- Uatp IP LLC v. Slick Slide LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 2, 2026 · PGR2024-00054 · APJ Brian D Range · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 22–26 are unpatentable based on obviousness; claims 1–17, 27, and 28 were not shown unpatentable. Patent Owner’s motion to terminate was denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“1. Mesh Layer Petitioner contends “no formal claim construction is necessary in this” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“5. Analysis On this complete record, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments do” slip op. at 31
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“form of nylon and some form of Teflon (and possible combinations thereof) having the specific coefficient of friction range given in limitation [1c] breaks down, because the building blocks of the obviousness argument are not sufficiently identified in Phillips alone, nor in the supporting testimony. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments and evidence fail to show that Phillips renders the challenged claims obvious. 6. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we determine that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–4, 6, and 7 would have been anticipated by or obvious in view of Phillips.” slip op. at 33
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“2. Products and Nexus We first consider the issue of whether certain evidence relied upon by” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 11,998,854 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,998,854 - Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00611 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10, 12, 13, 19, and 20 are unpatentable under § 103 over the stated Douglas–Mark and Hamilton-based grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties agree that experience could substitute for a degree, and vice versa. Pet. 3; PO Resp. 10. The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill are substantially similar. For this decision, as in the Institution Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level, which is supported by credible testimonial evidence and is consistent with the problems addressed in the ’774 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:16–52. Our decision would be the same, however, if we were to adopt Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other
“Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner argues that we need to construe any claim terms explicitly. See Pet. 2–3; PO Resp. 10. However, the parties contest two material claim-construction issues which we address below. To the extent that the parties’ positions depend on interpreting other claim language in a particular way, we discuss the relevant claim language below in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding the prior art.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that limitation 1.2 must be performed before limitations 1.3 or 1.4. See Ex. 1001, 35:21–24. See Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Unless the steps of a method actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.” (citing Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Sony Corp., 181 F.3d 1313, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The evidence suggests that a “target printer” is any printer that is ultimately selected for fabricating the object, and such a printer could send its configuration information either before or after that determination is made in limitation 1.2. This interpretation does not render the word “target” meaningless. At some point, a printer must be determined to be the target printer, which is the one intended to ultimately fabricate the three-dimensional object. But the target printer still exists, and is capable of being queried, before that determination is made. We find the examples in the ’774 patent pertinent to this question. The ’774 patent states that “the target printer may include more than one printer.” Ex. 1001, 18:66–67. In discussing the step of “query target printer for properties 306” (Fig. 3A), the ’774 patent states that “[i]n one aspect, numerous queries are sent to numerous printers, e.g., for use in selecting one or more of the printers as the target printer.” Id. at 19:8–10. Alternatively, “the query is sent to a printer that is not necessarily the target printer as described herein, e.g., when the query or information received from a response to the query is used for the selection of the target printer.” Id. at 19:11–14. Importantly, the second embodiment states that the queried printer “is not necessarily the target printer,” suggesting that the queried printer could be the target printer even before it is determined to be such. Id. at 19:11–12 (emphasis added). Based on the evidence of record, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the “target printer” can be determined after the query recited in limitation 1.3 or the reception of configuration information recited in limitation 1.4. Thus, the evidence does not impose an ordering between limitations 1.2 and 1.3 or between limitations 1.2 and 1.4. The evidence also does not support Patent Owner’s argument that the two reverse-order examples in the ’774 patent are unclaimed embodiments.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We disagree that Petitioner’s arguments are based on impermissible hindsight, because they are based on the disclosures in Douglas and Mark, and Petitioner has articulated a persuasive reason to combine those references without referring to the ’774 patent itself, as we discuss below. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (an obvious rationale is not improper hindsight if it “takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure”).” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 11,886,774 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,886,774 - Cambridge Industries USA, Inc. / Accelight Technologies, Inc. v. Applied Optoelectronics, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 27, 2026 · IPR2025-01570 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision
The majority held claims 1–19 not shown unpatentable: Wang did not anticipate claims 1–10, and Wang with Xiong did not render claims 11–19 obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“field of the ’690 Patent would have had at least (1) an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable field of study and (2) at least two years of experience with optical data communications or a comparable field of work.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22). Petitioner also states that “[i]ndividuals having different educational backgrounds and supplemental experience might still be of ordinary skill in the art if such experience compensates for any deficiencies in education relative to the criteria stated above” and “[i]n some cases, additional education might be an acceptable substitute for some experience, or vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill in the art. See e.g., PO Resp. 9. We adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art as it appears consistent with the disclosures of the ’690 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent is self-explanatory and would have been recognized by a [person of ordinary skill in the art] as having plain and ordinary meanings.” Pet. 10. “Petitioner submits that no special constructions are required” because “the claim terms appear understandable in the context of the disclosure provided by the specification of the ’690 Patent.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58). Patent Owner “agrees that the claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning as understood by a [person of ordinary skill in the art].” PO Resp. 10. After reviewing the arguments and evidence before us, we determine that we do not need to expressly construe any claim term to resolve any controversy in the proceeding. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Also relevant to our analysis is that this is an anticipation ground and Petitioner is required to show that the reference discloses not only the elements of the claimed invention, but also discloses those elements as arranged in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although our Institution Decision concluded that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to its anticipation challenge to independent claim 1 applying Wang (Inst. Dec. 6), at this stage of the proceeding we are required to evaluate Petitioner’s challenges under a higher standard, the preponderance of evidence standard. For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded that Petitioner sufficiently establishes that claim 1 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by Wang by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Wang discloses that “the isolator 100 is bonded to the substrate by means of an adhesive” in which “[t]he adhesive is not only used to fix the isolator 100 to the substrate, but also fills a gap between the isolator 100 and the substrate to improve the installation accuracy of the isolator 100.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 41 (emphasis added). Petitioner does not explain how filling in a gap between the isolator 100 and a substrate necessarily results in “each of the plurality of optical isolators [being] disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other,” as recited in claim 1. The cited portion in paragraph 43 references Figures 5 and 6, which depict Embodiment 1 of Wang and are reproduced below. Figures 5 and 6 of Wang depict isolators 100, base 311, and baffles 312. Although paragraph 44 of Wang states that “[t]he substrate includes a base 311, and baffles 312 and isolators 100 sequentially disposed on the base 311,” Petitioner does not sufficiently persuade us how Wang’s disclosure “sequentially disposed” isolators necessarily discloses that the isolators are “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” as recited in independent claim 1. Ex. 1006 ¶ 44. Although the cited portion in Figure 6 of Wang apparently shows a possibly parallel arrangement of Petitioner cites to Dr. Kirk’s Declaration, but Dr. Kirk does not opine on why cited portions of Wang necessarily disclose or depict the claimed “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” requirement. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 73, 74; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 41, 43, Figs. 6, 8, 10. At best, Dr. Kirk testifies that “a POSITA would have understood that Wang anticipates Claim 1.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 75. Also relevant to our analysis is that this is an anticipation ground and Petitioner is required to show that the reference discloses not only the elements of the claimed invention, but also discloses those elements as arranged in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although our Institution Decision concluded that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to its anticipation challenge to independent claim 1 applying Wang (Inst. Dec. 6), at this stage of the proceeding we are required to evaluate Petitioner’s challenges under a higher standard, the preponderance of evidence standard.” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 10,788,690 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,788,690 - Cambridge Industries USA, Inc. / Accelight Technologies, Inc. v. Applied Optoelectronics, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 27, 2026 · IPR2025-00437 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision
The majority held claims 1–19 not unpatentable: Wang did not establish anticipation of claims 1–10, and Wang with Xiong did not establish obviousness of claims 11–19.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Wang discloses that “the isolator 100 is bonded to the substrate by means of an adhesive” in which “[t]he adhesive is not only used to fix the isolator 100 to the substrate, but also fills a gap between the isolator 100 and the substrate to improve the installation accuracy of the isolator 100.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 41 (emphasis added). Petitioner does not explain how filling in a gap between the isolator 100 and a substrate necessarily results in “each of the plurality of optical isolators [being] disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other,” as recited in claim 1. The cited portion in paragraph 43 references Figures 5 and 6, which depict Embodiment 1 of Wang and are reproduced below. Figures 5 and 6 of Wang depict isolators 100, base 311, and baffles 312. Although paragraph 44 of Wang states that “[t]he substrate includes a base 311, and baffles 312 and isolators 100 sequentially disposed on the base 311,” Petitioner does not sufficiently persuade us how Wang’s disclosure “sequentially disposed” isolators necessarily discloses that the isolators are “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” as recited in independent claim 1. Ex. 1006 ¶ 44. Although the cited portion in Figure 6 of Wang apparently shows a possibly parallel arrangement of Petitioner cites to Dr. Kirk’s Declaration, but Dr. Kirk does not opine on why cited portions of Wang necessarily disclose or depict the claimed “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” requirement. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 73, 74; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 41, 43, Figs. 6, 8, 10. At best, Dr. Kirk testifies that “a POSITA would have understood that Wang anticipates Claim 1.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 75. Also relevant to our analysis is that this is an anticipation ground and Petitioner is required to show that the reference discloses not only the elements of the claimed invention, but also discloses those elements as arranged in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although our Institution Decision concluded that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to its anticipation challenge to independent claim 1 applying Wang (Inst. Dec. 6), at this stage of the proceeding we are required to evaluate Petitioner’s challenges under a higher standard, the preponderance of evidence standard.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Wang discloses that “the isolator 100 is bonded to the substrate by means of an adhesive” in which “[t]he adhesive is not only used to fix the isolator 100 to the substrate, but also fills a gap between the isolator 100 and the substrate to improve the installation accuracy of the isolator 100.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 41 (emphasis added). Petitioner does not explain how filling in a gap between the isolator 100 and a substrate necessarily results in “each of the plurality of optical isolators [being] disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other,” as recited in claim 1. The cited portion in paragraph 43 references Figures 5 and 6, which depict Embodiment 1 of Wang and are reproduced below. Figures 5 and 6 of Wang depict isolators 100, base 311, and baffles 312. Although paragraph 44 of Wang states that “[t]he substrate includes a base 311, and baffles 312 and isolators 100 sequentially disposed on the base 311,” Petitioner does not sufficiently persuade us how Wang’s disclosure “sequentially disposed” isolators necessarily discloses that the isolators are “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” as recited in independent claim 1. Ex. 1006 ¶ 44. Although the cited portion in Figure 6 of Wang apparently shows a possibly parallel arrangement of Petitioner cites to Dr. Kirk’s Declaration, but Dr. Kirk does not opine on why cited portions of Wang necessarily disclose or depict the claimed “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” requirement. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 73, 74; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 41, 43, Figs. 6, 8, 10. At best, Dr. Kirk testifies that “a POSITA would have understood that Wang anticipates Claim 1.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 75. Also relevant to our analysis is that this is an anticipation ground and Petitioner is required to show that the reference discloses not only the elements of the claimed invention, but also discloses those elements as arranged in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although our Institution Decision concluded that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to its anticipation challenge to independent claim 1 applying Wang (Inst. Dec. 6), at this stage of the proceeding we are required to evaluate Petitioner’s challenges under a higher standard, the preponderance of evidence standard. For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded that Petitioner” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“challenge set forth in the Petition by citing the background of the ’690 patent and Dr. Willner’s deposition testimony and characterizing the same as “admissions” of Patent Owner in Petitioner’s Reply, such “evidence” did not form the basis of Appellant’s original position set forth in the Petition.6 Petitioner’s arguments that all of the components recited in claim 11 “were known in the prior art” or that Dr. Willner admitted the same are unpersuasive at least because the Petition did not set forth this position. Contrary to Petitioner’s arguments during the oral hearing, the Petition does not present challenges based on “Applicant Admitted Prior Art.” See generally Pet.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“field of the ’690 Patent would have had at least (1) an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable field of study and (2) at least two years of experience with optical data communications or a comparable field of work.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22). Petitioner also states that “[i]ndividuals having different educational backgrounds and supplemental experience might still be of ordinary skill in the art if such experience compensates for any deficiencies in education relative to the criteria stated above” and “[i]n some cases, additional education might be an acceptable substitute for some experience, or vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill in the art. See e.g., PO Resp. 9. We adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art as it appears consistent with the disclosures of the ’690 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
Patent outcomesUS 10,788,690 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,788,690 - Posco Co., Ltd. v. ArcelormittalAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 16, 2026 · IPR2025-00371 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–25 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over the asserted combinations of Takagi, Cornette, Suehiro, GMW14400, Laurent, and Vaissiere.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had an undergraduate degree in materials science, manufacturing engineering, mechanical engineering, or equivalent knowledge, training, or experience, with two years of experience working in metallurgy.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 15). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA for this proceeding. PO Resp. 8. Because the parties agree and because Petitioner’s proposal is reasonable and consistent with the ’227 patent specification and the prior art, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“1. superficial layer The only independent claim at issue, claim 1, recites a “Superficial layer.” Ex. 1001, 15:6. Patent Owner argues that, based on plain and ordinary meaning, the term “superficial layer” refers to a “surface layer” or “top layer.” PO Resp. 8–9. Petitioner does not dispute this construction. See Pet. Reply 21–22 (arguing that the relevant layer of the Suehiro reference is a superficial layer because it is outermost and present at the surface). Because the parties are in agreement and because that agreement is consistent with plain language, claim language, and the ’227 specification, we construe “superficial layer” as referring to a surface layer or top layer.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Extrinsic evidence (dictionaries, experts)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“defined stoichiometry” (Ex. 2037, 527) but the word may also be a “generic term for phases . . . which may have a narrow or extended compositional stability range” (id.). The first glossary meaning is consistent with Patent Owner’s position. The second, broader, glossary meaning is consistent with Petitioner’s position. Some of the extrinsic sources before us support the broad definition, and some support the narrow definition. See PO Sur-Reply 3–4 (arguing that Dr. Miles admitted that various treatises distinguish intermetallic compounds from alloys and solid solutions). Thus, neither Dr. Miles or Dr. Raabe is “wrong scientifically” in how they use the term “intermetallic” in this proceeding. Id. at 2 (noting that Dr. Miles agreed that Dr. Raabe’s construction is not wrong scientifically). As explained below, however, only one of these meanings is appropriate here. To decide which possible meaning applies to the ’227 patent, we focus on the patent claims and specification. Claim 1 indicates that the intermetallic layer has a “mean composition” (emphasis added). Ex. 1001, 15:1–10. This indicates, albeit weakly, that iron composition across the layer may vary rather than having ordered stoichiometry—consistent with Petitioner’s position. The specification also indicates that “intermetallic alloying” is a possibility—again, consistent with Petitioner’s position. Ex. 1001, 2:47–50. Meanwhile, nothing in the ’227 specification explicitly (or implicitly) suggests that “intermetallic layer” must be limited to elements atomically joined with defined stoichiometry in an ordered crystal structure. We also find that Dr. Miles’s testimony regarding the meaning of “intermetallic” is more credible than Dr. Rabbe’s testimony. Dr. Rabbe, in deposition, stated that Figure 2 of the challenged patent “does not show a layer that meets [his] construction of intermetallic.” Ex. 1078, 129:21–24. The ’227 patent, however, states that Figure 2 includes an “Al-rich Intermetallic layer.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 2, 3:60–64 (“FIG 2. Illustrates a coating … which does not correspond to the invention. This succession of layers (interdiffusion layer and intermetallic layer) yields inferior results in resistance spot welding.”). Also, Dr. Raabe previously referred to a layer of Takagi as having “intermetallic phase layering and structure.” Pet. Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1076 ¶ 166; Ex ¶ 1075, 17) (emphasis omitted). Thus, Dr. Raabe’s construction of “intermetallic” for this proceeding does not fully account for the ’227 patent usage of the word “intermetallic” and does not fully account for Dr. Raabe’s prior usage of the word “intermetallic.” Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s construction “erases the meaningful distinction” between the claimed layers. PO Resp. 11. Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner’s construction renders the word “intermetallic” superfluous because allowing the intermetallic layer to be “merely a multi-element alloy erases the meaningful distinction among these layers.” Id. We disagree. The word intermetallic serves to require that the layer be composed of two or more metals or a metal and a metalloid. The word intermetallic also serves as a label to differentiate each of the four claimed layers. For example, in claim 1, the word “intermetallic” is used much like the words “interdiffusion” and “intermediate” to give each of the four layers (each having differently mean compositions) different labels.” slip op. at 16
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“Because IHS was a company that created an online database with the purpose of providing (selling) standards including General Motors standards to the public, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known to look to this database and would have been able to find GMW14400. Patent Owner presents no evidence to the contrary. Because a preponderance of the evidence supports Petitioner, we determine Petitioner establishes GMW14400 is qualifies as prior art.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 11,326,227 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,326,227 - Posco Co., Ltd. v. ArcelormittalAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 16, 2026 · IPR2025-00370 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–30 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over the asserted combinations of prior art.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had an undergraduate degree in materials science, manufacturing engineering, mechanical engineering, or equivalent knowledge, training, or experience, with two years of experience working in metallurgy.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–16). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA for this proceeding. PO Resp. 8. Because the parties agree and because Petitioner’s proposal is reasonable and consistent with the ’602 patent specification and the prior art, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“1. superficial layer All independent claims at issue, claims 1, 21, and 24, recite a “superficial layer.” Ex. 1001, 15:11, 16:60, 17:21. Patent Owner argues that, based on plain and ordinary meaning, the term “superficial layer” refers to a “surface layer” or “top layer.” PO Resp. 8–9. Petitioner does not dispute this construction. See Pet. Reply 21–22 (arguing that the relevant layer of the Suehiro reference is a superficial layer because it is outermost and present at the surface). Because the parties are in agreement and because that agreement is consistent with plain language, claim language, and the ’602 specification, we construe “superficial layer” as referring to a surface layer or top layer.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“defined stoichiometry” (Ex. 2037, 527) but the word may also be a “generic term for phases . . . which may have a narrow or extended compositional stability range” (id.). The first glossary meaning is consistent with Patent Owner’s position. The second, broader, glossary meaning is consistent with Petitioner’s position. Some of the sources before us support the broad definition, and some support the narrow definition. See PO Sur-Reply 3–4 (arguing that Dr. Miles admitted that various treatises distinguish intermetallic compounds from alloys and solid solutions) Thus, neither Dr. Miles or Dr. Raabe is “wrong scientifically” in how they use the term “intermetallic” in this proceeding. Id. at 2 (noting that Dr. Miles agreed that Dr. Raabe’s construction is not wrong scientifically). As explained below, however, only one of these meanings is appropriate here. To decide which possible meaning applies to the ’602 patent, we focus on the patent claims and specification. The claims indicate that the intermetallic layer has a “mean iron composition” (emphasis added). Ex. 1001, 15:6–10. This indicates, albeit weakly, that the iron composition across the layer may vary rather than having ordered stoichiometry— consistent with Petitioner’s position. The specification also indicates that “intermetallic alloying” is a possibility—again, consistent with Petitioner’s position. Id. at 2:50–54. Meanwhile, nothing in the ’602 specification explicitly (or implicitly) suggests that “intermetallic layer” must be limited to elements atomically joined with defined stoichiometry in an ordered crystal structure. We also find that Dr. Miles’s testimony regarding the meaning of “intermetallic” is more credible than Dr. Raabe’s testimony. Dr. Raabe, in deposition, stated that Figure 2 of the challenged patent “does not show a layer that meets [his] construction of intermetallic.” Ex. 1078, 129:21–24. The ’602 patent, however, states that Figure 2 includes an “Al-rich Intermetallic layer.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 2, 3:57–61 (“FIG 2. Illustrates a coating . . . which does not correspond to the invention. This succession of layers (interdiffusion layer and intermetallic layer) yields inferior results in resistance spot welding.”). Also, Dr. Raabe previously referred to a layer of Takagi as having “intermetallic phase layering and structure.” Pet. Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1076, 166; Ex. 1075, 17) (emphasis omitted). Thus, Dr. Raabe’s definition of “intermetallic” does not fully account for the ’602 patent usage of the word “intermetallic” and does not fully account for Dr. Raabe’s prior usage of the word “intermetallic.” Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s construction “erases the meaningful distinction” between the claimed layers. PO Resp. 11. Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner’s construction renders the word “intermetallic” superfluous because allowing the intermetallic layer to be “merely a multi-element alloy erases the meaningful distinction among these layers.” Id. We disagree. The word intermetallic serves to require that the layer be composed of two or more metals or a metal and a metalloid. The word intermetallic also serves as a label to differentiate each of the four claimed layers. For example, in claim 1, the word “intermetallic” is used much like the words “interdiffusion” and “intermediate” to give each of the four layers (each having differently defined mean iron compositions) different labels.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“have had reason to combine teachings of Takagi and Cornette with a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 11–20 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 28– 42; Ex. 1016 ¶ 35; Ex. 1014, 9; Ex. 1025, 5:17–20; Ex. 1026, 7; Ex. 1034 ¶ 13). In particular, Petitioner argues that Takagi discloses a pre-coating thickness of 10–20 µm but does not explicitly disclose a post hot-stamping coating thickness corresponding to the pre-coating thickness. Pet. 11. Cornette teaches that the hot-stamping thickness causes coating expansion from 25 µm to about 40 µm, an increase of 60%. Id. (citations omitted). Petitioner and Dr. Miles reason that, when hot stamping Takagi’s product, the thickness would be 32 µm. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 32); see also Pet. Reply 20–21. Thus, Patent Owner argues that Cornette evidences Takagi’s finally coating thickness without requiring modification of Takagi. Petitioner further argues that Takagi and Cornette teach that post hot- stamping thickness could be varied and optimized as a result effective variable. Id. at 12–13; see also Pet. Reply 17–18. Cornette teaches, for example, that “[t]he average [pre-coating] layer thickness showing the best compromise between corrosion protection and weldability is 25 µm” and links this pre-coating thickness to a final thickness of “about 40 µm at the steel surface.” Ex. 1014, 9. Petitioner also argues that it would have been obvious to fill in other details of Takagi including, for example, selecting USIBOR 1500 steel, based on the teachings of Cornette. Pet. 14. Patent Owner argues that there is no reason to combine Takagi with the teachings of Cornette. PO Resp. 26. Patent Owner makes seven related arguments. Patent Owner first argues that the Petitioner’s position is speculative and lacks basis. Id. at 26–27. We disagree. Cornette evidences a final coating thickness for Takagi, and the references also suggest that final coating thickness is result effective. Second, Patent Owner argues that there would have been no incentive to seek a motivation to seek a thicker coating post-hot stamping. Id. at 28– 35. This argument does not undermine Petitioner’s position that Takagi, by itself, would have reached a thicker coating after stamping as evidenced by Cornette. Pet. 11–12. Petitioner takes the position, with evidence, that practice of Takagi alone would reach the recited thickness. No motivation to modify Takagi is required under this position.” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 10,961,602 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,961,602 - Thermaltake Technology Co., Ltd. / Thermaltake Inc. v. Chien-Hao ChenAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 17, 2026 · IPR2024-01230 · APJ Andreas Baltatzis · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5 are unpatentable; substitute claims 6 and 7 are unpatentable, and the Revised Motion to Amend is denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“our Institution Decision comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’336 patent and the prior art of record. Inst. Dec. 15. Accordingly, we adopt the level of skill discussed in our Institution Decision. C.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Pharms. Inc. v. Amino Chemicals Ltd., 715 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). Accordingly, Patent Owner applies a different definition of “side,” in claim 1’s recitation of “an illumination area on at least two sides of the fan at top of the body,” to that definition used to understand “side[s] of the body,” discussed above. Specifically, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s dictionary definition of “side,” including “an area next to something” applies to “an illumination area on at least two sides of the fan at the top of the body.” See id. at 8–9.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“Hasegawa, and Huang teaches or suggests the limitations of claim 3, and that one skilled in the art would have been motivated to combine those teachings with a reasonable expectation of success. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 136– 140; Ex. 1008, 8:4–15, 3:20–29. Accordingly, we determine that claim 3 would have been obvious over Lai and Huang, or Lai, Hasegawa, and Huang. F.” slip op. at 50
- 112 supportMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“c) Conclusion We conclude that Patent Owner's Revised Motion to Amend adds new” slip op. at 90
Patent outcomesUS 10,690,336 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,690,336 - PTAB · Jan 14, 2026 · IPR2025-00632 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board reinstituted review of all challenged claims on all grounds after finding Petitioner sufficiently explained its differing claim-construction positions.
RulingsRemand decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Id. The Director neither addressed the merits of Petitioner’s challenges nor found that our prior consideration of those merits was faulty. Accordingly, we understand that we need not reconsider our conclusion that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of proving that claims 1, 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 were unpatentable or that the merits of patentability set forth in the Petition warranted institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 5
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“The question before us, therefore, is whether the Petitioner’s proffered explanation that it has proposed a different claim interpretation before the Board because the District Court may decline to adopt the narrower claim interpretations it advocates there is sufficient. We find that Petitioner’s explanation is sufficient because it follows the Director’s exemplary logic. Whether a district court has already or might in the future decline to adopt constructions that a petitioner proposes in related district court litigation merely reflects the timing of when a dispute over claim interpretation will be resolved. The Director and Patent Owner both recognize that, to resolve the dispute over claim interpretation that exists here, a decision-maker must determine “a single claim construction that best captures the true meaning of the patent claim.” Remand 4; PO Remand Br. 3. Based on the record presented by the parties to date in this proceeding, no dispute exists that the disputed claim terms mean what Patent Owner says they mean in the Litigation. Accordingly, we find that, at this stage of the proceeding, it is undisputed that Patent Owner’s interpretations of the claim terms represent the “single claim construction that best captures the true meaning of the patent claim.”8 Under that claim interpretation, we” slip op. at 8
NonePatents in suitUS 11,835,421 - Cambridge Industries USA, Inc. v. Applied Optoelectronics, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-00434 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Petitioner’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied because Shen and Soldano did not establish a reasonable likelihood of anticipating claims 1–7.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“When rehearing a decision on petition, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The party challenging the decision has the burden of showing the decision should be modified, and the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed” in its papers. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“II. ANALYSIS In our Decision, we concluded that Petitioner had failed to carry its burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of prevailing that either Shen or Soldano anticipated claims 1–7. Dec. 18, 26. Petitioner argues that we should institute review for three reasons. First, Petitioner argues that we abused our discretion by (a) “refusing” to interpret the scope of the claimed” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Owner’s interpretation of “carrier” as meaning “one or more components for supporting ROSA components such as an AWG.” Dec. 9 (quoting Pet. 11). For our analysis of Petitioner’s challenges, we referred to this interpretation of “carrier” as Petitioner’s second alternative construction. Id. We also noted that Petitioner appeared to dispute Patent Owner’s interpretation when it argued that “carrier” should mean “a ceramic or silicon substrate.” Id. (quoting Pet. 10). We referred to this interpretation of “carrier” as the first alternative construction. Id. Rather than resolve this apparent dispute about the meaning of “carrier,” we found that both of Petitioner’s anticipation challenges failed under both interpretations of “carrier.” Id. at 10–26. Because we found that Petitioner had failed to carry its burden regardless of which interpretation of “carrier” applied, we found it unnecessary to resolve the dispute over that interpretation. Id. at 9–10. For the reasons expressed in Parts II.B–C below, we maintain our conclusion that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of proving that either Shen or Soldano anticipates any claim under either interpretation of “carrier.” Accordingly, Petitioner fails to demonstrate an abuse of discretion in our alleged “refusal” to interpret “carrier.”” slip op. at 3
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Reh’g Req. 14. We cannot weigh Petitioner’s arguments based on its assertions about “caselaw” because Petitioner cited no cases to support its arguments. See id. Nevertheless, we infer that Petitioner intends its statements of “caselaw” to refer to the requirements to make out a case for anticipation. If so, Petitioner demonstrably miscasts what appear to be the legal principles for proving anticipation. As stated in our Decision: “A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987).” Dec. 7. Making a showing that a prior art reference anticipates a patent claim thus necessarily requires proof that a single reference “expressly or inherently” describes every element of that claim and with all elements being arranged in the reference as they are in the” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 10,379,301 - Arashi Vision (U.S.) LLC (D/B/A Insta360) v. Gopro, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 10, 2025 · IPR2024-01186 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable because Kwatra does not teach or suggest minimizing rotational velocity and acceleration as required by the claims.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have the following characteristics: “a bachelor’s degree in engineering or computer science, or equivalent field, and two years of experience working on image or video processing or digital cameras.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). Petitioner states that, “[a]lternatively, a POSITA would have four years of experience working on image or video processing 6 Patent Owner asserts objective evidence of nonobviousness. Prelim. Resp. 19–27. or digital cameras.” Id. Petitioner further contends “[a]n advanced graduate degree in the disciplines cited above may make up for the work experience indicated above.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim Resp. 14–15. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’894 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner “does not believe any terms require a formal construction.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner agrees “no claim terms presently require construction to resolve any current dispute between the parties.” PO Resp. 15. We do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language at this juncture because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Kwatra teaches, at Equation 7, minimizing velocity and acceleration of a function representing camera path (P). FF ¶¶ 6, 8–9. Kwatra does not state that this camera path function considers rotation. Rather, the words “camera path” suggest x, y, z movement of the camera rather than rotation of the camera. Dr. Foroosh’s testimony that Kwatra’s minimization of a smoothed camera path does not result in minimizing rotational velocity and acceleration is credible because this testimony is consistent with Kwatra as a whole and consistent with the other evidence of record. Id. ¶ 10. Kwatra recognizes that image rotation angle (“θ”) may not remain smooth. Id. ¶ 12. But rather than attempting to minimize velocity and acceleration of rotation of the camera housing, Kwatra states that applying a smoothness constraint on rotation angle “may be non-linear.” Id. ¶ 13. Consistent with Kwatra, Dr. Foroosh credibly explains the difficulty of applying linear techniques to rotation. Id. Thus, Kwatra proposes instead constraining the sine and cosine of theta. Id. ¶ 14. The Kwatra provisional application is part of the Kwatra reference (id. ¶ 15), and it similarly opts for simpler schemes rather than estimating all parameters for all frames jointly. Id. ¶ 16. The provisional explains that the rotational component is relatively small such that non-linear computations minimizing velocity and rotation can be avoided. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. The testimony of Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Foroosh, explaining the provisional is credible (Ex. 2018 ¶ 72) because it is consistent with Kwatra’s complete disclosure. Dr. Foroosh’s testimony is more credible than the testimony of Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Katsaggelos, because Dr. Katsaggelos did not review the Kwatra provisional application and, thus, did not review the entire disclosure of Kwatra. Id. ¶ 19; see also In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (obviousness analysis considers whether “the claimed inventions are rendered obvious by the teachings of the prior art as a whole” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 28
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“(id. ¶ 15), and it similarly opts for simpler schemes rather than estimating all parameters for all frames jointly. Id. ¶ 16. The provisional explains that the rotational component is relatively small such that non-linear computations minimizing velocity and rotation can be avoided. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. The testimony of Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Foroosh, explaining the provisional is credible (Ex. 2018 ¶ 72) because it is consistent with Kwatra’s complete disclosure. Dr. Foroosh’s testimony is more credible than the testimony of Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Katsaggelos, because Dr. Katsaggelos did not review the Kwatra provisional application and, thus, did not review the entire disclosure of Kwatra. Id. ¶ 19; see also In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (obviousness analysis considers whether “the claimed inventions are rendered obvious by the teachings of the prior art as a whole” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 10,574,894 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,574,894
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.