• Microsoft Corporation v. Interdigital Patent Holdings, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 23, 2025 · IPR2024-00538 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held all challenged claims of the ’933 and ’054 patents not unpatentable because the claims were entitled to the December 22, 2009 priority date, making the asserted prior art unavailable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “the time of the invention as someone that would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a closely related field, and one to three years of experience working with wirelessly connected mobile devices that used common wireless communications protocols such as Bluetooth and 802.11.” 537 Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1203 ¶¶ 29–32). Petitioner also contends that this description “would not differ materially between December 2008 and June 2013,” the earliest possible priority date for the patents-at-issue and the priority date alleged by Petitioner, respectively. Petitioner further contends that more education “would compensate for less work experience and vice versa.” Id. Petitioner. 537 PO Resp. 6−7; 538 PO Resp. 6−7. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s description as our own. We adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art particularly because it specifies having one to three years of experience working with wireless devices that use Bluetooth and 802.11.” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner construes the claims to have their “plain and ordinary meaning” and contends “that no terms invoke means-plus-function analysis.” 537 Pet. 17–18; 538 Pet. 18−19. Patent Owner does not contend that any terms require construction. 537 PO Resp. 6; 538 PO Resp. 6. We have not identified any terms that require construction for us to decide the threshold issue of priority. And given that the parties have no disputed terms, no claim terms are hereby construed.” slip op. at 17

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

    “The written description requirement is satisfied when “the missing descriptive matter” is necessarily present in the original “application’s specification such that one skilled in the art would recognize such a disclosure.” Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Thus, it is sufficient to show that the written description actually or inherently discloses the claim element. TurboCare Div. of Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 264 F.3d 1111, 1118−20 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We also note that Patent Owner argues that the field of the 948 application is a predictable application of wireless communications, which, compared to other complex and unpredictable technologies, would require a lower level of detail to satisfy the requirement. See Hologic, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 884 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“the level of detail required . . . varies depending on the nature and scope of the claims and on the complexity and predictability of the relevant technology.”); 537 PO Resp. 26−27; 537 Edwards Decl. ¶¶ 82, 87; 537 Surreply 8.” slip op. at 20

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for patent owner

    “1277 (Fed. Cir. 2011); PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008). At issue in the instant proceedings is the first requirement, whether the written description of the 948 application is sufficient, because Petitioner contends that the claims of the ’933 and ’054 patent are not entitled to claim priority to ancestry applications under 35 U.S.C. § 120. 537 Pet. 18.43 We disagree with Petitioner because we find that the claims are supported by the written description of the 948 application disclosure.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 9,173,054 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 9,173,054
• Microsoft Corporation v. Interdigital Patent Holdings, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 23, 2025 · IPR2024-00537 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held all challenged claims of the ’933 and ’054 patents not unpatentable because the claims are entitled to priority to December 22, 2009, making Forutanpour not prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd all claims patentableNot shown unpatentable

    “VI. ANALYSIS OF UNPATENTABILITY Because of our determination that the priority date of December 22, 2009 is appropriate, we conclude that the Forutanpour reference (a U.S. patent application published on April 7, 2011) is not prior art. presented in either Petition. VII. CONCLUSION Having reviewed the argument and supporting evidence of record, and after a full and fair hearing, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that any of the challenged claims of the ’933 and ’054 patents are unpatentable.” slip op. at 36

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Entitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

    “Thus, we find that the 948 application reasonably conveys to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the inventors contemplated the communication of wireless devices to continue using the known method of file/data transfers via Wi-Fi and that the technique for device discovery using Bluetooth would additionally provide environment information useful for assessing which nearby device has the TapApp functionality. Disclosure of the knowledge of wireless radio dialogue between devices to collect further information to provide a particular location of a device informs a person of ordinary skill in the art that the 948 application was not limited to using only Bluetooth for the method performed by the WTRU, culminating in data transfer.” slip op. at 23

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artDecided for patent owner

    “sufficiency of the written description, we conclude that the 948 application sufficiently describes Wi-Fi transfer for data transmissions in WTRUs even if the method also uses Bluetooth for selecting target WTRUs. Accordingly, the claims of the ’933 and ’054 patents are entitled to the priority date of December 22, 2009, the date of the 948 application. VI. ANALYSIS OF UNPATENTABILITY Because of our determination that the priority date of December 22, 2009 is appropriate, we conclude that the Forutanpour reference (a U.S. patent application published on April 7, 2011) is not prior art.” slip op. at 36

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “F. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner identifies a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the invention as someone that would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a closely related field, and one to three years of experience working with wirelessly connected mobile devices that used common wireless communications protocols such as Bluetooth and 802.11.” 537 Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1203 ¶¶ 29–32). Petitioner also contends that this description “would not differ materially between December 2008 and June 2013,” the earliest possible priority date for the patents-at-issue and the priority date alleged by Petitioner, respectively. Petitioner further contends that more education “would compensate for less work experience and vice versa.” Id. Petitioner. 537 PO Resp. 6−7; 538 PO Resp. 6−7. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s description as our own. We adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art particularly because it specifies having one to three years of experience working with wireless devices that use Bluetooth and 802.11.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 8,737,933 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,737,933
• Linkedin Corporation v. Ebuddy Technologies B.V.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 30, 2023 · IPR2022-00164 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision

  LinkedIn did not prove claims 1–3 and 6–10 unpatentable on any asserted Eaton- or Kim-based anticipation or obviousness ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeOther

    “In its Motion to Exclude, Patent Owner seeks to exclude Petitioner’s Exhibits 1017–1020, 1022–1026, 1030, 1032, 1033, 1034, and 1036. Mot. 1. Even without excluding any of these exhibits, Petitioner has not proven that any challenged claims are unpatentable. Thus, we dismiss Patent Owner’s Substitute Motion to Exclude as moot.” slip op. at 36

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner’s alternative definition that “a PHOSITA[3] would possess equivalent additional formal education such as graduate studies, or work experience to replace formal education” is unclear or, at best, does not meaningfully contribute to the first definition. See id. For example, Petitioner does not explain whether or how additional graduate studies would be both equivalent and additional to the education described in the first definition. See id. Patent Owner does not propose an alternative definition. See generally PO Resp.; Sur-reply. Thus, in this decision, we apply Petitioner’s proposed definition, without the alternative qualifier about “equivalent additional formal education . . . or work experience.” See Pet. 6. We determine that Petitioner’s definition is supported by the testimony of Dean Willis. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 32–35.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “B. Claim Construction We need only construe terms that are in controversy and only to the extent necessary to resolve the dispute. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We need not construe any terms to resolve the issues in this case.” slip op. at 6

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “We credit Dr. Rajeev Surati’s testimony6 (Ex. 2020 ¶ 2053) on this issue over Dean Willis’s testimony (Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 211–13) because Dr. Rajeev Surati’s testimony is more consistent with Kim’s disclosure and Dean Willis’s Declaration lacks an adequate explanation. Thus, Petitioner has not shown that Kim discloses the associating step.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 8,230,135 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,230,135
• Linkedin Corporation v. Ebuddy Technologies B.V.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 30, 2023 · IPR2022-00165 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3 and 6–10 were not shown unpatentable because Eaton and Kim each failed to disclose the claimed array and alternative-title limitations, and the obviousness grounds did not cure those deficiencies.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “alternative” or “alternative title.” Neither party contends that “alternative” or “alternative title” is a term of art with an art recognized meaning. In plain English, “alternative” as an adjective designates something that is another option, another choice. Dictionary.com (accessed June 23, 2022), https://www.dictionary.com/browse/alternative (Ex. 3002) (“affording a choice of two or more things, propositions, or courses of action,” “(of two things, propositions, or courses) mutually exclusive so that if one is chosen the other must be rejected: The alternative possibilities are neutrality and war.”). The specification of the ’179 patent also consistently uses the word “alternative” to mean something in lieu of or in place of another choice. For instance, the ’179 patent describes: Advantageously, data associated with the event can also (or in the alternative) be provided to the title provisioning engine 616. Ex. 1001, 8:15–17 (distinguishing “also” from “alternative”). A given event may cause the title provisioning engine 616 to rewrite the entire title array 618 with title strings associated with the most recent events. Alternatively, a given event may cause the title provisioning engine 616 to append title strings to the end of the title array 618. Id. at 8:24–28 (using “alternative” in mutually exclusive context). slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “During oral hearing, counsel for Petitioner clarified that the index to an array may start from “0” rather than “1” and that the index also need not be a number. Tr. 18:13–19:19. With that clarification, counsel for Patent Owner indicated that there no longer is any dispute with regard to the meaning of “array.” Tr. 61:14–25. Accordingly, we have no need to construe the term “array.” 4. “event” The term “event” is recited in independent claim 1. The specification” slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “reproduced above, are “event messages / strings 300 (shaded in green).” Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 31). But the cited evidence does not support that assertion. Paragraph 31 of Eaton describes the referenced column simply as “associated event 300.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 31. Further, even if the column stores associated event messages, Petitioner cites nothing to show that the associated messages in server memory column 300 are the event presence notification messages discussed above in the context of limitation 1[ii]. Alternatively, Petitioner relies on Eaton’s Figure 6 embodiment. Pet. 31. Petitioner asserts (id.) that in the Figure 6 embodiment server memory 160 stores an array of event notifications, referencing an annotated version of Eaton’s Figure 6, reproduced below: Figure 6 is a block diagram of an alternate embodiment of a server memory for use within a server of the instant message communication system, and Petitioner has shaded the EVENT AN–NN column green and the words “SERVER MEMORY” red. Ex. 1006 ¶ 19. Petitioner asserts that both the TOPIC N column 540 and the EVENT AN-NN column 670 as the stored event notifications. Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 56–58). But the assertion is not supported by the cited evidence. Paragraphs 56–58 of Eaton do not indicate that either topic entries 540 or event entries 670 are the event presence notification messages discussed above in the context of limitation 1[ii]. In its Reply, Petitioner asserts that event presence notification message EPNM “is associated with the character strings labelled Topics [1]- [N], and using ‘Topic N’ as the example, it is tied to ‘Event[s] AN-NN’ (representing the ‘events’ from the plurality of events 180 discussed in Claim 1[i]).” Reply 22. Even assuming that there is an association, Petitioner still has not shown that EPNM is any of Topics [1]-[N] in Figure 6. Similarly, Petitioner has not shown that EPNM is any of Event [1]-[N] in Figure 2.” slip op. at 26

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “’179 Patent as provided above in Ground 1. To the extent that there are arguably any meaningful differences between those claims and Eaton’s disclosures, those differences would have been trivial and obvious modifications to make for a PHOSITA.” Pet. 49. This conclusory assertion of obviousness does not specifically identify any difference between the claimed invention and Eaton, and does not provide any reasoning or rational underpinning to support the assertion. Conclusory assertions of obviousness are insufficient to satisfy Petitioner’s burden of proof. In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Petitioner asserts that to the extent that Eaton discloses various, “distinct” embodiments, it would have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art to combine Eaton’s teachings into a single system. Pet. 49. Petitioner also asserts that one with ordinary skill in the art “would understand that Eaton discloses possible configurations and/or operations of the same system, and to the extent that it is argued or found otherwise, the functions would have been entirely obvious to combine for [one of ordinary skill in the art] given Eaton’s express disclosures.” Id. It is uncertain what distinct embodiments are referred to by Petitioner. However, even assuming that the disclosures of Eaton’s embodiments, already discussed by Petitioner, are properly combinable, there still remains the deficiencies, discussed above in the alleged anticipation of claim 1 by Eaton, relating to the step of storing the event notification in an array, the step of providing the event notification from the array to a process executed by a processor, and the step of providing an alternative title from the array to the process. Accord Inst. Dec. 57.” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 8,402,179 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,402,179
• Bank Of America, N.A. v. Nant Holdings IP, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 2, 2023 · IPR2021-01333 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 18, 26, 27, 29, and 31 were not shown unpatentable because Ogasawara did not disclose claim 18’s determining limitation, and the obviousness grounds did not cure that deficiency.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a “Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, Computer Engineering, or equivalent, and one to two years of experience 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 287–88 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103. Because the ’252 patent was filed before the effective date of the relevant amendment, the pre-AIA versions of §§ 102, 103 apply. working with image processing, image recognition, or a related field.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 43). Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Jeffrey Rodriguez. Ex. 1003 ¶ 43. Patent Owner does not propose a description of the level of ordinary skill in the art or dispute Petitioner’s description. PO Resp. 15. We adopt Petitioner’s description, which is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction In an inter partes review proceeding, a patent claim is construed using the same standard used in federal district court in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2020). Patent Owner proposes construing the term “the image” in all challenged claims to refer to “the same, single image.” PO Resp. 20. Based on this proposed construction, Patent Owner argues that the combination of Ogasawara and Bolle does not teach the limitations of claim 31. Id. at 59–60. As discussed below, for reasons unrelated to the term “the image,” Petitioner does not meet its burden to show that the challenged claims are unpatentable. See Sections II.D–II.F. Therefore, we determine that the term “the image” does not require an express construction to resolve the parties’ disputes regarding the asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 6

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner does not show persuasively that Ogasawara expressly or implicitly discloses the determining limitation of claim 18. The portions of Ogasawara cited by Petitioner indicate that Ogasawara’s computing platform invokes its recognition software to analyze image data without first determining if the image contains a recognizable symbol. See Pet. 23–25 (citing Ex. 1005, 18:11–58, 20:41–67, 21:15–20). Ogasawara discloses that the user of its device verifies that an image contains an entire symbol when capturing the image and before transmitting the image data to the computing platform. Ex. 1005, 20:47–51 (“While the consumer is scanning a particular bar code with the digital camera, . . . the consumer can visually verify that the entire image has been captured.”); see also id. at 20:41–47, 22:10–13, 22:59–63 (disclosing that a user captures an image of an item’s bar code by placing it within the image field of the digital camera). As a result, when Ogasawara’s computing platform receives the image data, it simply invokes recognition software to analyze the image data.2 Id. at 18:32–37, 21:17–20. For example, Ogasawara discloses that “[o]nce the bar code image has been captured, the program decodes the bar code image data . . . by operating on the bar code image with pattern recognition software.” Id. at 21:17–20; see also id. at 18:32–37 (“Once this information is received . . . , a character 2 In fact, Petitioner appears to acknowledge that Ogasawara’s device operates in this manner. Pet. 24–25 (“[o]nce the bar code image has been captured, the program decodes the bar code image data . . . with pattern recognition software.”). recognition and/or pattern recognition application routine can be invoked . . . to . . . decode the bar code.”). Thus, Ogasawara supports Patent Owner’s position that Ogasawara’s computing platform does not determine if an image contains a recognizable symbol before analyzing the image. Petitioner argues that the term “recognize” in Ogasawara discloses determining if an image contains a recognizable symbol, whereas the term “decode” discloses analyzing the symbol to extract information. Pet. Reply 6 (“capture, recognize and decode captured images.”). We disagree. Ogasawara uses both terms—recognize and decode—to describe analyzing image data to extract information. Ex. 1005, 18:32–37, 21:17–20. For example, Ogasawara discloses that its computing platform invokes recognition software “to either decode the bar code videographic data or to perform pattern recognition functions on a[n] icon-like patter[n].” Id. at 18:32–37 (emphases added); see also id. at 21:17–20 (“the program decodes the bar code image data . . . by operating on the bar code image with pattern recognition software”) (emphases added). Thus, Petitioner’s reliance on the term “recognize” does not show that Ogasawara discloses the determining limitation of claim 18. For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner does not show sufficiently” slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner does not show persuasively that Ogasawara expressly or implicitly discloses the determining limitation of claim 18. The portions of Ogasawara cited by Petitioner indicate that Ogasawara’s computing platform invokes its recognition software to analyze image data without first determining if the image contains a recognizable symbol. See Pet. 23–25 (citing Ex. 1005, 18:11–58, 20:41–67, 21:15–20). Ogasawara discloses that the user of its device verifies that an image contains an entire symbol when capturing the image and before transmitting the image data to the computing platform. Ex. 1005, 20:47–51 (“While the consumer is scanning a particular bar code with the digital camera, . . . the consumer can visually verify that the entire image has been captured.”); see also id. at 20:41–47, 22:10–13, 22:59–63 (disclosing that a user captures an image of an item’s bar code by placing it within the image field of the digital camera). As a result, when Ogasawara’s computing platform receives the image data, it simply invokes recognition software to analyze the image data.2 Id. at 18:32–37, 21:17–20. For example, Ogasawara discloses that “[o]nce the bar code image has been captured, the program decodes the bar code image data . . . by operating on the bar code image with pattern recognition software.” Id. at 21:17–20; see also id. at 18:32–37 (“Once this information is received . . . , a character 2 In fact, Petitioner appears to acknowledge that Ogasawara’s device operates in this manner. Pet. 24–25 (“[o]nce the bar code image has been captured, the program decodes the bar code image data . . . with pattern recognition software.”). recognition and/or pattern recognition application routine can be invoked . . . to . . . decode the bar code.”). Thus, Ogasawara supports Patent Owner’s position that Ogasawara’s computing platform does not determine if an image contains a recognizable symbol before analyzing the image. Petitioner argues that the term “recognize” in Ogasawara discloses determining if an image contains a recognizable symbol, whereas the term “decode” discloses analyzing the symbol to extract information. Pet. Reply 6 (“capture, recognize and decode captured images.”). We disagree. Ogasawara uses both terms—recognize and decode—to describe analyzing image data to extract information. Ex. 1005, 18:32–37, 21:17–20. For example, Ogasawara discloses that its computing platform invokes recognition software “to either decode the bar code videographic data or to perform pattern recognition functions on a[n] icon-like patter[n].” Id. at 18:32–37 (emphases added); see also id. at 21:17–20 (“the program decodes the bar code image data . . . by operating on the bar code image with pattern recognition software”) (emphases added). Thus, Petitioner’s reliance on the term “recognize” does not show that Ogasawara discloses the determining limitation of claim 18. For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner does not show sufficiently” slip op. at 11

  Patent outcomesUS 7,899,252 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,899,252
• Xactware Solutions, Inc. v. Pictometry International Corp.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 28, 2017 · IPR2016-00593 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held that claims 12–15, 21–23, 25–27, 33–38, 44, and 45 were not shown unpatentable because Pictometry was not established as a publicly accessible printed publication.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable

    “Version 2.7 (“EFS 2.7 User Guide,” “Pictometry,” or “User Guide”) and, as the name suggests, is a user guide for the Pictometry software product. See Ex. 1004, xiii. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner does not demonstrate that Pictometry is prior art. PO Resp. 5–10. In our Final Written Decision in IPR2016-00594, we considered substantively the same arguments and evidence Patent Owner and Petitioner raise in this case. See IPR2016-00594 FWD 17–29; compare IPR2016-00594 Paper 31, 13–20 with PO Resp. 6– 13; and compare IPR2016-00594 Paper 33, 3–9 with Reply 4–11. In IPR2016-00594, we found Pictometry’s limited dissemination to some governmental entities subject to licensing restrictions was not sufficient to show public dissemination or public accessibility. IPR2016-00594 FWD 17–29. We adopt that same finding here. For the reasons explained in IPR2016-00594, we find that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that Pictometry was publicly accessible so as to render it a printed publication under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b) and 311(b).” slip op. at 6

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

    “substantively the same as the arguments made in IPR2016-00594. In IPR2016-00594, we denied Patent Owner’s motion to exclude Exhibit 1004 (Pictometry), Exhibit 1011 (a Merriam-Webster Dictionary Definition “database” copied from a web page), Exhibit 2010 (Cohasset Town Report 2008), 2011 (LARIAC1 Pictometry Training), Exhibit 2012 (LAR-IAC2 Product Guide), Exhibit 2020 (“GIS: Pictometry: Oblique Imagery training), Exhibit 2021 (“Pictometry License Guidelines”), and Exhibit 2022 (“Pictometry – April 19, 2007”). IPR2016-00594 FWD 5–17. We granted Patent Owner’s motion to exclude Exhibit 2013 (article titled “Los Angeles County Extends its License Agreement with Pictometry for New Oblique Aerial Photos”), Exhibit 2014 (“Pictometry Administrative Training”), Exhibit 2015 (“Information about TXWILM Administrative Training”), Exhibit 2016 (“Pictometry Administrative Training”), Exhibit 2019 (“GIS Working Group Meeting Minutes”), Exhibit 2023 (“Welcome to Your End User Training”), Exhibit 2024 (“Electronic Field Study Getting Started Guide”), Exhibit 2025 (“Pictometry Announces Technical Advancements for GIS Professionals1”), and Exhibit 2026 (“Pictometry Announces Technical Advancements for GIS Professionals2”). Id. We adopt the same findings and conclusions here. For the reasons explained in IPR2016-00594, we deny the motion to exclude Exhibits 1004, 1011, 2010, 2011, 2020, 2021, and 2022, but grant the motion to exclude Exhibits 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2019, 2023, 2024, 2025, and 2026. See id.” slip op. at 5

  Patent outcomesUS 8,823,732 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 8,823,732
• Xactware Solutions, Inc. v. Pictometry International Corp.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 24, 2017 · IPR2016-00594 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Final written decision

  Petitioner did not prove claims 1–10 and 13–20 unpatentable because it failed to establish that Pictometry was a publicly accessible printed publication.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMixed

    “Mot. Reply 3. Given the sequence of events, there is no prejudice to Petitioner, who introduced these documents and was served objections at an early stage. Patent Owner apparently cited to the documents in its Patent Owner Response to preserve the right to substantively respond to these documents rather than wait to see if they were presented in Petitioner’s Reply. Pursuant to our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(c)(3), we do not dismiss Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude due to allegedly untimely filed objections.” slip op. at 6

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable

    “are also prohibited. Id. The MAPC Agreement states under “Confidentiality of Licensed Products” that the Licensed Products are commercially valuable, proprietary products owned by Pictometry and are treated by Pictometry as confidential and contain substantial trade secrets of Pictometry. Ex. 2009, 16, Article 8.4. The licensee agrees that it will not disclose, provide a copy of, or disseminate the Licensed Products and that its personnel will protect the Licensed Products from unauthorized use, disclosure, copying, and dissemination, and that access to the Licensed Products and each part thereof will be strictly limited. Id. We acknowledge that these represent significant limitations on the dissemination of the User Guide.” slip op. at 21

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “involving the EFS software and provides no evidence that the EFS software and the EFS 2.7 User Guide were actually maintained confidential by the parties of the MAPC Agreement, or that the EFS software and the EFS 2.7 User Guide were inaccessible to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Reply 9. However, this improperly puts the burden to disprove public accessibility on Patent Owner. Although Patent Owner challenges whether Pictometry is a printed publication, the burden remains on Petitioner to demonstrate unpatentability. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (discussing the burden of proof in an inter partes review). Petitioner must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims are unpatentable, and one aspect of such a showing is that the references relied upon are patents or printed publications. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(b) 316(e).” slip op. at 22

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “preponderance of the evidence that Pictometry was publicly accessible so as to render it a printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). C. Anticipation of Claims by Pictometry Petitioner asserts that claims 1–10 and 13–20 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Pictometry. Pet. 16. As noted above, we determine that Petitioner has not shown that Pictometry is a printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Thus, Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that that claims 1–10 and 13–20 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Pictometry.” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 8,542,880 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 8,542,880
• Arista Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 25, 2017 · IPR2016-00306 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 63 was not shown unpatentable because Spinney does not disclose performing the selecting and determining steps in parallel.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “First, we give no credit to Dr. Chao’s opinion in this regard because it is not supported by Spinney. Specifically, we give no weight to Dr. Chao’s opinion that “Spinney makes clear that the CAM lookup and the hashing function (i.e., the forwarding lookup) take place at the same time.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 53. Instead, we find that the parallel operations in Spinney are confined to (1) applying the hash function to the 48-bit address and (2) performing a CAM lookup of the same 48-bit address. For example, Spinney discloses in Figure 8 that incoming address field 85 is subjected to hash function 86 to produce another 48-bit value. See id. at Fig. 8, 15:21−24; 16:16−19 (“The 48-bit destination address 61 from an incoming packet is simultaneously subjected to the hash function 86 and a CAM match” (emphasis added)), 16:44−46 (“this compare in the CAM is done in parallel with the hash function” (emphasis added)). The application of the hash function and the performance of the hash lookup are two different operations that produce different results. The hash function application produces a hashed 48-bit value, while the hash lookup results in pointing to an entry in the translation table that includes the gigaheader information, for processing the packet. See id. at Fig. 8 (identifying hash function 86 applied to input address 85, resulting in hashed address 89); 15:60−63. Spinney further discloses that the hash lookup is performed only if a CAM match is not found and, therefore, must occur after the CAM lookup is performed. Id. at 16:20–26 (“[I]f a CAM match is found in CAM 23, an index into the translation table 94 is immediately generated as indicated by the line 100. If not, the 16-bit field 88 of the hashed address 87 is used to index into the hash table 89 . . . .” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “is not supported by Spinney. Specifically, we give no weight to Dr. Chao’s opinion that “Spinney makes clear that the CAM lookup and the hashing function (i.e., the forwarding lookup) take place at the same time.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 53. Instead, we find that the parallel operations in Spinney are confined to (1) applying the hash function to the 48-bit address and (2) performing a CAM lookup of the same 48-bit address. For example, Spinney discloses in Figure 8 that incoming address field 85 is subjected to hash function 86 to produce another 48-bit value. See id. at Fig. 8, 15:21−24; 16:16−19 (“The 48-bit destination address 61 from an incoming packet is simultaneously subjected to the hash function 86 and a CAM match” (emphasis added)), 16:44−46 (“this compare in the CAM is done in parallel with the hash function” (emphasis added)). The application of the hash function and the performance of the hash lookup are two different operations that produce different results. The hash function application produces a hashed 48-bit value, while the hash lookup results in pointing to an entry in the translation table that includes the gigaheader information, for processing the packet. See id. at Fig. 8 (identifying hash function 86 applied to input address 85, resulting in hashed address 89); 15:60−63. Spinney further discloses that the hash lookup is performed only if a CAM match is not found and, therefore, must occur after the CAM lookup is performed. Id. at 16:20–26 (“[I]f a CAM match is found in CAM 23, an index into the translation table 94 is immediately generated as indicated by the line 100. If not, the 16-bit field 88 of the hashed address 87 is used to index into the hash table 89 . . . .” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 7,023,853 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 7,023,853
• Amazon.Com, Inc. / Amazon.Com, LLC et al. v. Zitovault, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 11, 2017 · IPR2016-01025 · APJ Daniel N Fishman · IPR · Final written decision

  Petitioner did not prove claims 1, 3, 5–8, and 10 unpatentable because the cited references did not adequately account for the claims’ session limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We are persuaded that our preliminary interpretation of “session” in our Decision on Institution is, at least in some respect, overly broad. Independent claims 1, 6, 7, and 10 each refer to “sessions” in plural, and independent claim 7 refers to “simultaneous” sessions. Thus, the term “session” must be understood, at least, in such a manner as to allow multiple sessions to be distinguished from one another. Although independent claim 5 does not recite “sessions” in plural, the same term should be construed consistently across all claims. Accordingly, we conclude that there must be sufficient delineation within a proper construction of “session” that separates a “session” between one client and one server and a different “session” when one of the client and server are replaced, and that separates multiple sessions from each other even between the same pair of client and server. During Oral Hearing there were extensive discussions regarding proper construction of “session.” See Tr. 7:9–22:18, 43:11–65:15, 74:21–76:13. At Oral Hearing, counsel for Petitioner agreed that “session” should be understood as communications having a recognizable beginning and a recognizable end. Id. at 10:13–16 (“Of course a session has a beginning and an end. I think that is axiomatic in a session. I think that is how Dr. Rubin defined it in his declaration”); see also id. at 12:21–13:5, Ex. 1005 ¶ 41. Patent Owner also agreed that if the construction of session is made to include a recognizable beginning and a recognizable end, that would be a proper construction for the term:” slip op. at 12

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has failed to identify what constitutes a “session” in Feinberg in accordance with a proper construction of “session.” That proper construction of “session” is set forth above and has been agreed to by the parties. Tr. 10:13–16, 53:13–54:10. We state it again here: “a set of transmitters and receivers, and the data streams that flow between them wherein each data stream flowing between the transmitters and receivers has a recognizable beginning of the data stream transmission and a recognizable end of the data stream transmission.” Petitioner identifies Feinberg’s disclosure of forwarding (shunting) received requests from the primary server to secondary servers (for purposes of load balancing) teaches the recited “communication between the main server and agent server enlists additional agent servers to support incremental secure sessions in response to maintaining performance at a desired level.” Pet. 21–23 (emphasis added). The analysis is excessively generic for the claim recitation of “incremental secure sessions.” It is uncertain what Petitioner regards as a session in Feinberg much less how it begins and how it ends. It is unexplained by Petitioner whether a request in Feinberg begins a session, or something else in Feinberg begins a session. We decline to speculate in that regard. It is Petitioner who bears the burden of proof, and who must account for all the limitations in a claim. In that regard, we note further that it is insufficient for Petitioner to present only dots that may be connected in some unspecified manner to yield the claimed invention. Instead, Petitioner must make a sufficient connection through the dots to demonstrate a full accounting of the claimed invention.” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “that the system supports “incremental secure sessions.” The Petition relies on Feinberg for disclosing such sessions, presenting the same arguments as those it presents for claim 6. See Pet. 33–34. Patent Owner argues Feinberg fails to disclose sessions for the same reasons as those that Patent Owner presented with respect to claim 6. See PO Resp. 36–37. Petitioner’s Reply asserts essentially the same arguments for claim 1 as it does for claim 6 regarding “incremental secure sessions.” Pet. Reply 17. Petitioner does not rely on Bhaskaran to alleviate the above-identified deficiency in the analysis of Feinberg with respect to claim 6. The standard for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is what would have been taught or suggested to the ordinarily skilled artisan with based on the references. The key to supporting any prima facie conclusion of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is the clear articulation of the reason(s) why the claimed invention would have been obvious and, the Court has noted that, the analysis supporting an obviousness assertion should be made explicit. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)). A “legal determinations of obviousness, as with such determinations generally, should be based on evidence rather than on mere speculation or conjecture.” Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2006). As discussed supra, Petitioner failed to account adequately for the recited “sessions.” Therefore, Petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that independent claims 1, 6, and 10 would have been obvious over Feinberg and Bhaskaran and, for the same reasons, has failed to establish claim 3, dependent from claim 1, would have been obvious over Feinberg and Bhaskaran.” slip op. at 24

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “Initially, we note Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude fails to identify the portions of Dr. Rubin’s Declaration that allegedly fail to be based upon sufficient facts or data, that allegedly are the product of unreliable principles and methods, or that allegedly fail to reliably apply sound principles and methods to the facts of the case. There is no requirement for an exact or perfect match between the expert’s experience and the field of the patent. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 1360, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Thus, Patent Owner fails to meet its burden with respect to this Motion to Exclude. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). Furthermore, regarding the objections under FRE 702, we note that under 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a), “[e]xpert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” Consequently, this objection more properly goes to the weight to be given Dr. Rubin’s testimony, and not to its admissibility. In any event, Patent Owner’s argument, that Petitioner did not explain the evidentiary weight or standard that was applied by Dr. Rubin, is misplaced. We note that Dr. Rubin is an expert witness, not a fact finder or a tribunal making fact findings. Dr. Rubin need only provide his opinion and, preferably, also provide the underlying reasoning, inclusive of data and facts, in support of his opinion. For the above reasons, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is denied.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 6,484,257 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 6,484,257
• Amazon.Com, Inc. / Amazon.Com, LLC et al. v. Zitovault, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 11, 2017 · IPR2016-00021 · APJ Daniel N Fishman · IPR · Final written decision

  Petitioner did not prove claims 1, 3, 5–8, and 10 unpatentable: the asserted grounds did not adequately identify sessions with recognizable beginnings and ends.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “We are persuaded that our preliminary interpretation of “session” in our Decision on Institution is, at least in some respect, overly broad. Independent claims 1, 6, 7, and 10 each refer to “sessions” in plural, and independent claim 7 refers to “simultaneous” sessions. Thus, the term “session” must be understood, at least, in such a manner as to allow multiple sessions to be distinguished from one another. Although independent claim 5 does not recite “sessions” in plural, the same term should be construed consistently across all claims. Accordingly, we conclude that there must be sufficient delineation within a proper construction of “session” that separates a “session” between one client and one server and a different “session” when one of the client and server are replaced, and that separates multiple sessions from each other even between the same pair of client and server. During Oral Hearing there were extensive discussions regarding proper construction of “session.” See Tr. 7:9–22:18, 43:11–65:15, 74:21–76:13. At Oral Hearing, counsel for Petitioner agreed that “session” should be understood as communications having a recognizable beginning and a recognizable end. Id. at 10:13–16 (“Of course a session has a beginning and an end. I think that is axiomatic in a session. I think that is how Dr. Rubin defined it in his declaration”); see also id. at 12:21–13:5, Ex. 1005 ¶ 41. Patent Owner also agreed that if the construction of session is made to include a recognizable beginning and a recognizable end, that would be a proper construction for the term:” slip op. at 12

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has failed to identify what constitutes a “session” in Feinberg in accordance with a proper construction of “session.” That proper construction of “session” is set forth above and has been agreed to by the parties. Tr. 10:13–16, 53:13–54:10. We state it again here: “a set of transmitters and receivers, and the data streams that flow between them wherein each data stream flowing between the transmitters and receivers has a recognizable beginning of the data stream transmission and a recognizable end of the data stream transmission.” Petitioner identifies Feinberg’s disclosure of forwarding (shunting) received requests from the primary server to secondary servers (for purposes of load balancing) teaches the recited “communication between the main server and agent server enlists additional agent servers to support incremental secure sessions in response to maintaining performance at a desired level.” Pet. 21–23 (emphasis added). The analysis is excessively generic for the claim recitation of “incremental secure sessions.” It is uncertain what Petitioner regards as a session in Feinberg much less how it begins and how it ends. It is unexplained by Petitioner whether a request in Feinberg begins a session, or something else in Feinberg begins a session. We decline to speculate in that regard. It is Petitioner who bears the burden of proof, and who must account for all the limitations in a claim. In that regard, we note further that it is insufficient for Petitioner to present only dots that may be connected in some unspecified manner to yield the claimed invention. Instead, Petitioner must make a sufficient connection through the dots to demonstrate a full accounting of the claimed invention. Petitioner had ample notice of the possibility of a narrower interpretation of “session.” See PO Resp. 7–11, 23–24. Indeed, Petitioner responded to that possibility by referring to its own expert’s testimony that the beginning and end of a session may be signified in a variety of forms. Pet. Reply 2. See Genzyme Therapeutic Prod. Ltd. P’ship v. Biomarin Pharm. Inc., 825 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The critical question for compliance with the APA and due process is whether [the parties] received ‘adequate notice of the issues that would be considered, and ultimately resolved, at [the] hearing’”) (internal citation omitted). Nevertheless, Petitioner’s Reply still does not specifically identify a “session” within Feinberg that accounts for what constitutes a session in Feinberg, including when it begins and ends. Claim 10 recites, in pertinent part, “sharing spare CPU cycles of the computer network for encrypting and decrypting communication to provide N simultaneous secure session[s] among said network of computers.” Petitioner’s analysis with respect to the recitation of “N simultaneous secure session[s]” is deficient for the same reasons we discussed above with respect to the recitation of “incremental secure sessions” in claim 6. For the above reasons, we are not persuaded Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 6 and 10 are anticipated by Feinberg.” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “that the system supports “incremental secure sessions.” The Petition relies on Feinberg for disclosing such sessions, presenting the same arguments as those it presents for claim 6. See Pet. 33–34. Patent Owner argues Feinberg fails to disclose sessions for the same reasons as those that Patent Owner presented with respect to claim 6. See PO Resp. 36–37. Petitioner’s Reply asserts essentially the same arguments for claim 1 as it does for claim 6 regarding “incremental secure sessions.” Pet. Reply 17. Petitioner does not rely on Bhaskaran to alleviate the above-identified deficiency in the analysis of Feinberg with respect to claim 6. The standard for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is what would have been taught or suggested to the ordinarily skilled artisan with based on the references. The key to supporting any prima facie conclusion of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is the clear articulation of the reason(s) why the claimed invention would have been obvious and, the Court has noted that, the analysis supporting an obviousness assertion should be made explicit. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)). A “legal determinations of obviousness, as with such determinations generally, should be based on evidence rather than on mere speculation or conjecture.” Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2006). As discussed supra, Petitioner failed to account adequately for the recited “sessions.” Therefore, Petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that independent claims 1, 6, and 10 would have been obvious over Feinberg and Bhaskaran and, for the same reasons, has failed to establish claim 3, dependent from claim 1, would have been obvious over Feinberg and Bhaskaran.” slip op. at 24

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “Initially, we note Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude fails to identify the portions of Dr. Rubin’s Declaration that allegedly fail to be based upon sufficient facts or data, that allegedly are the product of unreliable principles and methods, or that allegedly fail to reliably apply sound principles and methods to the facts of the case. There is no requirement for an exact or perfect match between the expert’s experience and the field of the patent. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 1360, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Thus, Patent Owner fails to meet its burden with respect to this Motion to Exclude. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). Furthermore, regarding the objections under FRE 702, we note that under 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a), “[e]xpert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” Consequently, this objection more properly goes to the weight to be given Dr. Rubin’s testimony, and not to its admissibility. In any event, Patent Owner’s argument, that Petitioner did not explain the evidentiary weight or standard that was applied by Dr. Rubin, is misplaced. We note that Dr. Rubin is an expert witness, not a fact finder or a tribunal making fact findings. Dr. Rubin need only provide his opinion and, preferably, also provide the underlying reasoning, inclusive of data and facts, in support of his opinion. For the above reasons, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is denied.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 6,484,257 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 6,484,257

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.