- Unified Patents Inc. v. Harry Heslop And Sportbrain Holdings, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 6, 2018 · IPR2016-01464 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–16 are unpatentable under § 103 over the combinations of Vock, Smith, and Onari; Vock, Smith, Onari, and Root; Vock, Smith, Onari, and Browne; or Shum, Nikolic, and Root.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes the claim term “step data corresponding to a number of steps” should be interpreted to mean data related to a number of steps, which can include data gathered by a pedometer. Pet. 21. Petitioner highlights that during prosecution, Applicants argued that the scope of this claim term encompasses pedometer step data. Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1017, 8). Petitioner also highlights that the Examiner in the reissue application interpreted this claim term to encompass any data developed from the number of steps of the user. Id. (citing Ex. 1022, 35). The Specification of the ’002 patent discloses examples of personal data as the number of steps counted during the user’s fitness activity or during the day, the distance walked by the user during the day, and the amount of calories burned by the user during the day. See Ex. 1001, 7:34, 8:53–55, 10:27–30. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s proposed construction of the claim term “step data corresponding to a number of steps.” Pet. 22. Patent Owner also does not provide its own proposed construction of this claim term. We agree with Petitioner’s reasoning and construe the term “step data corresponding to a number of steps” as encompassing at least data gathered by a pedometer, including a number of steps, or data developed from a number of steps, including a distance walked or an amount of calories burned.” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Supported by testimony of Dr. Eldering, Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least two years of work towards a Bachelor’s Degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related subject or equivalent, or at least one year of experience working with computer networks and web sites.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 22). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“We determine that Patent Owner’s contention that Vock teaches away from using the pedometer of system 620 shown in Figure 21 with the system shown in Figure 1 is inconsistent with Vock’s disclosure that “system 620 [shown in Figure 21] is useful to joggers who can gate it to serve as a pedometer” and that “[d]ata may also be acquired by the accelerometer and telemetered to the electronics 626 via an RF link 631 back to a remote base 632 for storage and processing (e.g., such as the base station 70, FIG. 1).” Ex. 1006, 50:5, 49:21–23, and Fig. 21. We determine that the Petition and supporting testimony of Dr. Eldering show that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to modify the sensing unit of Vock to measure and transmit the number of steps taken by a user, and to modify the base station of Vock to provide feedback based on the number of steps, in light of the teachings of Smith, for the benefit of providing a user with additional information with which to quantitatively assess performance during a physical activity, and that such modifications would have been accomplished with a high chance of success. See Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 50–52. We determine that the Petition and supporting testimony of Dr. Eldering show that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified the sensing unit of Vock to periodically transmit data gathered by the sensing unit to a base station, in light of the teachings of Onari, for the benefit of providing other users with updates on the performance of a user as new data is collected. See Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 55–62.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“SportBrain iSTEP product is evidence that the claims are not obvious. PO Resp. 32–36. Petitioner contends that Patent Owner has not established a nexus between the evidence of commercial success and the patented invention. Reply 22–23. In particular, Petitioner contends that the evidence suggests that data was sent from the activity tracker over a telephone line when the device was docked, rather than “over a wireless network” from “wireless communication devices” as claimed. Reply 22 (citing Ex. 1024, 11). Accordingly, Petitioner shows that the challenged claims do not encompass the docked/telephone product for conveying data, and no nexus presumption exists. See Reply Br. 22–23; WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1328–29 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (error to reach obviousness conclusion without first weighing all the factors, and relied upon product must be “the invention disclosed and claimed in the patent” to obtain a presumption of nexus) (quoting J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atl. Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). Even if a nexus presumption were to apply, Patent Owner’s alleged commercial success does not provide any analysis with respect to market share, so it is not clear how 10,000 subscribers or units with accessories sold shows success that alters the obviousness calculus appreciably. See PO Resp. 35–36 (alleging 10,000 subscribers and 35,000 related units and accessories); Pet. Reply 23 (citing Ex. 1024, 7–8 (showing any success probably was due to the growing popularity of exercise trackers in general)). We determine that Patent Owner has not established commercial success or a nexus, such that the product identified by Patent Owner sent data over a wireless network from wireless communication devices, as required by the claims.” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 7,454,002 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,454,002 - PTAB · Jan 10, 2018 · IPR2016-01404 · APJ Kamran Jivani · IPR · Final written decision
The Board found claims 1, 2, 13, 14, 33, 34, 39, 46, and 48 not shown unpatentable: Bensimon did not disclose the claimed restricted-access mode, and Takahashi did not cure that deficiency.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner states––and Patent Owner does not dispute––that “a person having ordinary skill in the art of secure computer data storage devices (i.e. in the art for the ’459 patent) would have had (i) a B.S. degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and (ii) approximately two years of experience in the design or research of secure computer data storage devices.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 32). We agree with Petitioner’s statement of the level skill of an ordinary artisan at the time and adopt it as our own. Although Patent Owner does not directly address an ordinary artisan’s level of skill, Petitioner’s description of the level of skill accords with that of Patent Owner’s witness Dr. Goldschlag. Compare id., with Ex. 2004 ¶ 21 (opining that “one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering, or equivalent training, as well as two to three years of technical experience in the field of computer security and storage devices.”). We further find the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau,” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“within an electronic circuit embedded within the storage device.” Ex. 1001, 9:58–59, 10:34–35. Although these claims are not at issue in this case, they evince the patentee’s desire to employ each of the terms “unique” and “specific” where each is intended. It is well established that ordinarily different claim terms are presumed to have different meanings. Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d 1324, 1333 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he use of two terms in a claim requires that they connote different meanings. . . .”); CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the use of these different terms in the claims connotes different meanings.”). Further, the Specification describes that, depending on the selected security level, a cryptographic key can be generated using in part “device-specific security information derived from the unique format information of the removable storage device.” Ex. 1001, 3:66–4:1. The Specification thus describes the format information of the removable storage device as “unique” but describes the security information of the device merely as “specific,” not “unique.” Finally, the Specification discloses “for exemplary purposes only” an embodiment wherein “a unique, device-specific security information can be generated from the unique characteristics of the underlying storage medium.” Id. at 7:43–47 (emphasis added). The Specification thus describes device-specific security information as unique in a particular, non-limiting example and explicitly indicates that the device-specific security information derived in that example is “unique.” See id. In light of the foregoing description, we disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments that “specific” in the context of the claim term “device-specific security information” means unique. Construing “specific” to mean “unique” as Patent Owner urges would render meaningless the subsequent use of “unique” in claims 9 and 17, without a clear indication in the Specification of such an intent. See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1480. Instead, we accord the word “specific” its ordinary and customary meaning and construe “device-specific security information” as meaning “information particular to, but not necessarily unique to, a storage device and used to secure access to the storage device.” Although we construe the disputed term “device-specific security information,” our determination that Petitioner has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that any of the Instituted Claims are unpatentable is not dependent upon our construction, as detailed below.” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner has not identified in Bensimon explicit or inherent disclosure of the claimed restricted-access mode. Claim 1 requires operating in restrictedaccess mode “when the storage device does not have the device-specific security information.” Ex. 1001, 9:24–26. Petitioner identifies Bensimon’s read/write password, either alone or in combination with the password-enabling flag, as meeting the claimed device-specific security information. Reply 13; Pet. 22. Thus, in order to meet the requirements of claim 1, Petitioner is required to show that Bensimon discloses operating in restricted-access mode when the storage device does not have the read/write password, or alternatively does not have the combination of the read/write password and password-enabling flag. See, e.g., In re Bond, 910 F.2d at 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that in order to show anticipation, claimed elements must be arranged as required by the claim). Petitioner does not make the required showing. As Petitioner argues: “these claims recite operating in one mode if ‘the device-specific security information’ (i.e., that instance of device-specific security information) is present, and operating in another mode if ‘the device-specific security information’ (i.e., that instance of device-specific security information) is not present.” Reply 16. Petitioner identifies Bensimon’s read/write password, alone or in combination with the password-enabling flag, as the device-specific security information, yet Petitioner does not identify in Bensimon an explicit disclosure that Bensimon’s storage device operates in the claimed restricted-access mode when the read/write password is absent from the device. See id. at 16–22. Rather, Bensimon describes two different possible modes of operation when the read/write password is absent from the storage device, namely either no protection or write protection. Ex. 1004, 5:33–39, 6:3–4, 6:13–29. Contrary to the claim language, operation in Bensimon’s write protection mode depends upon the presence of the write protection password, not upon the absence of the read/write password and password-enabling flag (i.e. the claimed device-specific security information). Ex. 1004, 6:13–23; see also Reply 16 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶ 18) (asserting the claimed restricted-access mode is met “when Bensimon’s storage device 100 only has the write-protection (read-only) password”). This disclosure is insufficient to establish anticipation because claim 1 requires operating in restricted access mode when the storage device does not have the device-specific storage information, which Petitioner asserts is the read/write password and password-enabling flag. “A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claims is found.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil. Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). We similarly are not persuaded that Bensimon inherently anticipates claim 1. “Under the principles of inherency, if the prior art necessarily functions in accordance with, or includes, the claimed limitations, it anticipates.” In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the cited disclosure identifies two possible modes of operation when the read/write password and password-enabling flag are absent from Bensimon’s storage device, neither of which necessarily must occur.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“E. Obviousness of Claims 2 and 34 based on Bensimon in combination with Takahashi Petitioner asserts dependent claims 2 and 34 would have been obvious in light of Bensimon and Takahashi. Pet. 36–40 (analysis of claim 2) and 42–43 (analysis of claim 34). Petitioner’s analysis of these claims does not repair the deficiencies described above with regard to the claimed restrictedaccess mode. See id.; see also Reply 25. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above in the context of claim 1 and based on the full trial record, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2 and 34 would have been obvious in light of Bensimon and Takahashi. See supra Section III.D.2.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,968,459 - LG Electronics, Inc. v. Broadcom CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 19, 2017 · IPR2017-01624 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Diaz did not disclose internally reprogrammable hardware accelerators, and the other grounds did not cure that deficiency.
RulingsInstitution decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther
“3. Construction of “configurable” In construing this term, we have considered the specification of the ’353 patent and its prosecution history. Microsoft Corp. v. Proxycinn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In accord with these portions of the ’844 patent specification and file history discussed supra, we conclude that a hardware accelerator is configurable only if its functionality can be internally reprogrammed. Thus, under our construction, an accelerator selected by an API or other instrumentality would not itself be “configurable.” This will be discussed further infra.” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“However, as Patent Owner argues, Diaz ’353 does not explicitly or inherently disclose hardware accelerators that are configurable to perform decoding functions according to a plurality of decoding methods. In Diaz ’533 the overall decoder — as opposed to the constituent hardware accelerators — is configurable in that the processor controls which hardware accelerators are activated. Prelim. Resp. 2, 5–8. We see no meaningful distinction in this respect between Diaz ’353 and Sullivan ’021 which, as discussed above, discloses an API that is configurable to select various hardware accelerators, but which are not themselves configurable, to assist in the decoding process. See Prelim. Resp. 6. In sum, the functionality of the hardware accelerators of Diaz ’353 cannot be internally reprogrammed, but rather can only be bypassed or reused for various operations. Therefore, in accord with our claim construction set forth above, we determine that those hardware accelerators are not “configurable” as required by claim 1. Accordingly, Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of independent claim 1 as anticipated by Diaz ’353.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“C. Obviousness of Claims 8 and 14 over Diaz ’353 and Purcell ’483, and of Claim 12 over Diaz ’353 and Fandrianto ’459 or Kim As discussed above, Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the issue of whether Diaz ’353 discloses the claim 1 requirement of configurable hardware accelerators. Claims 8, 12, and 14 depend from claim 1 and so also include this requirement by virtue of their dependency. Petitioner’s obviousness grounds directed to these claims is premised on Petitioner’s arguments with respect to claim 1 that Diaz ’353 discloses configurable hardware accelerators. Pet. 51–63. Petitioner does not provide argument or evidence — aside from the above-considered anticipation arguments based on Diaz ’353 alone — that the combination of Diaz ’353 with Purcell ’483, Fandrianto ’459 or Kim teaches or suggests “a hardware accelerator . . . configurable to perform the decoding function according to a plurality of decoding methods.” Accordingly, Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of claims 8 and 14 as obvious over Diaz ’353 and Purcell ’483, or of claim 12 as obvious over Diaz ’353 and Fandrianto ’459 or Kim.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Accordingly, Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of independent claim 1 as anticipated by Diaz ’353.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,284,844 - Blue Coat Systems, Inc. v. Finjan, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Jul 18, 2017 · IPR2016-01444 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Rehearing
Granted Blue Coat’s rehearing request and instituted review of claims 1, 4–6, 9, 12–14, 17, 24, 35, and 37; the petition showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the asserted § 103 grounds.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“reexamination proceeding. Of particular relevance, the reexamination concluded with a Reexamination Certificate issued on November 28, 2016, including a claim for the benefit of the November 8, 1996 filing date of U.S. Provisional Appl. No. 60/030,639 (“the ’639 provisional application”). Ex. 3006 at [60]. In denying the Petition, the Prior Decision noted that “Petitioner has taken no steps to explain or respond to the effect of these developments on its argument.” Dec. 7. This remains true. Nevertheless, we agree with Petitioner that our Prior Decision gave insufficient consideration to the Petition’s assertion that “U.S. Patent No. 7,613,926 [(“the ’926 patent”), i.e., an intermediate patent in the priority chain of the ’086 patent] fails to claim priority to the ’639 provisional application and instead the earliest priority document cited in the ’926 patent is [the ’194 patent].” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1012, col. 1, ll. 8–32); see Req. Reh’g 4–5, 6 n.4, 7–9. For a claim of a patent to be entitled to the effective filing date of an earlier filed application, each application in the priority chain must refer to the earlier filed application. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Alpine Elecs. of Am., Inc., 609 F.3d 1345, 1350–52 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s Rehearing Request and proceed to the merits of the Petition.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedMixed
“a formally defined safety policy” and allows checking “with certainty, that the proof is valid and hence the foreign code is safe to execute.” Ex. 1004, 107. Thus, Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably understand Necula to teach that its proof-carrying code adds to the foreign code, consistent with the construction of “append” that we apply herein, and Petitioner articulates sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to apply that teaching to Swimmer’s representation of DSP data. See Pet. 46–49. This is not an instance, for example, in which Petitioner relies on a characterization of the problem provided by the patent to derive its reasoning. Cf., e.g., Mintz v. Dietz & Watson, Inc., 679 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Indeed, Patent Owner’s contention that “the storage of the DSP in a database is one of the key features that distinguishes the ‘086 Patent over the prior art” dilutes the strength of its argument. The contrary positions of the parties’ declarants in their testimonial evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact, which we resolve in the light most favorable to Petitioner for purposes of this Decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). Accordingly, we conclude that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing also with respect to these elements, and that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of claims 1 and 9. See infra Section II.E.10 (discussing limits in our weighing of Patent Owner’s Secondary Considerations evidence in this Preliminary Proceeding).” slip op. at 21
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“be considered under 35 U.S.C. § 312 because Petitioner has failed to name all real parties in interest, as required by the statute.” Prelim. Resp. 9. The parties agree that, on June 12, 2016, Symantec Corporation (“Symantec”) announced that it was acquiring Petitioner. Pet. 13; Prelim. Resp. 9. The Petition discloses that “[t]he transaction is expected to close in the third quarter of 2016,” and that “[a]s of the filing date of this petition the transaction has not been executed.” Pet. 13. The Petition further represents that “Symantec has not controlled or had the ability to control the filing of this petition, whether through funding or strategy.” Id. As noted above, Petitioner expressly identified Symantec as a real party in interest before any decision on institution of an inter partes review was made. Paper 8, 2. Patent Owner contends that “Symantec had control over the filing of the Petition during the period between the announcement of the acquisition and the closing of the acquisition,” which it asserts occurred on August 1, 2016. Prelim. Resp. 9. Patent Owner also contends that it “understands from the underlying litigation that ‘Blue Coat Systems, Inc.’ no longer exists 1 A petition to accept an unintentionally delayed claim of priority for the ’926 patent, claiming the benefit of U.S. Patent Appl. No. 08/790,097 which was filed January 29, 1997, was dismissed by the Office on June 13, 2017. Exs. 1027, 3007. A renewed petition was filed on June 16, 2017. Ex. 3008. At this time, the Office has not ruled on the renewed petition, and that pending petition accordingly does not affect our determination of the challenged claims’ effective filing date for purposes of this Decision. as an entity, or at least goes by ‘Blue Coat Systems LLC’ for at least the last two months.” Id. at 10. We have reviewed the evidence provided by Patent Owner and find it insufficient to support Patent Owner’s allegation that Petitioner has failed to comply with 35 U.S.C. § 312(a) or 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(3). That evidence is, at best, suggestive regarding an issue that is not jurisdictional. Lumentum Holdings, Inc. v. Capella Photonics, Inc., Case IPR2015-00739, slip op. (PTAB Mar. 4, 2016) (Paper 38) (precedential).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“1. “Downloadable” Every challenged independent claim recites a “Downloadable,” and Petitioner contends that “[t]he broadest reasonable interpretation of the term ‘downloadable’ includes ‘an executable application program, which is downloaded from a source computer and run on a destination computer.’” Pet. 15. Petitioner’s proposed construction parallels a statement made in the Specification of the ’194 patent. Ex. 1012, col. 1, ll. 44–47. Patent Owner “does not dispute” this proposed construction, which we adopt for purposes of this Decision. Prelim. Resp. 5. 2. “database” Challenged independent claim 42 recites “a database of Downloadable security profiles.” Petitioner contends that “[t]he broadest reasonable interpretation of the term ‘database’ includes ‘a collection of interrelated data organized according to a database schema to serve one or more applications.’” Pet. 15. Patent Owner also “does not dispute” this proposed construction, but argues that “the practical import of Petitioner’s proposed construction for the term ‘database,’ is that log files, such as Swimmer’s audit trail, do not fall within the scope of the claims.” Prelim. Resp. 5–6. That is, Patent Owner contends that “logging functionality is distinct from storing in a database, which allows DSP to be efficiently retrieved from the database,” as compared with the “record-keeping” functionality of an “event log.” Id. at 7. Patent Owner’s argument was considered by the panel in IPR2015- 01892, which concluded that, “[t]o the extent that construction would exclude a log file consisting of an ‘unstructured collection of data on a computer,’ . . . [an] unstructured log file would not be a database,” but the construction does not “necessarily exclude[] all log files from being databases.” 1892 Dec. 16 (emphasis in original). We agree with the reasoning expressed in the Final Written Decision of IPR2015-01892. Id. at 12–17. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,079,086 - Elekta, Inc. v. Varian Medical Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 16, 2017 · IPR2016-00547 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 57–59 are unpatentable as anticipated by Jaffray MICCAI 2001 and the Jaffray Publication, and as obvious over the identified Jaffray combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“communication system that facilitates communication between many devices and that uses a networking protocol to selectively route messages to their intended devices.’” PO Resp. 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). Petitioner proposes a broader construction: “a link between two or more components of the radiation treatment system that allows information to be shared between them.” Reply 2. In our Final Written Decision in Elekta, Inc. v. Varian Medical Systems, Inc., IPR2015-01401 (PTAB Dec. 23, 2016) (Paper 56, “IPR2015- 01401 FWD”), we construed the same term based on nearly identical arguments and substantially the same evidence. See IPR2015-01401 FWD 7–8. In our Decision, we rejected the same argument Patent Owner presents in this case—that a “communications network” requires a networking protocol to selectively route messages to their intended devices. See id. We did so because neither the term’s plain language nor the specification supported imposing such a requirement. See id. For the same reasons explained in IPR2015-01401, we maintain our agreement with Petitioner. Under the broadest reasonable construction, a communications network is simply a link between two or more components of the radiation treatment system that allows information to be shared between them.” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“i. Jaffray MICCAI 2001 Teaches “a computing unit, coupled to the rotatable gantry via a communications network, to store the image projection data captured by the flat-panel imager” Claim 57 (and, by dependence, claims 58 and 59) requires “a computing unit, coupled to the rotatable gantry via a communications network, to store the image projection data captured by the flat-panel imager.” We agree with Petitioner one skilled in the art would understand Jaffray MICCAI 2001 includes this feature. Jaffray MICCAI 2001 teaches “[p]rototypes of the hardware and software of the system have been constructed.” Ex. 1020, 1077. It further describes “[b]ecause the bone matching can be performed accurately on fairly low resolution CT and the prostate matching only requires a small part of the cone-beam CT volume, the complete image analysis can be performed in less than 10 s on a 700 MHz PC.” Id. at 1078. As Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Hamilton, explains, because Jaffray MICCAI 2001’s computing unit performs image reconstruction, it “necessarily stores the projection image data captured by the flat-panel imager.” Ex. 1037 ¶ 20 (citing Ex. 1020, 1077; Ex. 1022 ¶ 162). Further, as Dr. Hamilton, explains, “[t]he outcome of [the computing unit’s] analysis is used with treatment planning data to control the treatment delivery,” which “necessarily requires controlling the gantry.” Id. (citing Ex. 1020, 1077; Ex. 1022 ¶ 163); see also Ex. 1020, 1077 (describing that “[t]he selected treatment plan will be delivered by means of a step-and-shoot intensity delivery technique using 5 beam angles and about 20 treatment segments”).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“In addition to demonstrating these alternative prior-art disclosures, Petitioner identified sufficient reasons that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements as the claimed invention does. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Specifically, Petitioner explains—with support from Dr. Hamilton—that one skilled in the art would have been motivated to combine the computers disclosed in Jaffray MICCAI 2001, Jaffray JRO 1999, and Jaffray 2001 into an interconnected network because doing so would increase the efficiency of delivering radiation therapy to a patient. See Pet. 38 (citing Ex. 1022 ¶ 181). In addition, Petitioner explains a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the claimed radiation energies (as disclosed in Jaffray JRO 1999) with the linear accelerator of Jaffray MICCAI 2001 to achieve a therapeutic response. Id. at 39 (citing Ex. 1022 ¶ 181). Thus, in addition to demonstrating the necessary disclosures in the prior art, Petitioner articulated sufficient reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion that its proffered combination would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. In disputing obviousness based on Jaffray MICCAI 2001, Jaffray 2001, and Jaffray JRO 1999, Patent Owner relies on its narrow construction for “communications network” as requiring a networking protocol and message routing. See PO Resp. 35–38, 43–45. In particular, Patent Owner asserts that, given added complexity associated with addressing data, communications networks are slower and more complex than dedicated physical connections, so one skilled in the art would not have been motivated to use a communications network as opposed to a direct connection. See id. at 43–44. We find Patent Owner’s arguments unpersuasive because, as explained above, we do not construe a communications network as requiring a networking protocol to selectively route messages to their intended devices, as Patent Owner contends. Instead, a communications network requires only a link between two or more components that allows information to be shared between them. Based on our review of the arguments and evidence in the Petition, Response, and Reply, we determine Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 57–59 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Jaffray MICCAI 2001, Jaffray 2001, and Jaffray JRO 1999. 3. Anticipation of Claims 57–59 Based on the Jaffray Publication” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesUnpatentableUnpatentable
“Petitioner contends “[t]o the extent they are not found to be anticipated by the Jaffray Publication, claims 57–59 are unpatentable because they would have been obvious over the Jaffray Publication in view of the general knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Pet. 54– 55. In light of our findings on anticipation based on Jaffrey Publication, and absent any assertions of secondary considerations supporting non-obviousness, we are persuaded Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claims 57–59 would have been obvious over the Jaffray Publication. See In re McDaniel, 293 F.3d 1379, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“It is well settled that ‘anticipation is the epitome of obviousness.’”); cf. Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (distinguishing anticipation from obviousness because “obviousness requires analysis of secondary considerations of nonobviousness, while secondary considerations are not an element of a claim of anticipation”).” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 7,945,021 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,945,021 - Elekta, Inc. v. Varian Medical Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 16, 2017 · IPR2016-00476 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 6 is unpatentable over Jaffray MICCAI 2001 under §§ 102(a), 102(b), and 103(a); claims 1–3, 7–10, and 12 are canceled on Patent Owner’s granted motion to amend.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“construction in light of the specification of the patent in which [they] appear[].” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). We presume a claim term carries its “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question” at the time of the invention. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We construe only those claim terms necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 2. “communications network”” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“i. Jaffray MICCAI 2001 Teaches “a translatable treatment couch coupled to the rotatable gantry via a communications network” Claim 6 requires “a translatable treatment couch coupled to the rotatable gantry via a communications network.” As Petitioner explains, the linear accelerator in Jaffray MICCAI 2001 is an Elekta SL-20. Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1021, 1076; Ex. 1026 ¶ 167), 24 (citing Ex. 1021, 1076, Fig. 1; Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 156, 167). A technical note describing the SL-20 explains as follows: “The hardware/software interaction of the SL-20 makes it particularly suitable for automated data collection. Communication between the control processor and the accelerator, gantry and patient couch is handled by a pair of high-speed serial links. These are daisy-chained through three separate control areas distributed throughout the machine.” Ex. 1015, 220. “[R]ecourse to extrinsic evidence is proper to determine whether a feature, while not explicitly discussed, is necessarily present in a reference.” Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In light of Exhibit 1015, we agree with Petitioner one skilled in the art would understand Jaffray MICCAI 2001’s translatable treatment couch and rotatable gantry are coupled via a communications network—i.e., a link between the two components that allows information to be shared between them. See Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1021, 1076, Fig. 1; Ex. 1015, 220; Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 156, 167); see also Reply 7–12; Ex. 1031 ¶¶ 19– 29.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable
“Petitioner asserts “to the extent [claim 6 is] not found to be anticipated by Jaffray MICCAI 2001, [claim 6] would have been obvious in view of Jaffray MICCAI 2001.” Pet. 27. In light of our findings on anticipation based on Jaffray MICCAI 2001, and absent any assertions of secondary considerations supporting non-obviousness, we are persuaded Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claim 6 would have been obvious over Jaffray MICCAI 2001. See In re McDaniel, 293 F.3d 1379, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“It is well settled that anticipation is the epitome of obviousness.”); cf. Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (distinguishing anticipation from obviousness because “obviousness requires analysis of secondary considerations of nonobviousness, while secondary considerations are not an element of a claim of anticipation”). 3. Anticipation of Claim 6 Based on the Jaffray Publication” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureNot shown unpatentableInherency not foundNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that using a computer-controlled treatment couch does not necessarily mean the treatment couch is connected to the gantry via a communications network, as claim 6 requires. See PO Resp. 28. As Patent Owner explains, controlling the couch with a computer “says nothing about how, if at all, the table would be coupled to the rotatable gantry.” Id. In addition, Petitioner’s standard-feature argument, even if correct, is not enough to show the Jaffray Publication necessarily discloses the disputed communications network feature. See Rexnord Indus., LLC v. Kappos, 705 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (explaining that “anticipation by inherent disclosure is appropriate only when the reference discloses prior art that must necessarily include the unstated limitation”). Thus, we find Petitioner has not shown the Jaffray Publication expressly or inherently discloses “a translatable treatment couch coupled to the rotatable gantry via a communications network,” as claim 6 requires, and consequently has not met its burden to show the Jaffray Publication anticipates claim 6. 4. Obviousness of Claim 6 Based on the Jaffray Publication” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 8,116,430 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,116,430 - Palo Alto Networks, Inc. / Blue Coat Systems, Inc. v. Finjan, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 16, 2017 · IPR2016-00480 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 14 and 19 were not shown unpatentable because neither Shin nor Poison Java and Brown teaches executable code received at the destination without modification.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“according to the entire disclosure of the ’633 patent specification the executable code is received at the destination without modification. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (the specification is “the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term,” and “acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms used in the claims or when it defines terms by implication.”). “The specification may define claim terms ‘by implication’ such that the meaning may be ‘found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.’” Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1268 (Fed.Cir.2001) (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582, 1584 n. 6). We also confirm the scope of the “executable code” in light of the advantage of the invention, e.g., to protect against malicious code without modifying the executable code, thereby minimizing resources. See Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (construing a ring as permanently attached to the cover because all embodiments read together suggest this relationship and the specification describes the advantages of the unitary structure). Although the specification describes additional advantages, such as not requiring pre-installation of security code within the destination, the claims need not encompass all stated advantages. See Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[P]atentees [are] not required to include within each of their claims all of [the] advantages or features described as significant or important in the written description.”). Finally, all the embodiments are consistent with and support the inventors’ characterization of the problem solved: avoiding the resource intensive modification by communicating to the destination the mobile protection code and the detected executable code. See Ex. 1001, 10:39−45; 1:63−3:6; see also O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (relying on the consistent disclosure of structures as being either non-smooth or conical and the statements distinguishing prior art where structures were smooth). In light of the disclosure, the plain and ordinary meaning of the disputed claim language emerges: the executable code whose operations are processed by the mobile protection code at the destination is the same as the executable code received, i.e., it undergoes no modification. In sum, we determine that the “executable code” at the destination is not modified.” slip op. at 17
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“research at Stanford, and archived by archive.org, shows that the article’s title was listed and that the article was publicly available through the Internet as of April 14, 1998. Ex. 1095. As explained in the affidavit proffered by Christopher Butler, Office Manager of Internet Archive, the URL format for captured website, “19980418130342/http://www-cs-students.stanford.edu/~ishin/research.html,” establishes that the website posting the abstract and the title of the article with a link to the article itself were archived on April 18, 1998 at 13:03:42. Id. The article was available as a PDF file, downloadable from the same page. Id. (identifying in a cover page the URL showing that Ex. 1009 was available from www-cs-students.stanford.edu/~ishin/paper.ps, as of April 18, 1998). We find this evidence credible and undisputed. Finally, there is also undisputed evidence that Dr. Rubin read Shin in 1998. Ex. 2022, 70:20−71:13. Accordingly, we find that Shin was publicly available and sufficiently accessible online to persons interested in applet security no later than April 14, 1998.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We find that Shin’s constant pool is not the same as the IAT embodiment described in the ’633 patent. As stated above, the mobile protection code modifies the IAT at the destination while processing the one or more operations of the executable code. In contrast, Shin’s applet is modified at the proxy server, and its modification constitutes rewriting the bytecode of the applet, which is executable. See Ex. 1009, 2 (“we propose a technique, called bytecode modification, through which we put restrictions on applets by inserting additional bytecode instructions that will perform the necessary run-time tests”), 4 (“modified executable entities are inserted in Java bytecode”). As explained by Shin, the constant pool is part of the class file of the applet. Id. at 5. Further, the bytecode modification is not performed at run-time, like the IAT modification table scenario. See id. at 2 (“HTTP proxy server []modifies classes before they are received by the browser”), 4 (Shin explaining that the “safety mechanism must be applied before the applet is executed”). The differences are significant, for the modification of the applet at the server is precisely the type of modification that the ’633 patent sought to avoid. The applet is undisputedly executable code, and is what Petitioner pointed to in Shin as disclosing executable code. See Pet. 43 (“Shin also discloses that the safeguarding code processes operations attempted by the applet (‘executable code’) . . . .”). By describing that the server modifies the constant pool in the applet, we find that Shin teaches modifying the executable code before the applet is processed at the client browser. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Shin teaches or suggests that the applet is “executable code” as we have construed the claim language, supra.” slip op. at 26
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“and 2048 in general as irrelevant, potentially confusing, and prejudicial. Id. at 8−15. Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude is denied as moot, because that evidence objected to is not relied upon in reaching our determination that Petitioner has not met its burden of showing that claims 14 and 19 are unpatentable.” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 7,647,633 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,647,633 - Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Finjan, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 16, 2017 · IPR2015-01974 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 14 and 19 were not shown unpatentable under either § 103 ground because both relied on modified executable code, contrary to the Board’s construction.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“To conclude, our determination is based on the plain and ordinary meaning of the claims within the context of the specification. First, 7 Similarly, Petitioner relies on testimony from the deposition of Finjan’s expert in the District Court litigation, Dr. Nenad Medvidovic, Exhibit 1100. Reply 5 (citing Ex. 1100). 8 We do not rely on expert testimony also because extrinsic evidence may not be used to contradict claim meaning that is unambiguous in light of the intrinsic record. Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2015). according to the entire disclosure of the ’633 patent specification the executable code is received at the destination without modification. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (the specification is “the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term,” and “acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms used in the claims or when it defines terms by implication.”). “The specification may define claim terms ‘by implication’ such that the meaning may be ‘found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.’” Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1268 (Fed.Cir.2001) (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582, 1584 n. 6). We also confirm the scope of the “executable code” in light of the advantage of the invention, e.g., to protect against malicious code without modifying the executable code, thereby minimizing resources. See Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (construing a ring as permanently attached to the cover because all embodiments read together suggest this relationship and the specification describes the advantages of the unitary structure). Although the specification describes additional advantages, such as not requiring pre-installation of security code within the destination, the claims need not encompass all stated advantages. See Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[P]atentees [are] not required to include within each of their claims all of [the] advantages or features described as significant or important in the written description.”). Finally, all the embodiments are consistent with and support the inventors’ characterization of the problem solved: avoiding the resource intensive modification by communicating to the destination the mobile protection code and the detected executable code. See Ex. 1001, 10:39−45; 1:63−3:6; see also O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (relying on the consistent disclosure of structures as being either non-smooth or conical and the statements distinguishing prior art where structures were smooth). In light of the disclosure, the plain and ordinary meaning of the disputed claim language emerges: the executable code whose operations are processed by the mobile protection code at the destination is the same as the executable code received, i.e., it undergoes no modification. In sum, we determine that the “executable code” at the destination is not modified.” slip op. at 16
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“publication or dissemination. See Ex. 1009. Petitioner, however, has provided other evidence establishing that Shin was publicly available no later than April 1998. A printout of the website directed to Mr. Shin’s research at Stanford, and archived by archive.org, shows that the article’s title was listed and that the article was publicly available through the Internet as of April 14, 1998. Ex. 1095. As explained in the affidavit proffered by Christopher Butler, Office Manager of Internet Archive, the URL format for captured website, “19980418130342/http://www-cs-students.stanford.edu/~ishin/research.html,” establishes that the website posting the abstract and the title of the article with a link to the article itself were archived on April 18, 1998 at 13:03:42. Id. The article was available as a PDF file, downloadable from the same page. Id. (identifying in a cover page the URL showing that Ex. 1009 was available from www-cs-students.stanford.edu/~ishin/paper.ps, as of April 18, 1998). We find this evidence credible and undisputed. Finally, there is also undisputed evidence that Dr. Rubin read Shin in 1998. Ex. 2022, 70:20−71:13. Accordingly, we find that Shin was publicly available and sufficiently accessible online to persons interested in applet security no later than April 14, 1998.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We find that Shin’s constant pool is not the same as the IAT embodiment described in the ’633 patent. As stated above, the mobile protection code modifies the IAT at the destination while processing the one or more operations of the executable code. In contrast, Shin’s applet is modified at the proxy server, and its modification constitutes rewriting the bytecode of the applet, which is executable. See Ex. 1009, 2 (“we propose a technique, called bytecode modification, through which we put restrictions on applets by inserting additional bytecode instructions that will perform the necessary run-time tests”), 4 (“modified executable entities are inserted in Java bytecode”). As explained by Shin, the constant pool is part of the class file of the applet. Id. at 5. Further, the bytecode modification is not performed at run-time, like the IAT modification table scenario. See id. at 2 (“HTTP proxy server []modifies classes before they are received by the browser”), 4 (Shin explaining that the “safety mechanism must be applied before the applet is executed”). The differences are significant, for the modification of the applet at the server is precisely the type of modification that the ’633 patent sought to avoid. The applet is undisputedly executable code, and is what Petitioner pointed to in Shin as disclosing executable code. See Pet. 43 (“Shin also discloses that the safeguarding code processes operations attempted by the applet (‘executable code’) . . . .”). By describing that the server modifies the constant pool in the applet, we find that Shin teaches modifying the executable code before the applet is processed at the client browser. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Shin teaches or suggests that the applet is “executable code” as we have construed the claim language, supra.” slip op. at 26
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“and 2048 in general as irrelevant, potentially confusing, and prejudicial. Id. at 8−15. Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude is denied as moot, because that evidence objected to is not relied upon in reaching our determination that Petitioner has not met its burden of showing that claims 14 and 19 are unpatentable.” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 7,647,633 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,647,633 - Broad Ocean Technologies, LLC v. Nidec Motor CorporationRehearing deniedPTAB · Feb 22, 2017 · IPR2015-01617 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Petitioner’s rehearing request, leaving intact its decision that claims 7–13 were not shown anticipated by Beifus.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“On rehearing, the burden of showing that the Decision should be modified lies with Petitioner, the party challenging the Decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 2
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“On rehearing, the burden of showing that the Decision should be modified lies with Petitioner, the party challenging the Decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“1 We do not disagree with Petitioner’s general contention that “a prior art reference’s disclosure of a non-anticipatory embodiment does not negate the invalidating effect under 35 U.S.C. §102 of any other anticipatory alternative embodiments.” Req. Reh’g 8–9 (citing Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. Pamlab, L.L.C., 412 F.3d 1319, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Paper 30, 15:10–16:2). Rather, we disagree that Petitioner has carried its burden of showing that Beifus discloses any anticipatory embodiment.” slip op. at 4
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“reliance in its Reply on the reasoning of Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2015)” gave improper effect to an objection raised by Patent Owner during Petitioner’s redirect examination of Dr. Sidman. See Req. Reh’g 12–13 (“Patent Owner Nidec waived all its evidentiary objections to the redirect testimony of Dr. Sidman by not filing a motion to exclude” (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(c))). This implication misconstrues the reasoning provided in the Final Written Decision. Rather, we determined that Petitioner’s reliance on Kennametal was improper because it was an argument not raised in the initial Petition. Dec. 18. Regardless of whether Patent Owner made an objection, and regardless of whether Patent Owner filed a motion to exclude based on such an objection, we are not absolved of our duty to guard against the improper presentation of shifting arguments that may unfairly disadvantage an opposing party. 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b) (“A reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition, patent owner preliminary response, or patent owner response.”) (emphasis added); CBS Interactive, Inc. v. Helferich Pat. Lic., LLC, Case IPR2013-00033, slip op. at 3 (PTAB Aug. 9, 2013) (Paper 79) (“Should there be improper arguments or evidence presented with a reply, the Board, exercising its discretion, may exclude the reply and related evidence in their entirety, or alternatively, decline to consider the improper arguments and/or related evidence.”). We recognize that Patent Owner addressed Kennametal in its Patent Owner Response, and, as a broadly general proposition, raising an argument in a Response may, without more, entitle a Petitioner to reply to it. But the specific circumstances in this case are not that simple.” slip op. at 7
§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 7,990,092 - Elekta, Inc. v. Varian Medical Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 23, 2016 · IPR2015-01401 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 4–7, 14, 15, 53, 60, and 61 are unpatentable over Jaffray 2001 under §§ 102(b) and 103(a), and over the stated Jaffray combinations under § 103(a).
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“ordinary and customary meaning,” which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question” at the time of the invention. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We construe only those claim terms necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 2. “capable of implementing a treatment plan” Patent Owner takes the position that to be “capable of implementing a treatment plan,” a radiation treatment system cannot still be in development and must pass industry-established quality assurance validations that are prerequisites to commissioning such systems for use on real patients. See PO Resp. 17–18. We decline to read in these additional limitations. Neither the claims nor the Specification has any support for excluding devices that are still early in development, or those that have not yet been validated against established quality standards. The broadest reasonable construction of the term requires no more than a system capable of implementing one or more treatment plans. 3. “communications network” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner asserts “[a] communications network is a communication system that facilitates communication between many devices and that uses a networking protocol to selectively route messages to their intended devices.” PO Resp. 28. In Reply, Petitioner proposes a broader construction: “a link between two or more components of the radiation treatment system that allows information to be shared between them.” Reply 11. We agree with Petitioner. In the three instances when the ’021 patent Specification recites “communications network,” it describes only a generic connection between components. See Ex. 1001, 2:36–40 (explaining that “[t]he couch 218 may be connected to the therapy simulator rotatable gantry via a communications network”), 4:16–18 (explaining that “the computer 220 connects to the simulator 100 and the command processor 225 via a communications network 240”), 6:16–18 (explaining that “box 451, processor 425, and computer 450 connect to simulator 400 via communications network 440”). Figures 1 and 3 of the ’021 patent depict the communications network (items 240 and 440) simply as arrows connecting various components. Notably absent from the ’021 patent is any reference to networking protocols or a routing mechanism, and nothing in the term’s plain language requires a networking protocol or selectively routing messages as Patent Owner suggests. We agree with Petitioner under the broadest reasonable construction, a communications network is simply a link between two or more components of the radiation treatment system that allows information to be shared between them. 4. “a high energy radiation source” and “a cone-beam radiation source”” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“i. Jaffray 2001 Teaches “a radiation treatment system capable of implementing a treatment plan” All of the challenged claims require a “radiation treatment system capable of implementing a treatment plan.” We agree with Petitioner that because Jaffray 2001 teaches “[t]he adaptation of this system to a medical linear accelerator for on-line image-guided radiation therapy demonstrates the suitability of this technology for intra-therapeutic guidance,” Jaffray 2001 discloses a system capable of implementing a treatment plan. See Pet. 18 (quoting Ex. 1003, 800); Ex. 2024 ¶¶ 25–28 (explaining that “a medical linear accelerator, by its very nature, is capable of implementing a treatment plan”), ¶¶ 29–30 (explaining that Fig. 2(a) from Patent Owner’s Exhibit 2015 confirms that Jaffray 2001’s medical linear accelerator is capable of implementing a treatment plan). In contesting this element, Patent Owner notes that one of the other Jaffray references—Jaffray JRO 1999 (Ex. 1007)—states its design “allows normal operation of the accelerator with the imagers removed and the kV xray tube retracted.” Ex. 1007, 775. Patent Owner interprets Jaffray JRO 1999’s statement to mean in all of Jaffray’s systems, removing the imaging system was “necessary” before the linear accelerator could implement a treatment plan. PO Resp. 8–9; Ex. 2020 ¶ 58. Patent Owner argues further Jaffray 2001’s system was not capable of implementing a treatment plan because it was still in development and had not been tested or validated against established industry standards that must be met before the FDA will commission such devices for medical use. See PO Resp.17–18; Ex. 2020 ¶¶ 49–52. We disagree. As explained above, under our claim construction, the claim limitation at issue requires only a system capable of implementing one or more treatment plans, not one that is ready to certify for actual medical use on real patients. Jaffray JRO 1999’s reference to allowing normal operation with the imagers removed does not undermine that teaching; it simply indicates the disclosed system permits radiation therapy with the imagers removed, a feature beneficial for “limited situations in which the treatment plan may require extreme angulation.” Reply 3; see Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 7–8. We find Jaffray 2001 discloses a radiation treatment system capable of implementing a treatment plan as the challenged claims require.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“challenged claims, the claimed subject matter would have been obvious over Jaffray 2001 at the time of the invention. See Pet. 26–27. As explained above, we find Jaffray 2001 discloses every limitation from the challenged claims. In addition, Petitioner explains—with unrefuted support from Dr. Hamilton and the prior art—by 1981 translatable treatment couches moveable in three planes plus angulation and coupled to the gantry via a communications network were standard on linear accelerators. See Pet. 26– 27 (citing Ex. 1016 ¶ 36; Ex. 1015, 220; Ex. 1010, 1, 2, 12, 39–48). Petitioner also explains—again with unrefuted support from Dr. Hamilton— none of the Jaffray references suggest any changes to these standard features and one skilled in the art would understand the linear accelerator depicted in Jaffray 2001 is the Elekta SL20, which had a translatable treatment couch including the same standard features. Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1016 ¶ 128). In addition, Petitioner explains that to the extent Jaffray 2001 fails to disclose a computing unit to capture and store image projection data, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art to include one because “to process the image projection data to generate volumetric images, it is necessary to store the image projection data in the computer which will process the data.” Pet. 27 (citing 1016 ¶ 207). Thus, in addition to demonstrating the necessary disclosures in the prior art (through incorporating its anticipation argument), Petitioner identified sufficient reasons that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements the way the claimed invention does. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. In contesting obviousness based on Jaffray 2001, Patent Owner reiterates its argument that Jaffray 2001 does not disclose a system capable of implementing a treatment plan (as required in all of the challenged claims), a computing unit coupled to the rotatable gantry via a communications network (as required in claims 1, 4, and 5), or a translatable treatment couch coupled to the rotatable gantry via a communications network (as required in claims 14, 15, and 60). PO Resp. 45. Patent Owner asserts also we should reject Petitioner’s obviousness challenge as an improper attempt to “bootstrap” obviousness to anticipation, without identifying any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art or explaining why those elements would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 43. We disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments addressing Jaffray 2001’s ability to implement a treatment plan and communications network for the reasons explained in our anticipation analysis above. Moreover, we do not view Petitioner’s obviousness challenge as a mere “bootstrap” to anticipation because Petitioner identified potential differences between Jaffray 2001 and claimed subject matter (i.e., the claimed translatable treatment couch and computing unit to store image projection data) as well as rationale explaining why one skilled in the art would have known to include those elements.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 7,945,021 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,945,021
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.