• Vudu, LLC v. Ideahub, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 14, 2022 · IPR2020-01688 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 11, 13, 15, 18, 19, 21, and 23 are unpatentable over DIS 23009-1; the revised contingent motion to amend is denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) in the relevant field as of the earliest priority date would have had at least the equivalent of a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related subject and two or more years of experience in the field of media streaming over the Internet. Pet. 18–19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 82). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assertions regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art, nor 6 Patent Owner does not present objective evidence of nonobviousness. does it present its own definition. We adopt Petitioner’s definition as it is consistent with the specification of the ’830 patent and the cited references.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner proposes that we construe “adaptation set,” “SegmentBase,” and “SegmentTemplate.” Pet. 19–21. Patent Owner does not address claim construction in its briefing. We need not construe any claim term to resolve any issues before us, and therefore, do not expressly define any claim term in our Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that construction is needed only for terms that are in dispute, and only as necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 11

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateDenied

    “not describe additional configuration information nor user characteristic information. Instead, it describes “an additional configuration to select a representation based on a user characteristics and terminal characteristics.” Ex. 2004 ¶ 232. It is unclear from Patent Owner’s argument whether Patent Owner intends for the claimed “user characteristic information” to include or refer to additional configuration information, accessibility features of a representation, or both. Reply Rev. Opp. 1 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 232, 234, 253). In any event, merely because paragraph 253 uses the term “[h]ereinafter” before it discloses “two simple attributes [] for the above-described purpose”––and not even in close proximity to the “user characteristics” and “additional configuration” in paragraph 232––is not sufficient to provide support for “the user characteristic information includ[ing] the usedWith attribute and the equivalentTo attribute,” as recited 8 Ex. 2005 is Application No. 16/168,933 (“the ’933 application”). in limitations [38.6], [40.6], and [46.6]. None of the cited portions (i.e., Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 232, 234, 253, 255–257, Table 13; Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 254–256, Table 13) indicates a sufficient connection or relationship, or the claimed inclusive relationship, between user characteristic information and the usedWith and equivalentTo attributes. Contra Reply Opp. Rev. MTA 1 (Patent Owner arguing that the cited disclosures “clearly show this relationship between the claimed attributes and user characteristic information”). For the foregoing reasons, we determine that claims 38, 40, and 46 do not find sufficient written description support in the ’644 application nor in the ’933 application, whether considered individually or collectively, and thus, these claims contain new matter.” slip op. at 35

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “rationale for combining DIS 23009-1 with M20060, Petitioner persuasively contends that: A POSA would have been motivated to add the additional “metadata” described in M20060 to the MPDs described in the DIS 23001-6 or DIS 23009-1 references in order to enable the client to choose the most suitable version of media content among alternative versions of media content. For example, M20060 describes that the additional metadata (e.g., the extended accessibility element and the usedWith, equivalentTo, bitDepth, minBitDepth, and maxBitDepth attributes) helps “both users and clients to select appropriate representations” by, for example, “1) supporting accessibility, 2) describing relationships of representations, and 3) describing media’s bit depth.” Moreover, a POSA would have had an expectation of success in modifying the MPDs in DIS 23001-6 or DIS 23009-1 to include the additional metadata described below because it simply would have been a matter of adding additional metadata to the MPD XML schemas described in DIS 23001-6 or DIS 23009-1. Id. (citing Ex. 1094 ¶ 33; Ex. 1097 § 1, 1). Dr. Bestavros persuasively explains that “M20060 expressly references the DIS 23001-6 reference and proposes specific modifications to the MPEG DASH metadata included in the MPD XML schema.” Ex. 1094 ¶ 34 (citing Ex. 1097 § 1, 1 (introduction of M20060); Ex. 1097, 7 (references cited by M20060)).” slip op. at 41

  Patent outcomesUS 10,270,830 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,270,830
• Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Feb 22, 2022 · PGR2021-00108 · APJ Aaron W Moore · PGR · Institution

  Institution was denied because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–20 were unpatentable, including because the asserted combination did not link rule generation to the packet correlation.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Obviousness Analysis A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations, primarily: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.6 Petitioner asserts that claims 1–2, 7–8, 10, 12–13, and 17–18 are unpatentable under § 103 as obvious in view of Paxton and Sutton. See Pet. 6, 18–64. For the reasons described below, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument and evidence.” slip op. at 14

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and approximately 2-3 years of experience in the design or development of telecommunication systems, or the equivalent” and that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 13–15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 18–20). Patent Owner does not address this issue in the Preliminary Response. As Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill in the art, and because we find it generally consistent with the disclosures of the ’797 patent and the prior art, we adopt it for purposes of this analysis. C.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Patent Owner argues that “[t]he plain and ordinary meaning of the terms “determining . . . a first plurality of log entries” and “determining . . . a second plurality of log entries” is “identifying” or “ascertaining” log entries.” Prelim. Resp. 16. Patent Owner also argues that “[t]he terms “provisioning, . . . based on the determined correlation, . . . rules configured to identify the first plurality of packets received by the network device,” and “provisioning, . . . based on the determined correlation, . . . rules configured to identify the second plurality of packets transmitted by the network device” (“provisioning rules”) . . . should be given their plain and ordinary meaning—rules configured to identify packets.” Prelim. Resp. 20. Neither party, however, argues that the prior art arguments presented in the Petition turn on the construction of these terms. Instead, it appears that they are raised as claim construction issues only because Petitioner is challenging the language under Section 112. We will discuss the Section 112 arguments below, but do not see a dispute about the constructions offered by the parties above the makes a difference in the prior art analysis and, therefore, do not construe these terms at this time. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “respect to this limitation for several reasons, including that Petitioner’s “alleged rule generation and provisioning” is responsive to detecting malicious activity, not “based on the determined correlation.” Prelim. Resp. 38. On this record, we agree with Patent Owner. The claims require “generating, by the computing system and based on the determined correlation, one or more rules configured to identify packets received from the first host.” We do not have sufficient argument or evidence to show that one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to generate these rules “based on” the determined correlation.” slip op. at 16

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 10,931,797
• Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jan 24, 2022 · IPR2021-01154 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution for claims 1–27 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that either asserted Jungck-based obviousness combination rendered the claims unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “c. Summary of Claim 1 In sum, Petitioner does not explain how the edge cache devices contribute or detract from Jungck’s ability to teach or suggest the “entire boundary” and “all traffic” limitations of the challenged claims. The evidence of device 900 and claims of collateral estoppel do not remedy this deficiency. In the absence of such evidence, Petitioner has failed to “identif[y], in writing and with particularity, . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge.” See Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (“It is of the utmost importance that petitioners in the IPR proceedings adhere to the requirement that the initial petition identify ‘with particularity’ the ‘evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.’”) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b). For the reasons above, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that the combination of Jungck and Wood meets the limitation of “[a] method of filtering packets at a packet security gateway, of a plurality of packet security gateways that collectively provide an entire interface across a boundary of a network protected by the packet security gateway . . . comprising: a first set of packet filtering rules to be applied to all network traffic traversing the boundary.”” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition’s avoidance of the operation of edge caches when edge caches are important in the processing of traffic flowing across the boundary undermines this ground of the Petition. If Petitioner wished to rely on an embodiment or configuration in which the edge caches were irrelevant, the edge caches were redundant to the edge server, or the edge caches were unnecessary, it was incumbent upon Petitioner to explain sufficiently how and why that was the case. Petitioner was aware of the edge caches because it appears to have omitted all references to them in the Petition yet did not explain why this was done. Additionally, although Petitioner’s declarant does include references to edge caches, its declarant also does not explain sufficiently the relevance of those edge caches. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 148, 212, 214, 215, 227, 323. Additionally, Petitioner’s references to collateral estoppel do not relieve Petitioner from the burden to describe its contentions regarding obviousness in the Petition.” slip op. at 15

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel does not applyDecided for patent owner

    “Our reviewing court has held that “[c]ollateral estoppel protects a party from having to litigate issues that have been fully and fairly tried in a previous action and adversely resolved against a party-opponent.” Nestle USA, Inc. v. Steuben Foods, Inc., 884 F.3d 1350, 1351–1352 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps S., LLC, 735 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). “It is well established that collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, applies in the administrative context.” MaxLinear, Inc. v. CF CRESPE LLC, 880 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citations omitted); Webpower, Inc. v. WAG ACQUISITION, LLC, Case IPR2016- 01239, Paper 21 at 26–28 (PTAB Dec. 26, 2017). “Issue preclusion [i.e., collateral estoppel] is appropriate only if: (1) the issue is identical to one decided in the first action; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the first action; (3) resolution of the issue was essential to a final judgment in the first action; and (4) plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action.” In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also MaxLinear, Inc., 880 F.3d at 1377 (citing Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 91 S. Ct. 1501, 28 L.Ed. 2d 788 (1971) (finding collateral estoppel applies to a patentee who had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the validity of a patent in a prior federal case.)). Patent Owner points out that the claims at issue in IPR2018-01443, 1444, 1513 (“prior IPRs”) did not include the “entire boundary” or “all traffic” limitations. Prelim. Resp. 26–27, 32, 44. We agree. Collateral estoppel does not apply because there are differences between the claim limitation at issue here and the adjudicated claim limitations at issue in the prior IPRs. See In re Freeman, 30 F.3d at 1465; accord MaxLinear, Inc., 880 F.3d at 1377–1378; cf. In re Arunachalam, 709 F. App’x 699, 702 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (finding collateral estoppel applies to an adjudicated claim that is not “materially different” than the adjudicated claims).” slip op. at 19

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner requests that the preamble of independent claims 1, 8, and 15 be treated as limiting. Prelim. Resp. 16–17. These preambles provide antecedent basis for “packet security gateway,” “boundary,” “network,” and “one or more other networks.” Id. at 16 (citing Ex. 1001, 20:64–21:2, 22:13–18, 23:35–42). The preambles also recite the “plurality of packet security gateways that collectively provide an entire interface across a boundary of a [protected] network,” which is “essential to understand” the “all traffic” limitation in the body of these claims and thus ‘“give life, meaning, and vitality”’ to the claims. Id. (citing Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). The preambles provide the context for the body of the independent claims by defining the arrangement of the “plurality of packet security gateways” relative to the “boundary” of the protected network and thus the basis for applying “packet filtering rules . . . to all network traffic traversing the boundary.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 20:64–21:8). The “entire interface” limitation also was relied on during prosecution of the parent ’437 Patent’s claims to distinguish them from the prior art. Id. at 16–17 (citing Ex. 2008, 254–61; Catalina, 289 F.3d at 808–09). Petitioner does not dispute the preambles are limiting. Pet. 18–21, 37. For, the reasons above, we construe the preambles of independent claims 1, 8, and 15 as limiting. After review of the current record, we conclude that, other than determining the preambles are limiting, no express claim construction is necessary to determine whether to institute review of the challenged claims. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 7

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,785,266
• Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Correct Transmission, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Nov 19, 2021 · IPR2021-00984 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that the asserted obviousness grounds taught or suggested the claimed responsive fragmentation.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Applying those standards, and upon consideration of the information presented in the Petition, Preliminary Response, and Reply, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one Challenged Claim of the ’669 patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the ’669 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a closely related field, and one to two years of experience in the design and development of network communication systems. Alternatively, a POSITA would have a master’s degree or similar post-graduate work in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a closely related field, and fewer years of design and development experience. Pet. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 59–63). “Patent Owner takes no position with respect to Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” Prelim. Resp. 37. We regard Petitioner’s proposed definition as reasonable, and consistent with the prior art before us. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 3 At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner has not presented objective evidence of non-obviousness. 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (determining that the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences did not err in concluding that the level of ordinary skill in the art was best determined by the references of record). Accordingly, we apply the level of skill set forth above, which also is consistent with the testimony of Dr. Yang. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 59–63.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner proposes any claim terms for construction. Pet. 6 (“Petitioner construes each term as having its ordinary and customary meaning.”); Prelim. Resp. 11 (“Patent Owner does not propose any claim term departs from its ordinary and customary meaning.”). We do not find that the express construction of any term is necessary for this decision. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “While not showing a teaching away, the above statement in Sourani contrasting stop points and fragmentation does show that one of ordinary skill in the art reading Sourani would know that the stop points in Sourani are not intended to be fragments. Petitioner has not explained sufficiently why, despite this contrast, one of ordinary skill would use fragmentation with the system of Sourani.” slip op. at 14

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,876,669
• Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Correct Transmission, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Oct 22, 2021 · IPR2021-00814 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on claims 1–3, 6, 7, 9–15, 18–24, 26, 27, and 30–32 because neither obviousness ground showed a reasonable likelihood of success.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Applying those standards, and upon consideration of the information presented in the Petition, Preliminary Response, and supplemental briefing, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to any of challenged claims 1–3, 6, 7, 9–15, 18–24, 26, 27, and 30–32 of the ’928 patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Accordingly, constrained by the record before us, we deny institution of an inter partes review of the ’928 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a closely related field, and one to two years of experience in the design and development of network communication systems. Alternatively, a POSITA would have a Master’s degree or similar post-graduate work in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a closely related field, and less years of design and development experience. Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 67–71). Patent Owner does not present an alternative definition at this stage of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 30. We regard Petitioner’s proposed definition as reasonable, and” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction Petitioner does not propose any claim terms for construction. Pet. 7 (“For purposes of this proceeding, Petitioner construes each of the ’928 claim terms as having its ordinary and custom[ary] meaning.”). Although, Petitioner does submit that, “[f]or purposes of this IPR only, Petitioner relies on the claim scope positions Patent Owner has advanced in district court for ‘port definer module.’” Pet. 8. Similarly, Patent Owner argues each claim term should have its ordinary and customary meaning, except that, as in the parallel district court proceeding, the function of alleged means-plus-function term “port definer module” should be construed to be “designating any one physical link of the logical link and examining the designated link of the logical link.” Prelim. Resp. 11–12. We note that, in the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not appear to identify any structure in the Specification for performing that function. See generally Prelim. Resp. Regardless, we do not find that the express construction of any term is necessary for this decision. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner has not explained sufficiently, let alone with particularity, why the skilled artisan, but for hindsight, would have (1) taken Y.1731, which says nothing concerning aggregated physical links with a single logical link to which packets are directed; (2) then turned to the architectural basis for Y.1731, namely “Ethernet specification G.8010/Y.1306”; (3) then turned to standards “IEEE 802.1D, 802.1Q, and 802.3,” which are “account[ed] for” by G.8010/Y.1306, and specifically selected to pursue 802.3 from among those; (4) then, without any reference or indication in Y.1731 itself, turned specifically to standard IEEE 802.3ad within the set of 802.3 standards, and specifically to its disclosure of aggregated physical links with a single logical link; and then (5) upon making all of these connections, understood Y.1731 itself to disclose or teach aggregated physical links with a single logical link, particularly in the context of the Challenged Claims as a whole. See InTouch Techs., Inc. v. VGO Commc’ns, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“It appears that [the expert] relied on the [] patent itself as her roadmap for putting what she referred to as pieces of a ‘jigsaw puzzle’ together.”); Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing W.L. Gore & Assoc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983)) (“To draw on hindsight knowledge of the patented invention, when the prior art does not contain or suggest that knowledge, is to use the invention as a template for its own reconstruction—an illogical and inappropriate process by which to determine patentability.”). Although “[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton” (KSR, 550 U.S. at 421), the Federal Circuit has observed that “‘the prejudice of hindsight bias’ often overlooks that the ‘genius of invention is often a combination of known elements which in hindsight seems preordained.’” Polaris Industries, Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2018).” slip op. at 17

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,768,928
• NVIDIA Corporation v. Invensas CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 1, 2021 · IPR2020-01729 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–8 are unpatentable under §103 over the listed combinations of Jaso, Stine1998, Pramanik1997, and Robinson.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner responds that, because Jaso discloses a damascene process with trenches, Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction is “unnecessary.” Reply 32. We agree that the damascene process of Jaso is the same damascene process to which Patent Owner seeks to limit this claim term. Patent Owner does not argue otherwise in its Sur-reply. See Sur-reply. Thus, we decline to construe the term “etching . . . trenches into a dielectric layer.”” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’231 patent “would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in physics, chemistry, materials science, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, or related discipline, in addition to 3–5 years of experience in the fabrication of integrated circuit devices. Additional years of experience could substitute for formal education, and vice versa.” Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 35). Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s description of the qualifications of a POSA for the purposes of this IPR.” PO Resp. 9. We regard Petitioner’s formulation of the level of skill as consistent with the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 Therefore, for purposes of this Final Written Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill in the art because it is consistent with the ’231 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below.” slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Overall, we have considered all of Patent Owner’s arguments but do not find that they undermine the overall credibility of Dr. Boning. However, we will consider any question regarding his credibility on any specific issue raised by Patent Owner in the obviousness analysis below, where appropriate.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Petitioner argues it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine Jaso and Stine1998 “to etch a plurality of dummy trenches in a dielectric layer between a first (wider) trench and a series of second (narrower) trenches.” Id. at 66 (citation omitted). Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary still in the art “would be motivated to combine the teachings in Jaso and Stine1998, as both references are directed to the addition of dummy conductors to equalize pattern density to improve CMP planarity.” Id. at 38–39 (citing Ex. 1004, code (57), 3:29–64; Ex. 1005, 668). In particular, Petitioner states that “Stine1998 enhances and improves upon the disclosure in Jaso by providing general teachings and specific methods that are widely applicable to dummy metal-fill techniques for addressing added capacitance.” Id. at 39 (citing Ex. 1005, 670–672). Petitioner points out that “Stine1998 expressly motivates a [person of ordinary skill in the art] to apply its teachings to a damascene process requiring dummy-fill to enhance planarity” because Stine1998 states its methodology can be extended to “inlaid metal techniques such as copper (emphasis omitted). Analysis of Patent Owner’s Arguments 1) Prior Art Does not “Look for” a Specific Configuration Patent Owner argues “Stine1998 does not tell the POSA to look for a specific configuration of structures, and then insert dummy metal into a particular location within that configuration (as the Relevant Solution does.)” PO Resp. 36–37. Patent Owner also argues that Jaso and Stine1998 “together accordingly tell the POSA to focus on pattern density, and to take steps to ensure that variations in pattern density across the chip are minimized” as opposed to looking for the particular configuration called out by the claims. Id. at 58. There is no requirement in the claims for the prior art to “look for” specific structures, but rather it must disclose those structure required by the claims. For the reasons articulated in the Petition, we agree that the combined teachings of Jaso and Stine1998 teach the structure required by claim 1. Pet. 38–39 (citing Ex. 1004, code (57), 3:29–64; Ex. 1005, 668), 50–52 (citing Ex. 1005, 670). We also credit Dr. Boning’s testimony that these references’ teachings “to locate dummies in sparse regions proximate to wide and narrow lines...would obviously include placing dummies in regions between such lines.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 183 (emphasis added). The fact that Jaso and Stine1998 may not purposefully seek out the configuration relied on by Patent Owner does not undermine Petitioner’s showing that the proper configuration would result from an obvious combination of the references. Thus, we are not persuaded by these arguments.” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 6,232,231 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,232,231
• Trustid, Inc. v. Next Caller, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 24, 2019 · IPR2018-01066 · APJ Jean R Homere · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103(a) over Bushnell, Bala, and Pickering.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (internal quotation and citation omitted). In that regard, Petitioner’s Declarant, Leonard J. Forys, Ph.D., testifies that a person with ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had a B.S. degree in Computer Science, or Electrical Engineering, or similar engineering discipline with an emphasis in communications and at least three years of experience designing and/or developing contact center solutions, including network interconnection, computer-telephony integration, and customer and agent interfaces. Ex. 1032 ¶¶ 56–58. Further, Petitioner contends that the level of ordinary skill could have varied somewhat so as to allow industry experience and education to compensate for each other. Pet. 8. Patent Owner’s response does not address Petitioner’s proposed assessment of the level of the ordinary skill in the art. On this record, we observe that Petitioner’s undisputed assessment of a person of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in the instant proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). We adopt the Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notNot reached

    “a. Centralized Caller profile System Patent Owner argues “Centralized Caller Profile System,” recited in the preamble of independent claims 1 and 11, is limiting and refers to caller profiles in a central location accessible and revisable by multiple parties. PO Resp. 8–9. According to Patent Owner, unlike caller profiles traditionally stored at a single location, the caller profiles are stored at a centralized database accessible and updatable by the user and authorized third parties (e.g., user’s agent, service provider). Id. at 9–10 (citing Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 40–44). Accordingly, Patent Owner submits that, as acknowledged by Petitioner, “Centralized Caller Profile System” encompasses not only caller profiles located at a single location, but also that which is accessible and revisable by multiple parties. Id. at 10–11 (citing Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 38, 44–54, Ex. 2004, 17:2– 18:7, 18:9–13, 21:7–14). Patent Owner therefore argues that Petitioner’s contention that the preamble is not limiting for lack of antecedent basis, and relates merely to a location (e.g. centralized or on the cloud) is not persuasive because it overlooks the ’612 patent’s description that the “Centralized Caller Profile System” permits multiple parties to access the database. Id. at 11–12, Sur-Reply 2–4. In response, Petitioner reasserts that the preamble is not limiting because it does not provide antecedent basis for and does not breathe meaning into the claims. Pet. Reply 3, Pet. 25. According to Petitioner, because the proposed construction of the preamble is already recited in the claim, namely “the Cloud Database is maintained [(meaning ‘accessible and revisable’)]” by each of a service provider, user, and third party, the reading of the preamble into the claim is duplicative and thereby non-limiting. Pet. Reply 3. We agree with Petitioner insofar as it is undisputed by the parties that the claim, as a whole, requires the Centralized Caller Profile System that comprises the Cloud Database including contents, which are maintained (i.e., accessible and revisable) by each of a user, a service provider, and a third party. Consequently, it is immaterial whether the preamble, which recites similar limitation, is limiting or not.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that, consistent with the cited disclosure of the ’612 patent, a POSITA would have understood that maintaining the “Cloud Database” relates to updating the “Content” thereof. PO Resp. 12– 13. As correctly noted by Patent Owner, the disclosure of the ’612 patent discusses in great detail updating the “Content” of the Cloud Database in connection with maintaining the Database, whereas Petitioner has not provided any references in the ’612 patent to support that maintaining the “Cloud Database” pertains also to updating the software and hardware thereof. Id., Sur-Reply 5–6. Accordingly, we construe “the Cloud Database is maintained” as being limited to updating or revising the “Content” of the caller information (e.g., profile or billing info) in the “Cloud Database”.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “5. Obviousness Analysis Petitioner provides explanations to account for all of the claim limitations required by claims 1–20, and reasons combining the teachings of Bushnell, Pickering, and Bala, citing Dr. Forys’s Declaration for support. Pet. 25–74, Ex. 1032. We begin our analysis with claim 1. We have reviewed the Petition, Patent Owner Response, Petitioner’s Reply, and Patent Owner’s Sur-Reply as well as the relevant evidence discussed in those papers and other record papers. We are persuaded that the record before us establishes Petitioner’s contentions for claims 1–20 by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 9,143,612 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,143,612
• Power Integrations, Inc. v. Semiconductor Components Industries, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 23, 2019 · IPR2018-00180 · APJ Kamran Jivani · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 4–7, 9–16, and 18 are unpatentable over Hwang or Hwang and Balakrishnan; claim 17 was not shown unpatentable over Hwang.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Although the parties formulate slightly differently their respective assessments of the skill level, neither party disputes directly the other’s assessment nor makes any arguments related to the assessments. See generally Pet.; PO Resp. The ’221 patent states its disclosure “relates, in general, to integrated circuits and, more particularly, to power converter integrated circuits.” Ex. 1001, 1:9–11. In view of the foregoing, we adopt Patent Owner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Further, this level of ordinary skill is reflected by the prior art of record. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “construction must begin with the words of the claims themselves.”); In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)) (“As with any claim construction analysis, we begin with the claim language.”). None of the challenged claims (nor even unchallenged claim 8) recites the claimed disabling or terminating occurs in response to the detect signal independent of other circuit conditions or in response only to the detect signal. See Ex. 1001, 12:5–14:36. For instance, independent claim 4 merely recites, “wherein the control circuit disables the switched drive control signal in response to the detect signal.” Id. at 12:49–51. Independent claim 7 similarly recites, “wherein the gating circuit disables the drive control signal in response to the detect signal.” Id. at 13:11–13. Independent claim 9 discloses only, “a first comparator . . . having an output for disabling the pulse generator.” Id. at 13:27–30. Finally, independent claim 15 requires, “comparing the error signal to a reference signal . . . to terminate the step of generating in response to the error signal.” Id. at 14:21–23. Therefore, the plain language of the challenged claims does not, standing alone, support adoption of Patent Owner’s proposed construction.” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “testimony from their respective declarants on whether one of ordinary skill in the art would understand “in response to” as requiring “independent of other circuit conditions.” Compare Reply 2–3 (citing Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 18–21, 26–30; Ex. 2003, 43:16–45:1) with PO Resp. 14–15, 17 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 42, 44–45.) and Sur-Reply 11–12 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 45). Patent Owner further directs our attention to a single sentence of deposition testimony in which Petitioner’s declarant Dr. Szepesi appears to agree with Patent Owner’s construction by stating, in the context of claim 9, that “the output signal of this first comparator disables the output pulses driving the gate of that independent of anything else.” PO Resp. 8 (citing Ex. 2003, 44:16– 45:1). Petitioner rebuts Patent Owner’s arguments by identifying additional deposition testimony and statements made in a second declaration offered by Dr. Szepesi opposing Patent Owner’s construction. Reply 2–3 (citing Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 18–21, 26–30; Ex. 2003, 43:16–45:1). For instance, immediately before the statement Patent Owner cites, Dr. Szepesi testified: Q: “So is it your opinion that an output for disabling the pulse generator must disable the pulse generator regardless of the other conditions in the circuit?” . . . A: “I don't understand your question. I said disabling the pulse generator means that the output of the pulse generator which is providing the pulses to the gate of the main switch, those pulses are disabled. That’s what it means in my opinion in this context.” Ex. 2003, 43:24–44:9. And, in his supplemental declaration, Dr. Szepesi states: As a first matter, I opined during my deposition that “an output disabling a pulse generator” means that “the output signal of this first comparator disables the output pulses driving the gate of that independent of anything else.” But, at the time of my deposition I had not done a focused claim construction analysis of the limitation “a first comparator […] having an output for disabling the pulse generator.” This is because I hadn’t anticipated there being a dispute relevant to the validity analysis in view of what I understood as the plain meaning of the language. Despite the quote that Patent Owner relied upon, I believe now that a POSITA would not understand the claim language to require the first comparator to disable the output pulses independent of anything else. This belief is consistent with my responses to the first two of three successive questions in which I was asked about “disabling the pulse generator.” It is my opinion that the operation of the disclosed embodiment requires the presence of other conditions precedent before the first comparator can disable the drive pulses and this requirement is not excluded by the claim language. Ex. 1016 ¶ 18 (emphasis added). Our reviewing court has made clear that extrinsic evidence “is generally of less significance than the intrinsic record” in matters of claim construction. Wi-LAN, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 811 F.3d 455, 462 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Here, beyond competing declarant testimony, neither party has entered into the record extrinsic evidence, such as dictionary definitions or contemporaneous usage in the art, addressing the scope of “in response to.” Having considered the testimony upon which Patent Owner relies and weighing it against the claim language itself, the Specification’s disclosures set forth above, and the contrary testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, we find on balance that it does not warrant departing from the plain and ordinary meaning of “in response to” as Patent Owner urges. See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that an inventor may define specific terms used to describe invention, but must do so “with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision”) (quoting Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387-88 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).” slip op. at 17

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Claim 4 further recites, “a control circuit having an input coupled for receiving the detect signal, wherein the control circuit disables the switched drive control signal in response to the detect signal.” Patent Owner’s sole contention with respect to claim 4 is that “[t]he alleged detect signal in Hwang does not satisfy this limitation” because “unlike the ’221 patent, the alleged ‘control circuit’ does not disable the switched drive control signal ‘in response to the detect signal’ independent of other circuit conditions.” PO Resp. 15–16. As discussed above, we decline to import into claim 4 a requirement that the claimed disabling must occur independent of other circuit conditions. See supra Section III.C.1. Because Patent Owner’s argument relies on a claim construction that we rejected above, we are not persuaded that Hwang fails to meet the limitations of claim 4. Rather, having reviewed the evidence cited by Petitioner, we agree with Petitioner that Hwang discloses the limitations of independent claim 4, arranged as recited in the claim. Petitioner’s analysis, as supported by the Szepesi Declaration, further demonstrates where Petitioner contends each element of dependent claims 5 and 6 is disclosed in Hwang. Pet. 21–24. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s analysis beyond the argument raised with respect to claim 4. See PO Resp. 17. Having reviewed the evidence cited by Petitioner, we agree with Petitioner that Hwang discloses the limitations of dependent claims 5 and 6, arranged as recited in these claims, and we adopt that analysis as our own. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we find Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Hwang anticipates claims 4–6.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 6,597,221 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,597,221
• Intel Corporation / Qualcomm Incorporated et al. v. DSS Technology Management, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 1, 2017 · IPR2016-00288 · APJ Minn Chung · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 8–12 are unpatentable because Heath anticipates each challenged claim under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenUnpatentable

    “art reference expressly or inherently describes each and every limitation set forth in the claim. See Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Further, a reference cannot anticipate “unless [it] discloses within the four corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed[,] but also all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although the elements must be arranged in the same way as in the claim, “the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). We analyze this asserted ground based on anticipation with the principles identified above in mind.” slip op. at 12

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “preliminarily interpreted the “angle limitation” set forth above—i.e., the limitation reciting “a side of the electrically insulative spacer has an angle relative to the substrate surface that is either a right angle or an acute angle of more than 85°”8—to mean “a side of the electrically insulative spacer has an angle relative to the substrate surface that is greater than 85° and less than or equal to 90°.” Dec. on Inst. 8–14. Importantly, we were unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that the angle of a side of the insulating spacer must be obtained “through the use of a low selectivity etch” (Prelim. Resp. 15–19) and determined that the challenged claims do not require the use of a low selectivity etch. Dec. on Inst. 8–12.” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “art reference expressly or inherently describes each and every limitation set forth in the claim. See Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Further, a reference cannot anticipate “unless [it] discloses within the four corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed[,] but also all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although the elements must be arranged in the same way as in the claim, “the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). We analyze this asserted ground based on anticipation with the principles identified above in mind.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “art reference expressly or inherently describes each and every limitation set forth in the claim. See Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Further, a reference cannot anticipate “unless [it] discloses within the four corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed[,] but also all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although the elements must be arranged in the same way as in the claim, “the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). We analyze this asserted ground based on anticipation with the principles identified above in mind.” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 6,784,552 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 6,784,552
• Arista Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 25, 2017 · IPR2016-00303 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 7–10, 12–16, 18–22, 25, and 28–31 are unpatentable as obvious over Huey and ATM UNI; claim 2 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed

    “PO Mot. 13–14. A motion to exclude is the wrong vehicle to challenge public availability, which is a substantive issue that goes to the sufficiency of the evidence, not to admissibility at issue here. FLIR Sys., Inc. v. Leak Surveys, Inc., IPR2014-00411, slip. op., Paper 113 at 4 (PTAB September 3, 2015) (“A motion to exclude is not a vehicle for addressing the weight to be given evidence.”); see also 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,767 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“A motion to exclude . . . may not be used to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to prove a particular fact.”). For the reasons above, we do not exclude Exhibit 1028.” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “35 U.S.C. § 102(b).” In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898–99 (Fed. Cir. 1986). To qualify as a prior art printed publication, the reference must have been disseminated or otherwise made accessible to persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter to which the document relates prior to the critical date. Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008).” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “References within the statutory terms of 35 U.S.C. § 102 qualify as prior art for an obviousness determination only when analogous to the claimed invention.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding both hair brush art and toothbrush art to be analogous to a claim to a hair brush) (citing In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). “Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor's endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” Id. (citations omitted). The scope of the field of endeavor is a factual determination based on the scope of the application's written description and claims. Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1326. slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “There are two problems with Petitioner’s assertion. First, Petitioner has not shown a reason to combine Kogge with Huey and the ATM UNI Specification. Second, to the extent this reference is used to show the scope and content of the art at the time of the invention, Kogge makes it clear that parallelism and pipelining are different concepts that are “generally discernably different in their general approach.” Ex. 1033, 1. Petitioner has not explained how Kogge shows that putting packets through the pipeline without waiting for the previous packet to finish would be considered operating in parallel given that this reference distinguishes parallel operation from pipeline operation. Petitioner argued at the oral hearing that Patent Owner was advocating “a particular flavor of parallelism, as opposed to what’s understood by normal parallel pipelining.” Tr. 41:6–14. However, neither Petitioner nor its declarant has explained what “normal parallel pipelining” is or what the basis is for us to define “normal parallel pipelining.” Thus, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that one of ordinary skill in the art would modify Huey to meet the limitation of performing at least two of said steps “in parallel using a pipeline.”” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 6,377,577 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 6,377,577

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.