- Global Shade Corporation v. With-U E-Commerce (Shanghai) Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 7, 2024 · IPR2023-00580 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4, 13, and 14 are unpatentable under § 103; proposed substitute claims 15–19 are unpatentable over Rousselle, Tsai, Ohnishi, Hoober, and Seo, so the revised motion to amend is denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“Although not identical, the parties’ definitions are substantially similar. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we determine that no reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We note, however, that our obviousness analysis in this Decision would not differ if we adopted either Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s definition.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner asserts construction is unnecessary and does not propose any term for construction. Pet. 7 (citing Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Patent Owner does not propose any specific claim construction for any term of the challenged claims. PO Resp. 14. On the full record, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“points to any teaching, suggestion, or motivation in either reference” to replace Tsai’s leg locks with Rousselle’s central lock. PO Resp. 44 (citing Pet. 36; Ex. 1002 ¶ 103). Petitioner disagrees, arguing that the Petition cites “voluminous disclosure” from Rousselle identifying the benefits of a central lock. Reply 18 (citing Pet. 35). We agree with Petitioner. The Petition provides several rationales, supported by Dr. Stein’s testimony, for making the alternative modification. Pet. 35–37. For instance, Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this modification because Rousselle discloses the benefits of a central lock over Tsai’s individual leg locking system, such as making the canopy easier and more convenient for a single user to operate. Id. at 35–36 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 102–103; Ex. 1003, 3:38–47; Ex. 1005, 4:29–5:5, 8:5–33, Figs. 1, 2, 18, 19). Petitioner also argues that the proposed modification is the simple addition of one known element to another known element to obtain predictable results and uses a known technique to improve a similar device and yield predictable results. Id. at 36–37 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 105–107; KSR, 550 U.S. at 417). We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence and find the reasons to combine persuasive. In sum, we determine that Petitioner’s proposed reasons to combine Rousselle and Tsai in accordance with the alternative modification are realistic, have rational underpinning, and are supported by expert testimony, which we find persuasive and credit. Thus, Petitioner’s evidence shows that a skilled artisan would have had reasons to combine the teachings of in doing so. slip op. at 32
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that Tsai’s disclosure of pulling the poles or legs apart to unfold the frame does not disparage central activation to the extent of discouraging one of ordinary skill in the art from investigating or considering Rousselle’s central lock in connection with Tsai’s shelter frame. See DePuy Spine, 567 F.3d at 1327 (holding a reference does not teach away “if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not ‘criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage’ investigation into the manually pulling the four poles 1 outwardly.” Ex. 1005, 10:28–29 (emphasis added). As such, Tsai “merely expresses a general preference” for this technique (see DePuy Spine, 567 F.3d at 1327) and does not specifically require it. We agree with Petitioner that Tsai’s general preference for this technique does not teach away from any other method for unfolding the frame. Furthermore, Tsai’s statement that the shelter frame of Figures 16 and 17 is “somewhat difficult to unfold in that an extra person is sometimes needed to push the center strut C upwardly to its completely extended position” (Ex. 1005, 2:19–22) does not disparage all other center lock configurations, in particular the configuration taught by Rousselle. As Petitioner points out, Rousselle discloses that its collapsible shelter/tent with the central lock arrangement can be erected by a single person. Ex. 1003, 13:59–65. So, instead of requiring “an extra person,” the shelter frame of the combination of Tsai and Rousselle could be erected by a single person. Similarly, Tsai’s statement that the shelter frame of Figures 16 and 17 reduces headroom in the tent (Ex. 1005, 2:17–19) does not disparage all other center lock configurations. We agree with Petitioner that the inner units of both Rousselle and Tsai’s Figure 1 embodiment are different than the inner units shown in Figures 16 and 17, which are large scissors-type linkages located well below the canopy’s roof supported by center strut C. See Reply 11. In contrast, Rousselle discloses shelter/tent 10 in which collapsible frame 100 supports sheet-material cover 200. Ex. 1003, 6:30–32; Fig. 1(A). Unlike the shelter frame of Tsai’s Figures 16 and 17, Rousselle’s frame does not include an upwardly extending center strut propping up the sheet-material cover. Instead, sheet-material cover 200 rests directly on frame in which canopy supporting rods 3 (i.e., the “inner units”) form a canopy support for supporting the canopy material. Ex. 1005, 4:11–25, 7:15–20. Accordingly, neither Rousselle’s or Tsai’s frames present the headroom issue that Tsai identifies with respect to the prior art shelter frame of Figures 16 and 17.” slip op. at 27
Patent outcomesUS 10,669,738 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,669,738 - PTAB · Jul 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00393 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1 and 3 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that the Amit, Jacobsen, and Isaksson combination renders them obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“unless the information presented in a petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and Preliminary Response, and accompanying exhibits and evidence, we determine Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim in the inter partes review. Therefore, we grant institution of an inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’518 patent on all challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends as follows: A POSITA [(person of ordinary skill in the art)] would have a degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field and experience working in signal processing and/or communication systems/networks, e.g., a bachelor’s and three or more years of experience; a master’s and at least one year of experience; or a doctorate and some work experience. Additional education could substitute for professional experience, or vice versa..” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther
“Only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Petitioner contends that the challenged claims are “obvious under any reasonable interpretation,” so “no express constructions are required.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner does not offer construction of any claim term, so there is no dispute over claim construction that we need to resolve. We apply the ordinary and customary meanings consistent with 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“and Jacobsen. Prelim. Rep. 36–41. Specifically, Patent Owner argues that Amit already identified and solved the reflection problem so there would be no need to make an additional modification to Amit. Id. at 36–37 (citing Ex. 1014, 19:65–20:43). This argument does not negate, however, Petitioner’s contention that a POSITA would have recognized that Jacobsen’s multicarrier modulation would improve upon Amit’s single-carrier modulation by mitigating distortion on the cable network, adapting to channel degradation, and providing increased computational efficiency. Pet. 49–50 (citing Ex. 1016, 312; Ex. 1004 ¶ 173); see KSR, 550 U.S. at 422 (motivation to combine established when POSITA would have appreciated the benefits achieved by the combination).” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,295,518 - PTAB · Jul 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00373 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–17 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability under § 103.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in a petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and Preliminary Response, and accompanying exhibits and evidence, we determine Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim in the inter partes review. Therefore, we grant institution of an inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’249 patent on all challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Decided for petitioner
“deny institution under § 314(a) based on the factors set forth in General Plastic Industrial Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 at 15–19 (§ II.B.4.i) (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (precedential) (“General Plastic”). Pet. 88–89; Prelim. Resp. 59–60. General Plastic addresses “[m]ultiple, staggered petitions challenging the same patent and same claims rais[ing] the potential for abuse.” General Plastic, Paper 19 at 17 (emphasis added). The parties point to no authority to support that General Plastic has ever been applied in the context of a reexamination filed before a petition similar to the facts of this case. We decline to consider further discretionary denial under General Plastic under the facts presented here.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“In evaluating discretionary denial under § 325(d), the Board follows a two-part framework: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (“Advanced Bionics”). The Advanced Bionics framework is further informed by the factors set forth in Becton, Dickinson” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends as follows: A POSITA would have had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field, and 2–3 years of experience in design or development of signal processing and communication systems or networks. . . . Additional education could substitute for professional experience, or vice-versa. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 17–18). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art, which is consistent with the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Accordingly, we agree with and will use Petitioner’s proposed level for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,594,249 - PTAB · Jul 25, 2024 · IPR2024-00478 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–19 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on anticipation by Rosenberg-I.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“In view of the above, we determine that this factor strongly weighs against the exercise of discretionary denial. 2. Factor 2: proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language at this juncture because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelOther
“would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field, plus at least two years of industry or graduate level experience with software engineering, haptics programming, and/or human-computer interaction, including experience with user-interfaces and applications involving touchscreens, touchpads, and related technologies.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–43). Patent Owner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science (or an equivalent degree), and two years of practical or industry experience in the field of human computer interaction (HCI), including implementation of computer-based systems and software for providing haptic feedback effects to a user,” and adds that a person having ordinary skill in the art “could have qualified . . . with more formal education and less practical or industry experience, or vice versa.” Prelim. Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 32). Although not identical, the parties’ definitions are substantially similar. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we determine that no express finding is necessary, and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We note, however, that our obviousness analysis in this Decision would not differ if we adopted either Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s definition. slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,430,042 - Apple Inc. v. THL Holding Company, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Jul 25, 2024 · IPR2024-00398 · APJ Elizabeth J Reagan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–12 and 15–20 based on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on claim 10 over Kalliola, Vauclair, and Kalayjian.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). Institution of an inter partes review requires that “the information presented in the petition and . . . any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review on all of the challenged claims of the ’680 patent based on all of the asserted grounds of unpatentability identified in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“art, “at the time of the ’680 Patent would have been a person having a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a similar technical field and 2–4 years of experience with wireless ranging and positioning systems, wireless communication devices, and associated computer programming” but that “[a]dditional industry experience or technical training may offset less formal education, while advanced degrees or additional formal education may offset lesser levels of industry experience.” Pet. 4–5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 35). We find that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art of the ’680 patent. This proposal is also supported by the Buehrer Declaration. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 35. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision.9” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionNo construction neededOther
“construction in a parallel proceeding,11 for the following term: “[a] pairing signal.” Pet. 6 (emphasis omitted) (citing Ex. 1009, 15–16). Petitioner proposes that we construe “[a] pairing signal” as “[p]rocessor signal to initiate a wireless device pairing sequence.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ex. 1009, 15–16). On the present record, Patent Owner does not dispute this proposed construction.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“ordinary skill in the art to “combine the prior art elements of Kalliola’s WCD communicating with a signal emitter via Bluetooth with Vauclair’s pairing menu and processor signals to yield the predictable result of a pairing signal in response to a first indication from a user to pair the WCD to the signal emitter” because “Bluetooth pairing and pairing menus were conventional well prior to the invention of the ’680 patent” and “there would have been a reasonable expectation of success.” Pet. 36 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 175; Ex. 1004 ¶ 4).” slip op. at 39
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,265,680 - Apple Inc. v. THL Holding Company, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Jul 25, 2024 · IPR2024-00399 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–19 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been shown obvious over Kalliola, Turunen, Oswald, Vauclair, and Kalayjian.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2023). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the briefing and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims, and we institute inter partes review on all of the challenged claims based on all of the grounds identified in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner
“1 Patent Owner does not request that we exercise our discretion to deny institution of either parallel petition. On the present record, we find that Petitioner’s explanation of the need for two parallel petitions is sufficient to justify not exercising discretion to deny institution in either case. The parallel petitions challenge different sets of claims of the ’246 patent, and there are a large number of claims challenged collectively between the two petitions.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“to “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a similar technical field and 2-4 years of experience with wireless ranging and positioning systems, wireless communication devices, and associated computer programming.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 35). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assertion on the present record. Prelim. Resp. 1–22. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that Petitioner’s proposed definition generally comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’246 patent and the asserted prior art. This definition is also supported by the testimony of Dr. Buehrer. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 35.10” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes construing two terms. Pet. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1011, 6–11). First, Petitioner proposes that we construe “[t]ime of flight calculations” as “[d]etermining the amount of time between when a signal is transmitted and when a reply signal is received.” Id. at 6. Second, Petitioner proposes that we construe “[s]ignal delay” as “[d]ifference in time between when a signal is received at two or more antennas.” Id. On the present record, Patent Owner does not dispute these proposed constructions. Prelim. Resp. 1–22. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt the constructions proposed by Petitioner. Those constructions are supported by briefing in the parallel district court case, in which they were proposed by Patent Owner. Ex. 1011, 6–11.” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,350,246 - Apple Inc. v. THL Holding Company, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jul 25, 2024 · IPR2024-00397 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Apple did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–9 and 11 were obvious, failing to show that the graphical user interface generates the claimed signals.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Upon consideration of the Petition and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’381 patent. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we decline to institute inter partes review of claims 1–9 and 11 of the ’381 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The level of ordinary skill in the art is also reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner for the purposes of this Decision because it is consistent with the ’381 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“a. Claim 1 We determine that Petitioner has failed to meet its burden to show a reasonable likelihood that Kalayjian and Vauclair would have rendered claim 1 obvious. This determination is based on the evidence and argument presented for limitations 1(a)(i) and 1(a)(ii), so we solely address issues relating to these limitations below.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,768,381 - PTAB · Jul 24, 2024 · IPR2024-00477 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–7 on all asserted grounds because the Petition showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“does not provide any authority supporting its position that failure to provide a Sotera stipulation “neutralizes” or “undercuts” the impact of a stay. We also disagree with Patent Owner’s suggestion that a district court stay can make discretionary denial inappropriate only when coupled with a Sotera stipulation. See Prelim. Resp. 59. Again, Patent Owner does not provide any authority supporting this position. Id. Contrary to Patent Owner’s positions, Fintiv indicates a district court stay “has strongly weighed against exercise of the authority to deny institution” independent of whether a Sotera stipulation—or any other type of stipulation—has been submitted. Fintiv at 6.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Other
“time it was made, 35 U.S.C. § 103 requires us to resolve the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention. In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art include, but are not limited to, the types of problems encountered in the art, the sophistication of the technology, and educational level of active workers in the field. Id. In a given case, one or more factors may predominate. Id.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We do not discern a need to construe explicitly any other claim language at this juncture because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,336,260 - Hunter’S Manufacturing Company, Inc. D/B/A Tenpoint Crossbow Technologies v. Ravin Crossbows, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 9, 2024 · IPR2023-00407 · APJ Robert J Silverman · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 1 is unpatentable as anticipated by Stanziale ’771; the Board did not reach the alternative grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“As an initial matter, the recited expression “mounted to” is broad. The Federal Circuit has explained that words in a claim “will ordinarily be given their full meaning,” without imposing narrowing modifications on the claim language. Johnson Worldwide, 175 F.3d at 989, see also Virginia Panel, 133 F.3d at 865–66. As to whether the “mounted to” connection may be an indirect connection, the parties agree that an indirect connection is permitted — a view that is amply supported by the intrinsic record, as discussed above. With regard to the types of movement that may occur between a “string guide” and a corresponding “limb,” the intrinsic record shows that that various types of movements (including no movement at all) are characterized as “mounted to.” Slight variations of “mounted to,” occurring in the intrinsic record, are helpful in understanding the claim language — particularly because the ’015 patent itself uses such a variant (“mounted . . . on”) to describe the very connection (between a “string guide” and a “limb”) that is elsewhere, and in claim 1, is described as “mounted to.” See Ex. 1001, 5:23–26.” slip op. at 22
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Patent Owner’ sole argument — i.e., that Stanziale ’771 fails to teach the “mounted to” limitation — is based upon its construction of the “mounted to” limitation, which permits the “string guide” to be rotatable relative the corresponding “limb,” but permits no other type of relative motion. See PO Resp. 4, 13–14. As discussed above, we do not accept Patent Owner’s construction of the “mounted to” limitation. In Stanziale ’771, first and second pulleys 145, 146, and interconnecting pivot 147 (all three of which Petitioner maps to claim 1’s “string guide[s]”) are pivotally connected to a number of intermediate members (e.g., lever arms or pushing arms 32, connecting elements 27, and constraining member 29) which are, in turn, pivotally connected to elastic members 10 (which Petitioner maps to claim 1’s “limb[s]”). See Pet. 41–42 (citing Ex. 1012 7:9–17, 8:26–8:13, 11:8–9, 14:18–15:22, 16:24–25, 16:29, 17:2, 17:15–17, 17:24–27, 19:12–30, 20:32–21:16, Figs. 1–7; Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 177–179); see also Ex. 1012 11:3–7, 11:34–12:4, 12:10–17, 16:29–18:3, 18:22–19:30, Figs. 8, 9, 10a, 10b. Therefore, Stanziale ’771, in Petitioner’s mapping, teaches the “string guide[s]” connected indirectly to the “limb[s].” Per the construction of the “mounted to” limitation employed herein (“connected to, either directly or indirectly”), Petitioner establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Stanziale ’771 teaches the “string guide[s]” “mounted to” the “limb[s],” as recited in claim 1 of the ’015 patent. Contrary to Patent Owner’s concerns (see Paper 47, 1), the indirect connection between Stanziale ’771’s “string guide[s]” and “limb[s]” is not “unbounded.” Rather, the connection disclosed by Stanziale ’771 is the type of indirect connection supported by the intrinsic record. See supra § II.B. Patent Owner’s contention that “a POSA would be disinclined to rely on [Stanziale ’771] as a reference for the improved crossbow design disclosed in Claim 1” is not persuasive. See PO Resp. 38 (citing Ex. 2029 ¶ 46). The test for anticipation is whether a prior art reference discloses each and every element recited in the claim, not whether one of ordinary skill in the art would have been inclined to rely on the reference. See Net MoneyIN, Inc., 545 F.3d at 1369.” slip op. at 32
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed
“Motions to exclude evidence are authorized under 35 C.F.R. § 42.64. Rule 42.64(b)(1) states: “Once a trial has been instituted, any objection [to evidence] must be filed within five business days of service of evidence to which the objection is directed.” Further, “[t]he objection must identify the grounds for the objection with sufficient particularity to allow correction in the form of supplemental evidence.” 35 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1). “A motion to exclude evidence must be filed to preserve any objection.” 35 C.F.R. § 42.64(c).” slip op. at 40
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“In the present proceeding, Petitioner proposed — and Patent Owner does not dispute (see PO Resp. 3) — the following definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art: A hypothetical POSA to which the ’015 Patent pertains would be a technical person who has at least some experience working in the field of archery, reviewing crossbows or engineering related to bows and/or crossbows, and is generally familiar with prior art crossbows. (Ex. 1016 ¶17.) Such a person would likely have at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or, alternatively, would have several years of experience in the field of archery or engineering related to bows and/or crossbows. (Id.) Pet. 28. As discussed above, we adopt Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill for the purposes of this Decision. See supra § II.A. Petitioner alleges various deficiencies in Mr. Teater’s background, education, and knowledge. Paper 39, 4–8. Nevertheless, Mr. Teater satisfies the definition, of a person of ordinary skill in the art, that Petitioner advanced. Specifically, Mr. Teater has reviewed crossbows for 14 years, encompassing the relevant priority date for the ’015 patent, during which time he wrote evaluations of various bows and crossbows, developed and published testing standards for crossbows, and served on the Archery Trade Association’s technical committee for standards and guidelines. Paper 41, 4 (citing Ex. 2029 ¶¶ 3, 4, 7). Accordingly, Mr. Teater satisfies Petitioner’s definition of “a technical person who has at least some experience working in the field of archery, reviewing crossbows or engineering related to bows and/or crossbows, and is generally familiar with prior art crossbows.” Pet. 28. Petitioner emphasizes that Mr. Teater “does not have a degree in mechanical engineering.” Paper 39, 4 (citing Ex. 2034, 1; Ex. 1034, 43:20–44:5). However, no degree of any kind is mandatory for satisfying Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Indeed, Petitioner’s definition states that “[s]uch a person would likely have at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or, alternatively, would have several years of experience in the field of archery or engineering related to bows and/or crossbows.” Pet. 28 (emphasis added). There is no dispute that Mr. Teater meets this standard. Petitioner raises various other issues that form no part of the definition that Petitioner advanced — for example, whether Mr. Teater has taught courses related to crossbows, whether he is named as an inventor on a” slip op. at 36
Patent outcomesUS 9,354,015 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,354,015 - Motif Foodworks, Inc. v. Impossible Foods, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 12, 2024 · IPR2023-00206 · APJ Donna M Praiss · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–12 and 14–24 are unpatentable as obvious over Giacino, Proulx, and Conrad, with Perret or MacLeod for certain dependent claims; the Board did not reach other grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The District Court’s claim construction for the term “compound” is shown below. Ex. 2016, 8–11. Claim Term District Court Construction The “sulfur compound” limitation must be satisfied by a compound that is present compound10 separately from a protein; “compound” will not be construed as being limited to compounds used as flavor precursors The District Court’s claim construction order cites to U.S. Patent 11,013,250 (the ’250 patent”) as representative of the ’096 patent and other related patents involved in the District Court litigation. See Ex. 2016, 7 (“Claim 1 of the ʼ250 patent claims is generally representative for purposes of the parties’ dispute.”). The District Court determined that plant proteins 10 Ex. 2016, 9, 11 (citing Ex. 1001, 15:26–27).” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“24. Pet. 20–26. Focusing on independent claim 1’s limitation “a compound selected from cysteine, cystine, thiamin, methionine, and mixtures of two or more thereof,” Petitioner asserts Brown’s disclosure of “pea flour” meets this limitation because “pea flour contains cystine, thiamine, and methionine.” Id. at 22–23 (citing Ex. 1012 (Brown) ¶ 364; Ex. 1003 (Tarte) ¶¶ 121–125; Ex. 1050/Ex. 1059 (Jahreis), 39, 41, 86; Ex. 1106, 3, 6–7). Petitioner qualifies that its mapping of “pea flour” to this claim limitation is based on the interpretation of “compound” as “not . . . limited to free compounds.” Id. at 22 n.7. Specifically, Petitioner states that the mapping is based on Brown’s “pea flour, which contains proteins having the claimed sugar and sulfur compounds.” Id. at 12; see Ex. 1003 ¶ 105 (reiterating this statement). Brown states, in pertinent part, “[a] muscle replica comprising pea flour, sunflower oil, and glucose.” Ex. 1012 ¶ 364. Dr. Tarté states in his declaration that a person of ordinary skill “would have understood that pea flour includes cystine, methionine, and thiamine.” Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 121–125. On cross-examination, Dr. Tarté stated that this mapping to the claim is based on an understanding that Brown’s proteins satisfy the sulfur compound limitation. Ex. 2032, 33:19–34:12; 98:11–99.9 (“[I]n as much as . . . Patent Owner considers proteins to satisfy the sulfur compound claim, then . . . the pea protein flour of Brown also satisfies the [sulfur] compound claim.”), 117:9–118:8. Patent Owner asserts that the Petition’s anticipation ground must fail if the claimed compound limitation does not extend to proteins. PO Resp. 13. Because we adopt the District Court’s construction of the claim term “compound,” Petitioner’s contention that Brown anticipates the ’096 patent necessarily fails. See Verdegaal Bros., 814 F.2d at 631 (“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.”). Petitioner concedes that the viability of this ground depends on construing the term “compound” to include whole proteins, and has failed to present evidence in this proceeding that Brown discloses a sulfur compound that is separate from a protein. Tr. 50:21–52:13 (Petitioner’s counsel conceding that the anticipation ground is not viable under the District Court’s claim construction for “compound”). Thus, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is unpatentable as anticipated by Brown.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNon analogous artDecided for patent owner
“The analogous-art test requires a showing that a reference is either in the field of endeavor of the challenged patent or is reasonably pertinent to the problem with which the inventor was concerned in order to rely on that reference as a basis for unpatentability. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Patent Owner argues that Petitioner fails to establish Crane as analogous art under this legal framework. PO Resp. 36–40; PO Sur-Reply 1–2. First, Patent Owner asserts Crane is not “from the same field of endeavor” as the ’096 patent. Id. at 37 (citing Ex. 2030 (Qian Decl.) ¶ 86). Based on this record, the ’096 patent is directed to food products while Crane, on the other hand, relates to “methods for producing recombinant functional heme-binding proteins.” Ex. 1001, 1:22–25; Ex. 1014, code (57). As Patent Owner points out, Crane does not even mention food products or any flavor functionality of heme-binding proteins. PO Resp. 37. Petitioner does not address Crane’s field of endeavor in its Petition or Reply. See Pet. 36–50; Pet. Reply 1 (“Petitioner . . . relies on the arguments made in the Petition for Ground 1 and 3A-3D”). We agree with Patent Owner that Crane is not from the same field of endeavor as the ’096 patent. Next, Patent Owner asserts the Petition fails to explain how Crane’s recombinant heme-binding protein is pertinent to the problem addressed by the ’096 patent inventors. According to Patent Owner, the problem solved by the inventors was “to provide meat-like-food products that overcome the limitations of prior-art meat substitutes.” PO Resp. 38. Crane, however, is directed to producing recombinant heme-binding proteins with complete heme incorporation. Ex. 1014 ¶¶ 3–5; Ex. 2030 ¶ 87. Neither Crane nor the Petition addresses how this is relevant to improving meat-associated flavors or aromas in food flavor additives. See generally, Ex. 1014; Pet. 36–50. The Petition asserts that Crane’s recombinant heme-binding protein, if used in place of Conrad’s blood/hemoglobin, which is added to improve taste, “would have produced the proteins with a high degree of purity.” Pet. 47–48. The Petition asserts that the benefit of high purity is greater control over the amount added and consistency in the end product. Id. at 48.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“argument at trial, we do not agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s basis for improving the nutritional content of the food product of Giacino is unsupported by the record. Proulx identifies iron deficiency as “a major nutritional problem, affecting over 2 billion people[.]” Ex. 1019, 1518; Ex. 1003 ¶ 93; see also Pet. Reply 25. Based on the evidence in this record, Giacino’s compositions lack a significant source of iron. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 387, 407. Furthermore, like Proulx, Giacino’s composition is intended to be an additive to food products. Specifically, Giacino’s composition is intended to be added to synthetic meat fibers, that may benefit from a source of iron, by mimicking not only the “meaty flavor” or aroma of meat, but the nutritional profile of conventionally sourced beef as well. Ex. 1003 ¶ 410; Ex. 1015, 7:22–26. This reasoning is supported by Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Tarté. Ex. 1003 ¶ 410. Patent Owner acknowledges the nutritive aspect of the addition is a “bonus” to the flavor impact. PO Sur-Reply 25–26. Proulx explicitly teaches adding leghemoglobin as an additive to food (“food fortificant”), therefore a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. Ex. 1019, Abs.; see id. at 1521 (“added with tortillas”). Even if the addition of Proulx’s leghemoglobin were to produce autooxidation and impact Giacino’s meaty flavor, the benefit of Proulx’s leghemoglobin as an additive to a food composition is not disputed and supports the combination. “The fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.” Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”). Moreover, the evidence of record regarding the asserted negative effect on aroma and flavor due to heme proteins is that this negative impact is merely a possibility. Ex. 2030 ¶ 76 (Dr. Qian states that heme proteins have an “unpredictable effect” and refers to statements made in related patent prosecution that “fortification [with] iron has a potential negative effect on organoleptic quality of maize products, in that soluble forms of iron can cause oxidative rancidity,” quoting Ex. 1148, 2715). Based on the evidence of record, the benefit of adding heme protein taught by Proulx outweighs the potential negative effect that it may have on Giacino’s flavoring additive. Thus, the preponderance of the evidence in this record supports Petitioner’s assertion that a POSITA would have been motivated to nutritionally fortify Giacino’s meat flavoring composition by adding Proulx’s soy leghemoglobin.” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 9,943,096 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,943,096
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.