• Sma Solar Technology America, LLC v. Tigo Energy, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 28, 2024 · IPR2023-00879 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable because Mieth does not disclose the claimed micro-controller, and the Petition did not present the reply’s new obviousness theory.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, or a similar discipline and at least two years of design experience with circuit design.” Pet. 22. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contention, except to add that “a person may qualify as a POSITA with more education and less experience or vice versa.” PO Resp. 5. We apply Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as modified by Patent Owner, and further modified to omit “at least,” which expands the range of experience with no upper bound, thus encompassing a person of extraordinary skill in the art. We determine that the foregoing is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “In an inter partes review, we apply the same claim construction standard as would be used by a district court to construe a claim in a civil action involving the validity or infringement of a patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history of record. Id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). We determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of resolving the controversy.” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “The “at once envisage” standard does not permit us to fill in a missing claim limitation for purposes of anticipation. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 851 F.3d 1270, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Petitioner invites the same error the Federal Circuit identified in Nidec, where the Board erred by holding that “anticipation can be found even when a prior art reference fails to disclose a claim element so long as a skilled artisan reading the reference would ‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement.” Id. (citing Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). As our reviewing court explained, “Kennametal does not stand for the proposition that a reference missing a limitation can anticipate a claim if a skilled artisan viewing the reference would ‘at once envisage’ the missing limitation.” Id.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner’s obviousness challenge relies on the same argument and evidence that it presents for anticipation of claim 1. Pet. 26 (section VII.A.1.iv addressing anticipation and the micro-controller limitation of claim 1); Pet. 50, 60, 71 (cross-referencing section VII.A.1.iv for obviousness challenge to independent claims 1, 10, and 18). The Petition presents reasons to combine Mieth and Balogh. Pet. 51–55. But Petitioner’s obviousness rationale does not modify Mieth’s load 20, which remains Pet. 52 (relying on “load 20 of Mieth” as part of the combination with Balogh). The Petition presents no rationale for modifying or replacing Mieth’s load 20 and presents no argument or evidence that it would have been obvious to modify Mieth’s circuit by adding or substituting a micro-controller. In short, the Petition and Holberg Declaration assert that the micro- controller limitation is expressly disclosed in Mieth and do not present or support any obviousness rationale for that limitation. Pet. 26, 50–55; Ex. 1007 ¶ 105. Petitioner presents a new theory of unpatentability in the Reply, arguing that “the differences between Mieth’s ‘load 20’ and the claimed micro-controller are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious to a [POSITA].” Pet. Reply 11–19 (reformatted). More particularly, Petitioner argues that “a [POSITA] understands that a micro-controller is a typical type of load that could be substituted into and replace whatever type of load is being employed by Mieth.” Id. at 17 (citing Exs. 1012, 1014, 1022). The Petition does not present that argument.” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 9,584,021 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,584,021
• 3M Company v. Bay Materials, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 16, 2024 · IPR2022-01214 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 7–11, and 13 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner did not establish the flexural-modulus limitation over Hinz and the Durasoft data sheets, with or without Sun.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “The parties disagree about the appropriate definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan and, in particular, whether that artisan would have had experience or familiarity with processing “thermoformable polymer sheets” to form “orthodontic and dental appliances.” Resp. 8; see Pet. 10–11 n.1 (disagreeing with that proposition). We agree with Patent Owner for the following reasons.” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “B. Conflicting Opinion Testimony Petitioner’s own witness, Dr. Giacomin, opines that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have been familiar with various machines and methods that would have enabled the thermoforming of multilayer dental sheets into shapes that conform with the teeth (i.e., creating a dental appliance).” Ex. 1002 ¶ 25. Nonetheless, Petitioner does not contest Patent Owner’s evidence that Dr. Giacomin himself lacks that qualification. Compare Resp. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 1–9, 17 & n.1), with Reply (nowhere contesting that evidence). Petitioner also leaves uncontested Patent Owner’s evidence that Dr. Osswald, by contrast, possesses “the required experience” with dental appliances, including thermoforming processes for their manufacture. Compare Resp. 10 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶¶ 2–8; Ex. 2007), with Reply (nowhere contesting that evidence). Dr. Giacomin possesses excellent qualifications in the field of polymer rheology, but on this record, he demonstrates no, or inadequate, familiarity or experience with methods of thermoforming dental appliances from polymeric materials, which by his own admission is a minimum qualification of the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 1–11 (statement of qualifications), App’x A (curriculum vitae). Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Osswald, by contrast, has “experience with polymer materials used in dental appliances” and “shaping operations, including thermoforming” processes for such applications. Ex. 2006 ¶¶ 5, 6. Against that backdrop, where the two witnesses’ opinions differ about the level of ordinarily skill in the art of thermoforming processes for dental appliances at the time of the invention, we credit Dr. Osswald’s opinions over those of Dr. Giacomin. We take note, moreover, that Dr. Osswald’s opinions would not change under Petitioner’s somewhat different definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 2006 ¶ 14.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction Claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We construe only terms in controversy and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). No claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “In the absence of explanation by Petitioner, we are left to wonder why either of those two ranges reported in Sun would have been recognized as applicable, without modification, to the three-layer dental splint of Hinz. Starting with a commercially-available, two-layer sheet of hard-soft PC-TPU or hard-soft PETG-TPU thermoplastic polymers, Hinz bonds a third layer, consisting of hard PC or hard PETG, to the soft TPU layer of the two-layer material by a process of thermoforming. No prior art reference explains how that process would have been understood to affect the overall flexural modulus of the resulting three-layer, hard-soft-hard composition. Petitioner does not supply an adequate reason for combining Sun’s preferred flexural modulus range, reported for Sun’s dental appliances at a temperature of 23˚ C, to dental splints formed by Hinz from fundamentally different polymers and a fundamentally different process. See Pet. 65–68 (entirety of four-page analysis on this ground); Resp. 32–38; Sur-reply 7–14 (well-supported explanation of those fundamental differences); Reply 8–16 (Petitioner’s unpersuasive responsive positions). The flexural modulus of Sun’s dental appliance not only is temperature dependent but also varies with the flexural strength of the polymeric material at hand. Ex. 1018 ¶ 12. Too late in the Reply, Petitioner raises fact-intensive reasons why those differences would not have mattered to an ordinarily skilled artisan. Reply 8–16. In any event, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner glosses over “[f]undamental differences” between the polymers and processes of Sun and Hinz, differences that “are central to [the] motivation to combine inquiry” and undercut Petitioner’s view that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood either of Sun’s flexural modulus ranges to apply, without modification, to Hinz’s polymers and process. Resp. 33 (quoting Adidas AG v. Nike, Inc., 963 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2020)) (first alteration in original); see Sur-reply 8–16 (Patent Owner’s persuasive arguments and evidence on point). The ground based on Sun is deficient for the above reasons.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 10,946,630 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,946,630
• Hope Medical Enterprises, Inc. v. Fennec Pharmaceuticals, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 1, 2023 · IPR2022-00125 · APJ Julia Heaney · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board granted the revised noncontingent motion to amend, canceled claims 18 and 20, and entered substitute claims 28 and 29, which were not proven obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner, relying on the testimony of Dr. Rogers, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have [had] a bachelor’s degree or equivalent in any of the pharmaceutical sciences with at least 5 years of experience in solid state chemistry; a master’s degree in any of the pharmaceutical sciences with at least 3 years of experience in solid state chemistry; or a Ph.D. in any of the pharmaceutical sciences with 1 year of experience in solid state chemistry. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 24–28). Petitioner further states that such “[a] person could also have qualified as a [person of ordinary skill in the art] with some combination of (1) more formal education and less technical or professional experience or (2) less formal education and more technical or professional experience.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill. See generally MTA, RMTA. Having considered the parties’ arguments and evidence, we adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, because it is consistent with the disclosures of the ’363 patent and the prior art of record. We note, however, that neither party contends that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “In our Preliminary Guidance, we construed “for a pharmaceutical composition” to mean “in combination with pharmaceutically acceptable excipients,” based on the ’363 patent’s definition providing that “[t]he terms ‘formulation’ or ‘pharmaceutical composition’ as used herein refers to the drug in combination with pharmaceutically acceptable excipients.” Prelim. Guid. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1001, 12:26–28; Ex. 2010, 17:11–12; Ex. 2011, 26:26– 27). We also encouraged the parties to address whether “for a pharmaceutical composition,” which appears in the preamble of substitute claims 28 and 29, is limiting, as opposed to a statement of intended use or purpose. Id. at 6. Following our Preliminary Guidance, the parties submitted further arguments concerning the term “for a pharmaceutical composition.” Patent Owner argues the term requires that the claimed process provide STS that is sufficiently pure for use in a pediatric patient (see RMTA 8–11) and that the word “drug” in the ’363 patent’s definition of “pharmaceutical composition” requires that the anhydrous STS is of sufficient purity for pharmaceutical use. Reply RMTA 3. Petitioner argues that the construction set forth in our Preliminary Guidance was correct. See Sur-reply RMTA 2–3. Having considered the arguments and evidence, we do not further construe the term “for a pharmaceutical composition” in this Decision because, as discussed in our analysis of obviousness below, it is not necessary to construe the term in order to determine whether Petitioner has met its burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that proposed substitute claims 28 and 29 are unpatentable. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 13

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted

    “1. Reasonable Number of Substitute Claims A motion to amend must “propose a reasonable number of substitute claims.” 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(1)(B); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)(3) (“A motion to amend may cancel a challenged claim or propose a reasonable number of substitute claims.”). Patent Owner proposes the same number of substitute claims as the original challenged claims that are cancelled, i.e., a one-to-one substitution for a total of two substitute claims. MTA 2; RMTA. “There is a rebuttable presumption that a reasonable number of substitute claims per challenged claim is one (1) substitute claim.” Lectrosonics, Paper 15 at 4; see 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)(3). Petitioner does not argue otherwise. See generally Opp. RMTA. Therefore, we determine that Patent Owner proposes a reasonable number of substitute claims. 2. Support in the Original Disclosure Patent Owner has identified written description support in the originally filed disclosure of the ’363 patent for the new limitations added for the proposed substitute claims. See RMTA 5–8. We have reviewed Patent Owner’s assertions of support in the original disclosure for the proposed revised substitute claims and determine that sufficient support exists. Petitioner does not argue otherwise. See generally Opp. RMTA. Therefore, we determine that Patent Owner has met this requirement. 3. Respond to a Ground of Unpatentability “A motion to amend may be denied where . . . [t]he amendment does not respond to a ground of unpatentability involved in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)(2)(i). Patent Owner asserts that the proposed revised substitute claims are patentable over the combination of references that forms the basis of the obviousness ground on which we instituted trial. RMTA 12–13. Petitioner does not argue otherwise. See generally Opp. RMTA. Therefore, we determine that Patent Owner has met this requirement. 4. Scope of the Claims Patent Owner asserts that the proposed revised substitute claims do not enlarge the scope of original claims 18 and 20. RMTA 5. We have reviewed Patent Owner’s assertion that the purity amendments of proposed revised substitute claims 28 and 29 narrow the claims’ scope. Id. Petitioner does not argue otherwise. See generally Opp. RMTA. Therefore, we determine that Patent Owner has met this requirement.” slip op. at 17

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “determine the evidence relied on by Petitioner does not support Petitioner’s position that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Levenson, Sherman, Edwards, and USP. Petitioner’s contention that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Levenson with Sherman is based on Dr. Rogers’s testimony that “[b]oth references disclose synthesis of sodium thiosulfate pentahydrate.” Ex. 1008 ¶ 151; see Pet. 36, 38. Dr. Rogers further testified it would have been obvious to add Edwards’s dehydrating step to the preparation of STS pentahydrate “which is obtained following the teachings of Levenson and Sherman” because “Edwards itself discloses dehydrating [STS] pentahydrate.” Id. ¶ 154. The Petition included these arguments even though they were inconsistent with Petitioner’s previous statement, during the Sherman prosecution, that Levenson taught STS heptahydrate, and therefore “does not provide any teaching with respect to [STS] pentahydrate.” Ex. 2013, 97. This prior inconsistent statement undercuts Petitioner’s rationale for combining Levenson, Sherman, and Edwards in this proceeding. Moreover, Petitioner’s rationale for combining the references in this proceeding is inconsistent with its statements about Levenson during the Sherman prosecution. Recognizing this inconsistency, Petitioner now takes the position that the Petition and Dr. Rogers’s testimony were incorrect. Paper 32; see Tr. 21:14–22:7, 59:1–2 (reemphasizing that “Petitioner maintains the statements that it made in the Sherman prosecution regarding Levenson”). Petitioner attempts to rationalize the inconsistency between its statements in the Sherman prosecution (including that “Levenson does not provide any teaching with respect to [STS] pentahydrate”) and its position in this proceeding by arguing that Dr. Rogers relies on Levenson as teaching surface activation “regardless of any particular hydrates Levenson discloses.” Tr. 22:8–9. That argument is not persuasive, because Dr. Rogers’s declaration clearly states the primary reason for his opinion that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Levenson with Sherman: “[b]oth references disclose synthesis of sodium thiosulfate pentahydrate.” Ex. 1008 ¶ 151. Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, Dr. Roger’s reliance on the surface activation teachings of Levenson is because he believes that both references pertain to STS pentahydrate; the surface activation teachings are not stated as an independent reason to combine the references. Id. Petitioner provides no further explanation of how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Levenson’s teachings regarding manufacture of STS heptahydrate with Sherman’s and Edwards’s teachings regarding STS pentahydrate, or how a person of ordinary skill would have regarded the difference between STS hydrates. Dr. Rogers’s acknowledgement of stability differences among STS hydrates highlights the insufficiency of Petitioner’s showing in this regard. See Ex. 2005, 35, 39. Having changed its position at the close of trial and having effectively withdrawn Dr. Rogers’s testimony as to similarities between Levenson and” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 10,792,363 not shown unpatentable
  Claim constructioncites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,792,363
• Sunspec Alliance v. Tigo Energy, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 26, 2023 · IPR2021-01286 · APJ Julia Heaney · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held that claims 1, 5–7, 12, and 13 were not shown unpatentable because the cited art did not disclose the required predetermined number of allowed skips.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would have had a bachelor’s degree or similar degree in electrical engineering and one year of experience in the design of solar power systems, power control systems, and/or power safety systems.” Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 17). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s proposed level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 2003 ¶ 25. Having considered the parties’ arguments and evidence, we adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, because it is consistent with the disclosures of the ’321 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Having considered the parties’ positions as to construction of the term “skips” and applicability of the definition of “skips” set forth in the ’321 specification (Ex. 1001, 9:36–37), we construe the term “skips” to mean “the event of missing a communication or pulse.” We adopt the definition set forth in the ’321 specification because patentee acted as its own lexicographer. Cont’l Cirs. LLC v. Intel Corp., 915 F.3d 788, 796 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316) (“When the patentee acts as its own lexicographer, that definition governs.”). We determine that, for purposes of this Decision, no other claim term requires express construction. See, e.g., Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803.” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Having considered the record as a whole, we find that Moine does not disclose the “predetermined number of allowed skips” limitation. We do not agree with Petitioner that Moine’s disclosure of determining whether a “skip” (i.e., the event of missing a communication or pulse, as we have construed that term supra) has occurred, meets the challenged claims’ requirement of determining communication has been interrupted “for a time period longer than the predetermined number of allowed skips.” See Pet. Reply 14–15. As explained below, we determine that the “predetermined number of allowed skips” limitation does not encompass zero skips, or a mere interruption in communication from the controller, as described in Moine.” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “2. Analysis Petitioner argues that to the extent the Board finds Moine’s receiver 5 is not a “watchdog unit,” Kronberg discloses a watchdog unit, as embodied in Figure 1. Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1006, 2:30–32, Fig. 1). Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use Kronberg’s watchdog to implement Moine’s receiver to achieve a predictable outcome, because watchdog timers were a well-known technique for detecting malfunctions, and the output of Kronberg’s watchdog could be provided to the switch 4 of Moine, to open and power down Moine’s circuit. Id. at 26–28 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 79–85; Ex. 1006, 1:53–55, 3:38–42, 4:9–12; Ex. 1013, 1269). Petitioner “does not rely on Kronberg to remedy any failure of Moine to disclose the ‘skips’ limitations.” Pet. Reply 19. As discussed above, we find that Petitioner fails to adequately demonstrate that Moine discloses the “predetermined number of allowed skips” limitation of claims 1 and 12. See supra § II.D.2. Accordingly, because Petitioner does not rely on Kronberg to remedy this deficiency in Moine, Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 12 would have been unpatentable over the combination of Moine and Kronberg.” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 8,933,321 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,933,321
• BASF Corporation v. Ingevity South Carolina, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 9, 2021 · PGR2020-00037 · APJ Julia Heaney · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10, 14–28, 32–38, 51, 52, 55–57, 59, 64–72, and 76–82 were not shown unpatentable for indefiniteness or obviousness over Hiltzik, Clontz WIPO, and Clontz SAE.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “art include “(1) educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of workers active in the field.” Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696–697 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d 1376, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Not all such factors may be present in every case, and one or more of these or other factors may predominate in a particular case. Id. Petitioner argues a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would possess at least a B.S. in chemistry or chemical or mechanical engineering and would have at least one year of experience working on control of automotive evaporative emissions,” and “would also understand the chemistry and physics associated with the phenomena of fuel vapor adsorption, desorption, and diffusion.” Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 17). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the ’553 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner and Dr. Rockstraw present peer-reviewed scientific literature demonstrating that gravimetric and volumetric measurement techniques were known to measure equivalent adsorption capacities and were viewed as compatible with each other. See Ex. 2022 ¶¶ 95–107 (addressing Anson7 (Ex. 2007), Belmabkhout8 (Ex. 1021), Zielinski9 (Ex. 2069)). For example, Belmabkhout reported similar results between measurements by gravimetric and volumetric instruments, except at very high pressures. Ex. 1021, 856–57. Zielinski reported “excellent agreement” between volumetric and gravimetric adsorption capacity measurements (Ex. 2069, 5–6); Dr. Zielinski (who oversaw the testing reported by Intertek 7 Anson, A., et al., “Hydrogen adsorption on a single-walled carbon nanotube material: a comparative study of three different adsorption techniques,” Nanotechnology 15 (2004), 1503. 8 Belmabkhout, Y., et al., “High-pressure adsorption measurements. A comparative study of the volumetric and gravimetric methods,” Measurement Science and Technology 15 (2004) 848. 9 Zielinski, J. et al., “High pressure sorption isotherms via differential pressure measurements,” Adsorption 13 (2007), 1–7. in Ex. 1020) also testified that he would expect capacity measurements for either a gravimetric or volumetric technique to yield the same results, or be “superimposable” under ideal conditions, because they represent “the same experimental measured quantities.” Ex. 2026, 52:11–53:7, 54:13–22, 69:12– 70:3, 139:8–19. Petitioner’s argument that these papers are not relevant because they do not address measurements on the adsorption capacity of n-butane (see Pet. Reply 26) is not persuasive, because Petitioner does not direct us to sufficient evidence showing a reason why measurements of n-butane’s adsorption capacity would have been subject to different measurement inconsistencies. Further, Petitioner’s argument about a 3% deviation in results between the measurement techniques reported in Anson and Belmabkhout is not persuasive because the papers’ conclusions suggest a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have seen such a deviation as significant (e.g., Ex. 1021, 849: “we have not observed important discrepancies” between gravimetric and volumetric measurements). Dr. Rockstraw also testifies as to numerous additional texts and standards that confirm persons of ordinary skill in the art understood that gravimetric and volumetric measurement techniques would provide consistent results when proper experimental protocols are followed and the instruments’ accuracy and precision are taken into consideration. See Ex. 2022 ¶¶ 88–91, 119–127. This evidence is essentially unrebutted by Petitioner. We find that the evidence submitted by Patent Owner as to the gravimetric and volumetric measurement techniques demonstrates that they were well established in the art as comparable methods of measuring adsorption capacity, and accordingly, not a basis for determining claim” slip op. at 16

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted in part

    “Exhibit 2027. Paper 57 (“Pet. Mot.”). We do not discuss or cite Exhibit 2080 or paragraph 39 of Exhibit 2027 in this Decision, and consideration of them played no part in our determinations set forth herein. Because their presence in the record would not affect our analysis in this Decision, we dismiss as moot Petitioner’s motion with respect to these exhibits. B. Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Patent Owner filed a motion to exclude Exhibits 1015–1016, 1023– 1025, 1032, 1038–1039, 1042 (certain paragraphs), 1044, 1046–1049, and 1052–1054. Paper 56 (“PO Mot.”). Patent Owner groups these exhibits into four categories, which we apply in discussing the motion below. 1. Patent Owner moves to exclude Exhibits 1015 and 1046 as “irrelevant determinations from other adjudicative bodies regarding different patents.” PO Mot. 1. We do not discuss or cite these exhibits in this Decision, and have not considered them in reaching our decision herein. Because the presence of these exhibits in the record would not affect our analysis in this Decision, we dismiss as moot Patent Owner’s motion with respect to these exhibits. 2. Patent Owner moves to exclude Exhibits 1023, 1024, 1025,” slip op. at 46

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)Written description adequateNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the gravimetric and volumetric methods provide fundamentally different measurements of adsorption capacity. Patent Owner and Dr. Rockstraw present peer-reviewed scientific literature demonstrating that gravimetric and volumetric measurement techniques were known to measure equivalent adsorption capacities and were viewed as compatible with each other. See Ex. 2022 ¶¶ 95–107 (addressing Anson7 (Ex. 2007), Belmabkhout8 (Ex. 1021), Zielinski9 (Ex. 2069)). For example, Belmabkhout reported similar results between measurements by gravimetric and volumetric instruments, except at very high pressures. Ex. 1021, 856–57. Zielinski reported “excellent agreement” between volumetric and gravimetric adsorption capacity measurements (Ex. 2069, 5–6); Dr. Zielinski (who oversaw the testing reported by Intertek 7 Anson, A., et al., “Hydrogen adsorption on a single-walled carbon nanotube material: a comparative study of three different adsorption techniques,” Nanotechnology 15 (2004), 1503. 8 Belmabkhout, Y., et al., “High-pressure adsorption measurements. A comparative study of the volumetric and gravimetric methods,” Measurement Science and Technology 15 (2004) 848. 9 Zielinski, J. et al., “High pressure sorption isotherms via differential pressure measurements,” Adsorption 13 (2007), 1–7. in Ex. 1020) also testified that he would expect capacity measurements for either a gravimetric or volumetric technique to yield the same results, or be “superimposable” under ideal conditions, because they represent “the same experimental measured quantities.” Ex. 2026, 52:11–53:7, 54:13–22, 69:12– 70:3, 139:8–19. Petitioner’s argument that these papers are not relevant because they do not address measurements on the adsorption capacity of n-butane (see Pet. Reply 26) is not persuasive, because Petitioner does not direct us to sufficient evidence showing a reason why measurements of n-butane’s adsorption capacity would have been subject to different measurement inconsistencies. Further, Petitioner’s argument about a 3% deviation in results between the measurement techniques reported in Anson and Belmabkhout is not persuasive because the papers’ conclusions suggest a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have seen such a deviation as significant (e.g., Ex. 1021, 849: “we have not observed important discrepancies” between gravimetric and volumetric measurements). Dr. Rockstraw also testifies as to numerous additional texts and” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 10,323,553 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 10,323,553
• Qiagen North American Holdings, Inc. v. Handylab, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 14, 2020 · IPR2019-01493 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–33 not shown unpatentable under the asserted §103 grounds because the petitioner did not establish the claimed separate sample inlets or a reasonable expectation of success in combining the references.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “We agree with the parties that a POSA would have had an engineering background and experience with microfluidic devices, which is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Our determination regarding the patentability of the challenged claims does not turn on the differences between Petitioner’s and Patent under either assessment.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We also agree with Patent Owner that the specification defines the structure of the sample lane. PO Resp. 12. The specification states: A sample lane is an independently controllable set of elements by which a sample can be analyzed, according to methods described herein as well as others known in the art. A sample lane comprises at least a sample inlet, and a microfluidic network having one or more microfluidic components as further described herein. Ex. 1002, 12:66–13:4. The embodiments described in the specification include sample inlets associated with each of the sample lanes. See, e.g., id.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner has failed to sufficiently demonstrate that the combination of Zou I and McNeely or Pease teaches multi-lane microfluidic cartridges, because Petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a POSA would reasonably have expected to be successful in combining Zou I’s microfluidic chip with a cartridge as taught by McNeely or Pease. In order to demonstrate that the challenged claims are obvious, a petitioner must demonstrate “that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). A petitioner must combination(s) of elements in specific references would yield a predictable result, or [3] how any specific combination would operate or read on the asserted claims.” Id. at 1327–28. Focusing on the parties’ arguments pertaining to how Zou I and McNeely or Pease could be combined, which combination of elements in the references would yield a predictable result, and how the combination would operate or read on the challenged claims, we determine that the evidence on this record is not sufficient to show that a POSA could have had a reasonable expectation of success in attempting to combine the teachings of Zou I with McNeely or Pease. Although the Petition sets forth various rationales for why a person of ordinary skill would have had reason to combine the teachings of Zou I and McNeely or Pease, the rationales are general in nature and do not address any specific modification to either of the references. Pet. 28–33. The Petition includes a single reference to reasonable expectation of success, in a conclusory statement that “a POSA would have been motivated to combine the multiplexing PCR unit of Zou I with a conventional integrated machine such as in McNeely or Pease, with a high expectation of success.” Id. at 28–29. The First Gale Declaration is similarly conclusory as to how Zou I and McNeely or Pease could be combined and does not elaborate on reasonable expectation of success. See Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 116–127. Such conclusory assertions, lacking factual substantiation, are insufficient for evaluating reasonable expectation of success as part of an obviousness determination. Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 35

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedGranted in part

    “Patent Owner also filed a Motion to Strike certain portions of Petitioner’s Reply. Paper 38. Petitioner filed an Opposition. Paper 39. We granted Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike in part, striking the arguments in Section II.B.ii from Petitioner’s Reply. Paper 42, 6–8, 13. We did not consider those arguments in the course of preparing this Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 2

  Patent outcomesUS 7,998,708 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 7,998,708
• Qiagen North American Holdings, Inc. v. Handylab, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 14, 2020 · IPR2019-00488 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–33 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the claimed multi-lane cartridge or a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with the parties that a POSA would have had an engineering background and experience with microfluidic devices, which is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Our determination regarding the patentability of the challenged claims does not turn on the differences between Petitioner’s and Patent under either assessment.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We also agree with Patent Owner that the specification defines the structure of the sample lane. PO Resp. 12. The specification states: A sample lane is an independently controllable set of elements by which a sample can be analyzed, according to methods described herein as well as others known in the art. A sample lane comprises at least a sample inlet, and a microfluidic network having one or more microfluidic components as further described herein.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “In an obviousness analysis, a sufficient reason must be shown as to why a POSA would have thought of combining or modifying the prior art to achieve the patented invention. See Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, Petitioner offers only the general proposition that drilling access holes into the glass cover of Zou I’s microfluidic chip was a “common technique,” but this does not provide a reason why a POSA would have been motivated to modify Zou I’s microfluidic chip. Pet. Reply 7. Petitioner’s argument and Dr. Gale’s that does not apprise us of why a POSA would have modified Zou I with access holes that would operate as separate sample inlets for each sample lane as required by the claims of the ’708 patent. Here, Petitioner attempts to imbue a POSA with the knowledge of the claimed invention, when no prior art reference, references of record, or other evidence conveys or suggests that knowledge. Petitioner’s argument that a POSA would have modified Zou I in this way appears to be premised on Petitioner’s knowledge of the ’708 patent disclosure. This is improper hindsight reasoning. Petitioner needed to explain what would have led a POSA at the time of the invention to consider modifying Zou I to include a separate sample inlet with each sample lane. Petitioner failed to provide such an explanation. See W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (In an obviousness analysis, we must “cast the mind back to the time the invention was made” and “occupy the mind of one skilled in the art who is presented only with the references, and who is normally guided by the then-accepted wisdom in the art.”).” slip op. at 31

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner has failed to sufficiently demonstrate that the combination of Zou I and McNeely or Pease teaches multi-lane microfluidic cartridges, because Petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a POSA would reasonably have expected to be successful in combining Zou I’s microfluidic chip with a cartridge as taught by McNeely or Pease. In order to demonstrate that the challenged claims are obvious, a petitioner must demonstrate “that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). A petitioner must combination(s) of elements in specific references would yield a predictable result, or [3] how any specific combination would operate or read on the asserted claims.” Id. at 1327–28. Focusing on the parties’ arguments pertaining to how Zou I and McNeely or Pease could be combined, which combination of elements in the references would yield a predictable result, and how the combination would operate or read on the challenged claims, we determine that the evidence on this record is not sufficient to show that a POSA could have had a reasonable expectation of success in attempting to combine the teachings of Zou I with McNeely or Pease. Although the Petition sets forth various rationales for why a person of ordinary skill would have had reason to combine the teachings of Zou I and McNeely or Pease, the rationales are general in nature and do not address any specific modification to either of the references. Pet. 28–33. The Petition includes a single reference to reasonable expectation of success, in a conclusory statement that “a POSA would have been motivated to combine the multiplexing PCR unit of Zou I with a conventional integrated machine such as in McNeely or Pease, with a high expectation of success.” Id. at 28–29. The First Gale Declaration is similarly conclusory as to how Zou I and McNeely or Pease could be combined and does not elaborate on reasonable expectation of success. See Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 116–127. Such conclusory assertions, lacking factual substantiation, are insufficient for evaluating reasonable expectation of success as part of an obviousness determination. Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 7,998,708 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 7,998,708
• Qiagen North American Holdings, Inc. v. Handylab, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 14, 2020 · IPR2019-00490 · APJ Julia Heaney · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–22 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations failed to establish the required multi-lane cartridges and a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “year of related experience.” Pet. 7. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s proposed definition “is not narrowly drawn to experience in ‘microfluidic systems that carry out PCR,’” and contends that a POSA “would have had a degree in Mechanical Engineering, Bioengineering, or a similar field, and three years of experience with microfluidic devices that carry out PCR, or would have an advanced degree in a similar field with at least one year of related experience.” PO Resp. 8 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶¶ 25–26). Patent Owner’s declarant Dr. Northrup states that, although he disagrees with Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSA, his “opinions would not change under” that definition. Ex. 2036 ¶ 28. We agree with the parties that a POSA would have had an engineering background and experience with microfluidic devices, which is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Our determination regarding the patentability of the challenged claims does not turn on the differences between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s definitions, and we note that our conclusions would be the same under either assessment.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the specification defines the structure of the sample lane. PO Resp. 12. The specification states: A sample lane is an independently controllable set of elements by which a sample can be analyzed, according to methods described herein as well as others known in the art. A sample lane comprises at least a sample inlet, and a microfluidic network having one or more microfluidic components as further described herein. Ex. 1003, 13:4–9. The embodiments described in the specification include sample inlets associated with each of the sample lanes. See, e.g., id. at 14:41–52, Figs. 10A, 10B (describing an exemplary microfluidic cartridge depicted in Figures 10A and 10B as showing “[m]ore than one inlet 202 . . . wherein one inlet operates in conjunction with a single sample lane”), 17:60–64, Fig. 13 (describing and depicting a 48-sample cartridge with separate inlets 602 for each sample lane). In contrast, when describing other elements (such as inlet ports and valves) that may be included in a sample lane, the specification clearly conveys that these other elements are optional. Id. at 13:10–13 (“In various embodiments, a sample lane can include a sample inlet port or valve, and a microfluidic network that comprises, in fluidic communication one or more components selected from the group consisting of” specified valves, vents, pumps, and chambers. (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundDecided for patent owner

    “In an obviousness analysis, a sufficient reason must be shown as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have thought of combining or modifying the prior art to achieve the patented invention. See Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, Petitioner offers only the general proposition that drilling access holes into the glass cover of Zou I’s microfluidic chip would have been a common technique Pet. Reply 7. Petitioner’s argument and Dr. Gale’s testimony with respect to the modification of Zou I leaves an analytical gap that does not apprise us of why a person of ordinary skill would have modified Zou I with access holes that would operate as separate sample inlets for each sample lane as required by the claims of the ’900 patent. Here, Petitioner attempts to imbue a person of ordinary skill with the knowledge of the claimed invention, when no prior art reference of record or other evidence conveys or suggests that knowledge. Without such evidence, Petitioner’s argument that a person of ordinary skill would have modified Zou I in this way appears to be premised on Petitioner’s knowledge of the ’900 patent disclosure. This is improper hindsight reasoning. Petitioner needed to explain what would have led a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention to consider modifying Zou I to include a separate sample inlet with each sample lane. Petitioner failed to provide such an explanation. See W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (In an obviousness analysis, we must “cast the mind back to the time the invention was made” and “occupy the mind of one skilled in the art who is presented only with the references, and who is normally guided by the then-accepted wisdom in the art.”).” slip op. at 31

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner has failed to sufficiently demonstrate that the combination of Zou I and McNeely or Pourahmadi teaches multi-lane microfluidic cartridges, because Petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably have expected to be successful in combining Zou I’s microfluidic chip with a cartridge as taught by McNeely or Pourahmadi. In order to demonstrate that the challenged claims are obvious, a petitioner must demonstrate “that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007). A petitioner must articulate “[1] how specific references could be combined, [2] which combination(s) of elements in specific references would yield a predictable result, or [3] how any specific combination would operate or read on the asserted claims.” Id. Focusing on the parties’ arguments pertaining to how Zou I and McNeely or Pourahmadi could be combined, which combination of elements in the references would yield a predictable result, and how the combination would operate or read on the challenged claims, we determine that the evidence on this record is not sufficient to show that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in attempting to combine the teachings of Zou I with McNeely or Pourahmadi. Although the Petition sets forth various rationales for why a Zou I and McNeely or Pourahmadi (Pet. 27–32), the rationales are general in nature and do not address any specific modification to either of the references. Further, the Petition includes a single reference to reasonable expectation of success, in a conclusory statement that “a POSA would have been motivated to combine the PCR unit of Zou I with a multi-cartridge integrated machine such as in McNeely or Pourahmadi, with a high expectation of success.” Pet. 27. The Gale Declaration is similarly conclusory as to how Zou I and McNeely or Pourahmadi could have been combined by the ordinary artisan, and does not elaborate on the artisan’s reasonable expectation of success. Such conclusory assertions, lacking factual substantiation, are insufficient for evaluating reasonable expectation of success as part of an obviousness determination. Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Thus, Petitioner did not make out its obviousness case based on combining Zou I and McNeely or Pourahmadi, in the Petition. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3).” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 8,323,900 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,323,900

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.