PTAB
Advanced fields
580 decisions · 518msnewest first
  • PTAB · Dec 28, 2021 · IPR2021-01195 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 6, 7, 11, and 12, finding a reasonable likelihood that the Batchelder-based obviousness grounds would prevail.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityNot reached

      “Under the Board’s precedential decision in SharkNinja Operating LLC v. iRobot Corp., when no time-bar or estoppel would apply once determining Petitioner did not name all RPIs, the Board need not address the issue. IPR2020-00734, Paper 11 (Oct. 6, 2020) (precedential); see also Lumentum Holdings, Inc. v. Capella Photonics, Inc., IPR2015-00739, Paper 38 at 6 (PTAB Mar. 4, 2016) (precedential) (“[O]ur jurisdiction to consider a petition does not require a ‘correct’ identification of all RPIs in a petition.”); Mayne Pharma Int’l Pty. Ltd. v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., 927 F.3d 1232, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[I]f a petition fails to identify all real parties in” slip op. at 8

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “the ’354 patent, the overlap in the asserted prior art, and our prior determination of unpatentability regarding the ’354 patent, we conclude that the merits of Petitioner’s case in this proceeding are substantively strong. Thus, this factor weighs strongly in favor of institution. 7. Holistic assessment of factors and conclusion We consider the above factors and take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. In weighing the totality of the evidence, we decide not to exercise discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution.” slip op. at 14

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “C. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill would have been knowledgeable regarding liquid cooling systems for computer systems, would have earned at least a bachelor’s degree, such as a B.S. (bachelor of science), or equivalent thereof, in electrical or mechanical engineering or a closely related field, and would have possessed at least two or three years of experience in liquid cooling systems for computer systems or in similar systems. Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 23–26). Patent Owner does not dispute this definition of a person of ordinary skill. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill as it appears to be consistent with the level of skill reflected by the specification and in the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 14

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

      “construe claim terms “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019). The parties stipulated to constructions of “reservoir” and “chamber” in the district-court litigation. Ex. 1005, 2. Petitioner proposes additional constructions for “impeller” and “radiator.” Pet. 8–10. Patent Owner does not dispute those constructions. See generally Prelim. Resp. Based on our analysis of the issues in dispute at this stage of the proceeding, we conclude that none of the claim terms identified by the parties require express construction at this time. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 15

    Claim constructionDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 10,613,601
  • PTAB · Dec 28, 2021 · IPR2020-01199 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–6, 9–12, 29–33, and 41 are unpatentable as obvious over the Carmichael-Anderson and Taube-based combinations; the Carmichael anticipation ground was not proven.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “We do not agree with Patent Owner that Dr. Imbruce’s testimony should be disregarded. With respect to Patent Owner’s contentions about “technically erroneous disclosures” and the construction of “for a next breath,” those are really about Patent Owner’s disagreements about those matters, not whether Dr. Imbruce was attempting to mislead the Board. Disagreement between the experts is not a basis for disregarding testimony. We have also reviewed the entirety of Dr. Imbruce’s deposition, and, in particular, the various parts identified by Patent Owner. PO Resp. 76–77. And, contrary to Patent Owner’s assertions, we found Dr. Imbruce gave detailed answers in response to Patent Owner’s questions. We found Dr. Imbruce’s testimony to be adequate. See, e.g., Ex. 2016, 107:11–115:8 (discussion of Anderson references, explaining the similarities of the references, but declining to vouch for data he has not seen or collected); 115:9–116:6 (FDA permission, offering to confirm what reference said about FDA approval, but attorney moving on to other questions). Thus, we do not find Dr. Imbruce’s behavior during cross examination as a reason to give no weight to the entirety of his testimony.” slip op. at 14

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “(i) a medically trained physician or clinician specializing in treating respiratory failure issues with at least five years of practical clinical ventilator experience treating such conditions; or (ii) a Master’s degree in Electrical Engineering or a related field and about five years of practical experience with developing ventilators for clinical patient treatment; or (iii) a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering or a related field and about 10 years of practical experience with developing ventilators for clinical patient treatment. Pet. 20‒21 (referencing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 71‒72). Petitioner proposes that “[a] higher level of education or specific skill might compensate less experience, and vice versa.” Id. at 21. Patent Owner does not present an opposing view of the level of skill of the hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art of the ’571 patent. See PO Resp. passim. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. We determine that this definition is consistent with the prior art of record and the skill reflected in the Specification of the ’571 patent, based on our review of the record.” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

      “In our Institution Decision, we determined that only the claim terms “first means” and “second means” required construction. Inst. Dec. 25–27. Neither party disputes those constructions and we maintain and adopt them for the purposes of this Decision. We determine that, for purposes of this decision, no other terms require express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 17

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “We agree with Patent Owner that Carmichael lacks adequate disclosure to anticipate the apparatus of claim 1. Specifically, because Carmichael focuses on the result of physician surveys, and not on the description of a ventilation system per se, Carmichael lacks details as to the specific manner in which the assist control mode was being used to control PEEP and FIO2 levels. Specifically, we cannot discern that Carmichael’s discussion of an assist control mode for mechanical ventilation necessarily entails adjustments to FIO2 and PEEP “for a next breath of the patient” as recited in claim 1. As explained by Patent Owner, it is possible that the parameters of PEEP and FIO2 could have been set manually by the physician and/or could have been updated only periodically during treatment. See, e.g., PO Resp. 25‒26. Thus, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of evidence that Carmichael anticipates claim 1, or claims 2, 5, 6, and 11 that depend from claim 1.” slip op. at 20

    Patent outcomesUS 7,802,571 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,802,571
  • PTAB · Dec 23, 2021 · IPR2021-01056 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–3, 5, 6, 9–11, and 13 because Petitioner likely could not produce its relied-upon expert for cross-examination.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • BurdenInstitution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “Given the facts surrounding Dr. Singh’s testimony, we do not consider him likely to be a willing participant in this proceeding. It is Petitioner’s burden to show unpatentability, and in support of its case Petitioner has brought forth the testimony of an expert that Petitioner likely cannot produce for cross-examination and would likely be excluded.9 Under the circumstances, we determine that the Petition does not warrant institution.” slip op. at 9

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “trial is instituted. Prelim. Reply 9. That suggestion, however, stands at odds with Dr. Singh’s agreement to work exclusively with PQA. See IPR2021-01229, Ex. 1033 (declaration describing PQA’s engagement of Dr. Singh), Ex. 1034 (engagement agreement between PQA and Dr. Singh). Petitioner submits that because Dr. Singh submitted his declaration in the Intel IPR and in the PQA IPR, “[i]t is unfathomable that a witness who submits two declarations would refuse to testify.” Prelim. Reply 10. But that argument ignores that Dr. Singh has agreed to work exclusively with PQA, which has not given any indication that it would release Dr. Singh from his agreement. Moreover, we have no evidence from Dr. Singh that he would be willing to testify here. Without some factual support to demonstrate that it reasonably expects Dr. Singh to cooperate, in light of the exclusive agreement with PQA, Petitioner’s assertion is speculation and does not demonstrate sufficiently that Dr. Singh would likely participate in this proceeding. Petitioner challenges PQA’s assertion of its exclusive agreement with Dr. Singh as “vague and ethically questionable” (id. at 9–10). This is more speculation. As noted above, PQA has produced its agreement with Dr. Singh (IPR2021-01229, Ex. 1034) and we have no basis to question the agreement’s legitimacy. Petitioner allowed this unusual situation by relying on a prior declaration by Intel’s expert, rather than retaining its own expert for a new declaration. Whether the agreement with Dr. Singh complies with ethical rules and whether it permits Dr. Singh to testify here are matters not before us. Moreover, they may present issues of contract law for the courts to decide, which may cause delay and prevent us from meeting our statutory deadlines, were we to institute a trial with the issues unresolved.” slip op. at 7

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “Given the facts surrounding Dr. Singh’s testimony, we do not consider him likely to be a willing participant in this proceeding. It is Petitioner’s burden to show unpatentability, and in support of its case Petitioner has brought forth the testimony of an expert that Petitioner likely cannot produce for cross-examination and would likely be excluded.9 Under the circumstances, we determine that the Petition does not warrant institution.” slip op. at 9

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 7,523,373
  • PTAB · Dec 23, 2021 · IPR2021-01064 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution

    Instituted inter partes review of claims 1, 14, 17, 18, 21, 22, and 24 on all four asserted § 103 grounds because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood it will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim, and we institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “In our view, Petitioner correctly emphasizes Fintiv’s language noting that the Board generally disfavors discretionary denial when litigation did not involve the petitioner, unless “the issues are the same as, or substantially similar to those already or about to be litigated, or other circumstances weigh against redoing the work of another tribunal.” Fintiv, IPR2020-00019, Paper 11, 13–14. Indeed, in multiple decisions Patent Owner cites for support, the Board determined that instituting review would require resolving issues that would also have been resolved by a district court. E.g., Fitbit, Inc. v. Philips N. Am. LLC, IPR2020-00828, Paper 13, 15–16 (considering the patent owner’s litigation with a non-petitioning party that would overlap with the inter partes review at issue); Mylan Labs. Ltd. v. Janssen Pharmaceutica N.V., IPR2020-00440, Paper 17, 19–23 (same, and additionally considering litigation involving the petitioner). Here, because the Intel litigation did not resolve issues presented by this proceeding, there is no chance of an inconsistent outcome. Indeed, “redoing the work of another tribunal” would only arise when that tribunal has resolved a dispute at issue before the Board. Patent Owner has not argued that resolving a dispute in this proceeding would conflict with an aspect of the Intel litigation. Thus, we do not agree with Patent Owner that, because “the [litigation] parties and the District Court invested enormous amounts of time and money litigating validity and infringement issues relating to the ’759 patent,” instituting review here would mean redoing the work of another tribunal. Prelim. Resp. 17.” slip op. at 8

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Denied

      “any relationship between those petitioners when weighing the General Plastic factors.” Valve Corp. v. Elec. Scripting Prods. Inc., IPR2019-00062, Paper 11, 9 (Apr. 2, 2019). In Valve, however, the petitioner and the prior petitioner were co-defendants accused of infringement based on the same product. Id. at 9–10. Patent Owner argues that the Board has found a relationship between petitioners when one uses substantive challenges from an earlier petition. Prelim. Resp. 21 (citing Ericsson Inc. v. Uniloc 2017 LLC, IPR2019-01550, Paper 8, 12). Ericsson imposed a relationship in light of the derivative nature of the petition at issue. Ericsson, IPR2019-01550, Paper 8, 12. That decision, however, has not been designated as precedential or informative by the Board, and other decisions have determined that factor 1 weights against discretionary denial for an independent petitioner. E.g., United Fire Protection Corp. v. Engineered Corrosion Solutions, LLC, IPR2018-00991, Paper 10 (determining that petitioner independence weighed against discretionary denial, but that substantive similarity with an unrelated prior petition meant the factor only moderately weighed against discretionary denial). We determine that factor 1 weighs somewhat against discretionary denial because Petitioner has not filed a prior petition, but did copy its substantive grounds from a prior petition. That the Board has not substantively addressed the merits of the prior petitions, in our view, weighs against discretionary denial, because that approach best balances the desires to improve patent quality and patent-system efficiency against the potential for abuse of the review process by repeated attacks on patents. See General Plastic, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19, 16–17. We view substantive consideration as an important factor in that balance, because to determine otherwise would asymmetrically insulate patent owners from potential abuse without addressing the desire to improve patent quality. Patent Owner suffers no abuse from having this tribunal consider the merits of these grounds for the first time.” slip op. at 10

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

      “The Federal Circuit held that “the Patent Office, when applying § 325(d), cannot deny institution of IPR based on abusive filing practices then grant a nearly identical reexamination request that is even more abusive.” Vivint, 14 F.4th at 1354. It found important that, when the Board denied Alarm.com’s IPR petition, the Board considered Alarm.com’s earlier petitions and reasoned that “allowing similar, serial challenges to the same patent, by the same petitioner, risks harassment of patent owners and frustration of Congress's intent in enacting the [AIA].” Id. at 1353 (quoting IPR2016-01091, Paper 11, 12) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted). The facts here are not remotely similar. The Intel IPRs were not denied for abusive filing practices, but rather were denied to avoid overlap with a parallel district-court litigation. See IPR2020-00106, Paper 17, 4–13; IPR2020-00498, Paper 16, 4–10. This proceeding involves a different petitioner, which has not before petitioned for review of the ’759 patent. Those facts show that this Decision does not involve potentially abusive filing practices by the same challenger, as was at issue in Vivint. Patent Owner has not identified how instituting review would be inconsistent with a prior decision on this patent. As explained above, because the invalidity issues presented at trial were different from those considered in the prior application of Fintiv, we reach a different conclusion under that doctrine based on different facts here. Thus, Vivint is not germane to our decision.” slip op. at 14

    § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 7,725,759
  • PTAB · Dec 22, 2021 · IPR2021-01055 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–5 and 9–19 on five § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons given below, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’766 Patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–5 and 9–19 of the ’766 Patent on the grounds of unpatentability raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

      “For a reference to qualify as a printed publication, “before the critical date the reference must have been sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art.” Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “When there is an established publisher there is a presumption of public accessibility as of the publication date.” VidStream LLC v. Twitter, Inc., 981 F.3d 1060, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2020); see also Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, Case IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential) (determining that, based on the totality of the evidence, a reference bearing a copyright date, a printing date, and an ISBN date all earlier than the critical date of the challenged patent, and the reference was a “textbook from an established publisher” provided sufficient indicia at the institution state).” slip op. at 15

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “configuration error” With respect to the limitation “configuration error,” Patent Owner asserts that configuration error means “either (1) the condition that occurs when ‘a rule or series of rules is not properly defined and produces an undesired effect’ or (2) ‘a series of improperly defined rules causes a part to be in more than one state at the same time.’” Prelim. Resp. 10 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:54–61; Ex. 2001 ¶ 40). At this stage of the proceeding, we find that Patent Owner’s proposed construction is supported by the ’766 Patent specification, and adopt Patent Owner’s proposed meaning of “configuration error,” with the following remarks with respect to Patent Owner’s additional arguments regarding the claim construction. Patent Owner, however, also argues that “the specification concerns errors internal to the configuration engine and not ‘errors’ that prevent product configurator users from making their desired but impermissible selections.” Prelim. Resp. 10. We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument because the first part of the construction, namely rules not being properly defined and “produc[ing] an undesired effect,” does not specify anything about an error being “internal” to the configuration engine. The specification provides that such a configuration error “may occur when a rule or series of rules is not properly defined and produces an undesired effect, such as the exclusion of a part that should be selectable” (Ex. 1001, 1:54–61, emphasis added), but the latter clause provides only one example of the undesired effect. We are not persuaded, based on our review of the Specification of the ’766 Patent that “an undesired effect” should be limited to the exclusion of a part. Thus, although Patent Owner argues that “a configuration error is not a condition that occurs when a user attempts to make a choice that is prohibited by a rule” (Prelim. Resp. 11 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 43)), at this juncture, we are not persuaded that such a condition would not be an undesired effect, according to the adopted construction. Therefore, we do not further limit the construction of “configuration error.” slip op. at 7

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “II. ANALYSIS Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner, supported by Dr. Wood’s testimony, proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, Computer or Electrical Engineering, Engineering Science, an engineering major with a significant computational component, or a similar discipline, or with at least two years of research or experience in configurable systems including testing.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 53–55). Patent Owner argues that “[t]here may be some differences between this and the correct level of skill in the art but those differences will not affect this case at this stage,” such that Patent Owner applies the proposed level of skill in the art without agreeing to it. Prelim. Resp. 10 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 35–37). At this stage of the proceeding, we find Petitioner’s proposal consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record, see Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978), and, therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 6

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 6,836,766
  • PTAB · Dec 21, 2021 · IPR2021-01129 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 3–7, 10, 17, 21, 22, 28, 33–39, and 43–45 based on a reasonable likelihood of success on the asserted obviousness grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialNot reached

      “Petitioners provide argument that the Board should not exercise its discretion under Sections 314(a) and 325(d) as addressed in Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 3 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”) (see Pet. 85–86) and General Plastic Indus. Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (PTAB Sep. 6, 2017) (precedential as to Section II.B.4.i) (“General Plastic”). See Pet. 95–97; see also Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 58 (Nov. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ tpgnov.pdf) (explaining that parties may wish to address the Board’s discretion to institute review in their papers). In addition, Petitioners filed a paper ranking the petitions filed challenging the ’837 patent and supporting the material differences among the petitions. Paper 2. Patent Owner did not file a preliminary response, and, accordingly, we do not reach or address Petitioners’ arguments on these issues.” slip op. at 9

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Decision in IPR2019-01568, Google ’837 IPR at 8–9. See Pet 5 n.3;5 Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37. Our prior decision in IPR2019-01568 found that A [person of ordinary skill in the art] has an accredited bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related discipline that included coverage of wireless communications and the use of communication protocols used for real-time communications, and also at least two years of industry experience. In lieu of specific academic training, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] may draw upon appropriate industry experience to meet the foregoing requirements. Google ’837 IPR at 8. We apply this level of skill in the present case.” slip op. at 10

    • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioners offer no proposed claim constructions and apply the constructions determined by the Board in the IPR2019-01568 Final Written Decision. Pet. 5. Petitioners assert that the remaining terms are given their “ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art as of the Critical Date . . . and [at] prosecution history.” Id. at 5–6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 73–74; 37 C.F.R. §42.100(b)). We adopt the claim constructions determinations in IPR2019-01568 provided in the table below.” slip op. at 10

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 7,894,837
  • PTAB · Dec 21, 2021 · IPR2021-01126 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 22, 23, and 31–40 because Petitioners showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the asserted § 103 obviousness grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialNot reached

      “Petitioners provide argument that the Board should not exercise its discretion under Sections 314(a) and 325(d) as addressed in Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 3 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”) and General Plastic Indus. Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (PTAB Sep. 6, 2017) (precedential as to Section II.B.4.i) (“General Plastic”). See Pet. 84–86; see also Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 58 (Nov. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf) (explaining that parties may wish to address the Board’s discretion to institute review in their papers). In addition, Petitioners filed a paper ranking the petitions filed challenging the ’870 patent and supporting the material differences among the petitions. Paper 2. Patent Owner did not file a preliminary response, and, accordingly, we do not reach or address Petitioners’ arguments on these issues.” slip op. at 9

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “III. CONCLUSION On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioners demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that they would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of challenged claims 22, 23, and 31–40 of the ’870 patent. We, accordingly, institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims. Our determination in this Decision is not a final determination on either the patentability of any challenged claims or the construction of any claim term and, thus, leaves undecided any remaining fact issues necessary to determine whether sufficient evidence supports Petitioners’ contentions by a preponderance of the evidence in the final written decision. See TriVascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting that “there is a significant difference between a petitioner’s burden to establish a ‘reasonable likelihood of success’ at institution, and actually proving invalidity by a preponderance of the evidence at trial”) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and comparing id. § 316(e)).” slip op. at 19

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioners assert the level of skill adopted in the Final Written Decision in IPR2019-01567, Google IPR at 8. See Pet. 9 n.3; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–38. Our prior decision in IPR2019-01567 found that [a person of ordinary skill in the art] has an accredited bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related discipline that included coverage of wireless communications and the use of communication protocols used for real-time communications, and also at least two years of industry experience. In lieu of specific academic training, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] may draw upon appropriate industry experience to meet the foregoing requirements. Google IPR at 8. We apply this level of skill in the present case.” slip op. at 10

    • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioners offer no proposed claim constructions and apply the constructions determined by the Board in the IPR2019-01567 Final Written Decision. Pet. 6–7. We adopt the claim constructions determinations in IPR2019-01567 provided in the table below. Claim Term IPR2019-01567 Construction “a data entry device of a handheld “a handheld terminal capable of terminal” (claim 20) data entry” “network connection” (claim 20) No construction required “graphical symbols” (claim 20)” slip op. at 10

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 7,292,870
  • PTAB · Dec 21, 2021 · IPR2021-01125 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 2–4, 11–14, 22, 23, and 31–33 based on the asserted obviousness grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialNot reached

      “discretion under Sections 314(a) and 325(d) as addressed in Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 3 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”) and General Plastic Indus. Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (PTAB Sep. 6, 2017) (precedential as to Section II.B.4.i) (“General Plastic”). See Pet. 87–90; see also Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 58 (Nov. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf) (explaining” slip op. at 9

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “III. CONCLUSION On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioners demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that they would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of challenged claims 2–4, 11–14, 22, 23, and 31–33 of the ’870 patent. We, accordingly, institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 24

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioners assert the level of skill adopted in the Final Written Decision in IPR2019-01567, Google IPR at 8. See Pet. 4 n.2; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–38. Our prior decision in IPR2019-01567 found that [a person of ordinary skill in the art] has an accredited bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related discipline that included coverage of wireless communications and the use of communication protocols used for real-time communications, and also at least two years of industry experience. In lieu of specific academic training, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] may draw upon appropriate industry experience to meet the foregoing requirements. Google IPR at 8. We apply this level of skill in the present case.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Prior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioners offer no proposed claim constructions and apply the constructions determined by the Board in the IPR2019-01567 Final Written Decision. Pet. 3–4. Petitioners argue that the remaining terms are given their “ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art as of the Critical Date . . . and the patent’s prosecution history.” Id. at 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 69; 37 C.F.R. §42.100(b)). We adopt the claim constructions determinations in IPR2019-01567 provided in the table below. Claim Term IPR2019-01567 Construction “a data entry device of a handheld “a handheld terminal capable of terminal” (claim 20) data entry” “network connection” (claim 20) No construction required “graphical symbols” (claim 20)” slip op. at 10

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 7,292,870
  • PTAB · Dec 21, 2021 · IPR2021-01124 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 5–10, 17–19, and 36–40, finding a reasonable likelihood that the asserted combinations would render the challenged claims unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialNot reached

      “Petitioners provide argument that the Board should not exercise its discretion under Sections 314(a) and 325(d) as addressed in Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 3 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”) (see Pet. 85–86) and General Plastic Indus. Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (PTAB Sep. 6, 2017) (precedential as to Section II.B.4.i) (“General Plastic”). See Pet. 84–86; see also Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 58 (Nov. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ tpgnov.pdf) (explaining that parties may wish to address the Board’s discretion to institute review in their papers). In addition, Petitioners filed a paper ranking the petitions filed challenging the ’870 patent and supporting the material differences among the petitions. Paper 2. Patent Owner did not file a preliminary response, and, accordingly, we do not reach or address Petitioners’ arguments on these issues.” slip op. at 9

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioners assert the level of skill adopted in the Final Written Decision in IPR2019-01567, Google IPR at 8. See Pet. 7 n.2; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–38. Our prior decision in IPR2019-01567 found that [a person of ordinary skill in the art] has an accredited bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related discipline that included coverage of wireless communications and the use of communication protocols used for real-time communications, and also at least two years of industry experience. In lieu of specific academic training, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] may draw upon appropriate industry experience to meet the foregoing requirements. Google IPR at 8. We apply this level of skill in the present case.” slip op. at 9

    • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “We adopt the claim constructions determinations in IPR2019-01567 provided in the table below. Claim Term IPR2019-01567 Construction “a data entry device of a handheld “a handheld terminal capable of terminal” (claim 20) data entry” “network connection” (claim 20) No construction required “graphical symbols” (claim 20)” slip op. at 10

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “III. CONCLUSION On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioners demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that they would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of challenged claims 5–10, 17–19, and 36–40 of the ’870 patent. We, accordingly, institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 21

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 7,292,870
  • PTAB · Dec 17, 2021 · PGR2021-00093 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · PGR · Institution

    The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–25 on all petition grounds after finding the § 101 challenge to claim 1 met the institution threshold.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “Fintiv sets forth the factors that we weigh in determining whether to exercise our discretion to deny institution of the post-grant patent review proceeding here under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). See Fintiv, Paper 11, 5–6. These factors are: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.” Id. at 6. “[T]he Board takes a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id.” slip op. at 7

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner

      “Because the claims at issue here, in particular claim 1, differ from the March 2015 amended claims of the ’859 patent and the August 2014 amended claims of the ’296 patent (see, e.g., Ex. 1001, 46:59–47:34), we are not persuaded that the cited prosecution history equally applies to the claims here. In particular, we note that claim 1, which we discuss in the analysis below, does not recite a first transceiver corresponding to a short-range communication mode and a second transceiver corresponding to a long-range communication mode, and does not specify whether a first or second transceiver perform certain actions recited in the claim. Id. As Patent Owner points out (Prelim. Resp. 19), claim 1 of the ’614 patent more but claim 1 does not specify whether it is long or short range and merely recites it being used to establish a connection for the exchange of information between a mobile device and a payment accepting unit in some of the claimed steps. Id. Thus, considering Becton, Dickinson factors (a) and (d), we are not persuaded that the same or substantially the same arguments concerning § 101 were previously presented to the Office. Because we determine that the same or substantially the same arguments with respect to § 101 were not previously presented to the Office, we need not address part two of the Advanced Bionics framework with respect to those arguments.” slip op. at 19

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “A [person having ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”)] would have had an education background of, or practical experience providing an equivalent to, a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, or a related/equivalent field and at least 3 years of academic or industry experience in electronic payment systems. Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 5–6). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contention in its Preliminary Response. See generally Prelim. Resp. Based on the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill to determine whether it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable. This level of skill in the art is consistent with the disclosure of the ’614 patent and the prior art of record. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995).” slip op. at 22

    • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionInstituted

      “Ex. 1001, 46:61–47:34. Based on the current record, we are persuaded that the limitations above recite the concept of identifying a merchant and making a purchase from the merchant. In particular, claim 1 recites steps for identifying payment accepting units (i.e., a merchant) — limitations 1.2– 1.7.1. Claim 1 also recites steps for conducting the purchase —limitations 1.7.2–1.11. Based on the current record, we find that identifying a merchant and making a purchase from the merchant is a commercial interaction, a sales activity. It falls within the enumerated “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity” grouping of abstract ideas set forth in MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2).” slip op. at 28

    Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Mayo · Bilski · Berkheimer · Phillips · Nautilus
    Patents in suitUS 10,891,614
Page 1 of 58
← Previous12345…Next →

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.