims 1–15 of the ’056 patent are not directed to patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” slip op. at 29
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner that the term “price axis” requires reading into the claim the additional “clarification” that a list of prices that do not contain gaps in between prices is not a price axis. There is nothing in the claim language itself that describes gaps or how data is arranged along the price axis or what contains a price axis. The passages and figures of the ’056 patent that Patent Owner (and Mr. Thomas) directs attention to are examples or embodiments of what is claimed, and do not indicate that Patent Owner disclaimed or limited price axis to consist of a list of prices that contains gaps in between prices. Moreover, Mr. Thomas’ illustration of what constitutes a price axis is conclusory and not supported by record evidence. Ex. 2169 ¶¶ 41–42. He has not directed attention to any evidence in support of his testimony as to what does and does not constitute a price axis as illustrated in 14 paragraph 41 of his declaration. As pointed out by Petitioner, an axis may be represented by scale breaks or logarithmic scales, and thus, need not retain an order of gaps as Patent Owner and Mr. Thomas contend. Pet. Reply 11–12; Ex. 1058, 103–109. We also have considered Patent Owner’s arguments and evidence that remarks made by the then applicant during prosecution of the application that matured into the ’056 patent amount to an express and clear disclaimer of the meaning for price axis. PO Resp. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1002, 178–179; Ex. 2169 ¶ 39). We are not persuaded by such arguments because the comments made during prosecution have not been shown to amount to a disclaimer of having a price axis without gaps in between prices. For example, Patent Owner directs attention to page 178 of Exhibit 1002 from the prosecution file in support of its disclaimer argument. On that page, however, is quoted language from several lines of the claim with an argument just prior stating that Silverman does not describe an axis of prices and all that is contained in the quoted language. Patent Owner has not explained sufficiently why we should construe such general remarks as a disclaimer. We also have reviewed the remarks made by the then applicant that the applied prior art displayed prices for which orders exist, but do not agree that Patent Owner has shown why such comments amount to a clear disclaimer or disavowal of the scope of the term “price axis.” To disavow claim scope, “the specification or prosecution history [must] make clear that the invention does not include a particular feature.” GE Lighting Sols., LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (internal citation, quotation, and alterations omitted).” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“icon at a location that corresponds to the desired price level along the price axis, the order icon indicating the user’s order at the electronic exchange.” (Emphasis added). Patent Owner argues that an “order icon indicating the user’s order at the electronic exchange” should be interpreted to mean “an icon indicating to the user that the user has an order at a particular level along the price axis, distinct from other orders at the same level.” PO Resp. 9. Petitioner argues that no construction of the phrase is necessary and that Patent Owner’s construction is inconsistent with Figure 3A, which shows the user’s order aggregated with other users. Pet. Reply 12. Petitioner further argues that any icon that indicates a user’s order, whether aggregated with other orders or separate, meets the claim term. Id. We agree with Petitioner. There is nothing in the language of claim 5 that requires indicating the specific user order (separating it out from all other orders) or indicating to the user that it is his order. If an order is placed by a user, resulting in the total quantity of orders placed at that same price to increase, the total number would indicate an increase, and thus, indicate the user’s order. Patent Owner argues that because claim 1 recites bid indicators and offer indicators, an order icon must represent something distinct from the 16 bid/offer indicators. PO Resp. 7–8. But even Patent Owner does not explain why an order icon cannot be one of the offer or bid indicators. Indeed, for the embodiment that Patent Owner directs attention to there is no distinction between offer and bid indicators with order icons (an order icon is one of the indicators). Id. We agree with Petitioner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the ’056 patent to use “icons” and “indicators” interchangeably. See, e.g., Pet. 18–20. Thus, we disagree with Patent Owner that the “order icon” of claim 5 cannot be one of the offer or bid indicators. For all of the above reasons, we decline to interpret an “order icon indicating the user’s order at the electronic exchange” to mean “an icon indicating to the user that the user has an order at a particular level along the price axis, distinct from other orders at the same level.”” slip op. at 16
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“B. The Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Notwithstanding the parties’ submissions of the level of ordinary skill in the art10, we find that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). 10 The parties’ submissions focus primarily on the degrees, occupations, and experience, as opposed to what the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art would have known at the time of the invention. As such, and as the triers of fact, based on the record before us, we do not find such information particularly helpful.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 7,533,056 unpatentableClaim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Enfish · Electric PowerPatents in suitUS 7,533,056 - Google, Inc. / Apple Inc. v. Smartflash LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 27, 2017 · CBM2015-00130 · APJ Jennifer S Bisk · CBM · Rehearing
The Board denied Smartflash’s rehearing request, leaving in place its determination that claims 3–10, 15–31, and 33 are patent-ineligible under § 101.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” slip op. at 3
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Decided for petitioner
“Id. at 13–14 (citing Ex. 1001, 25:59–61 (claim 1), 26:42–67 (claim 15), 27:36–55). But McRO does not stand for the general proposition that use of rules or conditions to achieve an improved technological result, alone, removes claims from the realm of abstract ideas. In McRO, the Court explained that “the claimed improvement [was] allowing computers to produce ‘accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated characters’ that previously could only be produced by human animators.” Id. at 1313 (citation omitted). The Court explained that the claimed rules in McRO transformed a traditionally subjective process performed by human artists into a mathematically automated process executed on computers (i.e., the processes were fundamentally different). Id. at 1314. The Court explained that “it [was] the incorporation of the claimed rules, not the use of the computer, that ‘improved [the] existing technological process’ by allowing the automation of further tasks.” Id. at 1314 (alteration in original) (quoting Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014)). The Court distinguished this from situations “where the claimed computer-automated process and the prior method were carried out in the same way.” Id. (citing Parker v. Flook, 437” slip op. at 6
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptDecided for petitioner
“In Amdocs, the Court held that “[claim 1] is eligible under step two because it contains a sufficient ‘inventive concept.’” Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300. The claim at issue recited “computer code for using the accounting information with which the first network accounting record is correlated to enhance the first network accounting record.” Id. The Court explained that the “claim entails an unconventional technological solution (enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a technological problem (massive record flows which previously required massive databases).” Id. The Court noted that, although the solution requires generic computer components, “the claim’s enhancing limitation necessarily requires that these generic components operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality.” Id. at 1300–1301. When determining that the claim was patent-eligible, the Court explained that the “enhancing limitation necessarily involves the arguably generic gatherers, network devices, and other components working in an unconventional distributed fashion to solve a particular technological problem.” Id. at 1301. The Court distinguished the claim from the claim held unpatentable in Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014) on the grounds that the “enhancing limitation . . . necessarily incorporates the invention’s distributed architecture—an architecture providing a technological solution to a technological problem,” which “provides the requisite ‘something more’ than the performance of ‘well-” slip op. at 8
§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Bilski · EnfishPatents in suitUS 8,118,221 - Apple Inc. v. Smartflash LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 27, 2017 · CBM2015-00127 · APJ Rama G Elluru · CBM · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving intact its determination that claims 4–12 and 16–18 are patent-ineligible under § 101.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“identify any specific matter that we misapprehended or overlooked. Although Patent Owner repeatedly states that the Board “misapprehends” Smartflash’s argument (see, e.g., Req. Reh’g 5, 10), it does not offer sufficient explanation as to how we misapprehended or overlooked any particular “matter [that] was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Rather than providing a proper request for rehearing, addressing particular matters that we previously allegedly misapprehended or overlooked, Patent Owner’s Request provides new briefing by expounding on argument already made.” slip op. at 4
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionDecided for patent owner
“Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 1001, 26:59–67 (claims 4–12), 28:12–19 (claims 16– 18)). But McRO does not stand for the general proposition that use of rules or conditions, such as payment, to achieve an improved technological result, alone, removes claims from the realm of abstract ideas. In McRO, the Court explained that “the claimed improvement [was] allowing computers to produce ‘accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated characters’ that previously could only be produced by human animators.” Id. at 1313 (citation omitted). The Court explained that the claimed rules in McRO transformed a traditionally subjective process performed by human artists into a mathematically automated process executed on computers (i.e., the processes were fundamentally different). Id. at 1314. The Court explained that “it [was] the incorporation of the claimed rules, not the use of the computer, that ‘improved [the] existing technological process’ by allowing the automation of further tasks.” Id. at 1314 (alteration in original) (quoting Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014)). The Court distinguished this from situations “where the claimed computer-automated process and the prior method were carried out in the same way.” Id. (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585–86 (1978); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010); Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356)). As explained in our Final Decision, the challenged claims “merely implement an old practice in a new environment.” Final Dec. 12 (quoting FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). The challenged claims are similar to the claims found ineligible in FairWarning, which the Court distinguished from those at issue McRO. FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1094–95. In FairWarning, the Court explained that “[t]he claimed rules ask . . . the same questions . . . that humans in analogous situations . . . have asked for decades, if not centuries” and that it is the “incorporation of a computer, not the claimed rule, that purportedly ‘improve[s] [the] existing technological process.’” Id. at 1095 (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358). This is similar to the challenged claims, where the “payment validation data” and “access rule” in claim 4, via its dependency from claim 3, for example, is merely a condition for “determin[ing] what access is permitted to data stored on the data carrier,” that the ’720 patent explains “will normally be dependent upon payments made for data stored on the data carrier” (i.e., allowing access when the data has been purchased). Ex. 1001, 9:21–25.” slip op. at 5
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptDecided for patent owner
“understood, routine, [and] conventional activities previously known to the industry.’” Id. (citations omitted). We are not persuaded that we misapprehended Amdocs. As noted in our Final Decision, “[t]he ’720 patent treats as well-known all potentially technical aspects of the challenged claims, which simply require generic computer components.” Final Dec. 15. Unlike the generic components at issue in Amdocs, the generic components recited in claims 4–12 and 16–18 of the ’720 patent do not operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality. See id. at 17–21. The challenged claims of the ’720 patent simply recite generic memories, data types, processors, and “code to” perform well-known functions with no description of the underlying implementation or programming. See id. at 14–17.” slip op. at 8
§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Bilski · EnfishPatents in suitUS 7,334,720 - Apple Inc. v. Smartflash LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 27, 2017 · CBM2015-00124 · APJ Rama G Elluru · CBM · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request and left intact its determination that claims 2–5, 9–11, 14, 15, 17, and 19 are patent-ineligible under § 101.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“showing unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 326(e). The standard of review for rehearing requests is set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which states: The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” slip op. at 3
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Decided for patent owner
“[b]ecause the challenged claims are a technological improvement over the then-existing systems, and limit transfer and retrieval of content based on payment and/or access rules in a process specifically designed to achieve an improved technological result in conventional industry practice, the challenged claims are not directed to an abstract idea. Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 1001, 22:36–57 (claim 11), 26:4–7 (claim 2–5), 26:58– 27:17 (claims 14, 15), 28:16–23 (claim 17)). But McRO does not stand for the general proposition that use of rules or conditions, such as payment, to achieve an improved technological result, alone, removes claims from the realm of abstract ideas. In McRO, the Court explained that “the claimed improvement [was] allowing computers to produce ‘accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated characters’ that previously could only be produced by human animators.” Id. at 1313 (citation omitted). The Court explained that the claimed rules in McRO transformed a traditionally subjective process performed by human artists into a mathematically automated process executed on computers (i.e., the” slip op. at 5
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptDecided for patent owner
“In Amdocs, the Court held that “[claim 1] is eligible under step two because it contains a sufficient ‘inventive concept.’” Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300. The claim at issue recited “computer code for using the accounting information with which the first network accounting record is correlated to enhance the first network accounting record.” Id. The Court explained that the “claim entails an unconventional technological solution (enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a technological problem (massive record flows which previously required massive databases).” Id. The Court noted that, although the solution requires generic computer components, “the claim’s enhancing limitation necessarily requires that these generic components operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality.” Id. at 1300–1301. When determining that the claim was patent-eligible, the Court explained that the “enhancing limitation necessarily involves the arguably generic gatherers, network devices, and other components working in an unconventional distributed fashion to solve a particular technological problem.” Id. at 1301. The Court distinguished the claim from the claim held unpatentable in Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014) on the grounds that the “enhancing limitation . . . necessarily” slip op. at 7
§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Bilski · EnfishPatents in suitUS 7,942,317 - Apple Inc. v. Smartflash LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 27, 2017 · CBM2015-00123 · APJ Jeremy M Plenzler · CBM · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request and left intact its determination that claims 2–5, 7, 9, and 12 are patent-ineligible under § 101.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“showing unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 326(e). The standard of review for rehearing requests is set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which states: The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” slip op. at 3
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionDecided for petitioner
“Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 1001, 26:27–35 (claim 3)). But McRO does not stand for the general proposition that use of rules to achieve an improved technological result, alone, removes claims from the realm of abstract ideas. In McRO, the Court explained that “the claimed improvement [was] allowing computers to produce ‘accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated characters’ that previously could only be produced by human animators.” Id. at 1313 (citation omitted). The Court” slip op. at 5
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptDecided for petitioner
“In Amdocs, the Court held that “[claim 1] is eligible under step two because it contains a sufficient ‘inventive concept.’” Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300. The claim at issue recited “computer code for using the accounting information with which the first network accounting record is correlated to enhance the first network accounting record.” Id. The Court explained that the “claim entails an unconventional technological solution (enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a technological problem (massive record flows which previously required massive databases).” Id. The Court noted that, although the solution requires generic computer components, “the claim’s enhancing limitation necessarily requires that these generic components operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality.” Id. at 1300–1301. When determining that the claim was patent-eligible, the Court explained that the “enhancing limitation necessarily involves the arguably generic gatherers, network devices, and other components working in an unconventional distributed fashion to solve a particular technological problem.” Id. at 1301. The Court distinguished the claim from the claim held unpatentable in Content Extraction &” slip op. at 7
§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · EnfishPatents in suitUS 8,033,458 - Apple Inc. v. Smartflash LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 27, 2017 · CBM2015-00121 · APJ Gregg I Anderson · CBM · Rehearing
The Board denied Smartflash’s rehearing request, leaving in place its determination that claims 1–28 are patent-ineligible under § 101.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“showing unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 326(e). The standard of review for rehearing requests is set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which states: The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” slip op. at 3
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionDecided for petitioner
“Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 1001, 26:35–37 (claim 1), 28:3–9 (claim 14)). But McRO does not stand for the general proposition that payment validation to achieve an improved technological result, alone, removes claims from the realm of abstract ideas. In McRO, the Court explained that “the claimed improvement [was] allowing computers to produce ‘accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated characters’ that previously could only be produced by human animators.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1313 (citation omitted). The Court explained that the claimed rules in McRO transformed a traditionally subjective process performed by human artists into a mathematically automated process executed on computers (i.e., the processes were fundamentally different). Id. at 1314. The Court” slip op. at 5
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptDecided for petitioner
“because it contains a sufficient ‘inventive concept.’” Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300. The claim at issue recited “computer code for using the accounting information with which the first network accounting record is correlated to enhance the first network accounting record.” Id. The Court explained that the “claim entails an unconventional technological solution (enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a technological problem (massive record flows which previously required massive databases).” Id. The Court noted that, although the solution requires generic computer components, “the claim’s enhancing limitation necessarily requires that these generic components operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality.” Id. at 1300–1301. When determining that the claim was patent-eligible, the Court explained that the “enhancing limitation necessarily involves the arguably generic gatherers, network devices, and other components working in an unconventional distributed fashion to solve a particular technological problem.” Id. at 1301. The Court distinguished the claim from the claim held unpatentable in Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014) on the grounds that the “enhancing limitation . . . necessarily 7 This is the only instance where one of Patent Owner’s papers is cited in the Request. incorporates the invention’s distributed architecture—an architecture providing a technological solution to a technological problem,” which “provides the requisite ‘something more’ than the performance of ‘well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities previously known to the industry.’” Id. (citations omitted). We are not persuaded that we misapprehended Amdocs. As noted in our Final Decision, “[t]he ’516 patent treats as well-known all potentially technical aspects of the challenged claims, which simply require generic computer components.” Final Dec. 15. Unlike the generic components at issue in Amdocs, the generic components recited in claims 1–28 of the ’516 patent do not operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality. See Final Dec. 20–22. Claims 1– 28 of the ’516 patent simply recite generic memories, processors, and “code to” perform well-known functions with no description of the underlying implementation or programming.” slip op. at 7
§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Bilski · EnfishPatents in suitUS 8,794,516 - Apple Inc. v. Smartflash LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 27, 2017 · CBM2015-00131 · APJ Jeremy M Plenzler · CBM · Rehearing
The Board denied Smartflash’s rehearing request, leaving in place its determination that challenged claims 3–6, 8–14, 16–25, 27–30, and 32–41 are ineligible under § 101.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” slip op. at 3
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Not reached
“Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 1001, 26:5–11 (claim 3)). But McRO does not stand for the general proposition that use of rules or conditions to achieve an improved technological result, alone, removes claims from the realm of abstract ideas. In McRO, the Court explained that “the claimed improvement [was] allowing computers to produce ‘accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated characters’ that previously could only be produced by human animators.” Id. at 1313 (citation omitted). The Court explained that the claimed rules in McRO transformed a traditionally subjective process performed by human artists into a mathematically automated process executed on computers (i.e., the processes were fundamentally different). Id. at 1314. The Court explained” slip op. at 5
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptNot reached
“In Amdocs, the Court held that “[claim 1] is eligible under step two because it contains a sufficient ‘inventive concept.’” Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300. The claim at issue recited “computer code for using the accounting information with which the first network accounting record is correlated to enhance the first network accounting record.” Id. The Court explained that the “claim entails an unconventional technological solution (enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a technological problem (massive record flows which previously required massive databases).” Id. The Court noted that, although the solution requires generic computer components, “the claim’s enhancing limitation necessarily requires that these generic components operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality.” Id. at 1300–1301. When determining that the claim was patent-eligible, the Court explained that the “enhancing limitation necessarily involves the arguably generic gatherers, network devices, and other components working in an unconventional distributed fashion to solve a particular technological problem.” Id. at 1301. The Court distinguished the claim from the claim held unpatentable in Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014) on the grounds that the “enhancing limitation . . . necessarily incorporates the invention’s distributed architecture—an architecture providing a technological solution to a technological problem,” which “provides the requisite ‘something more’ than the performance of ‘well-” slip op. at 7
§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Bilski · EnfishPatents in suitUS 8,061,598 - Apple Inc. / Google, Inc. v. Smartflash LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 27, 2017 · CBM2015-00133 · APJ Jeremy M Plenzler · CBM · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request and left intact its determination that challenged claims 2–4, 6, 7, 9, 11–13, 15–18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27–29, 31, and 33–36 are patent-ineligible under § 101.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“showing unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 326(e). The standard of review for rehearing requests is set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which states: The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” slip op. at 4
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionDecided for petitioner
“Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 1001, 26:35–37 (claim 1)). But McRO does not stand for the general proposition that use of rules or conditions to achieve an improved technological result, alone, removes claims from the realm of abstract ideas. In McRO, the Court explained that “the claimed improvement [was] allowing computers to produce ‘accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated characters’ that previously could only be produced by human animators.” Id. at 1313 (citation omitted). The Court explained that the claimed rules in McRO transformed a traditionally subjective process performed by human artists into a mathematically automated process executed on computers (i.e., the processes were fundamentally different). Id. at 1314. The Court explained 7 Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016). that “it [was] the incorporation of the claimed rules, not the use of the computer, that ‘improved [the] existing technological process’ by allowing the automation of further tasks.” Id. at 1314 (alteration in original) (quoting Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014)). The Court distinguished this from situations “where the claimed computer-automated process and the prior method were carried out in the same way.” Id. (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585–86 (1978); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010); Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356)). As explained in our Final Decision, the challenged claims “merely implement an old practice in a new environment.” Final Dec. 12–13 (quoting FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). The challenged claims are similar to the claims found ineligible in FairWarning, which the Court distinguished from those at issue McRO. FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1094–95. In FairWarning, the Court explained that “[t]he claimed rules ask . . . the same questions . . . that humans in analogous situations . . . have asked for decades, if not centuries” and that it is the “incorporation of a computer, not the claimed rule, that purportedly ‘improve[s] [the] existing technological process.’” Id. at 1095 (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358). This is similar to the challenged claims, where the “payment validation data” in claim 2, for example, is merely a condition for “enabl[ing] access to . . . multimedia content” that the ’772 patent explains “will normally be dependent upon payments made for data stored on the data carrier” (i.e., allowing access when the data has been purchased). Ex. 1001, 9:28–30.” slip op. at 6
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptDecided for petitioner
“In Amdocs, the Court held that “[claim 1] is eligible under step two because it contains a sufficient ‘inventive concept.’” Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300. The claim at issue recited “computer code for using the accounting information with which the first network accounting record is correlated to enhance the first network accounting record.” Id. The Court explained that the “claim entails an unconventional technological solution (enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a technological problem (massive record flows which previously required massive databases).” Id. The Court noted that, although the solution requires generic computer components, “the claim’s enhancing limitation necessarily requires that these generic components operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality.” Id. at 1300–1301. When determining that the claim was patent-eligible, the Court explained that the “enhancing limitation necessarily involves the arguably generic gatherers, network devices, and other components working in an unconventional distributed fashion to solve a particular technological problem.” Id. at 1301. The Court distinguished the claim from the claim held unpatentable in Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014) on the grounds that the “enhancing limitation . . . necessarily incorporates the invention’s distributed architecture—an architecture providing a technological solution to a technological problem,” which 8 This is the only instance where one of Patent Owner’s papers is cited in the Request. “provides the requisite ‘something more’ than the performance of ‘well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities previously known to the industry.’” Id. (citations omitted). We are not persuaded that we misapprehended Amdocs. As noted in our Final Decision, “[t]he ’772 patent treats as well-known all potentially technical aspects of the challenged claims, which simply require generic computer components.” Final Dec. 15. Unlike the generic components at issue in Amdocs, the generic components recited in claims 2–4, 6, 7, 9, 11– 13, 15–18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27–29, 31, and 33–36 of the ’772 patent do not operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality. See Final Dec. 20–24. Claims 2–5, 7, 9, and 12 of the ’772 patent simply recite generic memories and data types with no description of the underlying implementation or programming.” slip op. at 8
§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Bilski · EnfishPatents in suitUS 8,336,772
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.