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  • PTAB · Sep 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00775 · APJ Jason J Chung · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–9 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim is unpatentable, including over Carmel and Mattavelli.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “1. Principles of Law A claim is unpatentable under § 103 if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, “would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations, including (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of skill in the art; and (4) when in evidence, objective indicia of obviousness or non-obviousness (i.e., secondary considerations, such as commercial success, long-felt but unsolved need, failure of others, etc.).5 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). We analyze the asserted grounds based on obviousness with the principles we identify above in mind.” slip op. at 9

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Factors pertinent to a determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art include “(1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.” Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d 1376, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). “Not all such factors may be present in every case, and one or more of these or other factors may predominate in a particular case.” Id. at 696–97. Relying on the testimony of Dr. Polish, Google argues the following: [a] person of ordinary skill in the art . . . would have possessed at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or an equivalent field requiring learning computation principles, and two years of work experience in networking or streaming media systems, particularly audio and video, over the Internet. Additional education could compensate for less practical experience and vice versa.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “In the Petition, Google states that it “does not presently contend that any [claim] term requires express construction.” Pet. 6. In response, Withrow acquiesces; in particular, Withrow argues “the Board need not construe any terms of the ’849 Patent. Petitioner does not contend any [claim] terms require express construction.” Prelim. Resp. 13 (citing Pet. 6). Based on the preliminary record, there is no readily discernible controversy between the parties that requires us to construe any claim terms at this time. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “Turning to rationale to combine, Google contends that Carmel and Mattavelli are both directed to processing multimedia data playback “for the appreciation of a user,” while providing the highest perceived audio and video output quality possible in view of system constraints to ensure playback continuity. Pet. 50–51 (citing Ex. 1003, 10:48–54, 11:9–18, 7:35– 49, Figs. 3D, 6B; Ex. 1004, 2309, 2310). Google argues that both Carmel and Mattavelli pertain to compression of multimedia data using well-known coding and compression standards for video streaming. Pet. 51 (citing Ex. 1003, 7:25–26, 11:24–52; Ex. 1004, 2309–2311). Google argues a PHOSITA would appreciate both Carmel and Mattavelli complement each other because Carmel pertains to addressing constraints to available network bandwidth, whereas Mattavalli relates to addressing limits on available processing resources at the client/multimedia player. Pet. 52 (citing Ex. 1003, Abstract, 7:36–41; Ex. 1004, 2309–2312). Google argues that a PHOSITA would have been motivated to combine the complementary teachings in Carmel and Mattavelli to create a more robust streaming system that addresses both bandwidth constraints and client processing limits to provide a best possible playback experience. Pet. 52 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 212–215). Google argues that Mattavelli teaches merely optimizing transmission bandwidth is not sufficient and is potentially harmful, which provides an express motivation to combine Carmel’s and Mattavelli’s complementary teachings to ensure that different, related links in the streaming playback chain are optimized together. Pet. 53 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 216–217; Ex. 1004, 2310). In addition, Google argues Carmel contains an express disclosure that would have motivated a PHOSITA to combine Carmel with Mattavelli’s complementary teachings because Carmel states that multimedia playback is achieved “preferably with only a minimal necessary transmission and decoding delay.” Pet. 53–54 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 218; Ex. 1003, 10:50–54). Withrow does not specifically respond to these arguments, except for limitations 1[c.ii] and 1[c.iv] discussed infra. See generally Prelim. Resp. Nonetheless, the burden of persuasion remains on Petitioner to demonstrate unpatentability. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Based on the preliminary record, we discern no deficiency in Google’s characterizations of Carmel, Mattavelli, or the general background knowledge in the art. In addition, for purposes of institution, we are persuaded by Dr. Polish’s testimony concerning the relevant disclosures in Carmel and Mattavelli.” slip op. at 22

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,771,849
  • Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics Ltd.All claims unpatentable
    PTAB · Apr 6, 2020 · IPR2019-00030 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–5 are unpatentable as obvious over Ogino and Beich; claims 1–4 are also unpatentable over Ogino alone, but claim 5 is not shown unpatentable on that ground.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “We construe claim terms to the extent necessary. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “supported by the cited evidence. We are persuaded, instead, that “the image plane and the sensor are taught by the ’568 patent to be coincident,” and “[t]hus, there is no ambiguity in the ’568 patent about where the image plane is located or that TTL is measured to the image plane,” as Petitioner argues in its Reply. Reply 13 (Ex. 1026 ¶ 5; Ex. 1003, 33–35). Patent Owner acknowledges as much, noting that “as these terms[, i.e., the image plane and the sensor,] are used in the specification of the ’568 patent, the image plane is the surface of the sensor.” Sur-reply 2. We find that the ’568 patent discloses that the electronic sensor corresponds to or is coincident with the image plane and thus, the TTL could be measured with respect to either the sensor (electronic or film) or the image plane and reach the same result. Based upon the complete trial record, we maintain our construction of TTL from the ’1140IPR and the ’1146IPR3, which encompasses “the length of the optical axis spacing between the object-side surface of the first lens element and one of: an electronic sensor, film, and an image plane corresponding to either the 3 The panel authorized, and the parties filed, supplemental briefing to address this construction before it was adopted in both the related ’1140IPR and ’1146IPR, and that the parties responded to this construction in the hearing in this proceeding (with citations to the transcript). See, e.g., Paper 28 (PO’s demonstratives), 5; ’1140IPR, Paper 31; ’1146IPR, Paper 30; see also Trial Practice Guide Update 13–14 (July 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial-practice-guide-update3.pdf; Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. f’real Foods, LLC, 908 F.3d 1328, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding that the Board did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act when it adopted its own claim construction in the final decision because the parties had notice and an opportunity to be heard). electronic sensor or a film sensor.” See ’1140IPR, Paper 37, 18; ’1146IPR, Paper 37, 14.” slip op. at 14

    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “Even assuming, arguendo, we were to credit Patent Owner’s expert testimony as to the disjointed nature of optical lens assembly design experience and manufacturing experience, we are not persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention having only design experience would be so completely unaware of manufacturing considerations so as to preclude taking into account the very general guidance of Beich. See Reply 24–25. Beich teaches that a lens designer should have a basic understanding of the manufacturing process, which would include the limits for fabricating lens elements in an optical lens assembly. Ex. 1020, 7. We are persuaded that the information conveyed in Beich would have been understood, known, and applied by the ordinarily skilled lens designer (see Reply 4–6 (citing Ex. 2014, 4, 9, 11, Fig. 9.2)), irrespective of whether such person had manufacturing experience. Stated differently, although an ordinarily skilled designer of an optical lens assembly may not have had any real-world manufacturing experience, we are persuaded that such person would still have taken into account manufacturing concerns. Although there are differences between the definitions proposed, our conclusions rendered in this decision do not turn on selecting a particular definition for the level of ordinary skill in the art, for the reasons discussed above. We determine, on this record, that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Patent Owner is consistent with the ’568 patent and the asserted prior art. We agree with Patent Owner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill except for Patent Owner’s arguments about manufacturing discussed above. As such, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 18

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “As noted by Petitioner, The Handbook of Optics discloses that “[i]n the case of both negative and positive lens elements, it is good policy to avoid element forms wherein the center-to-edge thickness ratio exceeds three for positive elements.” Ex. 1019 § 34.15. Thus, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s fourth reason that the cited disclosure provides evidence that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have selected a particular diameter for the first lens element disclosed in Ogino in conformance with manufacturing considerations known to the ordinarily skilled artisan. We are further persuaded that, from the selection of that particular diameter, a Z1 value for the object-side surface and a Z2 value for image-side surface at the minimum usable edge of the first lens element can be obtained and, in turn, circumferential edge thickness L1e can be obtained. Pet. 35–36 (citing Ex. 1003, 42; Ex. 1005, 15:1–3). We are further persuaded by Petitioner’s supporting reasoning that “a POSITA would understand the manufacturing benefits of maintaining the lowest possible center-to-edge thickness ratio since ‘the preferred shape of a molded element is one that has fairly uniform thickness.’” Id. at 42 (quoting Ex. 1018, 92) (citing Ex. 1003, 48). Based on our review of the complete record, we find that the record supports Petitioner’s contentions concerning claim 1. Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Ogino.” slip op. at 37

    Patent outcomesUS 9,857,568 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,857,568
  • Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics Ltd.All claims unpatentable
    PTAB · Dec 3, 2019 · IPR2018-01140 · APJ Marc S Hoff · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1 and 13 are unpatentable as anticipated by Ogino; claims 14 and 15 are unpatentable as obvious over Ogino and Chen II.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable

      “claims 1 and 13 of the ’032 Patent are anticipated by Ogino. Petitioner has also demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 14 and 15 of the ’032 Patent are unpatentable over the combination of Ogino and Chen II. The chart below summarizes our conclusion. References Claims Claims Claims 35. Shown Not shown Challenged U.S.C. Unpatent- Unpatentable able Ogino 1 and 13 1 and 13 § 102 Ogino, Chen 14 and 15 14 and 15 § 103 II 1 and 13-15” slip op. at 40

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

      “that Ogino and Chen II disclose substantially different lens systems. PO Resp. 36. As Petitioner points out, both Ogino and Chen II describe mobile phone camera systems with all lenses being aspheric; a first lens with a meniscus shape with positive refractive power; a second lens with negative refractive power; a third lens with a meniscus shape and with a negative refractive power; a fourth lens with a meniscus shape with positive refractive power; and a fifth lens with a meniscus shape and with a negative refractive power. Pet. Reply 22; Pet. 41–44. We agree with Petitioner that such a skilled artisan, possessing an applicable college degree, approximately three years experience in designing multi-lens optical systems, “experience in analyzing, tolerancing, adjusting, and optimizing multilens systems, and experience with lens design software such as CodeV, Oslo, or Zemax,” would have the appropriate knowledge to perform routine modifications to a lens design. Pet. Reply 24; Pet. 7; PO Resp. 12. Patent Owner’s expert Dr. Moore testified that such a skilled artisan “would be able to use the computer program [i.e. CodeV or Zemax] to optimize lens designs.” Pet. Reply 24; Ex. 1025, 29:25–30:9. Dr. Moore testified that the skilled artisan would “tell the [lens design] program that you want to vary certain parameters of a lens . . . . And then the program, through a fairly complicated algorithm, then actually goes through and varies them and determines how to make a better lens. You determine as a lens designer what you’re trying to improve.” Ex. 1025, 28:13–23.” slip op. at 38

    • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

      “We are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that the skilled artisan would have understood that third, fourth, and fifth lenses also contribute to vignetting in Ogino. PO Resp. 38. We credit Petitioner’s argument that Dr. Moore’s conclusion regarding vignetting in the third, fourth, and fifth lenses is unreliable because it is based on assumptions not specified in Ogino. Pet. Reply 16; Ex. 1026 ¶ 11. For example, Ogino does not provide lens diameters or vignetting apertures for the lens assembly of Example 6 that would vignette the light beams on the third, fourth or fifth lens elements. Pet. Reply 17; Ex. 1026 ¶ 11. Additionally, Dr. Sasián testifies that vignetting is a result of the second lens. Pet. Reply 17–18; Pet. 54; Ex. 1003, 59.” slip op. at 36

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “Effective Focal Length (EFL) Petitioner asserts that while the specification of the ’032 Patent does not offer an express definition for the term “effective focal length,” “its meaning is well known in the art, as exemplified in Li (Ex. 1007), which states that “[t]he focal length of a lens assembly [is] also referred to as the effective focal length [(]EFL).” Pet. 9–10 (internal parentheses omitted); Ex. 1007, 2:59–61. Patent Owner, in response, does not dispute Petitioner’s construction of “effective focal length,” stating that the Petition does not turn on the construction of the term. PO Resp. 20. Having reviewed the evidence of record, we agree with Petitioner that Li supports construing the term “effective focal length” as “the focal length of a lens assembly.” We adopt this construction.” slip op. at 10

    Patent outcomesUS 9,402,032 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,402,032
  • PTAB · Aug 5, 2019 · IPR2018-01348 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Apple’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution because the petition did not show a sufficient motivation to combine Parulski and Christie.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “ANALYSIS When considering a request for rehearing, we review the Decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). The party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the Decision should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes [we] misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “and Parulski’s teachings of zoom are combinable (id.) and Petitioner has not established that they are predictable variations of each other. Disparate embodiments in one reference can only be combined if they are a “predictable variation” of each other that does not “require a leap of inventiveness.” C.f. Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 554 F.3d 982 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see e.g. Apple Inc. v. Valencell, Inc., Case IPR2017- 01704, slip op. at 10 (PTAB Mar. 27, 2018) (Paper 9) (acknowledging Boston Scientific stands for the proposition that combining two embodiments from the same reference requires an obviousness analysis); LG Display Co., LLC v. Innovative Display Techs LLC, Case IPR2014-01362, slip op. at 13 (PTAB Mar. 2, 2015) (Paper 12) (“The rationale . . . that a person of ordinary skill would ‘pick and choose’ features from various embodiments of Baur, simply because they are in the same patent, is insufficient to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on this challenge”). “Even when obviousness is based on a single prior art reference, there must be a showing of a suggestion or motivation to modify the teachings of that reference.” In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 4

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

      “fused image.” Reh’g Req. 13. The Petition proposed that “fused image” should be construed as “an output image including information from two images.” We determined that construing that term was unnecessary to resolve any controversy. Inst. Dec. 7. We maintain that determination. Petitioner provides a construction for “fused image” but not for “without fusion continuous Zoom video mode output images of the object or scene.” Id. at 9–10. We properly considered the entire claim limitation in assessing whether Petitioner had shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its obviousness challenge. slip op. at 12

    • BurdenDecided for patent owner

      “The burden of persuasion remains on a petitioner in inter partes review proceedings. See DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 866–67 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Petitioner appears to now argue that, in order to understand its contentions as to the “without fusion” limitation in Parulski, we were to mine the Petition for references to “switching between Wide sensor and Tele sensor” associated with Golan. We were not required to do so. Id. (“A brief must make all arguments accessible to the judges, rather than ask them to play archeologist with the record.”); c.f. Fieldpiece Instruments, Inc. v. Twin Rivers Eng’g, Inc., Case IPR2017-00362, slip op. at 4 (PTAB Sept. 25, 2017) (Paper 16)(“the portions of the Petition cited in the Rehearing Request relate only to overviews of the references”)” slip op. at 8

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 9,185,291
  • PTAB · Aug 21, 2018 · IPR2016-01738 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Apple's rehearing request, leaving intact its decision that the proposed substitute claims were not shown patentable over the cited art because Settsu did not disclose preloading during the same boot sequence.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “II. ANALYSIS A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party challenging a decision bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. Id.” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “First, as explained in the Decision, when construing the claims at issue (1) we looked at the language of the claims themselves, (2) we consulted the patent’s specification to help clarify the meaning of claim terms, because the claims “must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part,” Trading Techs. Int’l, v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)), and (3) we reviewed “the patent’s prosecution history in proceedings in which the patent has been brought back to the [US Patent and Trademark Office] for a second review” (Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). See Decision, 6–7.” slip op. at 3

    Claim constructioncites Markman
    Patents in suitUS 8,880,862
  • PTAB · Aug 21, 2018 · IPR2016-01737 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Apple’s rehearing request, leaving intact its finding that the prior art did not disclose the substitute claims’ preloading limitation.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “II. ANALYSIS A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party challenging a decision bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. Id.” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITADecided for patent owner

      “First, as explained in the Decision, when construing the claims at issue (1) we looked at the language of the claims themselves, (2) we consulted the patent’s specification to help clarify the meaning of claim terms, because the claims “must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part,” Trading Techs. Int’l, v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)), and (3) we reviewed “the patent’s prosecution history in proceedings in which the patent has been brought back to the [US Patent and Trademark Office] for a second review” (Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). See Decision, 6–7.” slip op. at 3

    Claim constructioncites Markman
    Patents in suitUS 8,880,862
  • PTAB · Jun 28, 2018 · IPR2017-00414 · APJ James T Moore · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–7 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 over either Cohen and Martin or Holmes and Martin because the combinations did not establish the claimed separate shaping before mixing.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “As used herein, the term “hearing aid profile” refers to a collection of acoustic configuration settings for hearing aid 102, which are used by a processor 110 to shape electrical signals related to sounds to compensate for the user's hearing loss. Ex. 1001, 3:11–15. Petitioner states that Patent Owner defined this term in the ’538 patent as “a collection of acoustic configuration settings for hearing aid 102, which are used by processor 110 to shape electrical signals related to sounds to compensate for the user’s hearing loss.” Pet. 15. According to Petitioner, this construction is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term, relying upon the testimony of its witness Dr. Les Atlas. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 38).10 Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed construction. Resp. 10–11. 10 Dr. Les Atlas is the Petitioner’s witness in this matter. We find him qualified to testify as to the subject matter of this proceeding, by virtue of his education and experience. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 4, and Appendix A thereto. We are cognizant of Patent Owner’s suggestion that we give his testimony “little, if any, weight” because of the similarity of the testimony with Petitioner’s arguments and discrepancies between it and his deposition testimony. Resp. 31–34. We give Dr. Atlas’ testimony appropriate contextual weight herein based upon the content of the testimony itself, and any contrary testimony in Exhibit 2005. We decline to assign generally no weight to his testimony, however. supports, and is consistent with, Petitioner’s proposal. Ex. 1001, 3:12–16. Accordingly, we determine that the broadest reasonable construction, in light of the specification of the ’538 patent, of the term “hearing aid profile” is a “collection of acoustic configuration settings for hearing aid, which are used by a processor to shape electrical signals related to sounds to compensate for a user’s hearing loss.”” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

      “For the purposes of our decision, we determine that no other claim terms need explicit construction. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (citation omitted).” slip op. at 9

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “11 Petitioner defines the level of ordinary skill in the art as someone with a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and at least two years of experience in the field of audio engineering. Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 25). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition. Resp. passim. The references in the record support a finding that this is the appropriate level. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of skill in the art). 12 The record contains no allegations or evidence of secondary considerations.” slip op. at 10

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedMixed

      “We find the testimony of Dr. Atlas on the key point of obviousness of pre-mixing processing to be less persuasive than that of Mr. Brown. We also find Dr. Atlas’ testimony falls short of adequately explaining how the combination of Cohen and Martin teaches a nexus (i.e., the “based on both the first [shaped] output signal and the second [shaped] output signal” (emphasis added) (hereinafter, “based on both limitation”) limitation recited in claim 1) between the claim 1 requirements of: (1) a condition precedent of shaping both a first output signal and a second output signal; and (2) a subsequent result of using both the first shaped output signal and the second shaped output signal if the hearing aid is in a third mode. Dr. Atlas assumes that one of ordinary skill in the art would process separately each signal and then mix them. Ex. 1003 ¶ 66. We find Dr. Atlas’ assumption is flawed. Specifically, in making this assumption, Dr. Atlas does not address adequately how the combination of Cohen and Martin opines “it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art” (emphasis added), his later sentences appears to base his opinion principally on the reason one of ordinary skill in the art could do it. Id. In particular, he testifies: Because Cohen’s hearing aid applies different hearing aid profiles to different input sources, it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art to add the functionality of the combination mode as taught by Martin to Cohen’s hearing aid such that the speaker would produce an audible sound based on the output signals of the processor. Combining two signals such that both signals are sent to a speaker to an audible combination of sounds, that is where each signal is sufficiently perceived, was well within the technical ability of a person of ordinary skill in the art. To accomplish this would require that each one of the two signals is passed through an appropriate hearing aid profile. For example, it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art that a different hearing aid profiles could be used for an audio coil inputs and that of a neighboring conversation and environmental sounds through a microphone. Namely, it is commonly known that the different frequency sensitivity of an audio telecoil versus a microphone can be beneficially compensated for. (Rodriquez, Ex. 1011, Abstract)” slip op. at 24

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,649,538
  • PTAB · May 25, 2018 · IPR2017-01690 · APJ Scott C Moore · IPR · Final written decision

    Petitioners failed to prove claims 1–10, 15, 20, and 24 unpatentable because they did not show a reason to refrain from calculating Hsu’s metrics when Franaszek’s type information was absent.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “and “at least two years of experience working with data compression or a graduate degree focusing in the field of data compression.” ’179 IPR, Ex. 1002 ¶ 26; ’808 IPR, Ex. 1002 ¶ 26. Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Zeger, “does not disagree” with Petitioners’ formulation, and does not offer any alternative formulation. See Ex. 2004 ¶ 20. Based on our review of the ’728 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’728 patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of Petitioners’ declarant, we adopt and apply Dr. Creusere’s formulation regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. The cited prior art references also reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We find that the level of appropriate skill reflected in these references is consistent with Dr. Creusere’s formulation regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “Petitioners requested that we construe the claim term “the data block being included in one or more data blocks,” which is recited in claims 2 and 3. ’179 Pet. 13, ’808 Pet. 11–12. Patent Owner did not request that we provide explicit constructions of any claim terms. On this record, we determine that it is unnecessary to provide an explicit construction of the claim term “the data block being included in one or more data blocks” in order to resolve the issues in dispute. Accordingly, we decline to adopt an express construction of this claim term. Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“claim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “Petitioners argue that Patent Owner is “presuppos[ing] that a POSA would only see one obvious way to combine prior art teachings.” Reply 5. Petitioners are correct that there may be more than one obvious way to combine prior art teachings. However, it is Petitioners’ burden to show that one particular combination of the references renders obvious all limitations of a given claim. Thus, it is entirely proper for Patent Owner to point out the tension between Petitioners’ stated rationale for combining the teachings of Hsu and Franaszek to arrive at limitations 1d and 24d, and Petitioners’ stated rationale for further modifying this combination to refrain from calculating Hsu’s block type and redundancy metrics when Franaszek’s type information is not present in order to arrive at limitations 1f and 24f. To prevail on Ground 1, Petitioners must demonstrate that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had sufficient reason to make both modifications. We find Petitioner has not persuasively harmonized the disparate rationales it proffers.” slip op. at 29

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

      “Notably, Dr. Creusere never opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to refrain from calculating Hsu’s block type and redundancy metrics when Franaszek’s type data was not present, in the manner Petitioners allege would have satisfied claim limitations 1f and 24f. See ’179 IPR, Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 141–146, 191–202; ’808 IPR, Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 141– 146, 191–202. In fact, during his deposition, Dr. Creusere confirmed that he was not offering an opinion that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have refrained from calculating Hsu’s block type and redundancy metrics when Franaszek’s “type” information was not present: Q. And in your declaration, you don't propose that a POSA would only use Hsu when Franaszek already has a data type and not use Hsu when Franaszek doesn't have a data type, right? A. I don't propose that a POSA has to do that. Though I do discuss the advantages that one could achieve if one had a data type, and one were to combine that with Hsu, but I don't say -- I don't say that you can only apply Hsu when you -- when you have a data type. Q. You don't have an opinion that a POSA would have been motivated to use Hsu only when Franaszek has a data type, but would not have been motivated to use Hsu when Franaszek doesn't have a data type, right? A. I don't believe that I expressed an opinion on that in my declaration. Ex. 2003, 130:18–131:12 (emphases added).” slip op. at 26

    Patent outcomesUS 9,054,728 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,054,728
  • PTAB · May 25, 2018 · IPR2017-00808 · APJ Scott C Moore · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–10, 15, 20, and 24 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioners did not establish a reason to forgo Hsu’s analysis when Franaszek lacked type information.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

      “In contrast, Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Zeger, directly addresses the issue in dispute, and testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have had reason to refrain from calculating Hsu’s block type and redundancy metrics when Franaszek’s type data was not present: While I do not agree that a POSA would be motivated to combine Franaszek with Hsu at all, I do agree with Dr. Creusere that if a POSA were to make such a combination, the POSA would rely on Hsu’s powerful data type recognition and compressibility analysis approach to identify a data type and redundancy metrics for each of Franaszek’s data blocks. I also agree with Dr. Creusere’s testimony that using Hsu in such circumstances would help Franaszek “pick a better compression technique and get more compression.” Id. at 130:12-17. I certainly do not believe that a POSA would want to refrain from using Hsu’s powerful data type recognition and compressibility analysis approach when Franaszek lacks data type information. To the contrary, Hsu describes a system that avoids any content independent compression and that instead uses an entirely content-dependent approach, and its teachings are thus heavily directed toward an approach for always identifying a data block’s data type as well as its three redundancy metrics. Thus a POSA would have to disregard a core aspect of Hsu’s teachings in order not to use Hsu when Franaszek lacks a data type. I agree with Dr. Creusere that a POSA would not take such an approach. It would certainly not be obvious for a POSA to do so. Ex. 2004 ¶ 24. We find Dr. Zeger’s testimony persuasive, especially in view of Dr. Creusere’s deposition testimony that advantages would result from using Hsu’s block type and redundancy metrics, regardless of whether Franaszek’s type data was or was not present.” slip op. at 27

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “and “at least two years of experience working with data compression or a graduate degree focusing in the field of data compression.” ’179 IPR, Ex. 1002 ¶ 26; ’808 IPR, Ex. 1002 ¶ 26. Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Zeger, “does not disagree” with Petitioners’ formulation, and does not offer any alternative formulation. See Ex. 2004 ¶ 20. Based on our review of the ’728 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’728 patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of Petitioners’ declarant, we adopt and apply Dr. Creusere’s formulation regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. The cited prior art references also reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We find that the level of appropriate skill reflected in these references is consistent with Dr. Creusere’s formulation regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “Petitioners requested that we construe the claim term “the data block being included in one or more data blocks,” which is recited in claims 2 and 3. ’179 Pet. 13, ’808 Pet. 11–12. Patent Owner did not request that we provide explicit constructions of any claim terms. On this record, we determine that it is unnecessary to provide an explicit construction of the claim term “the data block being included in one or more data blocks” in order to resolve the issues in dispute. Accordingly, we decline to adopt an express construction of this claim term. Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“claim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “Petitioners argue that Patent Owner is “presuppos[ing] that a POSA would only see one obvious way to combine prior art teachings.” Reply 5. Petitioners are correct that there may be more than one obvious way to combine prior art teachings. However, it is Petitioners’ burden to show that one particular combination of the references renders obvious all limitations of a given claim. Thus, it is entirely proper for Patent Owner to point out the tension between Petitioners’ stated rationale for combining the teachings of Hsu and Franaszek to arrive at limitations 1d and 24d, and Petitioners’ stated rationale for further modifying this combination to refrain from calculating Hsu’s block type and redundancy metrics when Franaszek’s type information is not present in order to arrive at limitations 1f and 24f. To prevail on Ground 1, Petitioners must demonstrate that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had sufficient reason to make both modifications. We find Petitioner has not persuasively harmonized the disparate rationales it proffers.” slip op. at 29

    Patent outcomesUS 9,054,728 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,054,728
  • PTAB · May 25, 2018 · IPR2017-00179 · APJ Scott C Moore · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–10, 15, 20, and 24 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioners did not establish a reason to refrain from calculating Hsu’s metrics when Franaszek’s type information was absent.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “and “at least two years of experience working with data compression or a graduate degree focusing in the field of data compression.” ’179 IPR, Ex. 1002 ¶ 26; ’808 IPR, Ex. 1002 ¶ 26. Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Zeger, “does not disagree” with Petitioners’ formulation, and does not offer any alternative formulation. See Ex. 2004 ¶ 20. Based on our review of the ’728 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’728 patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of Petitioners’ declarant, we adopt and apply Dr. Creusere’s formulation regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. The cited prior art references also reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We find that the level of appropriate skill reflected in these references is consistent with Dr. Creusere’s formulation regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “Petitioners requested that we construe the claim term “the data block being included in one or more data blocks,” which is recited in claims 2 and 3. ’179 Pet. 13, ’808 Pet. 11–12. Patent Owner did not request that we provide explicit constructions of any claim terms. On this record, we determine that it is unnecessary to provide an explicit construction of the claim term “the data block being included in one or more data blocks” in order to resolve the issues in dispute. Accordingly, we decline to adopt an express construction of this claim term. Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“claim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

      “Ex. 2004 ¶ 24. We find Dr. Zeger’s testimony persuasive, especially in view of Dr. Creusere’s deposition testimony that advantages would result from using Hsu’s block type and redundancy metrics, regardless of whether Franaszek’s type data was or was not present.” slip op. at 28

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “Petitioners argue that Patent Owner is “presuppos[ing] that a POSA would only see one obvious way to combine prior art teachings.” Reply 5. Petitioners are correct that there may be more than one obvious way to combine prior art teachings. However, it is Petitioners’ burden to show that one particular combination of the references renders obvious all limitations of a given claim. Thus, it is entirely proper for Patent Owner to point out the tension between Petitioners’ stated rationale for combining the teachings of Hsu and Franaszek to arrive at limitations 1d and 24d, and Petitioners’ stated rationale for further modifying this combination to refrain from calculating Hsu’s block type and redundancy metrics when Franaszek’s type information is not present in order to arrive at limitations 1f and 24f. To prevail on Ground 1, Petitioners must demonstrate that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had sufficient reason to make both modifications. We find Petitioner has not persuasively harmonized the disparate rationales it proffers.” slip op. at 29

    Patent outcomesUS 9,054,728 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,054,728
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Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.