- Miami International Holdings, Inc. / Miami International Securities Exchange, LLC et al. v. Nasdaq, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Jan 27, 2022 · CBM2018-00032 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · CBM · Rehearing
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for rehearing to authorize a request for Director rehearing of the final written decision.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“Given the particular circumstances of this proceeding, particularly that the Request for Rehearing was filed prior to the Supreme Court’s Arthrex decision, we construe Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing as requesting authorization to file a Request for Rehearing by the Director of the Final Written Decision and grant this request. Patent Owner is authorized to file a Request for Rehearing by the Director of the Final Written Decision within 30 days of the date of this decision. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.5, 42.71(d).” slip op. at 3
- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“Given the particular circumstances of this proceeding, particularly that the Request for Rehearing was filed prior to the Supreme Court’s Arthrex decision, we construe Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing as requesting authorization to file a Request for Rehearing by the Director of the Final Written Decision and grant this request. Patent Owner is authorized to file a Request for Rehearing by the Director of the Final Written Decision within 30 days of the date of this decision. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.5, 42.71(d).” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 7,933,827 - Miami International Holdings, Inc. / Miami International Securities Exchange, LLC et al. v. Nasdaq Ise, LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Jan 27, 2022 · CBM2018-00031 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · CBM · Rehearing
The Board granted Patent Owner’s rehearing request by authorizing a request for Director rehearing of the final written decision finding claims 1–9 unpatentable under § 101.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,246,093 - Miami International Holdings, Inc. / Miami International Securities Exchange, LLC et al. v. Nasdaq, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Jan 27, 2022 · CBM2018-00030 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · CBM · Rehearing
The Board granted Nasdaq’s rehearing request and authorized it to seek Director rehearing of the final written decision within 30 days.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 2
- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“The United States Patent and Trademark Office subsequently implemented an interim procedure1 whereby review of a final written decision by the Director may be requested by a party to a post-grant review proceeding.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 7,921,051 - Miami International Holdings, Inc. / Miami International Securities Exchange, LLC et al. v. Nasdaq, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Jan 27, 2022 · CBM2018-00029 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · CBM · Rehearing
The Board granted Nasdaq’s rehearing request and authorized it to seek Director rehearing of the final written decision within 30 days.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“Given the particular circumstances of this proceeding, particularly that the Request for Rehearing was filed prior to the Supreme Court’s Arthrex decision, we construe Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing as requesting authorization to file a Request for Rehearing by the Director of the Final Written Decision and grant this request. Patent Owner is authorized to file a Request for Rehearing by the Director of the Final Written Decision within 30 days of the date of this decision. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.5, 42.71(d).” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 7,747,506 - Miami International Holdings, Inc. / Miami International Securities Exchange, LLC et al. v. Nasdaq Ise, LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Jan 27, 2022 · CBM2018-00021 · APJ Michael W Kim · CBM · Rehearing
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for rehearing and authorized it to seek Director rehearing of the final written decision within 30 days.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 6,618,707 - Miami International Holdings, Inc. / Miami International Securities Exchange, LLC et al. v. Ften, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Jan 27, 2022 · CBM2018-00020 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · CBM · Rehearing
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for rehearing and authorized it to seek Director rehearing of the final written decision.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 2
- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970 (2021). The Supreme Court held “that 35 U.S.C. § 6(c) is unenforceable as applied to the Director insofar as it prevents the Director from reviewing the decisions of the PTAB on his own. The Director may engage in such review and reach his own decision.” Arthrex, 141 S. Ct. at 1987. The Supreme Court “conclude[d] that the appropriate remedy is a remand to the Acting Director for him to decide whether to rehear the petition.” Id. The United States Patent and Trademark Office subsequently implemented an interim procedure1 whereby review of a final written decision by the Director may be requested by a party to a post-grant review proceeding.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,386,371 - Cxloyalty, Inc. v. Maritz Holdings Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 19, 2019 · CBM2018-00037 · APJ Justin T Arbes · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1–15 are unpatentable under § 101; the motion to amend is granted for proposed substitute claims 16–23, which were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable
“does not remove the claim from the realm of abstract ideas. See Pet. 52–53; Reply 12; SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that it “does not matter to [the conclusion that the claim is directed to an abstract idea] whether the information here is information about real investments,” as “even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract” (citation omitted)). Further, the last two clauses of claim 1 that recite how the transaction is viewed from the perspectives of the participant and vendor system, respectively, merely express the “non-physical result” of the information transfers and confirm the abstract nature of the claimed subject matter. See Pet. 57. In fact, as to the vendor system clause, the Specification indicates that the vendor system transfers information no differently than it would for any other transaction. See Ex. 1001, col. 7, ll. 15–18 (disclosing that vendor system 208 responds to purchase request 216 “in the same way that it would respond to any other purchase request from a consumer that presents a credit card”).” slip op. at 35
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable
“Our conclusion also is supported by the ’087 patent’s description of” slip op. at 41
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“transaction, . . . display[ing] an order message indicating the completion of the purchase transaction to the respective participant.” Mot., App’x A, 4. An example in which a judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application is when “an additional element adds insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; Flook, 437 U.S. at 590 (holding that a step of adjusting an alarm limit variable was “post-solution activity”). Displaying an order message after the facilitated transaction has been completed amounts to insignificant post-solution activity, and does not support a conclusion that the abstract idea of claim 16 is integrated into a practical application.” slip op. at 75
- 101 substituteMixed
“transaction, . . . display[ing] an order message indicating the completion of the purchase transaction to the respective participant.” Mot., App’x A, 4. An example in which a judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application is when “an additional element adds insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; Flook, 437 U.S. at 590 (holding that a step of adjusting an alarm limit variable was “post-solution activity”). Displaying an order message after the facilitated transaction has been completed amounts to insignificant post-solution activity, and does not support a conclusion that the abstract idea of claim 16 is integrated into a practical application.” slip op. at 75
Patent outcomesUS 7,134,087 unpatentable§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Berkheimer · EnfishPatents in suitUS 7,134,087 - Autodesk, Inc. v. Uniloc USA, Inc. And Uniloc Luxembourg, S.A.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 11, 2017 · CBM2016-00043 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 12–19 are unpatentable under § 101; claims 3, 8–11, and 20 are subject to adverse judgment after disclaimer.
RulingsFinal written decision- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“B. Statutory Disclaimer During the pendency of this proceeding, Patent Owner filed a disclaimer pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 253(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a). Ex. 2014. According to this disclaimer, Patent Owner disclaims claims 3, 8–11, and 20 of the ’820 patent. Id.; see also Resp. 1 (“Contemporaneously with the filing of this Response, Patent Owner is disclaiming claims 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 20 of the ’820 Patent.”). Our rules provide for entry of adverse judgment against a Patent Owner who disclaims “a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). Although Patent Owner does not disclaim all the challenged claims, and although Patent Owner therefore has some claims remaining in this trial, we construe the disclaimer of claims 3, 8–11, and 20 as a request for the entry of adverse judgment solely with respect to those claims. We grant the request and enter adverse judgment with respect to claims 3, 8–11, and 20.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“1. Add-On Computer Software Code Both parties propose construing “add-on computer software code,” a term that appears in every challenged claim. Ex. 1001, 78:43–82:36. Petitioner argues that this term should be interpreted as a “set of computer code that cannot be run independently from a parent program.” Pet. 22. Patent Owner argues that the term should be interpreted as “set of computer code that is designed to run within a parent computer software application or code, particularly architectural CAD software (or another architectural, civil, industrial, or other software design tool), as an internal component.” Resp. 42–43. We agree with Patent Owner. Patent Owner’s construction is taken directly from the written description of the ’820 patent, which provides a reasonably clear, deliberate, and precise definition of the term. See Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1480; Ex. 1001, 61:42–51 (“The plug-in (add-on) computer software code is . . . .”). To the extent that Petitioner’s proposed construction seeks to limit add-on software code further by requiring that the software code be incapable of running independently from a parent program, as opposed merely to being designed to run within the parent program as an internal component, this further limitation is inconsistent with the lexicography undertaken by the patentee of the ’820 patent. Accordingly, we construe “add-on computer software code” as a “set of computer code that is designed to run within a parent computer software application or code, particularly architectural CAD software (or another architectural, civil, industrial, or other software design tool), as an internal component.”” slip op. at 6
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable
“As discussed above, the ’820 patent describes solving problems with the generation of cost estimates of construction projects, including that the process takes significant time and effort, that the estimates produced are difficult to revise, and that the estimates can be inaccurate, leading to cost overruns and difficulties obtaining construction loans. Ex. 1001, 1:15–62. The claims recite a computer readable medium or system for automating the process of generating a price schedule, which is used to develop the overall project cost estimate. Id. at 78:43–82:36. In so doing, the claims do not recite any “specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities,” such as the “self-referential table for a computer database” in Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336. Instead, the claims of the ’820 patent “invoke[]” known aspects of computer technology, including “[a] non-transitory computer readable medium,” “a computer that includes a processor and a memory,” “an add-on computer software code,” “a software design tool,” and “a database,” “merely as a tool” for solving the problem of improving the known process of generating construction project cost estimates. Id.; Ex. 1001, 78:43–60. Accordingly, the claims of the ’820 patent are not like those considered in Enfish, where the claims were determined at the first step of the Alice framework not to be directed to abstract ideas because they were directed to “[a] specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities.” 822 F.3d at 1336. Instead, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims of the ’820 patent are focused “on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea.’” Id. The ’820 patent makes clear that the heart of the claimed subject matter is generating prices for construction projects, a process that can be accomplished without automation technology. Ex. 1001, 1:15–62. The claims themselves recite “[a] non-transitory computer readable medium [that] causes [a] computer to generate a price schedule” and “[a] system for creating a pricing schedule.” Id. at 78:43–51, 82:4. As discussed above, the computer technology recited in the claims is used merely as a tool to automate the process of determining the price of a construction project. Determining a price is an abstract idea. See Versata Dev. Grp., 793 F.3d at 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Thus, on the current record, Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that the claims of the ’820 patent are directed to an abstract idea under the first step of the Alice analysis.” slip op. at 20
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable
“application of an abstract idea. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78. Petitioner argues that the challenged claims have no such elements, because “the challenged claims add nothing more than well-understood, routine, conventional activity to the abstract idea of calculating a price.” Pet. 32–48. Patent Owner argues that the presence of the add-on computer software code limitations in the challenged claims transforms those claims into patent-eligible applications. Resp. 49–50. We are persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims of the ’820 patent do not add an inventive concept sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent on the abstract idea itself. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 8,515,820 unpatentableClaim construction§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · EnfishPatents in suitUS 8,515,820 - Google Inc. / Apple Inc. v. Contentguard Holdings, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 21, 2016 · CBM2015-00040 · APJ Michael R Zecher · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1, 5, and 11 are unpatentable as anticipated by Stefik and obvious over Stefik with ordinary skill; the motion to amend is granted for substitute claim 37.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“claims of the ’280 patent at issue in this proceeding based on the same grounds of unpatentability. The Petition in Case CBM2015-00160 was accompanied by a Motion for Joinder that requests we join Apple as a party to this proceeding. Pursuant to § 324 and § 18(a) of the AIA, we instituted another covered business method patent review proceeding as to claims 1, 5, and 11 of the ’280 patent, and then granted Apple’s Motion for Joinder. Paper 14.” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“be confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 419. Instead, the relevant inquiry here is whether Petitioners have set forth “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cited with approval in KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. When describing examples of what may constitute a sufficient rationale to combine, the Court held that, “[w]hen there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and 50 there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. Upon considering the record in its entirety, we are satisfied that Petitioners’ rationale for modifying Stefik by allowing a NSOR to be exercised at a different time from a usage right suffices as an articulated reasoning with rational underpinnings that justifies the legal conclusion of obviousness. We first address whether a design need or market pressure existed to solve a particular problem, and then we turn to whether there were a finite number of identified, predictable solutions. As to the first inquiry, both the Background of the Invention of the ’280 patent and Stefik serve as evidence that there was a need to address particular problems associated with exercising and enforcing the rights of content owners during the distribution and use of their digital works in a multi-level distribution scheme. Ex. 1001, 1:29–61; Ex. 1002, 1:23–2:48.” slip op. at 50
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“’280 patent provides an explicit definition for the claim term “meta-right.” Dec. on Inst. 16. In particular, the specification discloses that “[m]eta-rights are the rights that one has to generate, manipulate, modify, dispose of or otherwise derive other rights.” Ex. 1001, 5:47–49. By using the verb “are” following “meta-rights,” the specification sets forth an explicit definition for this claim term with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. See Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1480. Notably, nothing in the specification contradicts this definition of the claim term “meta-right” or suggests another definition for this claim term. We, therefore, do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that this cited disclosure in the specification is only one of many fundamental characteristics pertaining to a meta-right. PO Resp. 23. Although we agree with Patent Owner that it is proper to consult the entire specification of the ’280 patent to interpret what the patentee meant by the claim term “meta-right” (PO Resp. 19–22), we do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that the specification further defines the claim term “meta-right” to import a negative limitation into the claims—namely, “a right that . . . is not itself a usage right because exercising a meta-right does not result in action to content” (id. at 23–25). For convenience, the relevant portion of the specification relied upon by Patent Owner is reproduced below:” slip op. at 27
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“1. Principles of Law To establish anticipation, “all of the elements and limitations of the claim must be shown in a single prior reference, arranged as in the claim.” Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “[A] reference can anticipate a claim even if it ‘d[oes] not expressly spell out’ all the limitations arranged or combined as in the claim, if a person of skill in the art, reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement or combination.” Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (second alteration in original) (quoting In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681 (CCPA 1962)). We analyze this asserted ground based on anticipation with the principles stated above in mind.” slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 7,774,280 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,774,280 - Google Inc. / Apple Inc. v. Contentguard Holdings, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 21, 2016 · CBM2015-00160 · APJ Michael R Zecher · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1, 5, and 11 are unpatentable as anticipated by Stefik and obvious over Stefik with ordinary skill knowledge; the contingent motion to substitute claim 37 is granted.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“claims of the ’280 patent at issue in this proceeding based on the same grounds of unpatentability. The Petition in Case CBM2015-00160 was accompanied by a Motion for Joinder that requests we join Apple as a party to this proceeding. Pursuant to § 324 and § 18(a) of the AIA, we instituted another covered business method patent review proceeding as to claims 1, 5, and 11 of the ’280 patent, and then granted Apple’s Motion for Joinder. Paper 14.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“transitional program for covered business method patents of claims 1, 5, 11, 12, and 22 of U.S. Patent No. 7,774,280 B2 (“the ’280 patent,” Ex. 1001). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). ContentGuard Holdings, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 8 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Taking into account the arguments presented in the Preliminary Response, we determined that the information presented in the Petition establishes that claims 1, 5, and 11 of the ’280 patent are more likely than not unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b) and 103(a). We, however, determined that the information presented in the Petition did not establish that claims 12 and 22 of the ’280 patent are more likely than not unpatentable. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 324 and § 18(a) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 329–31 (2011) (“AIA”),2 we instituted this covered business method patent review proceeding on June 24, 2015, only as to claims 1, 5, and 11 of the ’280 patent. Paper 9 (“Dec. on Inst.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“2. Level of Skill in the Art There is sufficient evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge level of a person with ordinary skill in the art. Petitioners’ declarant, Dr. Goldberg, attests that a person with ordinary skill in the art in the relevant time frame would be an individual who (1) possesses a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field; and (2) has at least two years of experience with digital content distribution and/or computer security. Ex. 1014 ¶ 10. Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Martin, agrees with Dr. Goldberg’s assessment. Compare Ex. 1014 ¶ 10, with Ex. 2009 ¶ 16. In addition, we note that the prior art of record in this proceeding—namely, Stefik—is indicative of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995).” slip op. at 48
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“8. Summary For the foregoing reasons, Patent Owner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that proposed, substitute independent claim 37 satisfies the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.221 and is patentable over the prior art. Accordingly, we grant Patent Owner’s request to cancel independent claim 1 of the ’280 patent and replace it with proposed, substitute independent claim 37.” slip op. at 72
Patent outcomesUS 7,774,280 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,774,280
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.