• Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00651 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 6, 7, and 9–20 were unpatentable over any asserted ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’680 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “target value” is part of a command that is sent from a computing device to a server and then to a controller. The controller then receives a measurement of the fluid by a sensor and determines whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” If the measurement does not satisfy the “target value,” further operations are undertaken. The recited operation sequence makes clear that the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” is not as Dr. Wooley opines because the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time is represented by the measurement taken by the sensor, 11 Some claim language less relevant to construing “target value” was omitted for ease of reference. which the controller then uses to determine whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” Additionally, claim 1 recites that the “target value” is sent as part of a command to the controller. The “target value” is not sent to the controller from the sensor, as might be expected if the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” were as Dr. Wooley opines. Petitioner and Dr. Wooley’s construction would also result in “target value” meaning effectively the same thing as the measurement of the fluid by the sensor, a concept that is separately recited in claim 1 and to which the “target value” is compared. The Specification of the ’680 patent does not support Petitioner’s understanding of the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value.” Although the Specification does not recite “target value,” it recites “target state,” and describes “target state” sufficiently to understand the plain and ordinary meaning of “target” as used in “target value” and “target state.” In particular, the ’680 patent explains that “[i]n some embodiments, the process 104 includes receiving, via a network interface, from a remote user device, (e.g., via a command-center server) a command to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state.” Ex. 1001, 11:48–51. This portion reflects that the command is seeking to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state. In other words, the “target value” or “target state” is not generally “the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time”; rather, it is a value or state that the fluid-handling device is desired to be in, as Patent Owner and Dr. Durham explain. Additionally, just as claim 1 recites a directional component for the “target value” to be sent to the controller in a command, so too does the Specification describe a “target state” as being sent in a command from a remote user device. Thus, the Specification clearly supports the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Patent Owner and Dr. Durham and not the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Petitioner and Dr. Wooley. slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “time-stamped process data, report exception therein to the remote host, and extract and transmit time-stamped process data to the remote host.” Ex. 1005, Abst. (emphases added). Almadi explains that its remote field systems must include a plurality of controller units “to issue commands to, and gather and process data from a plurality of field devices, including remote systems and instruments, . . . [and] a database server for the storage of process data retrieved from the remote subsystems and instruments.” Id. at 2:22–30 (emphases added). Based on these disclosures, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not established that Almadi discloses element [1.4]. Specifically, the teachings from Almadi identified by Petitioner refer to process data, which is data retrieved from the remote subsystems/field devices. Thus, we understand that Almadi’s teaching—of using an Ethernet switch to transmit “process data”—describes transmitting data from the remote subsystems/field devices. See Ex. 1005, 3:13–17, cited in Pet. 15. But claim 1 and particularly element [1.4], recites “sending, with the server, the target value to the network address [which identifies a controller of the fluid-handling device13] via the network,” which is different than sending process data from the field devices to the remote host or database server for storage.” slip op. at 19

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,175,680
• Tanklogix, LLC v. SiteproInstitution denied
  PTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00650 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 18–32 and 34 were unpatentable over Kahn or Kahn and Gutierrez.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’871 patent. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we decline to institute an inter partes review of claims 18–32 and 34 of the ’871 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “The respective proposed levels of qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art are similar, with Patent Owner proposing two years of experience compared to Petitioner proposing significant experience with remotely controlling fluid-handling devices, like SCADA systems. Patent Owner also proposes more extensive experience in lieu of educational experience. While we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications to be acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’871 patent and the asserted prior art. Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the qualifications adopted.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “actuators and the remote control of fluid handling devices, including the receipt with the user-interface module of “a user command to actuate an actuator via a presented control interface” (limitation [18.7]) and “account authorized to send commands to remotely control fluid handling devices” (limitation [18.11]). We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Kahn discloses or teaches these limitations because the evidence does not provide support that there is remote control of fluid handling devices or the use of a user command on a control interface to send a command to a fluid handling device, for instance. Kahn is directed to providing access to fluid sensing data and analyzing and providing visual information on that data, but we do not discern that it teaches or discloses the capability to remotely control fluid handling devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:27–36, 2:50–3:2. More specifically, the Kahn disclosures that Petitioner repeatedly relies upon for allegedly teaching this control are deficient. See Ex. 1005, 10:62–67, 14:35– 15:2, 15:62–16:32; see also Pet. 12–14, 16–18. Kahn discloses that “the communication unit 112B can include on-site alerts such as optical (indicator lights), audible alerts (e.g., alarm sounds), tactile (e.g., vibration of the unit) or can be interfaced to an appropriate control valve for simply shutting off the supply of fluid upon the detection of emergency events, for instance.” Ex. 1005, 10:62–67. Communication unit 112B is part of the local “sensor unit,” wherein the detection conditions determined by the sensor are communicated to remote devices by communication unit 112B. See id. at 3:31–33, 5:62–6:2, 6:27–35, 7:33–37, 13:7–12, Figs. 1A–1C. Kahn discloses that the sensor units, which include communication units 112B, can be located near shut-off valves and can communicate with distant locations. See id. at 11:1–13. There are no disclosures, however, in the above passages that there is remote control of fluid handling devices, that there is a user command on a control interface that actuates an actuator, or that there is a command sent to the facility actuators via a network connection, as required in limitations [18.5]–[18.7] and [18.9]–[18.12], respectively. Rather, the disclosure indicates that the communication unit 112B includes on-site alerts and that the local (non-remote) communication unit 112B can be interfaced with the control valve.” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,488,871
• Teladoc Health, Inc. v. Data Health Partners, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 12, 2025 · IPR2024-00617 · APJ Andreas Baltatzis · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 9–14, 16–18, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 6 and 7 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted grounds did not establish their missing limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the challenged claims, as of the earliest claimed priority date, “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in a healthcare field as well as 1–2 years of experience with health information technology, including specific experience with computer-based systems for recording, tracking, and analyzing patient health information.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶ 36). Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Bryan Bergeron. Ex. 1012 ¶ 36. Patent Owner does not oppose Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See generally PO Resp.; Ex. 2005 ¶ 32. On the full record, we determine Petitioner’s proposed level of skill comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’142 patent and the prior art of record. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that the Specification supports construing “selection” as including inputs to a user interface, thereby “assigning” a client to a provider within the system. For example, the Specification describes a user interface including selection components. Ex. 1001, 10:45– 48 (“the user interface . . . may display . . . selection or display components”), 12:19–22 (authorized users may make selections by doubling tapping a touchscreen). The Specification further discloses that the “administrators may have complete access to the service providers and the clients to assign the clients to individual service providers through the user interface.” Id. at 11:13–18 (reference numerals removed, emphasis added). Taken together, we agree with Petitioner that assigning clients in response to selections of a user interface is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the claims and the Specification. We decline to read Patent Owner’s additional limitations of “deliberate and active choice” into the claim, because these additional limitations lack support both in the claim language and the Specification. We do agree with Patent Owner’s argument that assigning and selection must be distinct elements, because they are separately listed and assigning happens in response to selection(s).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the Specification defines “projected closure date” as the date at which a goal will end. However, we agree with Petitioner that this definition is not limited to final goals, and would include the end date of any goal, including intermediate goals. Accordingly, we interpret “projected closure date” as the date at which any goal will end. We apply that definition below.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Patent Owner responds that “Petitioner does not identify any selection made by Douglas’s administrator which may result in assignment of a provider.” PO Resp. 15 (citing Pet. 19–20; Ex. 1002, 6:33–7:13, Fig. 2). First, Patent Owner construes “selection” as “a deliberate and active choice by an administrator,” and argues that “Douglas discloses no such selection.” Id. at 15–16 (citing Ex. 1001, 11:13–18; Ex. 2005 ¶ 66). Instead, “Douglas’s administrator merely inputs pre-determined information from the prescription form” that the physician provided and thereby selected. Id. at 16 (citing Ex. 1002, 6:33–7:13, Fig. 2; Ex. 2005 ¶ 67). We find this argument not commensurate with the claim scope. As discussed above in claim construction, we decline to read Patent Owner’s additional limitations of “deliberate and active choice” into the selection limitation as lacking support both in the claim language and the Specification. Supra, Section III.C.1. Second, Patent Owner argues that Douglas does not teach assigning “in response to” an administrator’s selection. PO Resp. 16–17. Instead, Patent Owner argues that Douglas’s “information entered by the case advisor was provided by the physician.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002, 6:33–7:16). Again, we find this argument not commensurate with the claim scope, as the claim does not require a single assignment of client to provider. In other words, even if Douglas’s prescription information qualifies as a first assignment of client to provider, Douglas teaches the administrator using the same information to assign the client to a provider within the system, thereby meeting the required claim limitation.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 11,151,142 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,151,142
• Teladoc Health, Inc. v. Data Health Partners, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 12, 2025 · IPR2024-00616 · APJ Andreas Baltatzis · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9, 11–17, 19, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious; claim 10 was not shown unpatentable because the petition lacked evidence supporting the proposed missing-data alert modification.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the challenged claims, as of the earliest claimed priority date, “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in a healthcare field as well as 1–2 years of experience with health information technology, including specific” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the separately listed “goals, a plan of action, and thresholds,” should be considered distinct elements that cannot exist as the “same element” and therefore must be separately taught by the art. However, we agree with Petitioner that the claims and Specification describe the elements as interrelated whereby one may interact the other, even if they are separate elements. See Google, 92 F.4th at 1059 (“The proper construction of the term must allow for any of the five claimed inputs to potentially be used to calculate another claimed input.”).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “modify Douglas with Wager to “ensure that the assigned physician had the capacity to effectively treat the patient,” given the number and variety of patients in Douglas’s system. Pet. 54–55 (citing Ex. 1002, 6:6–14, 6:36–7:4, Figs. 51, 57; Ex. 1012 ¶ 129). Petitioner asserts that Wager addresses this problem by presenting the staff manager “with a suite of provider assignment options and alternatives, to automatically organize and drive assignment ratios and other assignment parameters and options with compliance, capacity, best practice and other criteria taken into account.” Id. at 54 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 6–7; Ex. 1012 ¶ 128). Petitioner further argues that the combination “would have also helped ensure that the assigned physician had the capacity to effectively treat the patient” because Wager’s interface effectively manages capacity issues against fluctuating clinical demands, thereby increasing quality of care for the patient. Id. at 55 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 6, 8, 20; Ex. 1012 ¶ 129). Patent Owner makes six different arguments that one of ordinary skill would not have been motivated to combine Douglas with Wager. PO Resp. 36–46. As discussed below, Patent Owner’s arguments do not persuasively rebut Petitioner’s articulated reasons to combine the references, because Patent Owner’s arguments are inconsistent with KSR’s “expansive and flexible approach” to obviousness. See 550 U.S. at 415.” slip op. at 44

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “Finally, Patent Owner argues that “Douglas teaches against accomplishing its goals in an in-person setting like the one to which Wager is directed.” PO Resp. 43–45 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 4, 5, 11, 13; Ex. 2005 ¶ 108; Ex. 2006, 66:6–19). Patent Owner argues that Douglas’s system remotely monitors patients to avoid the costs and inconvenience of in-person programs. Id. (citing Ex. 1002, 1:29–35, 2:5–7; Ex. 2005 ¶ 109; Ex. 2006, 67:16–68:2). Patent Owner adds that Douglas’s teaching of office visits does not contradict the “remote only” argument, but instead, reinforces the patient’s desire to remain with their original physician, “instead of utilizing the proposed Douglas-Wager system to reassign the patient to a new physician.” Id. at 45. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Douglas teaches away from the combination with Wager. Douglas’s preference for remote medicine does not criticize or discourage office visits or the combination with Wager’s in-person setting. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from . . . alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed.”). Accordingly, there is no teaching away from the combination with Wager’s computerized system for assigning patients to physicians.” slip op. at 47

  Patent outcomesUS 11,144,554 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,144,554
• Abbott Laboratories / Abbott Diabetes Care Inc. v. Altivera LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 15, 2025 · IPR2024-00425 · APJ Bach V Hoang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5, 9, and 10 are unpatentable as obvious over Beck, Heller, and Lovejoy; the Board did not reach the alternative Bandy grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not dispute this assessment. See generally PO Resp. Having considered the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that Petitioner’s proposal comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’307 Patent. Accord Inst. Dec. 8–9.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “both the unique sensor ID as well as the associated unique wireless device ID is contradicted, or at least unsupported, by the claim language and the Specification. We determine that this limitation does not require authentication of both the unique sensor ID and the unique wireless device ID, or otherwise require authentication using the unique wireless ID. Rather, the limitation only requires authentication of the unique sensor ID. The language and structure of the claim itself, “the remote server authenticates said unique sensor ID associated with said unique wireless device ID,” requires authentication of the unique sensor ID but not the unique wireless device ID. See Ex. 1001, 19:51–52 (emphasis added). The portion of the limitation reciting “associated with said unique wireless device ID” is linguistically an appositive modifying the “unique sensor ID.” Indeed, Patent Owner acknowledges the “plain meaning of the claim term is that the remote server authenticates the unique sensor ID and that such unique sensor ID is associated with a unique wireless device ID.” PO Resp. 18.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed constructions of any of these other claim terms or phrases. PO Resp. 24. We agree with the parties that the identified limitations—which each recite a “means” or “means for” performing a particular function—are means-plus-function limitations that should be interpreted under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that “use of the word ‘means’ creates a presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies”). And we agree with Petitioner’s uncontested identification of the recited functions and corresponding structure for these limitations for the reasons explained by Petitioner. See Pet. 11–15 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:20–21, 2:24–28, 3:33–36, 17:18–30); id. at 13–15 (citing Ex. 1009, 9:4–6, 9:19–20, 9:57–65, 10:10– 11) (explaining that Lovejoy is incorporated by reference into the ’307 Patent). We adopt the uncontested constructions identified by Petitioner, as” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that the improvements offered by the incorporation of Heller’s teachings would have motivated one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Beck and Heller in the manner proposed by Petitioner. Confirming Petitioner’s assertion that the combination yields improvements, Heller states that it improves the type of glucose monitor used in one of Beck’s embodiments. Beck states that its “medical device 130 includes a glucose meter” which “measure[s] blood glucose levels of blood applied to test strips.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 34. Specifically addressing such “conventional” test strip glucose monitoring, Heller states that its in vivo glucose sensor system addresses a need for continuous or automatic monitoring in a small, comfortable device. Ex. 1016, 2:1–7, 2:15–58, 3:19–25. As such, we agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Beck and Heller to improve Beck’s medical device. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 401. We further agree with Petitioner that a POSITA would have been motivated to incorporate sensor implementation details described in Heller, e.g., an A/D converter and patient attachment systems, with Beck’s medical device. Pet. 44–45, 53, 55; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 228, 234, 236–238, 259, 267, 278, which do no more than yield predictable results, e.g., converting signals or attaching a sensor to a patient. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 401 (“[A] combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”).” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 7,969,307 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 7,969,307
• Interactive Communications International, Inc. v. Blackhawk Network Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00465 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–24 are unpatentable: claims 1–10 and 12–24 as obvious over Szrek and Llach, and claim 11 as obvious over Szrek, Llach, and Gilmore.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that the level of ordinary skill in the art is an artisan with a working knowledge of POS activation systems and lottery systems that was gained through a mixture of training and work experience in the relevant field such as (i) having a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer communications, electrical engineering, or equivalent degree, coupled with at least three years of work experience; (ii) having a Master’s degree in computer science, computer communications, or electrical engineering, but having less work experience; or (iii) having no formal degree, but having experience in the relevant field of at least six years of work experience. Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–14).9 Patent Owner states that, “[f]or the purpose of this proceeding, Patent Owner adopts the Petition’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 19 (citing Pet. 2–3). We find that the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’451 patent and the prior art of record. See Inst. Dec. 14; see Okajima v. 9 Petitioner proposes the same level of ordinary skill in the art that the Board adopted in PGR2020-00084 (Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1008, 11)), and IPR2023- 01235 (see IPR2023-01235, Paper 34 at 12–13). Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Therefore, we adopt the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We need not construe “transaction processor” expressly because its meaning is not in dispute and its construction is not necessary to resolve the controversy before us.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “On balance, we find that even with the alleged disadvantages identified by Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Szrek with Llach’s third-party transaction processor because the advantage of having a “centralized intermediary” allows Szrek’s system to support different game providers, such as different lottery companies, which would reduce some implementation costs and allow the system to be more easily and cheaply extended. Pet. 47 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 181); see Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”) (citing Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 795 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (stating the same). We acknowledge that the combination comes with some disadvantages, including “add[ed] delay, reduce[d] efficiency, and . . . implementation complexities by converting a simple, direct communication exchange into an exchange that traverses multiple systems.” PO Resp. 52 (citing Ex. 2052 ¶ 163). But, “[t]he fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.” Winner, 202 F.3d at 1349 n.8. Here, Szrek expressly teaches indirect communication as a possible implementation of its system and Petitioner’s combination—employing Llach’s third-party transaction processor as part of the indirect communication channel—offers the attractive benefit of allowing Szrek’s system to support different game providers, which would reduce some implementation costs even if it might increase other costs, e.g., by having to program certain components (e.g., the cash registers) differently. Specifically, we find that the ability to expand Szrek’s system to support different game providers provides advantages that outweigh the disadvantages discussed above in the circumstance where one desires a more robust and comprehensive system. See Pet. Reply 23 (noting three advantages of the combination— (1) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to use ‘a centralized system for activating lottery tickets from different retailers and different locations,’” (2) “allow[ing] support for different game providers, such as different lottery companies,” “reduc[ing] implementation costs,” and (3) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to ‘communicate with individual card” slip op. at 37

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “On balance, we find that even with the alleged disadvantages identified by Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Szrek with Llach’s third-party transaction processor because the advantage of having a “centralized intermediary” allows Szrek’s system to support different game providers, such as different lottery companies, which would reduce some implementation costs and allow the system to be more easily and cheaply extended. Pet. 47 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 181); see Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”) (citing Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 795 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (stating the same). We acknowledge that the combination comes with some disadvantages, including “add[ed] delay, reduce[d] efficiency, and . . . implementation complexities by converting a simple, direct communication exchange into an exchange that traverses multiple systems.” PO Resp. 52 (citing Ex. 2052 ¶ 163). But, “[t]he fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.” Winner, 202 F.3d at 1349 n.8. Here, Szrek expressly teaches indirect communication as a possible implementation of its system and Petitioner’s combination—employing Llach’s third-party transaction processor as part of the indirect communication channel—offers the attractive benefit of allowing Szrek’s system to support different game providers, which would reduce some implementation costs even if it might increase other costs, e.g., by having to program certain components (e.g., the cash registers) differently. Specifically, we find that the ability to expand Szrek’s system to support different game providers provides advantages that outweigh the disadvantages discussed above in the circumstance where one desires a more robust and comprehensive system. See Pet. Reply 23 (noting three advantages of the combination— (1) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to use ‘a centralized system for activating lottery tickets from different retailers and different locations,’” (2) “allow[ing] support for different game providers, such as different lottery companies,” “reduc[ing] implementation costs,” and (3) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to ‘communicate with individual card” slip op. at 37

  Patent outcomesUS 11,488,451 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,488,451
• Askeladden L.L.C. v. Calabrese Stemer LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 17, 2025 · IPR2024-00368 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 are unpatentable as anticipated by Horie; the Board did not reach the alternative obviousness ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The definition of a person having ordinary skill in the art that we adopted in the Institution Decision is supported by the testimony of Dr. Akl. Ex. 1003 ¶ 22. Patent Owner states that it agrees with that definition, while also proposing a broader definition that includes those with other qualifications. PO Resp. 2. Although Patent Owner argues that “the supporting evidence [for its addition] is broadly present in the case, namely, in the Patent-in-Suit and the associated intrinsic evidence” (PO Sur-reply 3 n.6), Patent Owner does not direct us to any specific portion of the record. See United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”); DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 866–67 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A brief must make all arguments accessible to the judges, rather than ask them to play archaeologist with the record.”). Additionally, while Patent Owner proposes expanding the definition, Patent Owner has not explained how that difference would materially affect the outcome of this proceeding. PO Resp. 2; PO Sur-reply 3 & nn. 4, 6. Dr. Akl uses Petitioner’s definition in his testimony (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 22, 23) and Patent Owner makes no argument regarding how, if we adopted Patent Owner’s broader definition, Dr. Akl’s conclusions would be affected. Patent Owner’s use of its definition does not describe the conclusions of one “educated in general physics” differently to one of ordinary skill as defined by Petitioner. PO Sur-reply 6. Patent Owner does not present declarant testimony regarding knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art under any definition.3 For these reasons, we maintain the definition of a person having ordinary skill in the art we adopted in the Decision on Institution: a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had experience in the hardware and software used in the field of securely transmitting and processing authorization requests over wired and wireless networks, such as requests for the processing of financial transactions, and a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related study, and would have one or two years of experience with wired and wireless 3 See infra footnote 5. as financial transactions. Less experience is necessary with additional education (e.g., a Master’s degree), and likewise, less education is necessary with additional work experience (e.g., 5–6 years).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Having analyzed the arguments and the evidence cited by Patent Owner, we do not agree. We begin with the claim language, which does not further describe the two transmission channels, let alone contradict the plain meaning. Ex. 1001, 6:5–19. Dependent claims also shed no additional light. Certain claims further specify transmission-channel-related requirements: that the first transmission channel be “selected from the group consisting of wireless and landline channels” (claim 7); that the request received via the first transmission channel be “provided via the Internet” (claim 5); or that the notifying step (via a second transmission channel) comprise “sending an SMS message to the customer (claim 2). Id. at 6:20–21, 6:28–29, 6:33–35. No claims further restrict claim 1 by describing both transmission channels. Id. Claim 9 requires that the notification be “substantially concurrent,” but nothing in the record establishes that substantially concurrent authorization and notification would require non-overlapping transmission channels, or that an overlap in the transmission channels, even if it did “encumber” the authorization process with the notification process, would prevent the processes from being “substantially concurrent.” While Patent Owner presents arguments about “the gist” of the invention (PO Resp. 4) and describes “an immediate separation of the two processes” as being disclosed by Figures 1 and 2 of the ’564 patent’s specification, we do not see in the specification an indication of a special disavowal of a broader scope. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316–1317; PO Resp. 13 (“The specification of the ‘564 Patent does not express any intent to impart a novel meaning to the term distinct.”). Although we agree with Patent Owner that Figure 1 illustrates transmission channels that are separate and non-overlapping, we do not see any indication that this is more than a description of preferred embodiments or that there was a limitation of the invention to these embodiments, and our reviewing court “has repeatedly ‘cautioned against limiting the claimed invention to preferred embodiments or specific examples in the specification.’” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1346–47 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). The specification similarly does not support that Figure 2 is intended as limiting.” slip op. at 16

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Because we do not adopt Patent Owner’s construction (including considering its arguments regarding speed and security of transmissions in the ’564 patent), and instead adopt a construction encompassing overlapping between distinct transmission channels, see supra Section II.C.1, we determine that the requirement of limitation 1d that “the second transmission channel [must be] distinct from the first transmission channel” is disclosed by the different connections, different hardware elements, and independent operation of the two transmission channels identified in Horie, even though they overlap to some extent. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 44, Fig. 1; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 224–227; see PO Resp. 9. Lastly, Horie discloses that the authorization of a transaction occurs without requiring a response from the customer. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 57, 58, 73; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 232–233. For these reasons, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claim 1 was anticipated by Horie.” slip op. at 29

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached

    “Obviousness Over Horie Petitioner additionally argues that each of claims 1–9 are obvious over Horie. Pet. 38–43. Because we determine that the challenged claims are anticipated by Horie, we do not address the parties’ arguments regarding those claims based on an alternate ground. See Boston Sci. Scimed, Inc. v. Cook Gp. Inc., 809 F. App’x 984, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“We agree that the Board need not address issues that are not necessary to the resolution of the proceeding.”).” slip op. at 34

  Patent outcomesUS 8,783,564 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,783,564
• Askeladden L.L.C. v. Calabrese Stemer LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 17, 2025 · IPR2024-00369 · APJ Andreas Baltatzis · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7 are unpatentable: claims 1–2 and 6–7 as anticipated, and claims 3–5 as obvious over Horie and Kobayashi.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time the invention was made “would have a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related study, and would have at least one or two years of experience with wired and wireless networks used to securely process requests for authorization of activity such as financial transactions.” Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22). Additionally, Petitioner contends that “[l]ess experience is necessary with additional education (e.g., a Master’s degree), and likewise, less education is necessary with additional work experience (e.g., 5–6 years).” Id. Patent Owner does not oppose or comment on Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA. We determine this level of skill, with the exception of the open-ended phrase “at least,” which we remove from Petitioner’s proposal, comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’706 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “construction.” Pet. 8. However, Petitioner explains the term “merchant’s” recited in independent claims 1 and 6. Id.; see Ex. 1001, 5:54, 5:56, 6:52. The possessive term “merchant’s” is not followed by a subject noun. See id. Petitioner contends that during prosecution of the parent patent, U.S. Patent No. 7,357,310 B2, “the applicant explained that the ‘secure network and the ‘payment guarantee’ channel are illustrated between the acquirer 8 [sic] and the modem 5 of the merchant’s terminal.’” Id. (citing Ex. 1013, 45). Accordingly, Petitioner asserts that both instances of “merchant’s” should be read as “merchant’s terminal.” Id. Institution Decision (Inst. Dec. 11), Petitioner adds that Patent Owner in a related proceeding explained “the expression may refer to anything in possession of, or under the control of the merchant, as the use of the possessive form implies.” Pet. Reply 2 (citing IPR2024-00367, Paper 10 (Patent Owner Response), 4)10. This explanation accords with Petitioner’s argument that “merchant’s” includes least a “merchant’s terminal.” Accordingly, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument and interpret “merchant’s” as at least including a “merchant’s terminal.”” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “We need not construe explicitly any other claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12

  • BurdenDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that Horie anticipates claims 1 and 2. Pet. 21–30. As discussed above, Patent Owner has not presented any arguments in a Response. The burden however remains on Petitioner, so we examine the Petition’s contentions to determine if they show by a preponderance of the evidence that the claims are unpatentable. For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Horie anticipates claims 1 and 2.” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 7,954,706 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,954,706
• Askeladden L.L.C. v. Calabrese Stemer LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 17, 2025 · IPR2024-00367 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4 are unpatentable as anticipated by Horie; the Board did not reach the alternative obviousness ground and dismissed Petitioner’s motion to exclude as moot.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We maintain the definition of a person having ordinary skill in the art that we adopted in the Institution Decision. First, it is supported by the testimony of Dr. Akl. Ex. 1003 ¶ 22. Second, Patent Owner states that it adopts that definition. PO Resp. 3. Third, to the extent Patent Owner proposes expanding the definition, Patent Owner has not explained how that difference would materially affect the outcome of this proceeding. Id. Fourth, Patent Owner does not point to sufficient evidence to support its position. Id. Although Patent Owner argues that “the supporting evidence [for its addition] is broadly present in the case, namely, in the Patent-in-Suit and the associated intrinsic evidence,” Patent Owner does not direct us to any specific portion of the record. See id. We decline to search the record to find the evidence that supports it. See United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”); DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 866–67 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A brief must make all arguments accessible to the judges, rather than ask them to play archaeologist with the record.”).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “As discussed below, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Horie anticipates claims 1 under Patent Owner’s proposed construction. See Section II.E.3. Because we only construe limitations “to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,” we do not expressly construe this limitation. See Nidec, 868 F.3d 1017 (quoting Vivid, 200 F.3d at 803).” slip op. at 12

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “preserved the objection by filing a timely motion to exclude. Mot. Exclude. Specifically, Petitioner argues that we should exclude Exhibit 2001 for three reasons: (1) it is untimely and prejudicial (37 C.F.R. §§ 42.23(b), 42.53(b); Fed. R. Evid. 403), (2) hearsay (Fed. R. Evid. 802), and (3) the best evidence rule (Fed. R. Evid. 1002). Id. The Stemer Declaration is used only to support Patent Owner’s arguments with respect to secondary considerations.5 PO Sur-reply 19–22; Ex. 2001; Ex. 2002. Because we do not reach obviousness, see infra Section II.F, we do not consider the Stemer Declaration, and we therefore dismiss the motion to exclude as moot.” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

  Patent outcomesUS 7,357,310 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,357,310
• Google LLC v. DH International Ltd.Instituted
  PTAB · Mar 24, 2025 · IPR2024-01322 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 10–12, and 19 are obvious over Mooney and over Mooney in view of Lee.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Under § 314, the Board may not institute review on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). If the Board institutes a review, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Pre-Institution Reply, Pre-Institution Sur-Reply, and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim in the ’294 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20 of the ’294 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “the claims nor the specification of the ’294 Patent require such a narrow reading of the term ‘activation cue’” as that proposed by Patent Owner. Reply 1 (citing Prelim. Resp. 9–10). Operative claim language—“a cue receiver operatively linked to said electronic circuit for receiving an activation cue from a source external to said cellular phone”—does not limit “activation cue” to a predetermined bit sequence or predetermined indicator as argued by Patent Owner. Claim 1 further recites the “data conveyance switching element . . . being assigned a first state upon an activation cue having been received by said cue receiver,” which also does not limit “activation cue” to a predetermined bit sequence or predetermined indicator. Both parties, moreover, cite the same description of the structure and function of the “activation cue” in the ’294 patent: “This activation cue is in the form of a data communication of a specific type which will be recognized by electronic device 10 as an activation cue, for example a predetermined bit sequence.” Prelim. Resp. 22 (citing Ex. 1001, 9:24–27); Reply 1 (citing Ex. 1001, 9:24–27); Sur-Reply 1 (citing same). The recited “activation cue,” when read in context and in view of the” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “for the recited “data conveyance switching element” pursuant to §112, sixth Petition characterizes the corresponding structure as “a physical structure, a virtual program, or both because the ’294 patent explains that a switching element ‘can be any type of device allowing data to be conveyed according to alternate data conveyance operations,’ such as ‘a series of instructions programmed onto [a] microchip’ or a ‘decisional logical circuit,’ and ‘can be a physical structure, a virtual program, or both.’” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 9:28– 31, 9:40–41; Lipoff Decl. Ex. 1003 ¶ 64). The Petition identifies the claimed function as switching between inactive and activated states based on whether or not the cellular phone receives an activation cue. Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 2:4–9, 4:18–23, 5:48–53; Ex. 1003 ¶ 64).” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “construction of an “external data exchange device” as a data transceiver coupled to a circuit that carries out the function of exchanging data. Prelim. Resp. 11 (citing Ex. 1001, 9:4–6, 12:62, 13:28, Figs. 1, 3, 4; Ex. 2001 ¶ 48); see Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:14–17, 4:7–14, 9:3–6; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 67–68). Patent Owner states that “[a]n external data exchange device is not a transceiver but a device with a transceiver.” Prelim. Resp. 11 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 48). On this preliminary record, we need not construe “external data exchange device” to decide whether or not to institute. To the extent there is a dispute over the plain meaning of “external data exchange device,” the parties are invited to address it in detail in their briefs following institution. On the present record, we determine that no further construction of claim terms is necessary to determine whether to institute a trial in this case. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The parties are free to address any further claim construction issues bearing on this inter partes review following institution.” slip op. at 16

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,022,294

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.