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  • PTAB · Oct 8, 2024 · IPR2024-00432 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–20 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Comcast would show at least one claim unpatentable over Zhang.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). slip op. at 12

    • Parallel petitionsDenied

      “petitions, Petitioner filed a Petition Ranking and Explanation of Material Differences Between Petitions, ranking its three petitions directed to the ’362 patent in accordance with the guidance with respect to parallel petitions in the Board’s November 2019 Consolidated Trial Practice Guide. Paper 3; see Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019, “CTPG”), at 59–60 (available at Available at https://www.uspto.gov/ TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated). In that Paper, Petitioner ranked the instant Petition first. Paper 3, 1.” slip op. at 10

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA” or “skilled artisan”) “would have had a degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with three-to-four years of experience with digital signal processing and RF tuning systems for satellite and/or cable communications,” and that “[a]dditional education may substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience may substitute for 8 Patent Owner does not present objective evidence of nonobviousness at this stage of the proceeding. See generally Prelim. Resp. formal education.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 30–32). Patent Owner does not address level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Claim Construction We apply the same claim construction standard used in district court actions under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), namely that articulated in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2021). In applying that standard, claim terms generally are given their ordinary and customary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. “In determining the meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17). Petitioner states that “[a]ll claim terms herein should be given their” slip op. at 13

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 9,210,362
  • PTAB · Oct 4, 2024 · IPR2024-00438 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Institution

    Instituted IPR on claims 1–76 and all asserted challenges because the Petition showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • Parallel petitionsDenied

      “We do not agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s filing of three parallel petitions is grounds to deny all three petitions on that basis alone. See Prelim. Resp. 4–30. As discussed above, Petitioner has complied with our guidance. See CTPG 59–60. For reasons given in our concurrent decisions denying institution in IPR2024-00439 and IPR2024-00440, however, we agree with Patent Owner that plural petitions are not warranted and we deny institution in the concurrently filed decisions for these petitions. Given our decisions to deny institution in IPR2024-00439 and IPR2024-00440, Patent Owner’s arguments on the need for more than one petition are unavailing with regard to the instant Petition. In view of the foregoing, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) in this proceeding.” slip op. at 8

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to all the challenged claims of the ’206 patent based on all the challenges raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner asserts that “[a]ll claim terms herein should be given their ordinary and customary meaning to a POSITA, as they would be given in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b),” where POSITA stands for “person of ordinary skill in the art.” Pet. 18. Petitioner further notes that “the ’206 patent defines ‘wideband’ as a band that carries multiple channels.” Id. at 18–19 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:36–39). Patent Owner does not respond. At this stage, on the record before us, we determine that no claim term requires express interpretation to resolve any controversy in this proceeding. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 9

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “Based on Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown sufficiently for purposes of this Decision that Zhang teaches the recited “digitizing” step of element 1C. For example, Zhang teaches that its ADC 220 “converts the down-converted multi-channel analog RF signal to a multi-channel digital RF signal.” Ex. 1013 ¶ 27 (cited by Pet. 22). Zhang explains that “many modifications, variations, alternatives, and equivalents . . . are intended to be within the scope of [its] invention,” and gives the example that “the RF channels need not be contiguous.” Id. ¶ 48 (cited by Pet. 22). We agree with Petitioner that Zhang’s example teaches or suggests that the RF channels may be contiguous. Zhang further describes “demultiplex[ing] the multi-channel digital RF signal into separate digital RF channels C1 to Cn,” which “contain content channels that are selected or used by a subscriber.” Id. ¶ 28 (cited by Pet. 22). Zhang describes filtering the RF channels so that “only the target RF channel passes.” Id. ¶ 32 (cited by Pet. 23). In addition, Zhang describes “select[ing] one or more of the RF channels D1 to Dm from one or more of the digital RF channels C1 to Cn,” where “only the selected channels are later demodulated unlike the systems using RF tuners which demodulate all of the RF channels.” Id. ¶ 28.” slip op. at 15

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 11,399,206
  • PTAB · Oct 1, 2024 · IPR2024-00435 · APJ Lynne H Browne · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–82 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Comcast would prevail on at least one claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons discussed below, we determine, based on the record before us, that there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail in showing at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Furthermore, we deny Patent Owner’s request for us to exercise our discretion to deny institution in this proceeding based on Petitioner’s filing of two additional parallel petitions challenging the same claims. We therefore institute inter partes review on all claims and all grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357 (2018).” slip op. at 2

    • Parallel petitionsDenied

      “We do not agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s filing of three parallel petitions is grounds to deny all three petitions on that basis alone. See Prelim. Resp. 4–30. As discussed above, Petitioner has complied with our guidance. See CTPG, 59–60. For reasons discussed in our concurrent Decisions Denying Institution in IPR2024-00436 and IPR2024-00437, however, we agree with Patent Owner that plural petitions are not warranted and we deny institution in the concurrently filed Decisions for these petitions. Given our Decisions to Deny Institution in IPR2024-00436 and IPR2024-00437, Patent Owner’s arguments regarding the need for more than one petition are unavailing with regard to the instant Petition.” slip op. at 11

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have had a degree in electrical engineering, or a similar discipline, along with three-to-four years of experience with digital signal processing and RF tuning systems for satellite and/or cable communications,” and that 6 Patent Owner does not present objective evidence of nonobviousness at this stage of the proceeding. See generally Prelim. Resp. “[a]dditional education may substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience may substitute for formal education.” Pet. 15– 16 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 30–32). Patent Owner does not address level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally, Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner states that “[a]ll claim terms herein should be given their ordinary and customary meaning to a POSITA as they would be given in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b).” Pet. 16. Yet, Petitioner proposes claim construction for “wideband” and “digital down converter” / “digital front end.” Id. at 16–19. Patent Owner does not address claim construction. See generally, Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no aspects of the challenged claims require explicit construction. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 14

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 11,381,866
  • PTAB · Sep 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00445 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–18 were unpatentable under any asserted obviousness ground.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “IV. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown with sufficient particularity why either Saey, Gross, or Cioffi disclose or suggest “generating, by said CMTS for each one of said plurality of service groups, a composite SNR-related metric based at least in part on a worst- case SNR profile of said SNR related metrics corresponding to said one of said plurality of service groups.” This failing undermines Petitioner’s obviousness contentions for both challenged independent claims under all of the alleged grounds. The same deficiency extends through to all of the grounds challenging the patentability of the dependent claims. And as a result, based on the arguments and evidence presented by the parties, we conclude that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one claim of the ’682 patent challenged in the Petition. Therefore, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 24

    • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

      “testimony of declarant Dr. Kiaei, we find Patent Owner’s criticism to have merit. The evidence from Cioffi, which Petitioner and Dr. Kiaei reference, neither discloses or suggests creating “a composite SNR-related metric” for a group of cable modems or channels. Moreover, Petitioner has failed to carry its burden of showing with particularity why a skilled artisan view Cioffi as disclosing or suggest generating a composite SNR-related metric based at least in part on a worst-case SNR profile of the SNR related metrics. More specifically, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s analysis appears to gloss over the details of Cioffi and fails to clearly articulate what of Cioffi allegedly meets the requirements of Limitations [1D] and [10D], which ultimately diminishes the persuasiveness Petitioner’s contention. Therefore, we are not persuaded Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently that Cioffi fills the gap in Thibeault and discloses or suggests Limitations [1D] and [10D] of the challenged independent claims. IV. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown with sufficient particularity why either Saey, Gross, or Cioffi disclose or suggest “generating, by said CMTS for each one of said plurality of service groups, a composite SNR-related metric based at least in part on a worst- case SNR profile of said SNR related metrics corresponding to said one of said plurality of service groups.” This failing undermines Petitioner’s obviousness contentions for both challenged independent claims under all of the alleged grounds. The same deficiency extends through to all of the grounds challenging the patentability of the dependent claims.” slip op. at 24

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “After studying Cioffi, in view of Petitioner’s contentions and the testimony of declarant Dr. Kiaei, we find Patent Owner’s criticism to have merit. The evidence from Cioffi, which Petitioner and Dr. Kiaei reference, neither discloses or suggests creating “a composite SNR-related metric” for a group of cable modems or channels. Moreover, Petitioner has failed to carry its burden of showing with particularity why a skilled artisan view Cioffi as disclosing or suggest generating a composite SNR-related metric based at least in part on a worst-case SNR profile of the SNR related metrics. More specifically, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s analysis appears to gloss over the details of Cioffi and fails to clearly articulate what of Cioffi allegedly meets the requirements of Limitations [1D] and [10D], which ultimately diminishes the persuasiveness Petitioner’s contention. Therefore, we are not persuaded Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently that Cioffi fills the gap in Thibeault and discloses or suggests Limitations [1D] and [10D] of the challenged independent claims. IV. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown with sufficient particularity why either Saey, Gross, or Cioffi disclose or suggest “generating, by said CMTS for each one of said plurality of service groups, a composite SNR-related metric based at least in part on a worst- case SNR profile of said SNR related metrics corresponding to said one of said plurality of service groups.” This failing undermines Petitioner’s obviousness contentions for both challenged independent claims under all of the alleged grounds. The same deficiency extends through to all of the grounds challenging the patentability of the dependent claims.” slip op. at 24

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 38–43). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’682 patent specification and the prior art.” slip op. at 10

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,135,682
  • PTAB · Sep 6, 2024 · IPR2024-00444 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that Saey or Gross taught the claimed composite SNR metric for a service group of cable modems.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “A. Legal Standard Petitioner has the burden of proof. Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“In an IPR, the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.”).” slip op. at 8

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (a skilled artisan) would have had a degree in computer or electrical engineering, computer science, information systems, or a similar discipline, along with at least three-to-four years of experience with the design and/or implementation of network-based content delivery systems, such as video-on-demand cable systems and Internet video streaming. Additional education may substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience may substitute for formal education. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 38–43). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’682 patent specification and the prior art.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “C. Claim Construction We interpret the challenged claims using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner states that “[a]ll claim terms herein should be given their ordinary and customary meaning.” Pet. 11. Patent Owner does not suggest otherwise. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim term requires express construction. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached

      “D. Petitioner Has Not Established Sufficiently That the Prior Art Discloses or Suggests Each and Every Limitation Recited by Independent Claims 1 and 10 Limitations [1D] and [10D] of challenged independent claims 1 and 10 recite “generating, by said CMTS for each one of said plurality of service groups, a composite SNR-related metric based at least in part on a worst-case SNR profile of said SNR related metrics corresponding to said one of said plurality of service groups.” Ex. 1001, 8:10–15 (Limitation [1D]), 9:22–26 (Limitation [10D]). And each ground in this Petition, directly or indirectly, depends on the sufficiency of Petitioner’s contention that either Saey or Gross disclose or suggest that limitation. See Pet. 19–23, 28–31, 52–54, 57–59, 75. After studying the submissions of both parties and the evidence of record, however, we determine there is insufficient support for that contention to satisfy Petitioner’s burden for instituting inter partes review. And because this deficiency is dispositive of the Petition, we focus our discussion below accordingly, after we first provide an overview of Saey and Gross.” slip op. at 11

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,135,682
  • PTAB · Sep 6, 2024 · IPR2024-00430 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in a petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and Preliminary Response, and accompanying exhibits and evidence, we determine Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim in the inter partes review. Therefore, we grant institution of an inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’690 patent on all challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “A POSITA6 would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a similar discipline, and three to four years of experience working in signal processing and/or communication systems/networks. Additional education may substitute for experience, and significant work experience may substitute for formal education. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 115–120). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art, which is consistent with the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). For this stage of the proceeding, we agree with and will use Petitioner’s proposed level for this Decision.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Since the parties apply what they contend is the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms in their briefs, and have stipulated in the Cox case that the plain and ordinary meaning applies, and Patent Owner argues that the district court’s construction in the Charter case is the plain and ordinary meaning, there is no controversy concerning claim terms that we need to resolve in this Decision. Pet. 6; Prelim. Resp. 10; Ex. 1005, 104–105; Ex. 2001, 2. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). At this stage of the proceeding, therefore, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning to the claim terms consistent with their ordinary and customary meaning under 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). We note, however, that Patent Owner seems to consider the court’s construction in the Charter case to require that the claimed “probe” must be of a type that can be compared with a reference signal. Prelim. Resp. 10. We question whether all of the different types of probes mentioned and claimed in the ’690 patent would require comparison with a reference signal. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 2:7–19. However, this is a matter best resolved, if necessary, on a full record at trial.” slip op. at 14

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableUnpatentableMixed

      “Prelim. Resp. 23 (citing Ex. 1013, 37) (annotated in red by Patent Owner). IEEE-802.16’s Table 5 shows that the CID is a field of a generic MAC header. Petitioner does not show sufficiently that the CID, located in the header, specifies content payload of a MAC message, as required by limitation 1A. Petitioner alternatively relies on IEEE-802.16’s ranging code index that it contends is another example of data that is in a ranging request parameter and is used for the ranging response payload. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1013, 49–51, 204–213, 576–579, 665–66; Ex. 1002 ¶ 149). Patent Owner asserts that the portions of IEEE-802.16 that Petitioner cites do not disclose that the ranging code index is sent as part of a ranging request message. Prelim. Resp. 25. Although the parts of IEEE-802.16 that Petitioner cites disclose that the ranging code index is sent from the SS to the BS and is included in a ranging response (Ex. 1013, 49–51, 204–213, 576–579, 665–66), the cited parts do not disclose that the SS sends the ranging code index to the BS in a ranging request. Consequently, Petitioner has not established that IEEE- 802.16 anticipates a ranging code index that is a parameter of a ranging request specifying the content payload of the ranging response corresponding to limitation 1A. For the foregoing reasons, on this record, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood to prevail in showing that claim 1 is anticipated by IEEE 802.16.” slip op. at 18

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 8,284,690
  • PTAB · Sep 3, 2024 · IPR2024-00446 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 and all petition grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 14, and 18 are obvious over Rabenko and Kim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. We may institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314.” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

      “Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17). At this early stage in the proceeding, we find that nothing in the language of the independent claims explicitly requires a controller that processes blocks 200 through 212 shown in Figure 2 of the ’775 patent. Additionally, we do not find any definition or disclaimer (explicit or implicit) in the intrinsic record to limit the independent claims a controller that processes blocks 200 through 212 shown in Figure 2 of the ’775 patent. See Trustees of Columbia University v. Symantec, 811 F.3d 1359, 1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “At this preliminary stage, we find that the evidence of record supports Petitioner’s position that limitation [18D] is taught by the combined teachings of Rabenko and Kim and Petitioner has provided sufficient reasoning to combine those teachings. We find that Patent Owner’s arguments (Prelim. Resp. 32–56) and Dr. Russ’s testimony (Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 91– 131) do not undermine Petitioner’s showing. Accordingly, we determine Petitioner has shown sufficiently for the purpose of institution that Rabenko and Kim teaches limitation [18D] of claim 18.” slip op. at 33

    • Parallel petitionsDenied

      “40 asserted grounds are voluminous and excessive. Prelim. Resp. 7, 56–58 (citing Adaptics Ltd. v. Perfect Company, IPR2018-01596, Paper 20, 18 (Mar. 6, 2019) (informative) (“Adaptics”); Uber Technologies, Inc. v. Surgetech LLC, IPR2023-00738, Paper 8 (Oct. 23, 2023); Energysource Minerals, LLC, v. Terralithium LLC, IPR2019-01607, Paper 10, 13 (May 4, 2020) (similar)); see also Prelim. Resp. 4. In particular, Patent Owner argues the Petition asserts “at a minimum 40 separate grounds (grounds ‘A’ through ‘NN’), involving eight separate references, challenging claims 1– 20” and “[t]his ‘voluminous and excessive’ number of grounds is an independently sufficient reason to deny institution.” Id. (citing Adaptics, 18). Petitioner challenges claims 1–20. Pet. 9. Fourteen claims, specifically claims 1–7, 10, 12, 14, 15, and 18–20, are challenged on the basis of four grounds, specifically Grounds A–D. Id. Petitioner relies on Lu for teaching a RISC processor recited in claims 1 and 14. Id. at 43–45. Petitioner submits one or two additional references for dependent claims 8, 9, 11–13, 16, and 17. Id. at 10. In view of the above, as well as the complexity of the technology and detailed nature of certain of Petitioner’s arguments, we decline to exercise discretion and deny institution on the basis of the number of grounds asserted.” slip op. at 42

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,223,775
  • PTAB · Aug 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00462 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on claims 1–3, failing to support a motivation to combine Carhart and Grube.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “A. Legal Standard Petitioner has the burden of proof. Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“In an IPR, the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.”).” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “bandwidth, we agree with Patent Owner that this contention is unsubstantiated. Although there is sufficient evidence that Grube’s common bit-loading scheme improves upon and benefits infrastructures utilizing telephone lines, Petitioner provides no basis, or minimal at best, to bridge those advantages obtained in the context of Grube’s system to Carhart’s BCN. The evidence Petitioner cites from Grube and Dr. Williams (Ex. 1010, 2:48–3:17, 3:34–42, 4:18–26, 6:54–67, 7:13–8:14, 14:33–46, 34:45– 52, 57:29–38, Fig. 8; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 92–111) either describes how Grube’s bitloading scheme works in an infrastructure utilizing telephone lines or it represents that the bit-loading scheme is able to satisfy the need for a one-tomany and/or many-to-one communication system within an infrastructure that utilizes existing telephone wires. Dr. Williams’s testimony provides little, if any, persuasive information to bridge the gap between how Grube’s bit-loading scheme’s usefulness within a telephone line infrastructure translates to a skilled artisan into adding similar value within a BCN infrastructure; instead, Dr. Williams largely mirrors the naked assertions Petitioner makes and cites to the same evidence without further substantive reasoning. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Likewise, no underlying support or reasoning from either Petitioner or Dr. Williams is provided to substantiate the claim that “Grube represents a suitable, known technique for orchestrating digital communication between a central unit and multiple remote units in networks like Carhart’s” (Pet. 16). Grube suggest that its technique eliminates high data rate transmission path requirements to expand the usefulness and areas in which communications systems may be established. Ex. 1010, 57:29–38. Petitioner offers no basis for us to determine Grube’s technique for eliminating high data rate transmission path requirements would have been a known technique by skilled artisans for orchestrating digital communication between nodes within a network like Carhart’s that necessarily depend on the high data rate transmission paths that a BCN provides. Left unfulfilled is any clear explanation for why or how Grube’s bit- loading scheme would have actually improved or benefited Carhart’s system, which Petitioner admits already teaches a network with a centralized computer that uses existing coaxial cables to communicate with remote stations (Pet. 10). For example, Petitioner does not identify a single known shortcoming with Carhart’s one-to-many and/or many-to-one communication system infrastructure that a skilled artisan would recognize may be overcome with Grube’s bit-loading scheme. To the contrary, as Patent Owner notes, rather than needing a technique Grube teaches to address the lack of “adequate bandwidth” provided by telephone wires (Ex. 1010, 2:1–3), Carhart teaches that its BCN provides excess unused bandwidth (Ex. 1009, 8:36–38). Nor does Petitioner explain why or how a skilled artisan would have viewed Grube’s bit-loading scheme to be superior to the schemes Carhart utilizes to form a multi-casting infrastructure. Moreover, Petitioner’s admission Carhart teaches that teaches a BCN with a centralized computer that communicates with remote stations, further weakens Petitioner’s position because it shows Carhart’s infrastructure already accomplishes the same goal that Petition proposes a skilled artisan would have sought to achieve through the proposed modification. In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (stating that the Board’s” slip op. at 26

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableDecided for patent owner

      “The last point we make about Petitioner’s reasoning is that it lacks any substantive support for why a skilled artisan would have chosen to configure Carhart’s node to have the functionality Grube describes for its primary site. Here again, Petitioner simply concludes that a skilled artisan would have found it obvious to have Carhart’s nodes act as Grube’s primary site without any evidence that such a correlation was known by skilled artisans or any analysis regarding the roles Carhart’s nodes and Grube’s primary site play within their respective infrastructures that would have led to that choice. Pet. 20–21. We are mindful that “[c]are must be taken to avoid hindsight reconstruction by using ‘the patent in suit as a guide through the maze of prior art references, combining the right references in the right way so as to achieve the result of the claims in suit.’” Grain Processing Corp. v. American–Maize Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 902, 907 (Fed.Cir.1988) (quoting Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1005, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Petitioner’s failure to provide any clear explanation backed by supporting evidence for why a skilled artisan would have selected Carhart’s nodes to modify and perform as the primary site when implementing Grube’s bit-loading scheme suggests Petitioner improperly relied on hindsight reasoning to piece together elements to arrive at the claimed invention. For the above reasons, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown with sufficient particularity why it would have been obvious to modify a node in Carhart, in view of Grube, to transmit a probe signal to the other respective nodes and determine a common bit-loading modulation scheme from the various bit-loading modulation schemes determined and provided by each of the other respective nodes that received a probe signal. And as a result, we find Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of proving that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Carhart and Grube as proposed. This failing undermines Petitioner’s showing as to independent claims 1–3 for all grounds.” slip op. at 28

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (a skilled artisan) would have had a degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field and experience working in signal processing and/or communication systems/networks, e.g., a bachelor’s and three or more years of experience; a master’s and at least one year of experience; or a doctorate and some work experience. Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 24–25). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’759 patent specification and the prior art.” slip op. at 11

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,889,759
  • PTAB · Aug 19, 2024 · IPR2024-00452 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving the challenged claims obvious over the asserted combinations.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “A. Legal Standard Petitioner has the burden of proof. Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“In an IPR, the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.”).” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “have viewed Grube’s common bit-loading scheme as providing improvements over and benefits to the Gurantz system’s ability to multi-cast information, we agree with Patent Owner that this contention is unsubstantiated. Although there is sufficient evidence that Grube’s common bit-loading scheme improves upon and benefits infrastructures utilizing telephone lines, Petitioner provides no basis, or minimal at best, to bridge those advantages obtained in the context of Grube’s system to Gurantz’s BCN. The evidence Petitioner cites from Grube and Mr. Bertonis (Ex. 1009, 4:43–51, 17:20–40; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 135–136) either describes how Grube’s bitloading scheme works in an infrastructure utilizing telephone lines or it represents that the bit-loading scheme is able to satisfy the need for a one-tomany and/or many-to-one communication system within an infrastructure that utilizes existing telephone wires. Moreover, Mr. Bertonis’s testimony provides little, if any, persuasive information to bridge the gap between how Grube’s bit-loading scheme’s usefulness within a telephone line infrastructure translates to a skilled artisan into adding similar value within a BCN infrastructure; instead, Mr. Bertonis largely mirrors the naked assertions Petitioner makes and cites to the same evidence without further substantive reasoning. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that modulation scheme from a plurality received response signals that each include a respective bit-loading modulation scheme determined by a separate node. To be clear, “we accept” these contentions about what Grube discloses without making a determination about whether the evidence of record supports such a finding in order to focus our analysis on the dispositive issue, which is whether, in view of Grube, Petitioner demonstrates sufficiently a rationale with a rational underpinning for modifying the nodes in Gurantz’s BCN system in the manner claimed.” slip op. at 24

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a similar discipline, and three to four years of experience working in signal processing and/or communication systems/networks. Additional education may substitute for experience, and significant work experience may substitute for formal education. Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 84). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’759 patent specification and the prior art.” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,889,759
  • PTAB · Jul 31, 2024 · IPR2024-00546 · APJ Lynne H Browne · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–7 would be unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.108. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to any claim challenged in the Petition. We therefore deny institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had (i) a bachelor-level degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field, and three or more years of experience working in signal processing and/or communications systems/networks; (ii) a master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field, and at least one year of experience in signal processing and/or communications systems/networks; or (iii) a doctoral degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field, and at least some experience in signal processing and/or 5 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 287–88 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103. Because the ’539 patent issued from an application that was filed before the effective date of the applicable AIA provisions (Ex. 1001, code (22)), the pre-AIA versions of §§ 102 and 103 apply. 6 The parties have not directed our attention to any objective evidence of obviousness or non-obviousness. communications systems/networks. Additional education could substitute for professional experience, or vice versa.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner states that “no express constructions are required in this proceeding” and “Petitioner reserves the right to address any construction proposed by Patent Owner or the Board.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner does not identify any claim terms which require construction and states Patent Owner “reserves its right to respond to any construction Petitioner later proposes.” Prelim. Resp. 8–9. We agree with the Parties that at this point in this proceeding, no express construction of any claim term is necessary.” slip op. at 9

    • BurdenNot reached

      “of a MAC layer using a probe packet.” Prelim. Resp. 26. Specifically, Patent Owner contends that “Hou discloses that its CMTS measures metrics, but without reference to any ranging protocol or request” and that this disclosure would not have suggested a MAC layer using a probe packet as required. Id. at 31 (citing Ex. 1005, 6:35–36, Fig. 5). We agree.” slip op. at 13

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,621,539

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.