• Cree, Inc. v. Optolum, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Dec 4, 2017 · IPR2017-01511 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable, chiefly because Begemann did not disclose the claimed heat-conduction-to-contained-fluid limitation.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “evidence. As explained below and given the evidence of record, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail on its assertions that Begemann anticipates either of claims 17 or 30. 1. Principles of Law” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016) (upholding the Board’s use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard in Inter Partes Review proceedings). Under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, and absent any special definitions, claims terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech. Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Any special definitions for claim terms or phrases must be set forth with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In the absence of such a definition, limitations are not to be read from the specification into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Petitioner advances interpretations of the claim terms “elongate,” “thermally conductive member,” and “heat dissipation protrusions.” Pet. 17–18. In turn, Patent Owner advances interpretations of “thermally conductive member,” “heat dissipation protrusions,” and “configured to.” Prelim. Resp. 17–21. Having considered the evidence of record and as reflected in the discussion below, we determine that express construction of these terms is not necessary for purposes of this Decision. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”).” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “A claim is anticipated if each limitation of the claim is disclosed in a single prior art reference arranged as in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “The requirement that the prior art elements themselves be ‘arranged as in the claim’ means that claims cannot be ‘treated . . . as mere catalogs of separate parts, in disregard of the part-to-part relationships set forth in the claims and that give the claims their meaning.’” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). The Federal Circuit has also explained, however, that “a reference can anticipate a claim even if it ‘d[oes] not expressly spell out’ all the limitations arranged or combined as in the claim, if a person of skill in the art, reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement or combination.” Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681 (CCPA 1962)).” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “likewise require that the thermally conductive member includes the “configured to” limitation and “one or more heat dissipation protrusions, at least one of said heat dissipation protrusions being carried on said elongate member outer surface” limitations discussed above. Ex. 1001 at 4:47–50, 5:60–63. In addition to the anticipation arguments for claims 17 and 30, Petitioner argues in the alternative, “[s]hould it be determined that Begemann does not disclose the claimed heat dissipation protrusions, then claim 17 is obvious in view of Begemann in combination with English” (Pet. 28) and “claim 30 is obvious in view of Begemann in combination with English . . . for reasons previously explained . . . for claim 17” (Pet. 59). According to Petitioner, English expressly discloses the placement of cooling fins on an exterior of a hollow, metal base portion of an elongated, thermally conductive metal support to further enhance heat dissipation for cooling LEDs mounted on the metal support. Pet. 31. Petitioner argues a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to provide the cooling fins of the lamp of English to the outer surface of Begemann’s gear column to enhance the performance and/or efficiency of cooling the LEDs by enhancing heat dissipation away from the gear column, substrate, and LEDs “to air circulating inside and at the outer surface of the gear column 1.” Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 93–94). Further, Petitioner presents the following annotated copy of Begemann’s Figure 1 to illustrate its proposed modification of Begemann’s gear column using English’s fins: Petitioner’s annotated version of Begemann Figure 1 with accompanying text that describes providing cooling fins to the outer surface of Begemann’s gear column 1. Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1003 at 4:6–9). As Patent Owner argues (Prelim. Resp. 39), Petitioner does not rely on English to meet the “configured to” limitation for either of claim 17 or 30 (see, e.g., Pet. 26–27, 55–56 (citing only Begemann for the “configure to” limitation)). Having determined above that Begemann fails to disclose the “configured to” limitation, Petitioner’s reliance on English to satisfy the heat dissipation protrusions limitation fails to cure the noted deficiencies in Begemann with regards to the “configured to” limitation of claims 17 and 30 of the ’028 Patent.” slip op. at 20

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,242,028
• Wendt Corporation v. Iqasr, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Sep 28, 2017 · IPR2017-01080 · APJ Richard H Marschall · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner failed to show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–15, 18–20, and 22 were unpatentable over Jody or Jody and the 1998 Handbook.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “We review the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we decline to institute an inter partes review. A.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “automobile shredder residue,” “sorting, non-ferrous recovery system,” “magnetic fuzz,” “selected magnetic fuzz,” “substantially free,” “recyclable materials,” and “air-locked automobile shredder residue sorting, non-ferrous recovery system” require construction. Pet. 12–35. In turn, Patent Owner proposes its own construction for those same terms. Prelim. Resp. 3–24. Having considered the evidence presented, we determine that we need only address the meaning of “magnetic fuzz” for purposes of this Decision. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”). slip op. at 6

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “The Petition also lacks an explicit inherency analysis. As Petitioner acknowledges in its legal background, inherent disclosure “necessarily describes” the unstated limitation. Pet. 35 (citing Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Even if Petitioner established that magnetic fuzz is likely present and sorted using Jody’s process, that does not establish inherency. See Bettcher Indus., Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 639 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” (citation omitted)). To the extent that Petitioner’s argument that magnetic fuzz “would be part of the plastic-rich stream and initially would be sorted from the PUF, fines, etc.,” amounts to an inherency argument, it lacks adequate support. Pet. 40–41 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 69) (emphasis added). Petitioner’s assertion fails to address why magnetic fuzz would be present in Jody’s automobile shredder residue in the first place, much less that Jody’s process necessarily must sort that magnetic fuzz. Given Jody’s failure to disclose magnetic fuzz expressly, Petitioner needed to do more than merely assume that magnetic fuzz is present and assert that magnetic fuzz “would be” sorted, without explaining why this must be the case.” slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “2. Discussion To establish anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102, “all of the elements and limitations of the claim must be shown in a single prior reference, arranged as in the claim.” Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Moreover, the reference must “enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make the invention without undue experimentation.” Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharms. Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 940–44 (CCPA 1962).” slip op. at 9

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,132,432
• Fisher & Paykel Healthcare Limited v. Resmed LimitedRehearing denied
  PTAB · Aug 17, 2017 · IPR2017-00215 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Fisher’s rehearing request, leaving trial denied because Fisher did not show an abuse of discretion in the findings on the fixed, non-adjustable position limitation.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision[,]” which party “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). And, because Fisher seeks rehearing of our Decision on Institution, it must show an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (“When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.”). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to present new arguments. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (requiring the rehearing request to “specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply”) (emphasis added).” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner

    “the effect of the prosecution history on the scope of the claims, as substantial evidence supports our findings. We understand that a prosecution disclaimer requires that a patentee make it clear “that the invention does not include a particular feature” and that, although “such disavowal can occur either explicitly or implicitly, it must be clear and unmistakable.” Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We are not persuaded by Fisher that ResMed’s disclaimer is limited to adjustment mechanisms that correspond to a structure that forms the engagement between a cushion component and a common frame.” slip op. at 5

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not reached

    “discretion. First, we do not understand Fisher as making this argument in the Petition. That is, we interpret Fisher to argue in the Petition that after a user adjusts the fit of mask 510 using adjustment wheels 530 to a desired configuration, the user will not further adjust the mask, and cushion/secondary frame 514 is in a fixed, non-adjustable position relative to chassis 512. See Pet. 27. We cannot misapprehend or overlook an argument that is not made. Even if the argument as Fisher articulates here is the argument in the Petition, we are not persuaded that we overlooked Berthon-Jones disclosing the “fixed, non-adjustable position” claim limitations, as substantial evidence supports our findings. Berthon-Jones’s adjustment is not the “wiggle” that ResMed referenced in its Preliminary Response, which would be associated with manufacturing tolerances and flexible materials that may allow for some small movement between the components.4 See Prelim. Resp. 15. Instead, Berthon-Jones discloses that its adjustment wheel 530 is used to adjust the sealing force or fit of the cushion against a user’s face— that is, the reason for adjustment wheel 530 as part of the mask is to adjust the cushion relative to the frame. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 186; see also ¶ 168 (“[Figures] 41 through 53 illustrate additional embodiments which allow 4 We stress that we do not decide whether the “fixed, non-adjustable position” claim limitations would encompass a structure with the “wiggle” that ResMed referenced in its Preliminary Response, as we do not need to reach that issued in deciding this Request.” slip op. at 10

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “discretion, as the argument is inconsistent with our construction of the “fixed, non-adjustable position” claim limitations. As we indicated above, we interpret these limitations to exclude masks with structures that adjust the 3 Fisher’s Petition did not identify raised central structure 538 as satisfying the subject matter of the fixed, non-adjustable position” claim limitations. See Pet. 25–27 (identifying protrusions 524 and receiving holes 526). We do not consider new arguments in a request for rehearing. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 7

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 9,381,316
• Kayak Software Corp. / Opentable, Inc. et al. v. International Business Machines Corp.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 7, 2017 · IPR2016-00609 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 12, 13, 15, and 18 are unpatentable as anticipated by Mellmer under § 102.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “for the first time in its Reply, even though it had an opportunity to brief this issue in its Petition. We therefore find Petitioner’s new argument in this regard waived. See Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Even if we were to consider Petitioner’s argument, however, we would still find it to be unpersuasive. “[C]lear reliance on the preamble during prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art transforms the preamble into a claim limitation because such reliance indicates use of the preamble to define, in part, the claimed invention.” Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (cited at PO Resp. 25). In this case, as Patent Owner points out, “the inventors stated that the preambles of [c]laims 1, 15, and 18 limit those claims,” and they “also used the term ‘federated computing environment’ to distinguish their claims over a reference cited during prosecution.” PO Resp. 24–25; see also Ex. 1003, 14–15 (“the subject disclosure provides for a ‘runtime user account creation operation within a single-sign-on process’ within the context of a ‘federated computing environment’” and “[t]he ‘federated’ context of the subject disclosure is evident from the preamble in each independent claim”); id. at 16 (“the ‘federated computing environment’ limitations of the preamble[s] are limiting”); id. at 17 (“Ting, the alleged anticipatory prior art, is not a ‘federated’ teaching. For that reason alone, the reference cannot and does not anticipate any pending claim.”). Based on the record before us, we conclude that the term “federated computing environment” is limiting.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We do not conclude, however, that the scope of the term is limited to an affiliation of enterprises, as both parties urge. Pet. 18; PO Resp. 23. Indeed, the specification of the ’346 patent teaches that, “[i]n the context of the present invention, a federation is a set of distinct entities, such as enterprises, organizations, institutions, etc., that cooperate to provide a single-sign-on, ease-of-use experience to a user.” Ex. 1001, 10:62–64 (emphasis added). According to the specification of the ’346 patent, an entity “generally refers to an organization, an individual, or a system that operates on behalf of an organization, an individual, or another system.” Id. at 8:31–33. We recognize that the portion of the ’346 patent that the parties cite specifies enterprises, but, in light of the specification of the patent as a whole, we find this instance of “enterprises” to illustrate an example of the types of entities that may make up a federation. Compare id. at 10:62–64 (“[i]n the context of the present invention, a federation is a set of distinct entities, such as enterprises”), with id. at 1:64–2:1 (“[a] federation is a loosely coupled affiliation of enterprises”). Accordingly, we determine that, under a broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification of the ’346 patent, the term “federated computing environment” refers to “an environment having a loosely coupled affiliation of entities that adhere to certain standards of interoperability; the federation provides a mechanism for trust among those entities with respect to certain computational operations for the users within the federation.”” slip op. at 8

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner counters, arguing that “federated computing environment” is not limiting “because that term only appears in the preamble, which the patentee used merely to state an intended use for the claimed subject matter,” the invention of the ’346 patent “is not limited to operating in a federated computing environment,” and “[t]he claim body of each independent claim defines a structurally complete invention.” Pet. Reply 2–3. According to Petitioner, that “the applicant argued that the preamble was limiting during prosecution” is not “categorically determinative,” but, rather, should be treated as a “guidepost[]” in “deciding whether a preamble is limiting.” Id. at 4. Petitioner raises the argument as to whether the preamble is limiting for the first time in its Reply, even though it had an opportunity to brief this issue in its Petition. We therefore find Petitioner’s new argument in this regard waived. See Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Even if we were to consider Petitioner’s argument, however, we” slip op. at 7

  • Expert testimonyOther

    “above in the “Claim Construction” section, we construe the term “single sign-on operation” to mean “a process by which a user is authenticated at a first entity and subsequently not required to perform another authentication before accessing a protected resource at a second entity.” An authentication, as explained by Petitioner, refers to a “process of validating a set of credentials that are provided by a user or on behalf of a user.” Pet. Reply 8. This is supported by the ’346 patent. See Ex. 1001, 9:50–51 (providing the same definition); see also Tr. 27:24–28:2 (Patent Owner stating that there is “no real dispute on the meaning of authentication”). While we recognize that DigitalMe “will construct an accessCard, prompt the user to associate a meCard, and re-issue the post” before the user is logged into the partner site in Mellmer, (see Ex. 1008, 25:66–26:2, Fig. 34), we do not find this disclosure to be indicative of a second authentication, as Patent Owner urges, (see PO Resp. 34). For instance, we note that an accessCard in Mellmer “represent[s] the partner site.” Ex. 1008, 24:48. As Petitioner points out, Mellmer “is silent as to what information is included in the accessCard” described in the “No Account On This Site Scenario” section. Pet. Reply 12. That is, Mellmer does not teach that the accessCard in a “No Account On This Site Scenario” includes a set of credentials. See id.; see also PO Resp. 34 (citing Ex. 1008, 24:62–25:4 (describing “A Normal Scenario”), 25:9–13 (describing “A Normal Scenario”), 25:38–43 (describing “A No Access Card Scenario”), 25:63– 26:2 (describing an accessCard in “A No Account On This Site Scenario,” without describing the contents of the accessCard), 26:32–35 (describing “A Site that is not DigitalMeTM—Aware Scenario”)). Thus, based on the arguments and evidence presented, we find that constructing an accessCard representing the partner site does not constitute providing or validating a set of credentials.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 7,631,346 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 7,631,346
• Kayak Software Corp. / Opentable, Inc. et al. v. International Business Machines Corp.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 7, 2017 · IPR2016-00608 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 12, 14, 15, and 18 are unpatentable as anticipated by Sunada under 35 U.S.C. § 102.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “We do not conclude, however, that the scope of the term is limited to an affiliation of enterprises, as both parties urge. Pet. 18; PO Resp. 13. Indeed, the specification of the ’346 patent teaches that, “[i]n the context of the present invention, a federation is a set of distinct entities, such as enterprises, organizations, institutions, etc., that cooperate to provide a single-sign-on, ease-of-use experience to a user.” Ex. 1001, 10:62–64 (emphasis added). According to the specification of the ’346 patent, an entity “generally refers to an organization, an individual, or a system that operates on behalf of an organization, an individual, or another system.” Id. at 8:31–33. We recognize that the portion of the ’346 patent that the parties cite specifies enterprises, but, in light of the specification of the patent as a whole, we find this instance of “enterprises” to illustrate an example of the types of entities that may make up a federation. Compare id. at 10:62–64 (“[i]n the context of the present invention, a federation is a set of distinct entities, such as enterprises”), with id. at 1:64–2:1 (“[a] federation is a loosely coupled affiliation of enterprises”). Accordingly, we determine that, under a broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification of the ’346 patent, the term “federated computing environment” refers to “an environment having a loosely coupled affiliation of entities that adhere to certain standards of interoperability; the federation provides a mechanism for trust among those entities with respect to certain computational operations for the users within the federation.” Based on our construction, the scope of this term encompasses enterprises, but is not limited to enterprises.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner raises the argument as to whether the preamble is limiting for the first time in its Reply, even though it had an opportunity to brief this issue in its Petition. We therefore find Petitioner’s new argument in this regard waived. See Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Even if we were to consider Petitioner’s argument, however, we would still find it to be unpersuasive. “[C]lear reliance on the preamble during prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art transforms the preamble into a claim limitation because such reliance indicates use of the preamble to define, in part, the claimed invention.” Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (cited at PO Resp. 15). In this case, as Patent Owner points out, “the inventors stated that the preambles of [c]laims 1, 15, and 18 limit those claims,” and they “also used the term ‘federated computing environment’ to distinguish their claims over a reference cited during prosecution.” PO Resp. 15 (citing Ex. 1003, 15–22); see also Ex. 1003, 14–15 (“the subject disclosure provides for a ‘runtime user account creation operation within a single-sign-on process’ within the context of a ‘federated computing environment” and “[t]he ‘federated’ context of the subject disclosure is evident from the preamble in each independent claim”); id. at 16 (“the ‘federated computing environment’ limitations of the preamble[s] are limiting”); id. at 17 (“Ting, the alleged anticipatory prior art, is not a ‘federated’ teaching. For that reason alone, the reference cannot and does not anticipate any pending claim.”). Based on the record before us, we conclude that the term “federated computing environment” is limiting.” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artPriority date, deniedDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the record before us, we find that Patent Owner does not meet its burden of producing evidence sufficient to show that Mr. Bray’s work on the source code inured to the benefit of the named inventors. It follows that we also find that Patent Owner does not meet its burden of producing evidence sufficient to show that any of the named inventors constructed an embodiment or performed a process that met all the claim limitations. See Cooper, 154 F.3d at 1327. Even if we were to accept that Mr. Bray’s work on the source code inured to the benefit of the named inventors, however, we find that Patent Owner fails to provide sufficient evidence showing that Mr. Bray’s code was tested successfully and adequately to show that the code actually worked for its intended purpose, as required by the second element of actual reduction to practice. See id. We note Petitioner’s argument that Patent Owner “fails to corroborate the testing by anyone who had first-hand knowledge of that alleged testing.” Pet. Reply 11. Petitioner explains that “Dr. Hinton, when asked on redirect at her deposition in this proceeding, testified that runtime account provisioning was tested, although on recross she admitted that she had no documentation to corroborate that testing.” Id. at 13 n.2 (citing Ex. 1018, 109:14–110:4). Petitioner also explains that “Mr. Wardrop testified that he did not write or test the code, nor was he able to find any documentation about the alleged testing.” Id. at 14 (citing Ex. 1017, 64:16– 22, 79:9–23). In addition, Petitioner points out, “Mr. Wardrop was also unable to say under what configuration the alleged testing would have occurred, which is significant because he testified that not all configurations would have involved runtime account creation.” Id. (citing Ex. 1017, 91:19– 92:21). We agree with Petitioner. In particular, we note the absence from the record of any evidence showing that Mr. Bray’s source code actually worked for its intended purpose. The only evidence that Patent Owner relies on to show testing of Mr. Bray’s code is the testimony of Dr. Hinton, a named inventor, and Mr. Wardrop, a non-inventor. See PO Resp. 40 (citing Ex. 2038 ¶¶ 12–14, 26; Ex. 2061 71:2–72:24). Patent Owner does not direct us to any test documentation corresponding to the code. Indeed, Dr. Hinton testified during her deposition that she has no access to any such documentation. Ex. 1018, 109:18–24 (“Q. You are not aware of any documentation that reflects that testing of runtime account creation for the PRPQ; correct? A. I don’t have access to the test documents. There would have been test cases created. I just don’t have them.”). Similarly, Mr. Wardrop testified during his deposition that he also has no access to any test documentation corresponding to Mr. Bray’s source code, and that he was not involved with the testing. Ex. 1017, 64:16–22 (“Q. Is there any documentation of that testing? A. I couldn’t find any, . . . but I know there was at the time, but it’s so long ago . . . because I’m not a tester, so I don’t know where they actually kept all those records.”); id. at 79:18–23 (“Q. . . . So the Exhibits 2040 to 2049 that you said wouldn’t have been included in the release but that would have been in the build, would you have been involved in testing with those? A. I was not part of the testing.”). In Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the Federal Circuit found significant “the absence of any physical record to support the oral evidence,” despite “the ubiquitous paper trail of virtually all commercial activity” that normally exists “in modern times.”” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Based on the record before us, we agree with Petitioner. Claims 1, 15, and 18 do not recite any “hallmark[]” of a mechanism for trust. Further, Patent Owner’s own assertion that computer components within a single enterprise implicitly trust each other implies that Sunada discloses a mechanism for trust among those computer components. See PO Resp. 27; see also Ex. 1001, 19:54–63 (“Within an exemplary federated environment that is able to support the present invention, there are two types of ‘trust domains’ . . . . An enterprise trust domain contains those components that are managed by the enterprise; all components within that trust domain may implicitly trust each other.”) (cited at Pet. Reply 24). Moreover, in her declaration, Ms. Spielman directs us to where the ’346 patent teaches that, “[i]f there is no trust relationship, then the service provider cannot depend upon the assertions received from the identity provider; they cannot be used by the service provider to determine how to interpret any information received from the identity provider.” Ex. 2039 ¶ 70 (citing Ex. 1001, 20:28– 32). As discussed above, Sunada’s SSO server sends attributes to a web application, and that web application uses those attributes for runtime account creation. Ex. 1005, Fig. 3. Having considered the arguments and evidence developed during trial, we find that Sunada’s exchange of attributes implies a trust relationship. Specifically, we note the cited teachings in the ’346 patent that all components within an enterprise trust domain may implicitly trust each other, (see Ex. 1001, 19:54–63), and that the service provider cannot depend on assertions from the identity provider where there is no trust relationship, (see id. at 20:28–32). Accordingly, we find that Sunada discloses a mechanism for trust. Patent Owner further argues that Sunada does not disclose a “federated computing environment” because, “‘[w]ithin a single enterprise, some web applications may participate in a single-sign-on, while others may not.’” PO Resp. 27 (quoting Ex. 2039 ¶ 79). Although this may be true generally, Patent Owner does not direct us to evidence showing a web application in Sunada specifically that does not participate in a single-sign-on. Indeed, Sunada teaches that both web applications 2 and 3 “have a function by which, in a case where a user who has logged in by way of the SSO function requests to be provided with a service and the user is not registered, the applications automatically create a user account.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 16 (cited at Pet. 25–26); see also Pet. 24 (“the [web applications in Sunada] ‘participate’ in the SSO and are configured to create a user account for a user that attempts to log on using the SSO server, but does not have an account with the [web application]”). We find that each of Sunada’s web applications participates in single-sign-on operations. Lastly, Patent Owner argues “that Sunada’s web applications and SSO server can share a user’s login status and information about the user is also not sufficient to show that Sunada discloses a ‘federated computing environment.’” PO Resp. 28. According to Patent Owner, computers within a single enterprise trust each other “because they can communicate over the same standard or protocol on a secure internal network,” and “that Sunada’s web application and SSO server purportedly communicate using the same standard or protocols also is not enough to make them a ‘federated computing environment’ because components within a single enterprise can communicate over the same standard or protocol.” Id.” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 7,631,346 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 7,631,346
• Lavelle Industries, Inc. v. Danco, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · May 4, 2017 · IPR2017-00159 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1, 6, 11, or 14 unpatentable on any asserted ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated, under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of any claim.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining whether an invention would have been obvious at the time it was made, 35 U.S.C. § 103 requires us to resolve the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention. In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art include, but are not limited to, the types of problems encountered in the art, the sophistication of the technology, and educational level of active workers in the field. Id. In a given case, one or more factors may predominate. Id. Petitioner does not propose a level of ordinary skill in the art. Relying on the testimony of Mr. Jones, Patent Owner, asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “typically would have had (a) a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in the design of plumbing components; or (b) a high school degree and at least four years of experience in the design of plumbing components.” Prelim. Resp. 19 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 24). Mr. Jones testifies that his opinion is based on his “experiences working in the field of product design in the plumbing industry in addition to the specification and claims of the ‘455 Patent in light of the state of the art in the 2012 time frame.” Ex. 2003 ¶ 24. We determine that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Mr. Jones is consistent with the challenged patent and the asserted prior art, and we therefore adopt this definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of the analysis below.” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments and evidence that Turner’s sleeves 20, 52 are collapsible. We agree with Patent Owner and Mr. Jones that “flexibility is not the same as collapsibility,” and that Turner thus does not disclose that flexible sleeves 20, 52 necessarily are collapsible. Furthermore, Mr. Jones testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would not find Turner’s sleeves to be collapsible and “a cylindrical polyethylene wall that is 1/16 or 5/32 of an inch [as disclosed in Turner] would actually be relatively rigid (although still capable of flexing).” Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 65–66. We find this testimony, which is based on Mr. Jones’ “experiences with polyethylene and similar materials and how they have been used in the plumbing industry,” credible and persuasive. See Ex. 2003 ¶ 66. Petitioner, on the other hand, offers no objective evidence supporting its assertion that Turner’s sleeves are collapsible.” slip op. at 28

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Having considered Petitioner’s argument and evidence, we are not persuaded that Schwartz’s intermediate portion 24 is collapsible. Instead, we agree with Patent Owner that the passage of Schwartz cited by Petitioner as disclosing collapsibility (line 21 of column 2), fails to suggest that intermediate portion 24 is collapsible. Indeed, this passage merely discloses that ferrule 12 is shaped with radial flange 18. Ex. 1002, 2:21. As such, we are not directed to any disclosure in Schwartz that suggests intermediate portion 24—or any part of ferrule 12—is collapsible. Schwartz discloses that ferrule 12 is made of “chemically inert plastic material” (Ex. 1002, 2:13–14), but insufficient reasoning is given to establish that this material necessarily would be collapsible. Regarding Petitioner’s argument noted above that intermediate portion 24 “must” be collapsible, we agree with Patent Owner that this argument is not persuasive. The assertion that the intermediate portion must at least partially collapse to provide a sealing force against the soil pipe and to take up any variable space present above the pipe is not supported sufficiently by objective evidence or analysis. Furthermore, this assertion is contradicted by Mr. Jones’ testimony, which we credit. See Ex. 2003 ¶ 51.” slip op. at 14

  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,273,455
• Westerngeco LLC v. PGS Geophysical AsRehearing granted
  PTAB · Feb 3, 2017 · IPR2015-00313 · APJ Justin Busch · IPR · Rehearing

  On rehearing, the Board held claim 2 unpatentable as anticipated by Gallagher, modifying the final written decision; no other aspect was modified.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

    “On rehearing, the burden of showing the Decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the Decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. For the reasons that follow, Petitioner’s request for rehearing is granted. This decision on rehearing modifies our Final Written Decision only to the extent that we now hold claim 2 of the ’059 patent to be unpatentable as anticipated by Gallagher. Neither party challenges our holdings with respect to any other claims in our Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Owner, and Petitioner does not contest, that traces “have the same coordinates” when those traces populate the same bin in the “set of bins.” We agree with Petitioner, however, that the disputed limitation is tied to the assignment of coordinates, not to the organizing step, and we are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments that a trace can only populate a particular bin after “the coordinate-designated set of traces” has been organized.” slip op. at 6

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “interpreted properly (i.e., not tied to the organizing step), Gallagher teaches or suggests the disputed limitation. Req. Reh’g 5–6. We found persuasive Petitioner’s mappings of (1) Gallagher’s assignment of sections and shells in a common reference point bin to the assigning step, (2) the section-shell segments created from that assignment to the recited set of bins, and (3) Gallagher’s decimation process, which in one example leaves one trace per section-shell segment (or bin), to the organizing step. Dec. 14–19; see Pet. 45–48. In Gallagher, it is the combination of the acquisition geometry and the selection of the sections and shells that defines the coordinate-designated set of traces and the bins. Prior to Gallagher’s decimation,” slip op. at 10

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 6,026,059
• Growlerwerks, Inc. v. Drink Tanks CorporationInstitution denied
  PTAB · Nov 22, 2016 · IPR2016-01125 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–19, exercising discretion to address the overlapping effective-filing-date question in the refiled petition.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “date of the challenged claims, as a predicate to applying Mociak as prior art to the ’670 patent; as discussed above, the answer to that question controls whether the 1125 Petition was untimely filed. Because the 262 Petition was filed after July 13, 2016, this second petition does not present the same untimely filing concern under 37 C.F.R. § 42.3 and 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.102(a)(1) as the 1125 IPR. The 262 Petition, however, does present the same question regarding effective filing date. Thus, deciding whether the 1125 Petition was untimely filed would potentially mean addressing the same question twice. We decline to do so. In our view, our decision on the effective filing date of the ’670 patent is best constrained to a single petition. First, addressing the question in a single proceeding conserves judicial resources because we will not be addressing the same question twice. Moreover, doing so avoids any possibility of reaching different decisions based on different evidence or arguments. Further, our approach does not unduly prejudice either Petitioner or Patent Owner. Petitioner took the opportunity to file the same challenge the filing date of the 1125 Petition in its Preliminary Response. Because the refiled petition proposes the same grounds and arguments for invalidity as the present Petition—it is substantively identical (IPR2017- 00262, Ex. 1021)—and was filed before any decision in this proceeding, it therefore does not present any concerns of taking a “second bite at the apple” or using our decision as a “roadmap” that other panels of the Board have found persuasive when considering multiple petitions against a given patent. See, e.g., Butamax Advanced Biofuels LLC v. Gevo, Inc., IPR2014- 00581, slip op. at 12 (PTAB Oct. 14, 2014) (Paper 8). We exercise our discretion to make our substantive determinations pursuant to the refiled 262 Petition, and deny the 1125 Petition.” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportNot reached

    “Petitioner argues that no claim of the ’670 patent is entitled to an effective filing date earlier than June 28, 2013.14 Pet. 8–11. Patent Owner does not address this issue in the Preliminary Response. See generally Prelim. Resp. Petitioner addresses this question with two separate arguments, one directed to independent claim 1 and dependent claims 2–17 (id. at 9–10), and the other directed at independent claim 18 and dependent claim 19 (id. at 10–11). While we take no position on these arguments at this time, if we were to conclude Petitioner is correct about either of those arguments, the ’670 patent would contain a claim with an effective filing date after March 13, 2016, and 37 C.F.R. § 42.102(a)(1) would require a petition for IPR be filed no earlier than nine months after the grant of the patent, here July 13, 2016. The present Petition was filed June 2, 2016 (see Paper 4).” slip op. at 6

  § 102 anticipationDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 9,156,670
• Amit Agarwal v. Immersion CorporationInstitution denied
  PTAB · Sep 19, 2016 · IPR2016-00807 · APJ Minn Chung · IPR · Institution

  Institution was denied for all challenged claims because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on either asserted ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “A claim is anticipated only if a single prior art reference expressly or inherently describes each and every limitation set forth in the claim. See Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Further, a reference cannot anticipate “unless [it] discloses within the four corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed[,] but also all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although the elements must be arranged in the same way as in the claim, “the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). We analyze this asserted ground based on anticipation with the principles identified above in mind. 2. Overview of Rosenberg (Ex. 1002)” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “A claim is anticipated only if a single prior art reference expressly or inherently describes each and every limitation set forth in the claim. See Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Further, a reference cannot anticipate “unless [it] discloses within the four corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed[,] but also all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although the elements must be arranged in the same way as in the claim, “the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). We analyze this asserted ground based on anticipation with the principles identified above in mind. 2. Overview of Rosenberg (Ex. 1002)” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combination of Rosenberg and Simon. Pet. 17– 20. Claims 5 and 15 depend from claims 1 and 12, respectively, and further recite “wherein the display signal is configured to display a keypad comprising a plurality of softkeys.” Claims 7 and 17 depend from claims 1 and 12, respectively, and further recite “wherein the plurality of softkeys comprises one softkey for each digit from 0 to 9.” Similar to its challenges based on anticipation discussed above, Petitioner relies on Rosenberg as disclosing all of the limitations of underlying independent claims 1 and 12. Id. at 17. Simon is relied upon by Petitioner only to teach the additionally recited limitations of claims 5, 7, 15, and 17. Id. at 17–19. Hence, Simon cannot and does not remedy the above-identified deficiencies in Petitioner’s analysis of challenged independent claims 1 and 12. Accordingly, on this record, the information presented in the Petition does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing in its challenge to claims 5, 7, 15, and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Rosenberg and Simon.” slip op. at 19

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner contends that “no claim interpretation is needed” (Pet. 1), and Patent Owner does not propose any claim constructions in this case (Prelim. Resp. 10). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented, we determine that no claim terms require express interpretation for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only those terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 9

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,773,356
• LG Display Co., Ltd. v. Delaware Display Group LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 23, 2016 · IPR2015-01666 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 are unpatentable because Shinohara anticipates them.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

    “Following institution, LG Electronics, Inc. filed timely a Petition and Motion for Joinder in Case IPR2015-01666, challenging the same claims of the ’973 patent on the same ground as that on which we instituted review in this proceeding, plus one additional ground. See Paper 24, 2. LG Electronics, Inc. agreed to abandon the additional ground should IPR2015- 01666 be joined with this proceeding. See id. at 2 n.1. To administer the proceedings more efficiently, we granted LG Electronics, Inc.’s Motion for Joinder, joining Case IPR2015-01666 with the instant proceeding. Id. at 5. For purposes of this Decision, we refer to LG Display Co., Ltd. and LG Electronics, Inc., jointly, as “Petitioner.”” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelOther
  • BurdenUnpatentable

    “B. Anticipation by Shinohara A claim is anticipated if each limitation of the claim is disclosed in a single prior art reference arranged as in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). As recently reiterated by the Federal Circuit, “a reference can anticipate a claim even if it ‘d[oes] not expressly spell out’ all the limitations arranged or combined as in the claim, if a person of skill in the art, reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement or combination.” Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681 (CCPA 1962)). We analyze this ground based on anticipation in accordance with the above-stated principles.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner repeats its unsuccessful argument that, “[w]ithout offering a construction for this term, the Petitioner has failed to meet the burden of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3).” Id. Petitioner responds that this term (1) does not require construction; (2) is limited to a specific embodiment in the specification; (3) and imports a limitation from the specification into the claims. Reply 3–4. Having considered the full record developed during trial, we agree with Petitioner that this term does not require construction. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Patent Owner’s arguments distinguishing the prior art do not rely on a particular construction for this term. See infra.” slip op. at 6

  Patent outcomesUS 7,434,973 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 7,434,973

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.