- Ironsource Ltd. v. Digital Turbine Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 12, 2024 · PGR2022-00053 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–22 are unpatentable under collateral estoppel; revised substitute claims 23–37 are allowed because Petitioner did not prove them unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableDecided for petitioner
“The party seeking to invoke collateral estoppel must show: (1) the issue is identical to one decided in the first action; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the first action; (3) resolution of the issue was essential to a final judgment in the first action; and (4) [the party against who collateral estoppel is being asserted] had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action. Google, 54 F.4th at 1381 (quoting In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). Collateral estoppel may also operate to bar re-litigation of common issues in actions involving different but related patents. Mycogen Plant Science, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 252 F.3d 1306, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Amgen, Inc. v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 98 F.3d 1328, 1329–32 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). We are persuaded that each of the four Google requirements is satisfied and, accordingly, agree with Petitioner that the challenged claims of the ’256 patent are unpatentable in light of our Final Written Decision in PGR2021-00096.” slip op. at 13
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 not directed to exceptionNot shown unpatentable
“specific requirements of the claims.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). But “failing to account for the specific requirements of the claims” is what Petitioner’s analysis of the claim limitations appears to do. Petitioner’s argument that “the focus of the claims” is captured by a single claim element (f3) not only ignores that that limitation recites performing two specific software tasks simultaneously—which we are not persuaded is an abstract idea—but also asks us to disregard multiple technical aspects recited in the claims, such as identifying a link, determining whether an installation client is available on the device, invoking the installation client, and redirecting to the device an app store. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 21:12–41; Revised MTA 24–25. That is, under Step 2A of the Guidance, we are neither persuaded that limitation f3, which Petitioner points us to, recites an abstract idea (Prong 1), nor that the other limitations recited in the independent claims fail to integrate the alleged abstract idea into a practical application (Prong 2). Petitioner characterizes the claims as directed to multitasking, which Petitioner describes as an example applied to improve a user experience, i.e., as related to organizing human activity. Pet. 29. Although the Guidance recognizes certain methods of organizing human activity, including certain activity between a person and a computer, as constituting a patent-ineligible abstract idea, we are not persuaded that the claims here fall within the scope of such activity. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (listing fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or legal interactions, and managing personal behavior or relationships as organizing human activity). The claimed invention may result in multitasking on the device, but the background instead of directing the user to an app store, thereby maintaining user experience with the foreground application, and do not recite an abstract idea. And although that process does result in improving user experience, the claims recite more than that mere result; they recite specific steps—invoking, without exiting the foreground software application, the installation client for downloading and installing applications on the device to run in the background—that accomplish the desired result. See Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305–06 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding a method that employs a new kind of file in a computer security system directed to a non-abstract improvement in computer functionality, rather than the abstract idea of computer security writ large). Petitioner thus fails to establish sufficiently that the claims are directed patent ineligible subject matter under Step 2A of the Guidance.” slip op. at 52
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“When the application package 172 has been received by the client system 130, the App Manager 180 may extract or retrieve a set of requested permissions 174 from the application package 172, and present a request to the user for asking for approval to perform operations corresponding to the requested permissions, e.g., opening files, accessing contact information, accessing a camera on the client device 130, and so on. . . . In particular embodiments, when the requested permissions 174 have been requested, and a response specifying a set of accepted permissions 176 has been received from the user, the set of accepted permissions 176 may be compared to the set of requested permissions 174. If the sets are the same, then the installation process may continue, and the App Manager 180 may invoke an installer 182 to install the application package 172. Ex. 1003, 8:67–9:22 (emphasis added). That is, the set of permissions to be checked are obtained by the App Manager once the download of the application package to be installed is initiated. See id. at 8:59–61 (“when the download is initiated by a request sent from the client system 130 to the server 162, the server 162 may send the requested object, e.g., the download page 168 or the application package 172, back to the client system 130”). And these permissions relate to operations that the installed applications may perform, e.g., opening files, accessing contact information, accessing a camera on the client device. Id. at 9:6–7. These permissions may also indirectly determine whether the installation client can install that app. See id. at 9:33–38. There is no suggestion in Pasha, however, that these permissions have anything to do with the host application, i.e., the second software application. said second software application is eligible to use capabilities of the installation client.” RMTA 25; see also Ex. 1001, 15:11–14 (“The installation client, upon receiving an instant install link, checks the eligibility of the caller and if identified as eligible continues the process of downloading the app.”). Pasha does not teach or suggest checking eligibility of its host application in any way or at any point. Moreover, as Patent Owner points out, Pasha’s App Manager performs the eligibility check after it downloads the app package, further supporting that Pasha’s eligibility check has nothing to do with the host application.9 Dr. Almeroth testifies that “Pasha discloses the App Manager 180 confirming that it has obtained the required permissions, which, in [his] opinion, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would understand may include inter alia that the ‘second software application’ (e.g., the host application invoking the app manager) is eligible to use its capabilities.” Ex. 1035 ¶ 68. Dr. Almeroth fails to cite any supporting evidence or provide any technical reasoning to support his statement. Id. Because we find no basis in the record for Dr. Almeroth’s conclusion, we give little weight to this testimony.” slip op. at 40
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Dr. Almeroth testifies that “Pasha discloses the App Manager 180 confirming that it has obtained the required permissions, which, in [his] opinion, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would understand may include inter alia that the ‘second software application’ (e.g., the host application invoking the app manager) is eligible to use its capabilities.” Ex. 1035 ¶ 68. Dr. Almeroth fails to cite any supporting evidence or provide any technical reasoning to support his statement. Id. Because we find no basis in the record for Dr. Almeroth’s conclusion, we give little weight to this testimony. 9 During oral argument, Petitioner pointed us to disclosure in Pasha that teaches that the permission dialog may be displayed to the user at different points in the download process. Tr. 47:24–48:8 (citing Ex. 1003, 22:21–42). As Patent Owner pointed out, this disclosure was not relied up on by Petitioner in its papers and is new evidence. Id. at 51:19–22; Paper 46, 4. Petitioner’s argument based on this new evidence is therefore forfeited. But even if we were to consider the cited disclosure from Pasha, it still only suggests that permissions need to come from the server after the download process has been initiated, and are therefore, unrelated to the host application. See Ex. 1003, 22:46–49 (“the requested permissions may be downloaded prior to downloading the application or may be extracted from the application package”). 24, 2022) (precedential) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”) (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a)). As the Board explained in Xerox, such expert testimony “is particularly problematic in cases where, like here, expert testimony is offered not simply to provide a motivation to combine prior-art teachings, but rather to supply a limitation missing from the prior art.” Id. (citing Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple, Inc., 832 F.3d 1355, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).” slip op. at 41
Patent outcomesUS 11,157,256 unpatentableClaim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Berkheimer · Enfish · PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,157,256 - PTAB · Oct 18, 2023 · IPR2023-00778 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 7, 9, 15, and 16 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have possessed at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, physics, optics or a related field, and approximately three years of experience in the fields of visual displays, circuit design, and related technologies.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 23–25). Petitioner states that the Board adopted this formulation in IPR2020-01289, Paper 9, 8–9 (PTAB Mar. 9, 2021). Id. Petitioner also asserts that “[o]ther formulations are also possible but, even if adopted, they would not materially change the analysis or the outcome.” Id. At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner “applies Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill without agreeing to it.” Prelim. Resp. 1. We find Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record, and, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“At this stage of the proceeding, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to determine whether to institute inter partes review. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). After reviewing the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that we do not need to expressly construe any term for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“On the current record, we find that, for purposes of institution, Petitioner has sufficiently shown that the combination of Gettemy, Kerman, Rosenzweig, Whitted, and Bell teach this limitation and has provided sufficient rationale to combine the references. First, we credit Dr. Baker’s testimony that “notwithstanding that the system in Gettemy will not permit the user to set the slider below the lower end of the displayed range . . . nothing in Gettemy states that the purpose of summation of the minimum value of the brightness range is to ensure that the final display brightness value used to control the brightness of the display meets a predetermined desired level of brightness.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 324. Thus, Petitioner relies on Whitted and Bell to teach this limitation. As for Patent Owner’s arguments that Whitted and Bell provide “redundant” functionality, we disagree on the current record. Petitioner explains the benefits of adding the functionality from Whitted and Bell as a backstop and to compensate for degradation of conventional displays. Pet. 71–72. Moreover, Dr. Baker provides supporting testimony and citations to additional references in support of Petitioner’s motivation to combine the references, and, accordingly, we disagree with Patent Owner that there is no evidence to support Petitioner’s 15 Patent Owner argues that the Board’s decision in IPR2018-01262 is instructive. Prelim. Resp. 69. We disagree. That decision described several deficiencies in the Petition relating to the “dark level bias” limitation (see IPR2018-01262, Paper 14, 12–16), and Patent Owner oversimplifies the Board’s findings by quoting from one paragraph in the decision. contentions. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 336 (citing Ex. 1019, 1020, 1021). In addition, Patent Owner’s arguments that Whitted and Bell do not disclose the “dark level bias” address Whitted and Bell individually, rather than on the combination as proposed by Petitioner, with Gettemy, Kerman, and Rosenzweig, and are therefore not persuasive on this record. The parties may wish to further develop the record as to the foregoing issues during trial.” slip op. at 32
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Gettemy, Kerman, and Rosenzweig teach this limitation and has provided sufficient rationale to combine the references. Petitioner’s arguments that sliders were “commonly used” is supported by the disclosure in both Kerman and Rosenzweig. Ex. 1014, 39 (Kerman describing that a slider is “a popular user interface”); Ex. 1015, 44 (Rosenzweig describing a slider as “a familiar user interface element used in all major software programs”). Petitioner relies on Kerman and Rosenzweig to explicitly explain how Gettemy’s conventional slider is implemented. Pet. 57. Patent Owner’s arguments largely address the references individually, rather than on the combination as proposed by Petitioner, where Kerman and Rosenzweig are relied upon for the underlying technical functionality of Gettemy’s slider. See Soft Gel Techs., Inc. v. Jarrow Formulas, Inc., 864 F.3d 1334, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2017); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). We find persuasive Dr. Baker’s testimony that “[a]n ordinarily skilled artisan, seeking to implement the brightness control system of Gettemy, would thus have been motivated to rely on the teachings of Kerman and Rosenzweig to better understand how to implement the slider controls in Gettemy, including the precise formula that produces the exact display brightness values exhibited in Gettemy.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 319. Further, we disagree with Patent Owner that Petitioner and Dr. Baker have made up an equation. The equations relied upon by Petitioner are directly from the Kerman and Rosenzweig references. See Pet. 57, 58, 62–64. Based on our review and consideration of the current record, we determine that, for purposes of institution, Petitioner has sufficiently shown that the combination of Gettemy, Kerman, and Rosenzweig teaches limitation 1(c) and has provided reasons sufficiently supported by factual underpinnings to combine the reference teachings with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 28
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,223,117 - Snap Inc. v. You Map Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 31, 2023 · IPR2022-00568 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Feldman and Jackson, or Feldman, Jackson, and Rush; the contingent motion to amend is granted.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field, plus two years’ work or research experience with location-based content delivery and/or visualization.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19– experience and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp.; Sur-reply. Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Shamos, testifies that he “generally agree[s]” with Petitioner’s proposed articulation, and provides substantially the same expression of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Shamos Decl. ¶¶ 30–31. In this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s proposed definition.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Although Patent Owner appears to argue that applying the preference factors to a general score does not encompass weighting the general score’s components (see, e.g., id. at 10–12; Sur-reply 13–16), this is not reflected in Patent Owner’s proposed construction (PO Resp. 12). Patent Owner’s construction provides no limitation on how the preference factors are applied to a general score. See id. To the extent Patent Owner argues that the phrase “applied to,” as recited in the claim, excludes such component-based weighting, we disagree. Rather, the record better aligns with Petitioner’s argument that “applied to” involves a linear combination of values, which could be the values of the general score’s components. See Pet. 30–31. Petitioner’s position is supported by the plain language of the claim, the ’727 patent’s discussion of weighted aggregation, and Mr. William’s testimony—all of which indicate that weighting the component scores is encompassed by claim 1. As for the plain language, the claim does not define how the factors are “applied to” the general score. Rather, the claim only recites that they are. In the context of the claim, the preference factors are applied to the general score. Patent Owner does not dispute this. PO Resp. 12. Claim 1 further recites that the customized score is based on the application of the preference factors to the general score. Ex. 1001, 23:14–27. We note that the generate the combined ranking, which is then used for the recited selection. Beyond that, the claim does not specify how the two rankings are used or how the combined ranking must be generated. Thus, under the claim’s plain language, the customized score can be used to rank the posts and is based on the general score. Id.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“adequately supported. We find that Mr. William’s declaration is adequately supported. This is not case where an expert “does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Rather, Mr. Williams adequately supports his testimony about the second preference factor with reasoning based on Jackson’s teachings about how the social-network distance is used to weight the global score. See, e.g., Williams Decl. ¶ 133 (citing Ex. 1006, Fig. 4A, 16:23–25, 58–60). weighting criteria can be used together. Id. ¶¶ 147–149 (citing Ex. 1006, 3:57–44:22, 5:53–58, 9:54–67, 13:17–22, 17:47–67). Mr. Williams’s analysis relies on Jackson’s discussion of using multiple factors to score a post. Ex. 1006, 17:47–55, cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 147; see also Pet. 42–43; Reply 9. Mr. Williams also cites Jackson’s discussion of how social-network distance and geographic distance can be used together. Williams Decl. ¶ 147 (citing Ex. 1006, 3:57–4:22). We agree with Petitioner that Jackson adequately supports this part of Mr. Williams’s analysis. Reply 7–9. Specifically, Jackson discloses that a determination may use social-network distance to “modify the criteria” that it uses to provide posts to users. Ex. 1006, 3:66–4:1, cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 147. Jackson further explains how geographic distance can be used in addition to other criteria: “Transmitting the post to the second computing device may be dependent upon determining that the criteria is met and determining that the posting location is within the threshold distance.” Id. at 4:19–22 (emphasis added), cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 147. This is consistent with Jackson’s teaching that a post may be recommended based on several factors and for several reasons. Id. at 17:47–67, cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 147. Also, Jackson explains how the global score, which Petitioner mapped to the recited “general score,” is used to generate a post’s score: “[A] particular post’s global score . . . is multiplied by, divided by, or summed with a distance between” a user and the post’s author. Id. at 9:54–67, cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 148. Jackson weights a post’s global score against a position of the posts author in a social graph. Id. at 9:25–53. Mr. Williams testifies that it is obvious and conventional to generate the modified scores embodiment. Williams Decl. ¶ 144. This is supported by Jackson. In another example cited by Petitioner, Jackson multiplies a post’s global score by a geographic distance to generate a personal score. Id. at 21:60–22:5, cited in Pet. 37, 39, 43. Thus, Petitioner has shown Jackson teaches or suggests applying two different sets of preference factors to a post’s global score. Pet. 41 (citing Williams Decl. ¶ 144). We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that neither Petitioner nor” slip op. at 31
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“We agree with Petitioner that Jackson adequately supports this part of Mr. Williams’s analysis. Reply 7–9. Specifically, Jackson discloses that a determination may use social-network distance to “modify the criteria” that it uses to provide posts to users. Ex. 1006, 3:66–4:1, cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 147. Jackson further explains how geographic distance can be used in addition to other criteria: “Transmitting the post to the second computing device may be dependent upon determining that the criteria is met and determining that the posting location is within the threshold distance.” Id. at 4:19–22 (emphasis added), cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 147. This is consistent with Jackson’s teaching that a post may be recommended based on several factors and for several reasons. Id. at 17:47–67, cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 147. Also, Jackson explains how the global score, which Petitioner mapped to the recited “general score,” is used to generate a post’s score: “[A] particular post’s global score . . . is multiplied by, divided by, or summed with a distance between” a user and the post’s author. Id. at 9:54–67, cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 148. Jackson weights a post’s global score against a position of the posts author in a social graph. Id. at 9:25–53. Mr. Williams testifies that it is obvious and conventional to generate the modified scores embodiment. Williams Decl. ¶ 144. This is supported by Jackson. In another example cited by Petitioner, Jackson multiplies a post’s global score by a geographic distance to generate a personal score. Id. at 21:60–22:5, cited in Pet. 37, 39, 43. Thus, Petitioner has shown Jackson teaches or suggests applying two different sets of preference factors to a post’s global score. Pet. 41 (citing Williams Decl. ¶ 144).” slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 10,616,727 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,616,727 - Unified Patents, LLC v. Causam Enterprises, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 18, 2023 · IPR2022-00404 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13–15, and 17 are unpatentable as obvious over Ehlers and Rose, and over Chen, Benson, and Rose.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Having considered the evidence and arguments of record, in this Decision we apply the same plain and ordinary meaning we applied in the Decision to Institute, where we further clarified “revenue grade metrology to include measurement techniques and meters that measure power consumption with sufficient accuracy to be used in revenue collecting applications.” See Dec. to Inst. 8–9. To the extent the entire phrase “at least one power consuming device has an actual value based on revenue grade metrology” requires further clarification, we find this phrase to mean that the actual value of a power consuming device is determined by applying techniques and/or meters that measure power consumption with sufficient accuracy to be used in revenue collecting applications.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“We understand Petitioner’s argument to be that in circumstances where customer billing occurs, a person of ordinary skill would have had reason to use revenue grade meters, such as those disclosed by Rose. Rose recognizes the need for a revenue grade power meter that measures and records high-speed electrical events along with revenue metering functions in a meter provided to a customer used for billing. Ex. 1006, 1:66–2:9. Ehlers discloses examples in which node 1.10C includes a metering module and performs control functions and metering functions, while communicating with the programming device over a two-way communications channel. Ex. 1005 ¶ 178, Fig. 2D. Ehlers discusses an “always on” system that allows utility 1.06 “to know exactly how much load is available from each participating end use device 1.08 at a customer site 1.04.” Id. ¶ 96. The utility may aggregate the load up to a desired combined total, or may target specific loads and manage demand by getting verification of control requests as curtailment commands are initiated. Id. Utility 106 can then pass detailed load curtailment data to back-office billing programs at the utility where credits can be applied to consumer bills commensurate with their contributions. Id. In view of these disclosures in Ehlers, we agree with Petitioner that, in applications where customer billing occurs, a person of ordinary skill would have had reason to use a revenue grade meter, such as that taught by Rose, at a load control node, as taught by Ehlers, with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 18
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther
“Petitioner’s arguments as to measurement and verification are persuasive. Patent Owner contends that Ehlers includes “issuing a rebate based on the measured usage while the device was operational, and the period of time that power was cut off . . . assumes the forecasted power savings is accurate . . . and fails to show any confirmation of the power savings by ‘measurement and verification’” (PO Resp. 16–17). Patent Owner’s arguments overlook other disclosure in Ehlers. In particular, Ehlers discloses that, upon receipt of a PROGRAM generated supply request, gateway node 1.10D first takes a whole house meter reading and reports the demand and consumption status of each controlled device 1.08 to system 1.02, then controls devices 1.08 in accordance with the Curtailment ID and Device Identities in the supply request, and at the end of the curtailment re enables devices 1.08 and reports the whole house demand and consumption to system 1.02. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 136–138, 140, 142, 144. We agree with Petitioner that a person of ordinary skill would have understood that the difference between the consumption reported at the beginning of the supply request and at the end of the supply request execution is the actual measured and verified curtailment, a measurement that confirms the actual reduction in power.” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“g) Summary of Claim 1 Findings Having considered the arguments and evidence of record, we conclude that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that a person of ordinary skill would have had reason to combine the teachings of Ehlers and Rose and that their combined teachings would have disclosed or suggested all the limitations of claim 1.” slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 10,396,592 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,396,592 - PTAB · Jun 20, 2023 · IPR2023-00193 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 14–18, finding a reasonable likelihood that the claims are obvious over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any response thereto shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and the evidence of record, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in establishing unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’991 patent. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering or a similar degree and two years of professional experience working in wireless networking, including WLAN and WPAN protocols and devices; more experience would supplement less education and vice versa.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 42–45). At this time, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither party proposes any express claim constructions. Pet. 5; Prelim. Resp. 13. However, as explained below, to the extent that the parties’ positions turn on an interpretation of the claimed “second network protocol,” we encourage the parties to directly address the scope of the challenged claims during trial. For the purposes of this Decision, we preliminarily determine that the language of the claims themselves provides some clarity regarding claim scope. Limitation [1g], for example, provides that the second network protocol “is an overlay protocol with respect to the first network protocol in that communications using the second network protocol are partially consistent with the first network protocol.” Also, the limitations of claims 6 and 7, which depend from claim 1, provide that the second network protocol “is a protocol that requires lower average power consumption over time relative to the first network protocol” (claim 6) and “is a modification of the 802.11x wireless protocol that is not entirely compliant with the 802.11x wireless protocol of the first network but can be maintained in a common wireless space as the 802.11x wireless protocol” (claim 7).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have been motivated to incorporate Ganu’s teachings of FNs using data forwarding techniques to relay [I]nternet traffic between MNs and APs into Cromer’s system such that client device 100 relays data between peer-to-peer WPAN devices 180 and AP 160, allowing peer-to-peer WPAN devices 180 to communication with AP 160 via client device 100 and access the Internet.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,264,991 - Ironsource Ltd. v. Digital Turbine Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Mar 17, 2023 · PGR2022-00053 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–22 under § 101, § 102(a) over Pasha, and § 103 over Pasha, Pasha and Yamada, and Pasha and Molinet.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), a post-grant review may not be instituted unless it is determined that it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Based on the information presented in the Petition and the supporting evidence, we are persuaded that the Petition demonstrates it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of the challenged claims on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“[t]he words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art when read in the context of the specification and prosecution history.” Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313). “There are only two exceptions to this general rule: 1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.” Id. (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Neither of those exceptions apply here, and for the reasons below, we find the plain and ordinary meaning of “invoke” or “invoking” to be to call or activate, as proposed by Petitioner. slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“to mean “to shift user interaction on the device,” and we disagree with Patent Owner that the claim term requires the shifting to take place without requiring a user interaction. We begin with the language of the independent claims. Claim 1 recites “redirect said device to an app store for downloading said first software application on said device.” Ex. 1001, 21:38–40. The claim language, therefore, does not recite any requirement relating to user interaction during the redirect.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“3. Other Claim Terms We determine that we do not need to expressly construe any other terms in order to determine whether to institute. The parties are reminded claim terms will be based on the complete record developed during trial.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Alice · Enfish · PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,157,256 - Ironsource Ltd. v. Digital Turbine Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 4, 2023 · PGR2021-00096 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18 are unpatentable; the contingent motion to amend proposing claims 19–36 is denied, and the parties’ motions to exclude are denied in part and granted in part.
RulingsFinal written decision- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'IneligibleUnpatentable
“3. Analysis On the full record developed during trial, we are persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument. Petitioner’s analysis of the independent claims described above only loosely corresponds to the actual limitations recited in the claim. The Federal Circuit has “cautioned that courts ‘must be careful to avoid oversimplifying the claims’ by looking at them generally and failing to account for the specific requirements of the claims.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Petitioner’s analysis of the claim limitations appears to do. Petitioner’s argument that “the essence of all the claims” is captured by a single claim element (f3) not only ignores that that limitation recites performing two specific software tasks simultaneously—which we are not persuaded is an abstract idea—but also asks us to disregard multiple technical aspects recited in the claims, such as identifying a link, determining whether an installation client is available on the device, invoking the installation client, and redirecting to the device an app store. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 21:6–35. That is, under Step 2A of the Guidance, we are neither persuaded that limitation f3, which Petitioner points us to, recites an abstract idea (Prong 1), nor that the other limitations recited in the independent claims fail to integrate the alleged abstract idea into a practical application (Prong 2). Petitioner characterizes the claims as directed to multitasking, which Petitioner describes as representing a basic task in organizing human activity. Pet. 30. Although the Guidance recognizes certain methods of organizing human activity, including certain activity between a person and a computer, as constituting a patent-ineligible abstract idea, we are not persuaded that the claims here fall within the scope of such activity. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (listing fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or legal interactions, and managing personal behavior or relationships as organizing human activity); October 2019 Update at 5 (“this grouping is limited to activity that falls within the enumerated sub-groupings . . . , and is not to be expanded beyond these enumerated sub-groupings except in rare circumstances”). The claimed invention may result in multitasking on the device, but the claims are directed to downloading and installing an application in the background instead of directing the user to an application, and do not recite an abstract idea. And although that process does result in improving user experience, the claims recite more than that mere result; they recite specific steps—invoking, without exiting the foreground software application, the installation client for downloading and installing applications on the device to run in the background—that accomplish the desired result. See Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305–06 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding a method that employs a new kind of file in a computer security system directed to a non-abstract improvement in computer functionality, rather than the abstract idea of computer security writ large). Petitioner thus fails to establish sufficiently that the claims are directed patent ineligible subject matter under Step 2A of the Guidance. We also agree with Patent Owner that the challenged claims are somewhat similar to those that the Federal Circuit held patentable in DDR Holdings. The claims there were directed to a method of generating a composite webpage that combined visual elements of a host website with content from a third-party, e.g., by combining the logo, background color, and fonts of the host website with product information from a merchant. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1248. When a user clicked on a link on the host website, the system would construct the composite web page comprising a look and feel description from the host website along with content based on product information from the merchant’s product catalog. Id. at 1250. The court held those claims were not directed at an abstract idea because they addressed the problem of retaining website visitors that, absent the claimed invention, would be instantly transported away from a host’s website after clicking on an advertisement and activating a hyperlink. Id. at 1257.” slip op. at 29
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“1. Independent Claim 1 a) “A mobile device configured for running software applications, comprising:” Petitioner contends that Pasha discloses computer system 600, which” slip op. at 38
- 112 supportMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“4. Support in the Original Disclosure A motion to amend may not present substitute claims that introduce new subject matter. 35 U.S.C. § 326(d)(3); 37 C.F.R. § 42.221(a)(2)(ii) (“A motion to amend may be denied where . . . [t]he amendment seeks . . . introduce new subject matter.”). “Normally, a claim element without support in the original disclosure (i.e., the application as originally filed) merits a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112 for lack of written description support.” Lectrosonics, Paper 15, 7. Accordingly, a motion to amend must set forth written description support in the originally filed disclosure of the subject patent for each proposed substitute claim.” Id.” slip op. at 74
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted in part
“CTPG at 73–74. Accordingly, Rule 42.23(b) prohibits filing of new evidence other than deposition transcripts of the cross-examination of any reply witness with a sur-reply. Patent Owner does not argue that the opinions presented in paragraphs 4–13 of Dr. Mao’s declaration are within the scope of §42.23(b). See generally PO MTE Opp. Nor do we find it in the interests of justice to allow this evidence in the case file. Accordingly, we grant in part Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude paragraphs 4–13 of Exhibit 2013 pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b).22” slip op. at 90
Patent outcomesUS 10,782,951 unpatentable§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipationcites Alice · Enfish · Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,782,951 - The Chamberlain Group, LLC. v. Overhead Door CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 25, 2022 · IPR2022-00842 · APJ Hubert C Lorin · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–6, 8, 10, 11, 13–15, and 17 obvious over the asserted combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability claims 1–6, 8, 10, 11, 13–15, and 17 of the ’120 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the ’120 patent. IV. ORDER It is: ORDERED that the Petition is denied; and FURTHER ORDERED that no inter partes review is instituted.” slip op. at 39
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in an academic discipline emphasizing the design of electrical, computer, or software technologies, in combination with training or at least one to two years of related work experience in the fields of access control or automated door control systems, or equivalent work experience or training in the field of such technologies. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 31). Patent Owner does not address the level of skill of the ordinary artisan. See, generally, Prelim. Resp. Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art appears reasonable, and we adopt that definition for our analysis in this decision.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away foundMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“i. Principles of Law A reference does not teach away “if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not ‘criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage’ investigation into the invention claimed.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). However, “[a] reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” Id. (quoting In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“We find that Patent Owner’s argument is supported by Marchetto’s disclosure, which explains that one must first enter a certificate via the programming unit’s keypad 56 in order to activate a new transmitter (see Ex. 1007 ¶ 87). Thus, using Marchetto’s external device would involve an extra step of manually entering recognition codes. This is in contrast to Sommer, which actuates transmitters simply by transmitting a code to the receiver once its learn–in mode is activated (see Ex. 1004 ¶ 11). Adding an extra manual–entering step would increase, rather than “alleviate,” the labor needed to activate transmitters per Sommer’s system. Petitioner relies on the testimony of Dr. Davis. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 47; Pet. 12. But it simply repeats the argument in the Petition. Dr. Davis states that “[u]sing an external programming device … alleviate[s] the need for a human to locate, physically handle, and manually actuate each wireless transmitter [as in Sommer]” (id.; Pet. 12) but does not elaborate. Dr. Davis does not, address, for example, Marchetto’s stated need to additionally enter recognition codes into the external device and whether the combination of Sommer and Marchetto still yields an alleviation from having to do so. Absent evidentiary support or persuasive explanation, we afford Dr. Davis’s conclusory testimony little weight. There is insufficient evidence on this record showing one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Sommer and Marchetto because it would “alleviate” the human labor associated with actuating transmitters per Sommer’s procedure.” slip op. at 23
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,869,120 - Snap Inc. v. You Map Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Sep 2, 2022 · IPR2022-00568 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 12 would be obvious over the asserted combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“The standard for instituting an inter partes review “is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons discussed below, the Petition meets this standard. Thus, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. In this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s proposed definition, which appears to be consistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted references. If Patent Owner proposes a different level of ordinary skill in the” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“At this stage and on this record, we disagree with Patent Owner’s claim construction to the extent that it excludes the disclosed embodiment that uses areas of a map as screen attribute information: For example, the social mapping module 106 may receive a request from the client device 300. The request may include device. For example, the size of the display 305, the resolution of the display 305, areas of a map displayed on the display 305, etc. Ex. 1001, 15:13–15 (emphasis added). We emphasize “For example” here because it indicates that “areas of a map” are screen attribute information. Id. Area is listed together with the device’s size and resolution. Id. Thus, at this stage and on this record, we disagree with Patent Owner that “‘areas of a map displayed on the display’ is a function of the ‘screen attribute information about a display of the client device’ not the other way around.” Prelim. Resp. 30.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“These teachings lead us to favor Petitioner’s arguments over Patent Owner’s, at this stage, because the cited teachings show that Jackson proposes using a flexible approach, which may include multiple factors or criteria. See id. at 16:40–66. For example, Petitioner asserts that “Jackson explains that its ‘recommendation system 522’ can make its decision based on weighting the ‘global score’ or its signals, and that its ‘personal score 538’ can create weighted scores based on each.” Pet. 52 (citing Ex. 1006, 19:50–61, 22:63–23:3). As for the global score, Petitioner asserts that Jackson’s global score would be weighed based on secondary criteria, such as location, to arrive at a modified score: [I]t would have been obvious to: (1) generate “global scores” for “every post” based on non-user-specific “primary criteria” (Jackson, 9:19-25, 16:45-56), (2) weight those global scores using “secondary criteria” relating to the user and poster sharing a geographic location (Jackson, 16:65-17:7) to generate “modified scores” for the posts, and (3) rank the posts according to the modified scores in the same way Jackson teaches in connection with the social-network-distance secondary criteria (Jackson, 9:54-67).” slip op. at 28
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,616,727 - PTAB · Jul 22, 2022 · IPR2022-00404 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13–15, and 17, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on both §103 grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (designated precedential May 5, 2020), we should exercise our discretion to deny the Petition because of the advanced state of the parallel ITC proceeding, which will be addressing the validity of the ’592 patent. See generally, Prelim. Resp. Patent Owner notes that there has been no request for a stay in the ITC proceeding, that Petitioner lacks standing to request a stay, and that the ITC case is expected to maintain its current schedule. Prelim. Resp. 7. Petitioner argues that all the district court proceedings are stayed and the ITC lacks authority to cancel or amend claims. Pet. 85; Reply 1. provided instructions on the exercise of discretion in post-grant proceedings with parallel district court litigation. See Memorandum for the Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation, issued June 21, 2022 (“Guidance Memo”).1 The Guidance Memo provides that “[u]nlike district courts, the ITC lacks authority to invalidate a patent and its invalidity rulings are not binding on either the Office or a district court.” Id. at 6 (citation omitted). Accordingly, “[t]he PTAB will not discretionarily deny petitions based on applying Fintiv to a parallel ITC proceeding.” Id. at 7. All of Patent Owner’s arguments for discretionary denial in this case are premised on avoiding duplicative efforts between this case and the parallel ITC proceeding. Weighing the Fintiv factors in light of the Guidance Memo and that the parallel district court proceedings are stayed, these factors weigh strongly toward declining to exercise discretion to deny institution. Therefore, we decline to exercise discretion to deny institution under Fintiv.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“(“Petition” or “Pet.”), to institute an inter partes review (“IPR”) of claims 1– 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13–15, and 17 (the “challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 10,396,592 B2 (“the ’592 patent”). 35 U.S.C. § 311. Causam Enterprises, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response, Paper 7 (“Prelim. Resp.”), contending that the Petition should be denied as to all challenged claims. As authorized by the Board, Petitioner filed a Reply. Paper 8. Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply. Paper 9. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We construe only those claim terms that require analysis to determine whether to institute inter partes review. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). A. Revenue Grade Metrology Noting that the term “revenue grade metrology” is found only in the Abstract and claims of the ’592 patent, Petitioner asserts that the plain and ordinary meaning of “revenue grade metrology” “would at least include a method of measurement using any apparatus used for the purpose of making measurement of, or obtaining the basis of a charge for, electricity supplied to a purchaser.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003, Ehsani Decl. ¶ 26). Petitioner notes that in the ITC proceeding, Patent Owner argued no construction was necessary, but that if a construction were adopted, “revenue grade metrology” should be construed to mean “metrology conforming to revenue grade requirements.” Id. at 6 (citing Ex. 1010, 7). Petitioner argues against adopting Patent Owner’s ITC construction proposal as merely repeating the claim language without adding any clarification. Id. On this point, we agree with Petitioner. ordinary meaning applies and no construction of this term is needed. However, to the extent the plain and ordinary meaning of this term requires clarification, for purposes of this Decision, we understand revenue grade metrology to include measurement techniques and meters that measure power consumption with sufficient accuracy to be used in revenue collecting applications.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionOther
“B. Power Supply Value Petitioner proposes we construe “power supply value” using its explicit definition in the Specification, i.e. “an actual value that includes measurement and verification of the reduction in consumed power.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1001, 9:2–4). Petitioner notes that Patent Owner proposed a very similar definition in the ITC proceeding. Id. (citing Ex. 1009, 2). For purposes of this Decision, we construe “power supply value” to have the definition given in the Specification.” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,396,592
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.