• Bizlink Technology, Inc. v. Anderson Power Products, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 7, 2025 · IPR2024-00687 · APJ Lisa L Tsang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3 and 7–12 are unpatentable; claim 4 is not shown unpatentable because Winkler does not establish that its insulating barriers press against each other when partially disconnected.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner’s first argument that a level of ordinary skill in the art that encompasses an individual having experience with electrical circuits but not electrical connectors is not consistent with the technology and descriptions in the ’017 patent. See PO Resp. 7. The field of the invention of the ’017 patent is “electrical connectors, and more particularly, . . . an electrical connector that suppresses arcing if connected or disconnected while current is flowing.” Ex. 1001, 1:7–9. Consistent therewith, the challenged claims are directed to “[a]n electrical connector pair” and recite structural features of the electrical connector pair. Id. at 4:20–56, 5:1–20.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We find that the intrinsic evidence supports maintaining our construction in the Institution Decision that “insulating” means “electrically insulating.” See Dec. 11–12. In particular, we agree with Patent Owner’s argument that the insulating barriers would be unable to be configured to “block[] substantially all through-air arcing paths between the first and second electrical contacts,” as claimed, unless they were electrically insulating. See Ex. 1001, 4:36–44. Moreover, as Patent Owner avers, our interpretation of “insulating” as it applies to the first and second insulating barriers should be the same as for the first and second housings. See Digital Biometrics, 149 F.3d at 1345 (“whatever interpretation we assign [to a word used in a claim] should encompass both uses because the same word appearing in the same claim should be interpreted consistently” (citation omitted)).” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Ex. 2001 ¶ 102. Accordingly, we find Dr. Eldering’s testimony persuasive as to this issue and determine that the diagram shows what an ordinarily skilled artisan would have reasonably inferred Winkler to disclose when the connectors are partially disconnected. Compare Ex. 1004, Fig. 2, with Pet. 33; see also Ex. 1004, 3:14–27 (discussing the process by which the connectors are engaged with each other).” slip op. at 44

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Id. at 3:27–37 (emphasis added). These wall portions 58 are located between the distal ends of the terminals and where Petitioner proposes to add a printed circuit board or wiring board to Winkler. See id. at Fig. 2; Pet. 44–46 (diagrams showing Winkler as modified to have a printed circuit board or wiring board). As such, movement of Winkler’s terminals appears to be mostly limited to within their respective receiving pockets. Given the above teachings, we fail to see how Petitioner’s proposed modification would have meaningfully interfered with the degree of freedom of movement required by Winkler’s terminals. Notably, Mr. Locati’s testimony regarding this issue is conclusory. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 120. Because movement of Winkler’s terminals occurs primarily in the receiving pockets, we also do not discern how the solder joint of Petitioner’s proposed modification would experience undue stress or risk breaking due to that movement. See Ex. 1004, 1:47–55, 3:14–37, Fig. 2; Pet. 44–46. This is particularly true in view of Winkler’s teaching that each cylindrical end portion may be soldered to a cable. See id. at 2:6–10; see also Pet. 43 (arguing that Winkler teaches soldering to a cable but not specifically to a printed circuit or wiring board). Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 8 would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Winkler and Handbook.” slip op. at 55

  Patent outcomesUS 8,808,017 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,808,017
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Power2b Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 27, 2025 · IPR2021-01257 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board held claims 1, 2, 6–8, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 21–23, 26, and 30 unpatentable as obvious over the stated Newton and Reime grounds.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “On February 12, 2025, the Federal Circuit issued an opinion vacating and remanding our Final Written Decision based on the determination of the construction of the impingement term recited in the ’170 patent. Appeal Dec. 9. More specifically, the Federal Circuit found that the Board’s construction was too limited. Id. at 8–9. The Federal Circuit found that As properly construed, in the context of the challenged claims, ‘impingement of an electromagnetic radiation spot’ must include ‘reflected, projected, and interrupted or blocked radiation.’ In other words, when a finger or non-light-emitting stylus interrupts or blocks a beam of electromagnetic radiation, and does so over a certain spot on the surface of a device, the claim limitation is satisfied. Contrary to the Board’s construction, as articulated by Power2B on appeal, the ‘electromagnetic radiation spot on . . . [the] interactive surface element’ does not ‘require[that] radiation imping[e] on the surface element’ and, hence, does not exclude interrupting or blocking radiation. Appeal Dec. 9 (citations omitted).” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “better definition for purposes of this proceeding, except we again decline to adopt “at least” because that language is vague and open-ended. With respect to the educational qualifications, Petitioner’s proposed qualifications are that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 41) (emphasis added). The claims are directed to an interactive assembly comprising at least one input sensor to provide an output indicative of an impingement of an electromagnetic radiation spot. Individuals with bachelor’s degrees in physics would be knowledgeable in researching, designing, or developing such assemblies and would be able to comprehend and evaluate the teachings of the prior art. Accordingly, Petitioner’s proposed qualifications are overly narrow in not including individuals with bachelor’s degrees in physics. With respect to work experience, a person having two years of experience would be able to comprehend and evaluate the teachings of the prior art, consistent with Petitioner’s proposal.” slip op. at 10

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “impingement of an electromagnetic radiation spot” includes “reflected, projected, and interrupted or blocked radiation” and “when a finger or nonlight-emitting stylus interrupts or blocks a beam of electromagnetic radiation, and does so over a certain spot on the surface of a device, the claim limitation is satisfied.” Appeal Dec. 9. Under this construction, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that Newton teaches this claim limitation. More specifically, Newton discloses that a user touch interrupts beams of electromagnetic radiation over certain spots over a surface, which provides an output. See Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 13, 25; see also Ex. 1002 ¶ 72. slip op. at 18

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that the claims do not require a detector assembly to be physically separate from the interactive surface element. The language of the claims does not require this, nor is there any disclosure in the ’170 patent specification that indicates that separation of these elements is required. Patent Owner refers to certain embodiments that have separate structures, but we decline to import this as a requirement to the claim term. We also agree with Petitioner that the ’170 patent broadly views what it means to be “at an edge,” and that can include being behind, about, or along an edge within its scope. See Ex. 1001, 55:63–56:2.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 9,317,170 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,317,170
• Skullcandy, Inc. v. Earin ABInstitution denied
  PTAB · Sep 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00690 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Director review

  The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 20 and 21 were unpatentable on any asserted obviousness ground.

  RulingsDirector review decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Having considered the parties’ arguments and the evidence of record, we determine that, for the reasons discussed herein, Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus decline to institute an inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354, 1359–60 (2018).” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey–Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed.Cir.1986)).” slip op. at 7

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “Analysis of the Parties’ Contentions We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition is conclusory––the Cooperstock Declaration merely reiterates the position set forth in the Petition and does not provide sufficient detail or explanation of why Olodort’s “low power state” would have been understood by a POSITA to mean that “existing connections to a second wireless earbud and to a wireless audio streaming host device will be disconnected,” as recited in claim 20. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see Pet. 23–24; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 84–87. We further agree that claim 38 is not directed to entering “a standby mode” as it recites “the low power state is a standby mode from which the second earpiece is awakened in response to detecting that the second earpiece has been attached to an ear.” Ex. 1002, claim 38 (emphasis added). As such, we agree with Patent Owner that Olodort’s “claim 38 contains no disclosure concerning what happens to ‘existing connections’ when exiting, let alone entering, the ‘standby mode.’” See Prelim. Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 1002, claims 32, 34, 38). We further agree with Patent Owner that the Cooperstock Declaration in paragraphs 86 and 87 sets forth an alternative obviousness theory “based on a modification to Olodort to add ‘circuitry for disconnecting the earbuds from one another and from any wireless audio streaming host device when in the low power state’” that is improperly incorporated by reference into the Petition. Prelim. Resp. 10–11 (emphasis added) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (A petition for inter partes review “may be considered only if . . . the petition identifies, in writing and with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for challenged to each claim.”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) (“The petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) (“Arguments must not be incorporated by reference from one document into another.”)). As such, we need not and do not consider this alternative obviousness theory.” slip op. at 18

  • Expert testimonyDecided for patent owner

    “Analysis of the Parties’ Contentions We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition is conclusory––the Cooperstock Declaration merely reiterates the position set forth in the Petition and does not provide sufficient detail or explanation of why Olodort’s “low power state” would have been understood by a POSITA to mean that “existing connections to a second wireless earbud and to a wireless audio streaming host device will be disconnected,” as recited in claim 20. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see Pet. 23–24; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 84–87. We further agree that claim 38 is not directed to entering “a standby mode” as it recites “the low power state is a standby mode from which the second earpiece is awakened in response to detecting that the second earpiece has been attached to an ear.” Ex. 1002, claim 38 (emphasis added). As such, we agree with Patent Owner that Olodort’s “claim 38 contains no disclosure concerning what happens to ‘existing connections’ when exiting, let alone entering, the ‘standby mode.’” See Prelim. Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 1002, claims 32, 34, 38). We further agree with Patent Owner that the Cooperstock Declaration in paragraphs 86 and 87 sets forth an alternative obviousness theory “based on a modification to Olodort to add ‘circuitry for disconnecting the earbuds from one another and from any wireless audio streaming host device when in the low power state’” that is improperly incorporated by reference into the Petition. Prelim. Resp. 10–11 (emphasis added) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (A petition for inter partes review “may be considered only if . . . the petition identifies, in writing and with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for challenged to each claim.”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) (“The petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) (“Arguments must not be incorporated by reference from one document into another.”)). As such, we need not and do not consider this alternative obviousness theory.” slip op. at 18

  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,402,120
• Therabody, Inc. v. Datafeel Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Aug 21, 2025 · PGR2025-00026 · APJ Lisa L Tsang · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show claim 4 more likely than not unpatentable on either obviousness or § 112 ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), a post-grant review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Post-grant review is available for patents that issue from applications that at one point contained at least one claim with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), §§ 3(n)(1), 6(f)(2)(A). Upon considering the arguments and evidence, we conclude that the information presented shows it is not more likely than not that at least one challenged claim of the ’174 patent is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art articulated by Petitioner because, based on the current record, it is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’174 patent and prior art of record. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We note, however, that our analysis below would be the same regardless of whether we adopt Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s proffered level of skill in the art.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner and Patent Owner agree that no claim terms need construction. Pet. 14; Prelim. Resp. 6. After reviewing the evidence and arguments presented by the parties, we determine that it is not necessary to expressly construe any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of our analysis below. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached

    “of Choi to support its argument that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood Choi’s infrared lamp housing to define a concave shape as claimed. See Pet. 61–62. With only this explanation and evidence from Petitioner and Dr. Jenson, however, we cannot not discern how these portions of Choi would have so apprised an ordinarily skilled artisan. For example, the side view of the infrared lamp housing, illustrated in Figure 5 reproduced below, shows the housing having a convex, rather than concave, shape. See Ex. 1008, Fig. 5. Furthermore, paragraphs 20 and 48 refer to the housing’s “circular” shape and outer periphery and also “tubular” shape. See id. ¶¶ 20, 48. But these descriptions, either alone or together with Figure 5, also do not support adequately a finding that Choi’s housing is concave. Choi’s teachings in paragraphs 20 and 46 regarding the lamp housing guiding or directing infrared light from the lamp to irradiate the skin of a user, without more, are similarly deficient. See id. ¶¶ 20, 46. And although Dr. Jensen appears to equate “concave” with “inner circular,” he does not provide the basis for his testimony or explain what “inner circular” means, particularly in the context of distinguishing a convex shape from a concave shape. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 197. Accordingly, we determine there is insufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s conclusory statements that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood Choi’s infrared lamp housing to define a concave shape as claimed.” slip op. at 23

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 12,036,174
• Nintendo Co., Ltd. / Nintendo Of America Inc. v. American GNC CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 20, 2025 · IPR2024-00668 · APJ Lisa L Tsang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1 and 4 are unpatentable as obvious over Smith, Chan, and Bernstein (claim 1), Smith, Chan, Bernstein, Irwin, and Merhav (claim 4), and Tingleff, Chan, and Bernstein (claims 1 and 4).

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner

    “partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (emphasis added). Accordingly, a petition for inter partes review may be considered only if, among other things, it “identifies all real parties in interest,” and no real party in interest was served with a complaint alleging infringement of the challenged patent more than one year before the petition was filed. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). “[T]he IPR petitioner bears the burden of persuasion to demonstrate that its petitions are not time-barred under § 315(b) based on a complaint served on a real party in interest more than a year earlier.” Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, “an IPR petitioner’s initial identification of the real parties in interest should be accepted unless and until disputed by a patent owner,” who, in turn, “must produce some evidence that tends to show that a particular third party should be named a real party in interest.” Id. at 1242, 1244 (footnote omitted).” slip op. at 8

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the arguments and evidence of record, we determine that Patent Owner has not produced sufficient evidence to support a finding that STMicro should be named a real party in interest to this proceeding. At best, Patent Owner’s evidence and arguments establish only that Patent Owner previously filed a complaint against STMicro, asserting that STMicro infringed patents related to the ’648 patent (see generally Ex. 2012); and that Patent Owner served a subpoena to compel STMicro to testify and produce documents in Patent Owner’s infringement suit against Petitioner (see generally Ex. 2014). The record before us does not demonstrate a relationship between Petitioner and STMicro sufficient to show that STMicro is a real party in interest. See Worlds, 903 F.3d at 1242, 1244 (“[A]n IPR petitioner’s initial identification of the real parties in interest should be accepted unless and until disputed by a patent owner,” who, in turn, “must produce some evidence that tends to show that a particular third party should be named a real party in interest.” (footnote omitted)).” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 12–14). Patent Owner counters that the skilled artisan would have had “at least a ‘Master’s Degree in Electrical or Electronics Engineering, and approximately five years of relevant experience in the development of control systems for inertial navigation, MEMS semiconductor processing, and analog circuit design.’” PO Resp. 18 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶ 57). We adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’648 patent and prior art of record, and we apply it in our obviousness evaluations below. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We note, however, that we would reach the same conclusions applying either Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s definition of the level of skill in the art.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “We find unavailing Petitioner’s reliance on Catalina to support its claim construction position. See Reply 2. In particular, although Petitioner contends the body of the claims “define[s] a structurally complete invention,” Petitioner does not explain how the claims additionally “use[] the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention,” as Catalina further requires. See Catalina, 289 F.3d at 808 (“a preamble is not limiting ‘where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention” (emphasis added)). In this regard, we discern no reason to interpret “[a] micro inertial measurement unit” as reciting only a purpose or intended use because the term, on its face, uses “micro inertial measurement” as an adjective that conveys further structural details of the unit. Accordingly, on the complete record, and for the reasons set forth in our Institution Decision, we maintain our construction that “[a] micro inertial measurement unit” recited in the preamble is limiting and requires a micro-sized inertial measurement unit, and that the structures recited in the limitations of the claims are limited to structures implemented as MEMS devices. Dec. 21–24.” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 6,671,648 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,671,648
• Nintendo Co., Ltd. / Nintendo Of America Inc. v. American GNC CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 20, 2025 · IPR2024-00667 · APJ Jennifer S Bisk · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1 and 3 are unpatentable under § 103 over Fujiyoshi, Kumar, Cox, and Townsend, and independently over Mitamura and Townsend.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerNot time barredDecided for petitioner

    “other things, it “identifies all real parties in interest.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). “[T]he IPR petitioner bears the burden of persuasion to demonstrate that its petitions are not time-barred under § 315(b) based on a complaint served on a real party in interest more than a year earlier.” Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, “an IPR petitioner’s initial identification of the real parties in interest should be accepted unless and until disputed by a patent owner,” who, in turn, “must produce some evidence that tends to show that a particular third party should be named a real party in interest.” Id. at 1242, 1244 (footnote omitted). Whether a non-party is a real party in interest is a “highly fact-” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or similar degree, with two to three years of practical experience designing and/or implementing systems that include sensors for measuring movement, such as acceleration and rotational position. . . . A skilled artisan could also have had more formal education and less practical experience, or vice versa. Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 12–14). Patent Owner states that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art with respect to the ’122 Patent would have at least a five years of relevant experience in the development of control systems for inertial navigation, MEMS semiconductor processing, and analog circuit design.” PO Resp. 18 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶ 57). We adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’122 patent and prior art of record, and we apply it in our obviousness evaluations below. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We note, however, that we would reach the same conclusions applying either Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s definition of the level of skill in the art.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019). In this context, claim terms “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations omitted) (en banc). “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms ... that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Neither party argues that any claim term requires construction. Pet. 6; PO Resp. 18. Accordingly, we do not explicitly construe any term.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Record evidence supports Petitioner’s contentions that a skilled artisan would have had reason to look to Kumar for further implementation details of a circuit that performs functions like those performed by Fujiyoshi. See Pet 24–26. For example, Dr. Young testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that Kumar discloses the details, at a granular level, of Fujiyoshi’s capacitive sensing systems and would have looked to Kumar for understanding of how to implement Fujiyoshi’s system. Ex. 1002 ¶ 145. Patent Owner does not point to persuasive evidence to rebut this opinion. Moreover, Petitioner cites to Kumar, not only for an explicit disclosure of capacitive pickoff signals, but also for its disclosure of both DC bias and AC carrier signals and recognizing the applicability of an AC carrier pickoffs that operates without DC bias. Pet. 24–26 (citing Ex. 1005 3:65–4:2, 6:29–36). We credit Dr. Young’s testimony on this issue and agree with Petitioner that a person of ordinary skill in the art, looking at Fujiyoshi’s description of capacitive sensing systems, would be motivated to look to Kumar for its more detailed teachings of the implementation details of such systems and would combine these details to arrive at limitation 1(a). We determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Fujiyoshi and Kumar in the manner argued by Petitioner.” slip op. at 37

  Patent outcomesUS 6,508,122 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,508,122
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 19, 2025 · IPR2024-00821 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 23 is unpatentable as obvious over Spain-I, Hunzinger, and Nanda.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1036 ¶¶ 31–32). Patent Owner waived entry of a Preliminary Response, did not enter a Patent Owner Response, and accordingly does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’698 patent and prior art of record, and we apply it in our obviousness evaluations below. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “prosecution history of the ’698 patent for understanding the phrase “at least one number based on,” recited in claim 23. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1004, 165– 166). Petitioner proposes that the plain meaning of this phrase was expressly described during prosecution of the application that became the ’698 patent, where the Applicant argued that [a]s the specification explains, the “number based on []” is intended to refer to the output of any “formula,” including but not limited to a difference formula, that serves as a comparison “metric” (including “logical comparisons, arithmetically threshold (rounded) logical comparisons, arithmetic, probabilistic, fuzzy logic, neural network enabled, [or] heuristic” [¶00561], or “determinations that are based on derivatives, mathematical normalizations, correlation functions, functions” [¶0139]). Ex. 1004, 165–166. For purposes of this Decision we apply Petitioner’s proposed plain meaning for this phrase as it is reasonably based on the prosecution history of the ’698 patent and not disputed by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Construction is needed only for those terms “that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803). After reviewing the parties’ arguments and evidence, apart from the “at least one number based on” phrase, we determine that no claim terms require express construction for this Decision.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “advance arguments directed to claim 23. Accordingly, Patent Owner has forfeited any argument regarding Petitioner’s contentions for these claims. We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments regarding claim 23, which Patent Owner does not contest, and find them persuasive. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s contentions as our own. Based on Petitioner’s arguments and accompanying evidence, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 23 would have been unpatentable over Spain-I, Hunzinger, and Nanda. 5. Conclusion on Obviousness For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 23 is unpatentable over the combined teachings of Spain-I, Hunzinger, and Nanda.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 8,594,698 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,594,698
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Broadphone LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 5, 2025 · IPR2024-00155 · APJ Lisa L Tsang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4, 5, 8, 14, 15, 18, 19, 22, 24, 25, and 28 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated combinations of prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We agree that the language in the Specification of the ’811 patent does not indicate that the patentee intended to either act as its own lexicographer, or disavow the full scope of the claim term. See Thorner v. Sony Comput. Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must ‘clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term’ other than its plain and ordinary meaning” (citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002))); Elbex Video, Ltd. v. Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., 508 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (guiding that disavowal or disclaimer of claim scope “must ‘be both clear and unmistakable’ to one of ordinary skill in the art” (citing Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003))). However, Dr. Cooklev’s opinion that “device-specific target location” means “a target location that is specific to a particular device” is not supported adequately. In particular, “[t]he words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art when read in the context of the specification and prosecution history.” Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365 (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313) (emphasis added). Importantly, Dr. Cooklev does not cite to any portions of the intrinsic evidence to support his claim construction. See Ex. 2003 ¶ 34; see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318 (“conclusory, unsupported assertions by experts as to the definition of a claim term are not useful to a court”). Given the conclusory nature of Dr. Cooklev’s testimony, and because the intrinsic evidence is sufficiently clear, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proffered construction of “device-specific target location.”” slip op. at 17

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had at least a BS degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or similar discipline, and two or more years of experience with location determining-based systems and/or processes, such as for example systems/processes for determining mobile device location(s). . . . More education can supplement practical experience and vice versa. Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 31–32). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 4. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’811 patent and prior art of record, and we apply it in our obviousness evaluations below. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner relies solely on the testimony of Dr. Cooklev to support its proffered claim construction. PO Resp. 5 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 34). Dr. Cooklev testifies, “[b]ased on my review of the patent and intrinsic record, [“device-specific target location”] has a plain and ordinary meaning and is used by the claims with that meaning, which requires a target location that is specific to a particular device.” Ex. 2003 ¶ 34. Other than further opining that “I see no lexicography or disclaimer in the intrinsic record indicating that ‘device-specific target [location]’ refers to a location that is generally applicable to numerous devices, or that the term otherwise has a meaning broader than its plain and ordinary meaning,” Dr. Cooklev provides no support for why the claimed “device-specific target location” “requires a target location that is specific to a particular device.” See id. We agree that the language in the Specification of the ’811 patent does not indicate that the patentee intended to either act as its own lexicographer, or disavow the full scope of the claim term. See Thorner v. Sony Comput. Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must ‘clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term’ other than its plain and ordinary meaning” (citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002))); Elbex Video, Ltd. v. Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., 508 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (guiding that disavowal or disclaimer of claim scope “must ‘be both clear and unmistakable’ to one of ordinary skill in the art” (citing Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003))). However, Dr. Cooklev’s opinion that “device-specific target location” means “a target location that is specific to a particular device” is not supported adequately. In particular, “[t]he words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art when read in the context of the specification and prosecution history.” Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365 (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313) (emphasis added). Importantly, Dr. Cooklev does not cite to any portions of the intrinsic evidence to support his claim construction. See Ex. 2003 ¶ 34; see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318 (“conclusory, unsupported assertions by experts as to the definition of a claim term are not useful to a court”). Given the conclusory nature of Dr. Cooklev’s testimony, and because the intrinsic evidence is sufficiently clear, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proffered construction of “device-specific target location.”” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “c) Analysis Patent Owner’s Response does not advance arguments directed to claims 1 and 15. See generally PO Resp. Accordingly, Patent Owner has forfeited any argument regarding Petitioner’s contentions for these claims. See In re Nuvasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that a patent owner forfeits an issue presented in its preliminary response if it fails to renew the issue in its response after trial is instituted). We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments regarding claims 1 and 15, which Patent Owner does not contest, and find them persuasive. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s contentions as our own. Based on Petitioner’s arguments and accompanying evidence, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 15 would have been unpatentable over Spain-I, Hunzinger, and Nanda.” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 10,341,811 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,341,811
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 5, 2025 · IPR2024-00154 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 9–10, 12–13, 15–16, and 21 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated combinations of Spain-I, Hunzinger, Nanda, and, for certain claims, additional references.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “would have had at least a BS degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or similar discipline, and two or more years of experience with location determining-based systems and/or processes, such as for example systems/processes for determining mobile device location(s). . . . More education can supplement practical experience and vice versa. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 31–32). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 4. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with our review and understanding of the 9 The record does not include allegations or evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness. technology and descriptions in the ’698 patent and prior art of record, and we apply it in our obviousness evaluations below. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “prosecution history of the ’698 patent for understanding the phrase “at least one number based on,” recited in claim 1. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1004, 166). Petitioner proposes that the plain meaning of this phrase was expressly described during prosecution of the application that became the ’698 patent, where the Applicant argued that [a]s the specification explains, the “number based on []” is intended to refer to the output of any “formula,” including but not limited to a difference formula, that serves as a comparison “metric” (including “logical comparisons, arithmetically threshold (rounded) logical comparisons, arithmetic, probabilistic, fuzzy logic, neural network enabled, [or] heuristic” [¶00561], or “determinations that are based on derivatives, mathematical normalizations, correlation functions, functions” [¶0139]). Ex. 1004, 166. Patent Owner does not dispute this interpretation. See generally, PO Resp. 2. For purposes of this Decision, and to the extent necessary for institution, we apply Petitioner’s proposed plain meaning for this phrase as it is reasonably based on the prosecution history of the ’698 patent. Apart from this, where neither party proposes any particular construction or indicates disagreement as to the meaning of any claim language, we need not explicitly construe any claim terms at this stage of the proceeding. Construction is needed only for those terms “that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” See Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017 (quoting Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803). After reviewing the parties’ arguments and evidence, apart from the “at least one number based on” phrase, we determine that no claim terms require express construction for this decision.” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “remotely storing the fingerprint database, as does Nanda. Pet. 47–49. Dr. Almeroth testifies persuasively in support that “Spain-I describes configurations where the fingerprint database may be stored remotely from the MU,” and “Nanda also discloses similar features where the mobile device creates a fingerprint and transmits it for storage in a remote database for subsequent analysis.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 194 (citing Ex. 1005, Fig. 3, 4:28–58; Ex. 1006, 12:14–31; Ex. 1009, 5:22–42; Ex. 1010, 5:20–41; Ex. 1011, Fig. 3, 6:9–14, 6:15–30). As discussed above, claims 1, 2, from which claim 4 depends, and claim 5, from which claim 6 depends, are not contested by Patent Owner. Dr. Almeroth’s testimony as to the prior art teachings and disclosure with respect to claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 is credible, supported by the record, and essentially unrebutted in this proceeding. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 93–182, 191–201. Accordingly, based on the complete record, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown a preponderance of evidence that claims 4 and 6 would have been obvious over Spain-I in view of Hunzinger and Nanda.” slip op. at 29

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “argument as to claim 1, Patent Owner does not expressly dispute that Spain-I and Nanda fail to disclose “wherein the chosen location signal strengths were measured by a second portable RF communication device.” PO Resp. 5–13. Dr. Almeroth testifies persuasively, for example, that “Nanda explains ‘receiv[ing] fingerprints from multiple mobiles devices’ allows for a ‘much larger database of available access points than would be found in a single mobile device.’” Ex. 1002 ¶ 185 (quoting Ex. 1006, 12:14–31). With respect to a motivation to combine, Dr. Almeroth testifies further that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have considered “multiple MUs to create/maintain a larger database of antenna station fingerprint information, like that suggested by Nanda (Ex-1006, 12:26-29), thus beneficially expanding applications of Spain-I’s disclosed features.” Id. ¶ 187. For claim 6, as discussed above, Petitioner argues that Spain-I teaches remotely storing the fingerprint database, as does Nanda. Pet. 47–49. Dr. Almeroth testifies persuasively in support that “Spain-I describes configurations where the fingerprint database may be stored remotely from the MU,” and “Nanda also discloses similar features where the mobile device creates a fingerprint and transmits it for storage in a remote database for subsequent analysis.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 194 (citing Ex. 1005, Fig. 3, 4:28–58; Ex. 1006, 12:14–31; Ex. 1009, 5:22–42; Ex. 1010, 5:20–41; Ex. 1011, Fig. 3, 6:9–14, 6:15–30). As discussed above, claims 1, 2, from which claim 4 depends, and claim 5, from which claim 6 depends, are not contested by Patent Owner. Dr. Almeroth’s testimony as to the prior art teachings and disclosure with respect to claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 is credible, supported by the record, and essentially unrebutted in this proceeding. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 93–182, 191–201. Accordingly, based on the complete record, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown a preponderance of evidence that claims 4 and 6 would have been obvious over Spain-I in view of Hunzinger and Nanda.” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 8,594,698 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,594,698
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Broadphone LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 5, 2025 · IPR2024-00153 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10, 17–20, and 24–26 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations; the Board did not reach the additional Damarla and Houri grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “would have had at least a BS degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or similar discipline, and two or more years of experience with location determining-based systems and/or processes, such as for example systems/processes for determining mobile device location(s). . . . More education can supplement practical experience and vice versa. Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 31–32). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 4. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’583 patent and prior art of record, and we apply it in our obviousness evaluations below. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “In the Petition, Petitioner submits that “no special constructions are necessary” beyond the plain meaning of the claims. Pet. 4. Patent Owner states in its Patent Owner Response that it “agrees that no formal claim construction is necessary.” PO Resp. 5. Construction is needed only for those terms “that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” See Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017 (quoting Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803). After reviewing the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that no claim terms require express construction for this decision.” slip op. at 10

  • BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable

    “Petitioner’s arguments regarding claim 1, which Patent Owner does not contest, and find them persuasive. Pet. 5–41. We adopt Petitioner’s contentions as our own. Based on Petitioner’s arguments and accompanying evidence, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 would have been unpatentable over Spain-I, Hunzinger, and Nanda.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “argument as to claim 1, Patent Owner does not expressly dispute that Spain-I and Nanda fail to disclose “wherein the chosen location signal strengths were measured by a second portable RF communication device.” PO Resp. 5–13. Dr. Almeroth testifies persuasively, for example, that “Nanda explains ‘receiv[ing] fingerprints from multiple mobiles devices’ allows for a ‘much larger database of available access points than would be found in a single mobile device.’” Ex. 1002 ¶ 186 (quoting Ex. 1006, 12:14–31). With respect to a motivation to combine, Dr. Almeroth testifies further that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have considered “multiple MUs to create/maintain a larger database of antenna station fingerprint information, like that suggested by Nanda (Ex-1006, 12:26-29), thus beneficially expanding applications of Spain-I’s disclosed features.” Id. ¶ 188.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 8,170,583 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,170,583

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.