- Tesla, Inc. v. Charge Fusion Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 13, 2026 · IPR2025-00152 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17 are unpatentable as obvious: claims 1–4, 6–9, and 11–14 over Sutardja, Donnelly, and Letendre; claims 5, 10, and 15 with Seelig; claims 16 and 17 with Knockeart.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Tesla submits that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical or mechanical engineering (or an equivalent field) and at least two years of work experience involving automotive systems, including electric vehicle power management. . . . Additional industry experience or technical training may offset less formal education, 1 US 2008/0136371 A1, pub. Jun. 12, 2008 (Ex. 1011, “Sutardja”). 2 US 7,124,691 B2, iss. Oct. 24, 2006 (Ex. 1006, “Donnelly”). 3 Steven E. Letendre, The V2G Concept: A New Model for Power? PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, Feb. 15, 2002, at 16 (Ex. 1007, “Letendre”). 4 US 5,654,621, iss. Aug. 5, 1997 (Ex. 1078, “Seelig”). 5 US 6,622,083 B1, iss. Sep. 16, 2003 (Ex. 1010, “Knockeart”). while advanced degrees or additional formal education may offset lesser levels of industry experience. Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 29). Charge Fusion “takes no position with respect to Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 9. For purposes of our analysis, we apply Tesla’s proposed level of ordinary skill, which we find to be consistent with the problems addressed in the ’788 patent and the prior art. B. Claim Interpretation” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“shown in Figure 7 of the ’788 patent. Pet. 4–5. Charge Fusion responds that Tesla’s proposed construction should be rejected because it “wrongly import[s] embodiments from the specification.” PO Resp. 14–16. We discern no dispute over the meaning of “unitary vehicle charge indicator” because, contrary to what Charge Fusion argues, Tesla does not contend that this limitation is “required to be limited to” the bar graph embodiment of Figure 7, only that it “at least includes” that embodiment. Compare Pet. 5, with PO Resp. 14–16. Tesla also argues that the “first” and “second” portions of the unitary vehicle charge indicator—which indicate the charged and uncharged capacities of the battery—recite merely “communicative content,” and thus, are “not entitled to any patentable weight” because they are directed to nonfunctional printed matter. Pet. 5–7 (citing various case law). At the same time, however, Tesla maintains that “[r]egardless, Donnelly teaches a bar graph indicating the amount of charge and uncharged capacity.” Pet. Reply 11–12 (citing Pet. 33–34); see also Hrg. Tr. 74:22–25, 75:9–11. For reasons expressed below, we agree that Tesla persuasively demonstrates that the asserted combination teaches the “unitary vehicle charge indicator element” as claimed and construed by Charge Fusion. Accordingly, we need not decide the printed matter issue.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Initially, we note that, as claimed, there is no express restriction on the manner in which the “amount” or “charge” is specified or otherwise expressed. Indeed, the Specification uses both “desired charge percent level” and “desired charge range level” as alternative ways for a user to specify an “amount of charge.” Ex. 1001, 14:63–15:18 (emphases added). In particular, the Specification defines “desired charge range level” as meaning “a desired distance to travel.” Id. at 15:8–18. Elsewhere, the Specification describes that a user may specify the amount of charge as follows: “the user may indicate a desired charging level (and/or a desired charging level may be automatically calculated) based on a desired distance of travel.” Id. at 19:59–67 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“full charge” for the battery, and thus, Tesla fails to explain how the combination of Sutardja with Donnelly’s battery bar graph image “would allow a user to select a specific amount of charge or how this would result in a unitary vehicle charge indicator,” as claimed. PO Resp. 30. According to Charge Fusion, “[l]imiting the single option of ‘full charge’ as described in Sutardja would defeat the purpose of implementing a slider” as taught by Donnelly. Id. (citing Ex. 2008 ¶ 72). We disagree. Charge Fusion’s argument rests on the mistaken premise that Sutardja only contemplates selecting a full amount of charge for the battery and not an amount below a full charge, i.e., a partial charge. But that is not what Sutardja says. More accurately, Sutardja teaches that the user specifies the amount of charge—"The user interface module 108 may comprise a key pad, a display, a microphone, and/or a speaker (all not shown). A user of the vehicle 102-1 may use the user interface module 108 to set charging parameters for charging the battery 14.” Ex. 1011 ¶ 243. Elsewhere, Sutardja teaches that the user may set a “predetermined level” of charge— The charge monitoring module 150 may inform the control module 112 when the battery 14 is charged to a predetermined level (e.g., full charge) that may be indicated in the charging parameters. Subsequently, the charge monitoring module 150 may stop charging the battery 14 by deactivating the converter 156 and the charging module 152. The power meter 24 may measure the amount of power received from the utility company 23 during the charging operation. Id. ¶ 270 (emphases added). Although that passage indicates that a “full charge” is an example of a “predetermined level” of charge, nowhere does it exclude the selection of a lesser amount. Indeed, the passage contemplates the ability to “stop charging the battery,” which indicates that selection of the predetermined level may be less than a full charge. Id. Thus, we are not persuaded by Charge Fusion’s argument to the contrary. Rather, in our view, Tesla demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the Sutardja-Donnelly combination teaches a “unitary vehicle charge indicator” that includes at least “first” and “second” portions and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to successfully combine their respective teachings in a manner that allows a user to predetermine, i.e., specify, an amount of charge. slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 11,990,788 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,990,788 - Globus Medical, Inc. v. Spinelogik, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00226 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 7, and 9 are unpatentable under §103 over Moskowitz and Steffee; the Board did not reach the Moskowitz-only ground and rejected the Hess ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s or equivalent degree in mechanical engineering or a related discipline (e.g., biomedical or metals and materials engineering), and at least five years of experience consisting of (a) designing, developing, evaluating and/or using spine devices, (b) anatomy, physiology and biology of soft and calcified tissues including bone healing and fusion, and (c) biomechanical and functional loading of orthopedic implants. Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 49). Petitioner also asserts that “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 49). “Patent Owner does not dispute the proffered definition for a POSA.” PO Resp. 9. Based on the full record, we determine that Petitioner’s undisputed proposed level of skill is reasonable and consistent with the ’385 patent and the asserted prior art. Thus, for these reasons, we adopt Petitioner’s level of skill in the art.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“1. “channel” Throughout the challenged claims, “channel” appears together with “curved” in the term “curved channel.” For example, claim 1 recites “the fusion member comprising a first curved channel and a second curved channel,” “a first anchoring member configured to insert through the first curved channel,” and “second anchoring member configured to insert through the second curved channel.” Ex. 1001, 26:58–59, 26:60–61, 26:65– 66. Prior to institution, Petitioner asserted that one of ordinary skill in the art would “understand the claim term ‘channel’ to refer to a passage through which something moves or is conveyed.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 54). And, for purposes of our Decision on Institution, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed construction as being “consistent with the intrinsic record.” Institution Dec. 10. the ’385 [p]atent is readily understood by a POSA in context without needing explicit construction” and the plain and ordinary meaning should apply. PO Resp. 9–10. According to Patent Owner, the ’385 patent “consistently uses ‘channel’ to refer to a pathway within the fusion member through which an anchoring member traverses” and “explicitly states that channels may have different shapes and sizes and need not have a constant diameter, indicating the patentee did not intend to narrow the term beyond its common understanding.” Id. Petitioner replies noting that Patent Owner’s understanding “is substantively identical to Petitioner’s construction (‘a passage through which something moves or is conveyed’), specifically applied to an anchoring member.” Pet. Reply 6 (Pet. 18; PO Resp. 9–10). Thus, Petitioner concludes that “[t]he parties thus agree with the Board’s construction.” Id. Based on the full record, we agree with Petitioner that the parties’ positions on the meaning of the term “channel” are “substantively identical.” Because we see no difference between the parties’ position on the meaning of “channel,” we continue to adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction as it is consistent with the plain language of the claims and Specification. See Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1001, 9:42–44, 9:53–55, 10:63–66, 11:47–63, 14:25–31, 14:65–67, 16:32–35, 22:51–57, 24:55–67) (The Specification uniformly refers to a “channel” as “a passage through which something (e.g., an anchoring member) traverses.”).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“between the spinous processes in order to decompress the spinal canal, and thus, “relieve pressure on the spinal cord and nerves by increasing the area of the spinal canal.” Ex. 1006, 1:32–34, 1:50–52, 2:1–6. In contrast, the ’385 patent identifies that “the goal is to achieve solid bony fusion between the involved endplates and eliminate the symptoms caused by motion and associated degenerative and other reactive changes between these unstable vertebral segments.” Ex. 1001, 1:53–57. Thus, Hess’s disclosed implant is designed to distract and stabilize the spinous processes, not to promote solid bony fusion between adjacent vertebral bodies. Consequently, we agree with Patent Owner that “converting Hess for intervertebral fusion would require eliminating its core dynamic stabilization functionality—directly contradicting Hess’s stated design objectives.” PO Resp. 42 (citing Ex. 1006, 2:5–26, 7:43–45). We also are not persuaded that Petitioner adequately explains why a person of ordinary skill would have modified Hess’s implant in the manner proposed. Petitioner contends that only “minimal modifications” to Hess’s shell dimension and shape would be required for intervertebral use. Pet. 61–67; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 122–128. However, simply modifying the shape and size of Hess’s shell does not, without more, support a motivation to redesign Hess’s device from a posterior interspinous implant engaging spinous processes to an interbody implant positioned between vertebral bodies and anchored into vertebral bodies. Here, Hess discloses that modifying its dimensions serves to “preserv[e] mobility and alignment.” Ex. 1006, 7:5–7. Conversely, the ’385 patent’s fusion implant serves to limit mobility between vertebrae by achieving “solid bony fusion between the fusion member and the adjacent vertebral bodies.” Ex. 1001, 24:67–25:3. spinal fusion procedures” (id. at 6:49–52), we do not find that statement, without more, to disclose or suggest reconfiguring Hess’s interspinous implant as an “a fusion member configured to position between first and second vertebral bodies,” as required by limitation [1.1]. At most, Hess’s “adjunct to” statement suggests that the interspinous implant may be used in connection with, or in support of, a fusion procedure. It does not explain how or why Hess’s implant would be redesigned for placement between two adjacent vertebral bodies, nor does it teach that Hess’s locking wings would be reoriented or adapted to anchor into vertebral bodies rather than spinous processes. On this point, Mr. Culbert states that “[t]he only changes required to modify Hess for use as an intervertebral implant would be to modify the dimensions of Hess’s shell, which was ‘dimensioned and configured for placement between the spinous processes’” (Ex. 1002 ¶ 126 (citing Ex. 1006, 7:3–4)), but Mr. Culbert does not explain how Hess’s locking wings and guide tracks would be reoriented or adapted to function as anchoring members that are inserted into adjacent vertebral bodies rather as opposed to spinous processes. Instead, Mr. Culbert simply states that “Hess’s locking wings would engage and at least partially penetrate the superior and inferior adjacent vertebrae” (emphasis added) (Ex. 1002 ¶ 135) without explaining how or why one of ordinary skill in the art would have made the modification with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 17
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“modify Hess for use as an intervertebral implant would be to modify the dimensions of Hess’s shell, which was ‘dimensioned and configured for placement between the spinous processes’” (Ex. 1002 ¶ 126 (citing Ex. 1006, 7:3–4)), but Mr. Culbert does not explain how Hess’s locking wings and guide tracks would be reoriented or adapted to function as anchoring members that are inserted into adjacent vertebral bodies rather as opposed to spinous processes. Instead, Mr. Culbert simply states that “Hess’s locking wings would engage and at least partially penetrate the superior and inferior adjacent vertebrae” (emphasis added) (Ex. 1002 ¶ 135) without explaining how or why one of ordinary skill in the art would have made the modification with a reasonable expectation of success. Hess’s disclosure that its shell may have shape variations to match adjacent bone (Ex. 1006, 7:7–13) also does not adequately explain why a person of ordinary skill would have had a reason to redesign Hess’s device for a different intervertebral environment, or why such a redesign would and “anchoring members,” i.e., locking wings. And, to the extent Hess discloses matching the shell to “the profile of the adjacent bone when deployed” (Ex. 1006, 7:11–13), Hess never suggests adapting the shell for placement between two adjacent vertebral bodies or for use as a fusion cage, it discloses that the “shell 12 is dimensioned and configured for placement between the spinous processes of symptomatic disc levels” (id. at 7:2–4). Thus, we agree with Patent Owner that the proposed modification “minimizes the structural differences and conflicting functional objectives inherent in modifying a device intended for the posterior elements of the spine for use in the anterior load-bearing column” (emphasis omitted). PO Resp. 41. For the reasons discussed above, we determine that Petitioner’s reliance on Mr. Culbert’s testimony amounts to more than just providing a motivation to modify Hess. Here, it amounts to relying on expert testimony to supply a missing limitation. As such, Petitioner’s arguments are not persuasive to demonstrate that the prior art teaches the limitations of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence. See Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9, 16 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential) (explaining that relying on expert testimony “is particularly problematic in cases where, like here, expert testimony is offered not simply to provide a motivation to combine prior-art teachings, but rather to supply a limitation missing from the prior art.”).” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 8,460,385 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,460,385 - Globus Medical, Inc. v. Spinelogik, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00225 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6, 11, 12, and 15–17 are unpatentable: claims 1–4, 6, 11, 12, 15, and 17 over Blain; claims 5 and 16 over Blain, Bray, and Steffee.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s or equivalent degree in mechanical engineering or a related discipline (e.g., biomedical engineering, metals and materials engineering), and at least five years of experience with a) designing, developing, evaluating and/or using spine devices, b) anatomy, physiology and biology of soft and calcified tissues including bone healing and fusion, and c) biomechanical and functional loading of orthopedic implants. Pet. 18–19 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 77–78). Petitioner also asserts that “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 78). “Patent Owner does not dispute the proffered definition for a POSA.” PO Resp. 10. proposed level of skill is reasonable and consistent with the ’805 patent and the asserted prior art. Thus, for these reasons, we adopt Petitioner’s level of skill in the art.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Based on the full record, we determine that “housing,” as it appears in the context of the term “delivery housing” is a component that is a part of the delivery mechanism (see Ex. 1001, 11:27–31) and that simply contains and guides another component during delivery. See Ex. 1001, 13:25–27, 21:30–50. Thus, we apply the ordinary meaning of “housing,” as it appears in the context of the term “delivery housing,” and address in the context of “delivery housing,” as recited by claims 2 and 4.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“understanding of plain and ordinary meaning as set forth in the litigation.” Pet. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1022, 2 (“channel . . . [that] has a curved path”)). Thus, Petitioner concludes that the parties agree on construction of “curved channel.” Id. at 13–14.10 9 Although the parties refer to “curved” alone or to a “curved channel,” we understand the parties to be referring to a “channel of the fusion member [that] is curved,” as recited in claims 5 and 16. 10 At oral argument, the parties confirmed that there was no dispute as to the meaning of “curved channel.” See Tr. 15:12–14 (Petitioner stating that “the term “curved channel” appears consistent with the plain language of the claims and Specification. Thus, we adopt the parties’ agreed-upon construction and construe a channel that is “curved” to mean a channel following a curved trajectory.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We have considered Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, and Patent Owner’s counterarguments and find, on the complete trial record, that Petitioner demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Blain discloses “a fusion member for positioning between two vertebral bodies, the fusion member having a first plurality of channels, each channel of the first plurality of channels having an opening on a same side of the fusion member,” as recited by limitation 1.1. At the outset, we find Patent Owner fails to establish that any of the alleged differences between Blain’s “apertures and the ’805 [p]atent’s internal channel geometry” relate to any particular recitation in argued limitation 1.1. Although we acknowledge that claims 5 and 16 each requires curved trajectories (see, e.g., claim 5 reciting “each channel of the fusion member is curved”), limitation 1.1 does not recite such a feature. As Petitioner correctly notes, “[n]othing in the claim requires a special ‘internal channel geometry,’ ‘shaped block,[’] ‘curved tubular channels,’ non ‘straight-through’ apertures, or ‘flexible’ anchors.” Pet. Reply 14 (footnote omitted). See In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982) (rejecting arguments “not based on limitations appearing in the claims”). Therefore, after reviewing the arguments and evidence, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Blain discloses the subject matter of limitation 1.1.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 9,730,805 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,730,805 - Apple Inc. v. Memoryweb, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 8, 2026 · PGR2022-00006 · APJ Jason M Repko · PGR · Remand
On remand, the Board held claims 1–59 unpatentable: claims 1–6, 8–37, 40–44, and 49–59 over A3UM under §103, and claims 6, 7, 38, and 39 for lack of written description under §112.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“On remand, the Board is to determine “[w]hether the alleged inconsistency in [Petitioner’s] treatment of map images compared to other first/second versions of claim elements supports rejecting [Petitioner’s] theory on claim-construction or other merits grounds is a matter for the Board to consider in the first instance on remand, constrained by any relevantly similar now-final findings of fact and conclusions of law in the ’020 PGR and related proceedings” (CAFC Dec. 16). Thus, the two issues on remand are (1) the construction of the second map image and (2) whether A3UM teaches or suggests the claimed “second map image” under that construction.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A person of ordinary skill in the art in 2011 would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical engineering, and (2) at least one year of experience designing graphical user interfaces for applications such as photo management systems. Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 44–46). In the Institution Decision and Final Written Decision, we applied Petitioner’s proposed definition. Inst. Dec. 12; FWD 30–31. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 7. We continue to find that the skill level identified by Petitioner (Pet. 12) is consistent with the record. Thus, we use the same definition here that we used in the Institution Decision and Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“c. Analysis We agree with Petitioner that the “second map image” should be construed as the map image in the second person view. Reply 5. Under Petitioner’s proposed construction, the terms “first” and “second” identify which person view that the map image is within. Id. The map image’s connection to the person view is important to how the user interacts with the interface because selecting the map image in one view does something different than selecting the map image in another, as recited in claims 14 and 46.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Here, we disagree with Patent Owner’s argument because it is based on the premise that the second map image is different from the first in a way that is not reflected in the claims. See Section II.C.3 supra. Even if “the claims consistently use the terms ‘first’ and ‘second’ to refer to separate and distinct elements,” A3UM’s first and second map images are separate and distinct elements for at least the reason they are included in separate and distinct views in the interface. See Pet. 63; Reply 5. As discussed in Section II.C.3, the second map image is the map image in the second person view. Here, Petitioner sufficiently shows that A3UM provides the same functionality for each person, including displaying the person in the Faces view with their name within A3UM’s overall user interface. See Pet. 62 (citing Ex. 1003, ¶215; Ex. 1005, 418–420). Patent Owner does not dispute this. See PO Resp.; Sur-reply. For the same reasons why A3UM teaches the “first map image” with respect to a first person view recited in claims 1 and 31, Petitioner has shown that A3UM also teaches the “second map image” in the second person view. See FWD 53–56. In sum, Patent Owner’s arguments are unpersuasive because they are based on an incorrect claim construction, and Petitioner has shown that claims 13 and 45 are unpatentable. 5. Claims 14–16 and 46–48 Apart from the arguments analyzed above, Patent Owner does not present separate arguments directed to the subject matter of claims 14–16 burden to show that the challenged claims are unpatentable. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence submitted in connection with the remaining limitations and find them persuasive as they are consistent with and supported by the evidence of record. See Pet. 63–64. Thus, Petitioner has shown that claims 14–16 and 46–48 are unpatentable over A3UM.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 11,017,020 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 11,017,020 - Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00221 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8 are unpatentable as obvious: claims 1, 2, 5, and 6 over Dateki; claims 3 and 7 over Dateki and Mate; and claims 4 and 8 over Dateki and Chitrapu.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“[w]ould have been someone knowledgeable and familiar with the wireless communications systems that are pertinent to the ’889 patent. That person would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of wireless communication systems or design of similar communication systems. Pet. 18–19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 25). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contention as to the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally, PO Resp. Based on this record, and because there is no dispute, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’889 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art, itself, can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“do not recite, as Patent Owner interprets it, that the extracted power control information upon which the UE bases its transmission of a signal be “the same” power control information extracted from the control message. PO Resp. 25. Where the claim is clear on its face, we decline to inject “the same” into the construction, that is, words that are not actually in the claim. Yet considering the plain language of claim 1, we mostly agree with Patent Owner’s interpretation, namely that “a transmission power level based on the extracted power control information,” as required in limitation [1.6] includes power control information extracted from “the control message,” in limitation [1.5] having “power control bits for a plurality of UEs” as recited in limitation [1.4]. Ex. 1001, 10:2–19. We understand and interpret the concluding limitation in method-type claim 5 in the same manner as limitation [1.6].” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“do not recite, as Patent Owner interprets it, that the extracted power control information upon which the UE bases its transmission of a signal be “the same” power control information extracted from the control message. PO Resp. 25. Where the claim is clear on its face, we decline to inject “the same” into the construction, that is, words that are not actually in the claim. Yet considering the plain language of claim 1, we mostly agree with Patent Owner’s interpretation, namely that “a transmission power level based on the extracted power control information,” as required in limitation [1.6] includes power control information extracted from “the control message,” in limitation [1.5] having “power control bits for a plurality of UEs” as recited in limitation [1.4]. Ex. 1001, 10:2–19. We understand and interpret the concluding limitation in method-type claim 5 in the same manner as limitation [1.6].” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“where packet transmission is conducted, “the transmission power control information is transmitted via the HS-SCCH as second transmission power control information TPCC at a shorter periodic cycle.” PO Resp. 11 (quoting Ex. 1005, 13:11–13). But in context, after describing transmission of TPCC 1 on F-DPCH, Dateki says “[a]lso, in a case where packet transmission is conducted, the transmission power control information is transmitted via the HS-SCCH as second transmission power control information TPCC at a shorter periodic cycle.” Ex. 1005, 13:8–13 (emphasis added). We find it significant that the word “also” is used by Dateki, here, to describe the relationship of TPCC 1 and TPCC 2 as used together. If the intent was to transmit and use only TPCC 2 on HS-SCCH when data packets are transmitted on HS-PDCH, it would have made more sense to say “alternatively,” and otherwise make clear that only TPCC 2 is transmitted. But they did not. On the other hand, the inventors certainly understood how to explain when TPCC 2 is not transmitted. For example, Dateki makes clear that in certain embodiments TPCC 2 is unnecessary and “transmission power control may be effectively realized without including transmission power control information in the HS-SCCH.” Id. at 14:33–35. The same cannot be said for TPCC 1.” slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 11,664,889 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,664,889 - Google LLC v. Brodti Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00472 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over Nicholas, Laidlaw, Mayadas, and Error, with Yasnovsky added for claims 7, 8, 16, 17, and 20.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s definitions for the level of ordinary skill in the art are substantially similar. In light of the record before us, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’898 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Patent Owner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’898 patent and the prior art, particularly experience pertaining to Internet/web interfaces and web-based media. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Neither party argues, nor do we determine, that the outcome of our Decision depends on which party’s definition is selected.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“includ[e] a server and one or more webpages that may be provided by the server for display in a web browser.” Pet. Reply 5 (citing Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 13–15). Petitioner argues, and we agree, that the Specification strongly supports this construction (requiring a server and webpage(s)) by describing a “website” as synonymous with a server computer system: “The WWW [(World Wide Web)] service allows a server computer system (i.e., Web server or Web site) to send graphical Web pages or screens of information such as the advertising materials to a remote client computer system 10.” Ex. 1001, 3:66–4:2 (emphases added); see id. at Fig. 1 (depicting a service engine and webpages as a web server, i.e., website), 3:15–18 (describing Figure 1 as showing “a server of the website” (emphasis added)); Pet. Reply 5; see Ex. 1026 ¶ 13. Petitioner also submits a supporting (and persuasive) contemporaneous technical dictionary definition of “website,” which highlights the distinction between a lay person’s understanding of the term versus that of the relevant artisan. Pet. Reply 5–6. This definition explains that the “common but technically inaccurate” usage of “website” is to mean “Web page,” but the technically correct usage of “website” is to mean “one or more computers that are associated with a fully qualified domain name and make content available on the Web.” Id. (citing Ex. 1028, 402). Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Crovella, likewise testifies that “[a] website cannot exist without the server or computer that provides its webpages.” Ex. 1026 ¶ 15; see Ex. 1027, 36:8–20 (Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Myler, agreeing that “it has to be some machine somewhere that’s providing the webpages for the website.”). The limitations of claim 1 also support Petitioner’s position that “website” includes a server and webpage(s). Reply 5. For example, claim 1 recites advertising material for “populat[ing] on one or more websites,” and selected “advertising buy options comprise at least one website of the respective websites.” Ex. 1001, 10:29–51 (emphases added). We find these limitations make the most technical sense where “website” implicates an Internet domain or domain name, such as brodti.com, which itself is a computer system (server) and associated webpage(s) reached via that domain name. This interpretation aligns with testimony of Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Myler, in which he states that a “website” describes “a group of webpages at a particular domain (e.g., www.espn.com, www.espn.com/nba, www.espn.com/nfl, www.espn.com/nhl).” Ex. 2009 ¶ 68 (emphasis in italics added). In other words, brodti.com and espn.com are two different websites, with each website having one or more webpages (e.g., www.espn.com/nba, www.espn.com/nfl), and such websites include a server giving life to such webpage(s). slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner proffers that placing advertising material “within” web property content means “inserting” an advertisement into particular content. PO Resp. 12. Petitioner responds that “placing . . . within” means what it says, and notes that “[t]he words ‘insert’ or ‘inserting’ appear nowhere in the [Specification].” Pet. Reply 7–8; see id. at 8 (Petitioner arguing that Patent Owner’s expert “admitted that the claim does not specify details regarding how advertising material needs to be placed within web property content.” (citing Ex. 1027, 29:18–24)). Patent Owner replies that the relevant artisan allegedly “would have understood ‘placing . . . within’ to mean ‘inserting into,’” but then submits that whether “placing . . . within” versus “inserting into” is used does not matter because Petitioner allegedly has not demonstrated the obviousness of either. PO Sur-reply 17. As Petitioner observes, “[i]t is unclear if Patent Owner intended any difference in meaning between these two terms.” Pet. Reply 8. Accordingly, based on the complete record before us, we determine that no further construction of this limitation is needed, and “placing A within B” means what it says—“placing A within B.”” slip op. at 20
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther
“determining” of impression validity feature of limitation 1[h] by disclosing “a ‘single-pixel’ image technique for determining that an impression is valid,” e.g., by using “cookies.” Pet. 42–45. Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Crovella, testifies that this “single-pixel” impression tracking technique would have been a “well-known” technique to the relevant artisan, and as described by Error, operates as follows: [A] URL link for a single pixel (or transparent) image file is embedded onto a webpage that is delivered to a web browser. The image is not meant to be viewed and will likely not be visible to the user. After the user’s browser receives the webpage, it uses the embedded URL link to request the single-pixel image from a server. The receipt of that request by the server provides an indication that the user’s web browser actually received and presented the web page to the user. Ex. 1002 ¶ 133 (citing Ex. 1007, 1:36–54, 2:6–21); see id. at ¶¶ 132–139. slip op. at 43
Patent outcomesUS 11,416,898 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,416,898 - Kubota North America Corporation v. Vermeer Manufacturing CompanyAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00168 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 31–49, 70–79, 86, and 87 unpatentable under §103 over KR996 and JP705, with Bares added for claims 70–79.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Pet. Init. CC Br. 3 (stating that “by including the term ‘generally’ in a statement, the feature (i.e., single weldment) is expressly identified as merely included in some, but not all embodiments”); PO Init. CC Br. 3 (“This language is merely exemplary, using reference numerals to refer to the embodiment’s features and qualifying ‘single weldment’ as referring ‘generally’ to specific embodiments.”). The Iowa District Court reached the same conclusion. See Ex. 1020 at 4 (holding that “‘mainframe’ will be given its plain and ordinary meaning and does not require a single weldment” (emphasis added)), cited at Pet. Init. CC Br. 2; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (“Any prior claim construction determination concerning a term of the claim in a civil action, or a proceeding before the International Trade Commission, that is timely made of record in the inter partes review proceeding will be considered.”). Turning to the prosecution history, neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner has highlighted any specific statements that impact the scope of the term “mainframe.” And from our independent review, we do not discern any such statements. For these reasons, the intrinsic evidence as a whole supports construing “mainframe” as a primary supporting structure.” slip op. at 33
- Skill levelOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The level of ordinary skill in the art is “a prism or lens” through which” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“probative and cogent evidence in the record” and “may often establish that an invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the prior art was not.” Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, notwithstanding what the teachings of the prior art would have suggested to one skilled in the art, secondary considerations (objective evidence of non-obviousness) may lead to a conclusion that the challenged claims would not have been obvious. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1471–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Our obviousness analysis includes consideration and weighing of Patent Owner’s objective indicia of non-obviousness.” slip op. at 55
Patent outcomesUS 9,321,386 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,321,386 - Kubota North America Corporation v. Vermeer Manufacturing CompanyAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 30, 2026 · PGR2025-00016 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 4–14 are unpatentable: claims 4 and 7–12 as anticipated by KR996, claims 5–6 as obvious over KR996 and JP705, and claims 13–14 as obvious over KR996 and Bares.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“2. The Reasons to Combine KR996 and JP705 Petitioner provides reasons to combine KR996 with JP705. See” slip op. at 73
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusObjective indicia outweighedDecided for petitioner
“probative and cogent evidence in the record” and “may often establish that an invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the prior art was not.” Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, notwithstanding what the teachings of the prior art would have suggested to one skilled in the art, secondary considerations (objective evidence of non-obviousness) may lead to a conclusion that the challenged claims would not have been obvious. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1471–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Our obviousness analysis includes consideration and weighing of Patent Owner’s objective indicia of non-obviousness.” slip op. at 53
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted in part
“For these reasons, we are persuaded by Petitioner to exclude, as” slip op. at 27
Patent outcomesUS 12,098,063 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 12,098,063 - Kubota North America Corporation v. Vermeer Manufacturing CompanyAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00381 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10 are unpatentable: claims 1–8 and 10 are anticipated by KR996, and claim 9 is obvious over KR996 and Bares.
RulingsFinal written decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“2. Independent Claim 1 Petitioner contends that KR996 both anticipates and renders obvious independent claim 1. Pet. 23–46. To support its arguments, Petitioner identifies certain passages in the cited references and explains the significance of each passage with respect to the corresponding claim limitation. Id. Patent Owner argues that KR996 does not disclose a “loader support” and thus fails to disclose limitations requiring “linkage[s]” and an “actuator” attached to the “loader support.” See PO Resp. 37–40; PO Sur-reply 20. In addition, Patent Owner presents evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness. See PO Resp. 51–68; PO Sur-reply 23–27. We address each issue in turn. a. The Loader Support Limitations Claim 1 recites, in relevant part, “[1.3] a loader support having a first side and a second side . . . ; [1.5] a first linkage connected to the first side of the loader support . . . ; [1.6] a second linkage connected to the first side of the loader support . . . ; [1.7] a second actuator for raising the loader, the second actuator being connected to the loader support.” Ex. 1001, 6:56, 6:60–7:1 (collectively, the “loader support limitations”). As to the recitation of “a loader support having a first side and a second side,” Petitioner provides the following annotated version of Figure 9 of KR996: Pet. 30. In the annotated version of Figure 9 of KR996 above, Petitioner added (1) red text and arrows identifying a “loader support,” a “first side of loader support,” and a “second side of loader support” and (2) blue text identifying a “loader.” Id. Petitioner adds that “the loader support includes the portions of the frame of the KR996 vehicle that when in operation, support the attached loader unit 40 having loader arms of the booms 44.” Pet. 29. Petitioner also states that “KR996’s loader support includes the bracket to which the link 45 and boom cylinder 46 attach, as well as the frame protrusion, connected to the bracket, to which the forward link attaches.” Id. (citing Velinsky Pet. Decl. ¶ 72).” slip op. at 32
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“2. Dependent Claim 9 Petitioner contends that KR996, modified based on Bares, satisfies the additional limitations of claim 9. Pet. 60–69. To support its arguments, Petitioner identifies certain passages in the cited references and explains the significance of each passage with respect to the corresponding claim limitation. Id. Petitioner also articulates reasons to combine the relied-upon aspects of KR996 and Bares and explains why there would have been a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 62–65. Patent Owner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have had reason to combine KR996 and Bares. See PO Resp. 41–50; PO Sur-reply 22–23. Patent Owner also relies on its prior arguments that KR996 does not disclose the “loader support” limitations in independent claim 1. See PO Resp. 50. In addition, Patent Owner relies on the same evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness discussed above. See PO Resp. 51–68; PO Sur-reply 21–27. We address each issue in turn. a. The Reasons to Combine KR996 and Bares Petitioner presents reasons why one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined KR996 and Bares and why the proposed combination would have had a reasonable expectation of success. See Pet. 62–65; Velinsky Pet. Decl. ¶¶ 157–162. After discussing why KR996 and Bares are analogous art to the claimed invention, Petitioner states that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Bares with KR996 to produce a predictable and beneficial configuration of a tracked vehicle” in that “[t]he simple substitution of Bares’ track assembly for the wheels in the KR996 vehicle would have been predictable with a reasonable expectation of success that both KR996 and Bares relate to similar vehicle types with a similar mainframe having a drive mechanism attached thereto.” Pet. 63 (citing Velinsky Pet. Decl. ¶¶ 158–162). Petitioner asserts that “designing this vehicle type with a drive” slip op. at 64
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“probative and cogent evidence in the record” and “may often establish that an invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the prior art was not.” Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, notwithstanding what the teachings of the prior art would have suggested to one skilled in the art, secondary considerations (objective evidence of non-obviousness) may lead to a conclusion that the challenged claims would not have been obvious. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1471–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Our obviousness analysis includes consideration and weighing of Patent Owner’s objective indicia of non-obviousness. In order to accord substantial weight to secondary considerations in an obviousness analysis, “the evidence of secondary considerations must have a ‘nexus’ to the claims, i.e., there must be ‘a legally and factually sufficient connection’ between the evidence and the patented invention.” Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC, 938 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); Quanergy Sys., Inc. v. Velodyne Lidar USA, Inc., 24 F.4th 1406, 1417 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Although the patent owner bears the initial burden of proving a nexus (WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999)), a presumption of nexus may be appropriate if the patent owner shows “the asserted objective evidence is tied to a specific product and that product ‘embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them.’” Polaris Indus, Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (emphasis added)); Quanergy, 24 F.4th at 1417. On the other hand, “[w]hen the [product] is not coextensive with the patented invention—for example, if the patented invention is only a component of a commercially successful machine or process,” the patent owner is not entitled to a presumption of nexus. Demaco, 851 F.2d at 1392. A patent owner may establish nexus, either through (1) the use of a rebuttable presumption that arises when certain conditions are met or (2) a direct showing of nexus. In the first, a patent owner may rely on a rebuttable presumption of nexus as follows:” slip op. at 43
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part
“2. Analysis “The moving party has the burden of proof to establish that it is entitled to the requested relief.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.20. Exhibit 1005 is an English language translation of Korean Patent No. 10-1041996. Exhibit 1006 is an English language translation of Japanese document JP2004-17705A. Exhibit 1014 is an English language translation of Korean Patent No. 10-1023528. A Certification of Translation signed by Takashi Maeshiro of HC Language Solutions, Inc., accompanies each of Exhibits 1005, 1006, and 1014. Ex. 1005 at 28; Ex. 1006 at 16; Ex. 1014 at 16. Each Certification of Translation is worded substantially the same except for the references to the document at issue and the source language being either Korean or Japanese. Exhibit 1005’s Certification of Translation, for example, states: I, Takashi Maeshiro, on behalf of HC Language Solutions, Inc., do solemnly and sincerely declare, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that the attached text represents a translation of Korean Patent No. 10-1041996, that the translation was performed by HC Language Solutions, Inc., and that the translation represents a true, correct, and faithful translation from Korean to English in a form that reflects the intention and meaning of the original text. I hereby declare that all statements made herein of my own knowledge are true and that all statements made on information and belief are believed to be true; and further that these statements were made with the knowledge that willful false statements and the like so made are punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both, under Section 1001 of Title 18 of the United States Code. Ex. 1005 at 28 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 11,465,891 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 11,465,891 - Resmed Corp. v. Cleveland Medical Devices, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 29, 2026 · IPR2025-00246 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 15–29 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations; the contingent motion to amend claims 30–41 is denied for lack of written-description support.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner filed an authorized Motion to Terminate, alleging that Petitioner failed to name its corporate parent, ResMed Inc., as a real party in interest. Paper 39. Petitioner filed an opposition. Paper 42. Patent Owner filed a reply. Paper 43. We denied the Motion to Terminate. Paper 51.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.10 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. The parties agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art (sometimes referred to herein as “POSITA”) would have had: at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, biomedical engineering, or a similar technical field, with at least two years of relevant product design experience working with diagnostic sensor systems and network data systems, such as networked PAP machines. Additional experience could substitute for less education, and additional education could likewise substitute for less experience. Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1003 (Kirkness Decl.) ¶ 44); PO Resp. 4. 9 Patent Owner does not assert any objective indicia of nonobviousness. See generally PO Resp. 10 For purposes of this Decision, we apply a priority date of November 4, 2005. See supra n.4. Because the proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner does not persuade us to construe the term as “a value [or calculated value] that indicates how dire a patient’s symptoms are.” Patent Owner points to nothing in the intrinsic record that purportedly supports this construction, and we agree with Petitioner that “the patent specification’s disclosures regarding determining a level of symptom severity are broad, establishing that it can generally be derived from any sensor data and/or breathing events.” Pet. Reply 3–4; see also Ex. 1001, 3:44–46 (“Signals from the[] sensors are then analyzed to determine the level of severity of the symptoms of the subject’s sleep disorder.”). Patent Owner relies only on expert declarations to support its construction. But as indicated by the Federal Circuit, extrinsic evidence is “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining ‘the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005). This is especially applicable here, where neither Dr. D’Ambrosio’s nor Dr. Schwartz’s declaration was prepared for this proceeding, and neither declarant was subject to cross examination on their opinions. Moreover, neither of the declarants was opining on claim construction; rather, they were addressing indefiniteness and/or written description issues. See Ex. 1058 at 7 (heading addressing definiteness); Ex. 2026 at 18 (heading addressing written description). Further, Dr. Schwartz appears to have been making an argument about certain patent claims (not the challenged ’333 patent) based on Patent Owner’s own statements made during prosecution of a separate patent application. See Ex. 2026 ¶ 47 (“[T]he similar term used in the ’284 patent claims (‘data of severity of sleep disorder symptoms’) does not find written description support in the specification by a disclosure of the same statistics disclosed in Wright, because CleveMed argued those statistics are not related to severity of sleep disorder symptoms.” (emphasis added)). Patent Owner has not persuaded us that Dr. Schwartz’s testimony has direct applicability to the claim term at issue here. Dr. Borkholder’s testimony is likewise unpersuasive. Aside from citing Dr. D’Ambrosio’s and Dr. Schwartz’s declarations, Dr. Borkholder cites Exhibits 2027 and 2016. These exhibits discuss indices such as AHI and RDI that are used to assess the severity of a patient’s symptoms, but Patent Owner has not adequately explained how they bear on construction of the claim term at issue here, which is not addressed in these exhibits. Ex. 2022 ¶¶ 32–33. Accordingly, we accord Dr. Borkholder’s claim construction opinions little weight, because they are unsupported by reference to objective, corroborating evidence of record. See, e.g., Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Lack of factual support for expert opinion going to factual determinations . . . may render the testimony of little probative value in a validity determination.”); Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, IPR2022-00624, Paper 9, 15 (PTAB 2023) (precedential) (explaining that declaration testimony that “is conclusory and unsupported” and which “adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support . . . is entitled to little weight”).” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We find that Petitioner has the better argument. Tidal volume refers to “the volume of air that is inspired or expired during a respiratory cycle.” Ex. 2028, 13–14; PO Resp. 10. “[H]ypopnea events are defined as a reduction of ≥50 % or 74 % in tidal volume from baseline and apnea events as absence of tidal volume for at least 10s.” Ex. 2028, 13–14 (emphasis omitted). Toge teaches that a control unit analyzes collected data (e.g., the flow rate) and calculates tidal volume. Ex. 1044 (Toge) ¶¶ 34–38. The calculated tidal volume is “a quantified level of severity data based on the subject’s sleep apnea symptoms during the therapy” because it represents, e.g., the “level of airway obstruction the patient experiences during the sleep apnea treatment using the PAP device.” Pet. 15. As Dr. Chatterjee explains: Toge discloses that tidal volume Fp is a quantified level of data because Toge discloses that Fp is monitored with respect to threshold values (id., [0051]) and because Fp is a function of Ft, Fa, and Fb, which are quantitative values. Toge discloses that tidal volume Fp is severity data because Toge discloses that tidal volume is indicative of whether the patient’s breathing warrants “emergency measures” (id., [0039]) and whether to “send an alert” in “an emergency where the patient’s breathing has drastically weakened” (id., [0055]). . . . . Because Toge discloses determining tidal volume (determine a quantified level of severity data) based on Ft, Fa, and Fb (id., [0035]), which corresponds to the subject’s condition (subject’s sleep apnea symptoms) while using the device (during the therapy) (id., [0036], [0037]), Toge discloses determin[ing] a quantified level of severity data based on the subject’s sleep apnea symptoms during the therapy. Ex. 1005 (Chatterjee Decl.) ¶¶ 122–125. Patent Owner’s attempt to dismiss tidal volume as a mere “breathing metric” is unavailing. First, Petitioner correctly “notes that in the paragraph PO cites to in Dr. Schwartz’s declaration, he indicates that breathing metrics are a level of severity data.” Pet. Reply 8 (citing Ex. 2026 ¶ 46 (“standard sleep disordered breathing metrics” [ ] were well validated indicators of the type and severity of sleep disordered breathing”)). Second, Dr. Kirkness explains that tidal volume represents the level of airway obstruction, e.g., apnea “is the most severe form of reduction in airflow [and] the absence of airflow results in quantified tidal volume of zero milliliters per breath.” Ex. 1003 (Kirkness Decl.) ¶¶ 157, 159; see also PO Resp. 10–11 (Patent Owner recognizing that an apnea is defined as absence of tidal volume for at least 10 seconds). The calculated tidal volume thus indicates severity because it is used to adjust the PAP system, e.g., in the case of decreasing tidal volume, a medical professional can change the airflow settings “to counter/treat the more severe level of airway obstruction observed from the decreasing tidal volume.” Ex. 1003 (Kirkness Decl.) ¶ 158; Pet. 15–16; Ex. 1044 (Toge) ¶ 39.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 11,857,333 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,857,333
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.