- PTAB · May 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00085 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7–11, 13, and 15 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a), we have authority to institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Preliminary Reply, the Preliminary Sur-reply, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims of the ’659 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the Challenged Claims on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“We disagree with Patent Owner. Our analysis under Fintiv is guided by the USPTO Director’s Memorandum issued on June 21, 2022, titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation.”8 The Director’s Memorandum explains that, when a petitioner makes a Sotera-type stipulation, “it mitigates concerns of potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts between the district court and the PTAB” and “[w]ith such a stipulation, if an IPR or PGR is instituted, the grounds the PTAB resolves will differ from those present in 8 https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretio nary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf (“Director’s Memorandum”). the parallel district court litigation.” Director’s Memorandum 7 (citing Sotera, IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 18–19). Pursuant to the Director’s Memorandum, we “will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR or PGR in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Id. Because Petitioner provides a Sotera-type stipulation, we do not exercise our discretion to deny institution under Fintiv.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Upon review of the prior art of record and the parties’ arguments, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision as it appears consistent with the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art). Petitioner’s proposed definition appears overly restrictive, as it requires a graduate degree in a narrow field of engineering or equivalent experience. We find that a bachelor’s degree with the accompanying experience proposed by Patent Owner more closely aligns with the prior art of record and the ’659 patent. We note, however, there is some overlap in the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art because Patent Owner’s proposal includes “at least” a bachelor’s degree, which would encompass Petitioner’s master’s degree as well. Prelim. Resp. 19. Nonetheless, our determination herein would be the same under either party’s definition.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s claim construction. By using the word “or,” the plain and ordinary meaning of “prone, kneeling, or standing” is that only one must be satisfied to meet the claim. See, e.g., SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc., 727 F.3d 1187, 1199 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The disjunctive ‘or’ plainly designates that a series describes alternatives.”). Furthermore, and although claims are read in light of the specification, limitations in a specification are not read into a claim. In re van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Even if the Specification describes embodiments in which the user can begin in a prone position and then transition to a kneeling or standing position, as Patent Owner points out (see Prelim. Resp. 20), the claim does not recite the term “transitioning,” and we do not read the terms “each of” or “substantially flat surface” into this claim limitation. For example, the claim does not recite a “substantially flat” top surface and Patent Owner’s attempt to infer this structure into the claim is not supported under the law. See id. at 29–30. For purposes of this Decision, we agree with Petitioner and construe “prone, kneeling, or standing” in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning as alternatives, and the prior art need only show one to satisfy this aspect of the claim.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 9,586,659 - PTAB · May 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00086 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 5-8, 10-15, 17, 18, 20, and 21 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of success and declining Fintiv denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in an inter partes review). slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“1. “wherein a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in a prone, kneeling, or standing position” With respect to the claim term “wherein a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in a prone, kneeling, or standing position,” Patent Owner points to passages of the Specification, arguing that all three positions are possible. Prelim. Resp. 19–21 (citing Ex. 1001, Abstr., 4:13–17, 4:33–40; Ex. 2006 ¶ 18). We do not agree with Patent’s Owner proposed construction because even if the Specification discloses that all three positions are possible, that is not what the plain language of the claim requires. Claim 1 recites “or,” which means that a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in any one of the three positions. See, e.g., SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc., 727 F.3d 1187, 1199 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The disjunctive ‘or’ plainly designates that a series describes alternatives.”). Patent Owner does not identify any definition or disclaimer that would modify this plain meaning. See Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, we agree with Petitioner and apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase “wherein a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in a prone, kneeling, or standing position,” to construe “prone, kneeling, or standing” as alternatives, and the prior art need only show one to satisfy this aspect of the claim.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Neither party explains how or why its particular proposal impacts the issues before us in this proceeding. We find that a bachelor’s degree with the accompanying experience proposed by Patent Owner more closely aligns with the prior art of record and the ’044 patent. We note, however, there is some overlap in the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art because Patent Owner’s proposal includes “at least” a bachelor’s degree, which would encompass Petitioner’s master’s degree as well. Prelim. Resp. 10. Nonetheless, our determination herein would be the same under either party’s definition.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedInstituted
“As the Board has held in a precedential decision, “at the institution stage, the petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,359,044 - PTAB · Mar 13, 2023 · IPR2022-01303 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 2, 4–7, 9, 11–13, 45–48, 50, and 54–59 on all grounds; the Board found a reasonable likelihood that claim 54 was obvious over Gottschalk and Kramer.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“5. Weighing the Graham Factors “Once all relevant facts are found, the ultimate legal determination [of obviousness] involves the weighing of the fact findings to conclude whether the claimed combination would have been obvious to an ordinary artisan.” Arctic Cat, 876 F.3d at 1361. On balance, considering the record presently before us, which includes Petitioner’s strong showing regarding claim 54 and Patent Owner’s weaker evidence of nonobviousness, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the combination of Gottschalk and Kramer would have rendered the subject matter of claim 54 of the ’068 patent obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 38
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Additionally, the Director recently clarified the Interim Procedure, stating that “[t]he Board should first assess Fintiv factors 1–5; if that analysis supports discretionary denial, the Board should engage the compelling merits question.” CommScope Techs. LLC v. Dali Wireless, Inc., IPR2022-01242, Paper 23 at 6 (PTAB Feb. 27, 2023) (precedential). Here, we determine that, on balance, Fintiv factors 1–5 do not favor exercising our discretion to deny institution and, therefore, there is no need to determine whether the Petition establishes compelling merits. 7. Conclusion on Fintiv Factors Upon consideration of the Fintiv factors, we determine not to exercise our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 19
- Parallel petitionsDenied
“sufficiently address the challenged claims” of the ’068 patent. Notice 1. According to Petitioner, Gentex asserted a large number of claims in the parallel litigation “that are distinct from one another, that collectively comprise several thousand words of claim language.” Id. Petitioner ranks this Petition as “B” and the Petition in IPR2022-01302 as “A.” Id. at 1–2. Petitioner also explains its reasoning for the grouping of the claims challenged in each petition and that the only overlap between the two petitions is claim 1, from which a large number of claims depend. Id. at 2–3. Patent Owner did not file a response to the Notice. Nor did Patent Owner otherwise dispute Petitioner’s contentions that two petitions are necessary. See generally Prelim. Resp. On the present record, we see no reason to exercise our discretion to deny institution of either petition on the basis of Petitioner filing two petitions to address the large number of claims asserted in the related litigation. See PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 59 (Nov. 2019)10 (recognizing that one circumstance in which more than one petition may be necessary is when a patent owner asserts a large number of claims in related litigation).” slip op. at 19
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, or an equivalent field, and three to five years of experience working with computer implemented tracking systems. Additional education might compensate for less experience and vice-versa.” Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 48). Patent Owner states that “[f]or purposes of responding to [Petitioner’s] Petition for [inter partes review], Patent Owner accepts [Petitioner’s] proposed person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 6. Patent Owner further states, “[h]owever, for any other purpose, Patent Owner disagrees with [Petitioner] at least that such [person of ordinary skill in the art] would be limited to a maximum of five years of experience.” Id. And, Patent Owner further “reserves the right to offer an alternative definition based on expert evidence in the event the Petition is instituted.” Id. At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we find that Petitioner’s uncontested level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’068 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 6,757,068 - PTAB · Mar 13, 2023 · IPR2022-01302 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 14–20, 23–33, 35, and 41–44 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood claim 1 is obvious over Gottschalk and Kramer.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons below, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the Challenged Claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Memo states that it may be useful to compare a trial date with evidence of a median time to trial. Director’s Memo 8. The purpose of doing so is to ascertain the likelihood of the scheduled trial date actually occurring on or around that date. Id. at 8 (“Stakeholders correctly noted that scheduled trial dates are unreliable and often change[,]” and a “scheduled trial date . . . is not by itself a good indicator of [when] the district court trial will occur.”). The Director’s Memo does not state that median time-to-trial statistics are themselves a trial date, or otherwise replace consideration of a trial date under Fintiv factor 2. And, in the circumstances here, where the case was transferred from the Western District of Texas, the usefulness of the median time to trial statistics is less clear. Ultimately, though, we will not speculate on when a trial may be scheduled. Accordingly, factor 2 favors not exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 18
- Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner
“sufficiently address all the challenged claims” of the ’068 patent. Notice 1. According to Petitioner, Gentex asserted a large number of claims in the parallel litigation “that are distinct from one another, that collectively comprise several thousand words of claim language.” Id. Petitioner ranks this Petition as “A” and the Petition in IPR2022-01303 as “B.” Id. at 1–2. Petitioner also explains its reasoning for the grouping of the claims challenged in each petition and that the only overlap between the two petitions is claim 1, from which a large number of claims depend. Id. at 3–4. Patent Owner did not file a response to the Notice. Nor did Patent Owner otherwise dispute Petitioner’s contentions that two petitions are necessary. See generally Prelim. Resp. On the present record, we see no reason to exercise our discretion to deny institution of either petition on the basis of Petitioner filing two petitions to address the large number of claims asserted in the related litigation. See PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 59 (Nov. 2019)10 (recognizing that one circumstance in which more than one petition may be necessary is when a patent owner asserts a large number of claims in related litigation).” slip op. at 21
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“In this case, claim 1 recites mounting “a sourceless orientation tracker on a user’s head.” Ex. 1001, 15:5–6. There is no further reference to “sourceless orientation tracker” in claim 1. Id. Claim 11 recites “[t]he method of claim 1 in which the sourceless orientation tracker comprises an inertial sensor”; claim 12 recites “[t]he method of claim 1 in which the sourceless orientation tracker comprises a tilt-sensor”; and claim 13 recites “[t]he method of claim 1 in which the sourceless orientation tracker comprises a magnetic compass sensor.” Id. at 15:35–40. The parties have not identified and we do not discern anything in the language of the claims that suggests we should deviate from the plain and ordinary meaning of “sourceless orientation tracker.” We now turn to the Specification of the ’068 patent. The Specification states that “[v]irtual reality (VR) systems require tracking of the orientation and position of a user’s head and hands with respect to a world coordinate frame.” Ex. 1001, 1:11–13. The Specification also describes “a variety of mechanical, acoustic, magnetic, and optical systems” used for such tracking and states that “[t]hese systems require propagation of a signal between a fixed ‘source’ and the tracked ‘sensor,’” which “limit[s] the range of operation.” Id. at 1:15–20. The Specification describes that “‘[s]ourceless’ orientation trackers have been developed based on geomagnetic and/or inertial sensors.” Id. at 1:26–27. And, the Specification explains that “the invention features a sourceless orientation tracker including an inertial sensor, a tilt-sensor, or a magnetic compass sensor.” Id. at 2:6–8.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 6,757,068 - PTAB · Mar 13, 2023 · IPR2022-01298 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2–12, 16–18, and 38 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would be obvious over Gottschalk and Kramer.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Memo states that it may be useful to compare a trial date with evidence of a median time to trial. Director’s Memo 8. The purpose of doing so is to ascertain the likelihood of the scheduled trial date actually occurring on or around that date. Id. at 8 (“Stakeholders correctly noted that scheduled trial dates are unreliable and often change[,]” and a “scheduled trial date . . . is not by itself a good indicator of [when] the district court trial will occur.”). The Director’s Memo does not state that median time-to-trial statistics are themselves a trial date, or otherwise replace consideration of a trial date under Fintiv factor 2. And, in the circumstances here, where the case was transferred from the Western District of Texas, the usefulness of the median time to trial statistics is less clear. Ultimately, though, we will not speculate on when a trial may be scheduled. Accordingly, factor 2 favors not exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 11
- Parallel petitionsDenied
“sufficiently address all the challenged claims” of the ’648 patent. Not. 1. According to Petitioner, “Patent Owner, via an exclusive licensee,” asserted a large number of claims in co-pending litigation “that are distinct from one another, that collectively comprise several thousand words of claim language.” Id. Petitioner ranks this Petition as “A” and the Petition in IPR2022-01301 as “B.” Id. at 1–2.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“obviousness] involves the weighing of the fact findings to conclude whether the claimed combination would have been obvious to an ordinary artisan.” Arctic Cat, 876 F.3d at 1361. On balance, considering the record presently before us, which includes Petitioner’s strong showing regarding claim 1 and Patent Owner’s weaker evidence of nonobviousness, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the combination of Gottschalk and Kramer would have rendered the subject matter of claim 1 of the ’648 patent obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. 6. Summary of Claim 1 For all the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Gottschalk and Kramer.” slip op. at 37
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, or an equivalent field, and three to five years of experience working with computer implemented tracking systems, virtual reality systems, and/or augmented reality systems” but that “[a]dditional education might compensate for less experience and vice-versa.” Pet. 24–25 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 48–49). For purposes of this proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 6. Patent Owner further states, “[h]owever, for any other purpose, Patent Owner disagrees with Petitioner at least that such [person of ordinary skill in the art] would be limited to a maximum of five years of experience.” Id. at 6. And, Patent Owner further “reserves the right to offer an alternative definition based on expert evidence in the event the Petition is instituted.” Id. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’648 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,301,648 - PTAB · Feb 8, 2023 · IPR2022-01328 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 10–18, 31, and 32 under § 103 over Hardin ’665 and Salmre, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons below, Petitioner has established a reasonable 1 Petitioner’s Preliminary Reply is limited to the issue of discretionary denial pursuant to Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential), and, particularly, the effect of Samsung’s stipulation in related litigation, in accordance with Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A). likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the Challenged Claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateOther
“Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in IPR2022-01327, Paper 13, we: (1) determine, based on the present record, that the Challenged Claims of the ’387 patent are not entitled to the priority date of the ’094 application, and, therefore, Hardin ’665 is available as prior art to the ’387 patent; (2) determine that, on balance, considering the record presently before us, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the combination of Hardin ’665 and Salmre would have rendered the subject matter of claims 10–18, 31, and 32 of the ’387 patent obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention; (3) decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and Fintiv; and (4) decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 17
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedOther
“Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in IPR2022-01327, Paper 13, we: (1) determine, based on the present record, that the Challenged Claims of the ’387 patent are not entitled to the priority date of the ’094 application, and, therefore, Hardin ’665 is available as prior art to the ’387 patent; (2) determine that, on balance, considering the record presently before us, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the combination of Hardin ’665 and Salmre would have rendered the subject matter of claims 10–18, 31, and 32 of the ’387 patent obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention; (3) decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and Fintiv; and (4) decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in IPR2022-01327, Paper 13, we: (1) determine, based on the present record, that the Challenged Claims of the ’387 patent are not entitled to the priority date of the ’094 application, and, therefore, Hardin ’665 is available as prior art to the ’387 patent; (2) determine that, on balance, considering the record presently before us, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the combination of Hardin ’665 and Salmre would have rendered the subject matter of claims 10–18, 31, and 32 of the ’387 patent obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention; (3) decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and Fintiv; and (4) decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 17
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,049,387 - PTAB · Jan 5, 2023 · PGR2022-00046 · APJ Robert L Kinder · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on the design claim, finding PayPal more likely than not anticipates and renders the claim obvious; it also instituted on all other petition grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority to determine whether to institute a post-grant review under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018), which provides that review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition,” if “not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Applying that standard, for reasons explained below, we grant the Petition and institute a post-grant review of the challenged claim.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner further asserts that “[t]he designer of ordinary skill would be someone with a background in designing animated GUI’s, such as animated GUI’s that facilitate financial transactions.” Id. at 64 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 109). Based on the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s identification of the ordinary observer and designer of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision because they are consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art references and the ’453 patent, supported by witness testimony, and unopposed by Patent Owner at this juncture.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“portion with animated [GUI].” Ex. 1001, code (57). “Petitioner proposes that the ’453 Patent claim should be construed as a display screen portion with an animated graphical user interface displaying a series of images including the elements shown in non-broken lines in FIGS. 1-4,” and “in accordance with its explicit statements that the broken lines and the dot lines ‘form[] no part of the claimed design’ and that ‘[t]he process or period in 8 Petitioner refers to a graphical user interface as a GUI. which one image transitions to another image forms no part of the claimed design.’” Pet. 43–44. For purposes of this Decision, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed construction that the claim encompasses a display screen portion with an animated graphical user interface displaying a series of images including the elements shown in non-broken lines and agree that the broken lines and dot lines in the figures form no part of the claimed design. See id. To the extent that the features of the claimed design require further discussion, however, we provide it in our assessment of the challenges, which we turn to next.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner explains that PayPal was publicly accessible because “MPEP § 2128 states that YouTube videos ‘can be sources of prior art, provided the public accessibility requirements . . . are met,’” where “‘[p]rior art disclosures on the Internet . . . are considered to be publicly available as of the date the item was publicly posted,” and, here, PayPal is a YouTube video that was publicly posted on April 8, 2021 “and has received over 107,000 views,” with “a corresponding April 8, 2021 article posted by CNET [having] linked to this video.” Pet. 20 (citing MPEP § 2128; Ex. 1028). Petitioner also points out that “persons interested and having ordinary skill in cashless payment applications could locate PayPal exercising reasonabl[e] diligence . . . by searching the Internet for videos concerning QR code payment systems payments,” and that “PayPal has been viewed over 100,000 times, suggesting that PayPal is a well-known payment system and that persons interested and having ordinary skill in cashless payment applications could have easily located PayPal.” Id. at 20–21. Petitioner argues that PayPal qualifies as “otherwise available to the public” prior art because “the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office’s training materials specifically list YouTube videos as prior art that should be considered ‘otherwise available to the public’ under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (a)(1) . . . [,] [a]nd the evidence described above confirms that PayPal was otherwise available to the public as of its publication date of April 8, 2021.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1032, 15). Based on the record before us, we determine it is more likely than not that PayPal qualifies as prior art, either as a printed publication or as otherwise available to the public.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness - Resmed, Inc. v. New York UniversityInstitutedPTAB · Dec 5, 2022 · IPR2022-00989 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims and all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on obviousness over Sullivan995 and Sullivan460.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“§ 315(b) is unavailing. Rule 42.104(b) requires a petitioner to state in its petition “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed” and “specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art.” 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.104(b)(3), (b)(4). The Petition states “[t]he Board construes the claims ‘using the same claim construction standard that would be used’ in district courts.” Pet. 20. We disagree that Rule 42.104(b) or the CTPG requires Petitioner to make any specific statement if it takes the position that no express construction of claim terms is required. Rather, the CTPG states that “a petitioner may include a statement that the claim terms require no express construction.” CTPG 44.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for petitioner
“We use a two-part framework to analyze a request to exercise discretion to deny institution under § 325(d). First, we determine “whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office.” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. Second, if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, then we consider “whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of [the] challenged claims.” Id. In applying this framework, we refer to the non-exclusive factors delineated in Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to § III.C.5, first paragraph). These factors are: a) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; b) the cumulative nature of asserted art and the prior art evaluated during examination; c) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection; d) the extent of overlap between the arguments made during examination and the manner in which Petitioner relies on the prior art or Patent Owner distinguishes the prior art; e) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and f) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the Petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art or arguments. Id. at 17–18.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “in 2003 would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, biomedical engineering, or a similar technical field, with at least two years of relevant product design experience” and “[a]dditional experience could substitute for less education, and additional education could likewise substitute for less experience.” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 77). Petitioner further states that the “Petition does not turn on this precise definition, and the challenged claims would be unpatentable from the perspective of any reasonable person of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 78). Patent Owner, at this stage of the proceeding, does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 9. We find, on the current record, that the ’539 patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of appropriate skill reflected in these references and in the ’539 patent is consistent with the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” as evidence of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner propose no express construction for any claim term, at least with regard to the alleged obviousness grounds of unpatentability. See Pet. 20. In regard to the alleged anticipation grounds, Petitioner contends “the patient is in an awake state when there is an absence of obstructions or other breathing patterns indicative of sleep,” and asserts this is an “implied construction of ‘an awake state’ based on [Patent Owner’s] infringement allegations” in district court. Id. at 68, 70. Patent Owner proposes no express construction of any claim term and states “no claim terms are in controversy.” Prelim. Resp. 10. In light of our determinations below, we find that an express construction of any claim term is not necessary for purposes of rendering this Decision. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,427,539 - SAP SE v. Teradata US Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Nov 15, 2021 · IPR2021-00861 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–16 and all petitioned grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Based on the present record, we do not find Patent Owner’s proposed construction supported by the intrinsic evidence. The ordinary meaning of “manage the storage of data in the volatile storage” does not require limiting the number of copies of the data in the volatile storage, and Patent Owner does not argue to the contrary. Turning to the language of the other claims, we note that claim 5, which depends from claim 1, specifically includes additional language stating that the data is stored “only in one of two portions of the volatile storage,” but claim 1 does not include such language. The use of this additional limitation in dependent claim 5 suggests that the inventors did not intend it to be included within claim 1’s broader language reciting “manag[ing] the storage of data in the volatile storage.” See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“the presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption that the limitation in question is not present in the independent claim”). Turning to the ’923 patent specification, the portions of the specification Patent Owner relies on appear to discuss a preferred embodiment of the invention, rather than limiting the invention itself. The portions of columns 14 and 15 upon which Patent Owner relies discuss Figure 3 which, the specification explains, “depicts a volatile storage 300 that uses a persistent temperature-based storage management technique as well as a conventional storage management technique in accordance with one embodiment.” Ex. 1001, 14:48–51 (emphasis added); see id. at 5:5–8 (also describing Figure 3 as being “in accordance with one embodiment” of the invention). Interpreting claim 1 to require maintaining only a single copy of a data portion in either the first portion or second portion, where that language does not exist in claim 1, would be tantamount to reading a limitation from a preferred embodiment into the claims, which would be improper. See Philips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”). Patent Owner does not identify any portions of the specification suggesting that limiting the number of copies of the data in the volatile storage is a necessary part of the invention, or that the inventors intended to expressly or impliedly define “manage the storage of data in the volatile storage” to include this requirement. Consequently, at this stage of the proceeding, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction requiring that “manag[ing] the storage of data in the volatile storage” requires “coordinating placement of data into and out of the volatile storage so as to limit the number of copies of the data in the volatile storage.” The parties may further address the meaning of this claim phrase during the trial, if appropriate.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“3. Other Terms We determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any other claim terms at this stage of the proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention would have had “a Bachelor of Science degree in computer science and two years of industry experience or research working 2 At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner has not presented objective evidence of non-obviousness. with database and related storage management technologies,” and that “[a]dditional education, such as an M.S. in computer science, could substitute for the industry experience as it typically involves at least two years of additional study focused exclusively on computer science, as well as a thesis or project spanning several terms to implement a substantial project.” Pet. 12–13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 31). According to Petitioner, the person of ordinary skill would have “understood the advantages of partitioning a volatile memory into multiple different sections (e.g., buffer pools) and applying multiple different storage management (e.g., cache replacement) policies to those different sections, and known how to implement such designs.” Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 32). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill at this stage of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 14. For purposes of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’923 patent and the asserted prior art of record.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“At this stage of the proceeding, Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that Lee discloses this claim element. Paragraph 17 of Lee discloses the use of a temperature-based storage management technique and a non-temperature-based storage management technique (the LRU replacement policy), and that both “may be used to manage a cache.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 17. Based on the present record, Petitioner sufficiently shows that Lee’s disclosure of using these techniques “to manage a cache” involves “manag[ing] the storage of data in” the cache, because both techniques operate in order to control what data is stored in the cache. We do not find Patent Owner’s argument persuasive because it is based on Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “manag[ing] the storage of data in the volatile storage” to require “limit[ing] the number of copies of the data in the volatile storage,” which we do not adopt. See § II.A.2, supra. Consequently, we determine that, on the record before us, Petitioner’s cited evidence sufficiently supports its contentions regarding this limitation.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,851,923 - Platform Science, Inc. v. Omnitracs, LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Sep 3, 2021 · IPR2020-01612 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted rehearing and instituted IPR on all petition grounds for claims 1–4, 6–9, 11, 12, and 15, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“preliminary stage, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to claim 1.” slip op. at 44
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“The only dispute pertaining to claim construction at this stage of the proceeding is whether the phrase “a process for creating said response message,” recited in claim 1, is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.6 Petitioner 6 As noted above, Petitioner raises a second claim construction issue in its Rehearing Request. See Req. Reh’g 12–15 (asserting that the claims require only one instance of copying information from a formatted message to a response message based on which formatted message was received). Petitioner did not raise this issue in the Petition, Patent Owner has not had an contends that the phrase should be interpreted as a means-plus-function limitation, whereas Patent Owner contends that it should not. Compare Pet. 2–7 (advocating for a means-plus-function construction), with Prelim. Resp. 9–11 (advocating for an ordinary and customary meaning). At this stage of the proceeding, the dispute between the parties regarding the construction of this claim phrase does not impact our Decision. Accordingly, we need not construe expressly any claim terms for the purpose of this Decision.” slip op. at 17
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“VI. ANALYSIS Legal Standards – Anticipation “[A] claim is anticipated ‘if each and every limitation is found expressly or inherently in a single prior art reference.’” King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs., Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Anticipation is a question of fact, In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2009), assessed from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art, see Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“the dispositive question regarding anticipation [i]s whether one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer from the [prior art reference’s] teaching that every claim element was disclosed in that single reference” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted)).” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,925,308
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.