- Wellmatics, LLC / GR Energy Services Management, LP et al. v. Canatex Completions Solutions, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 8, 2024 · IPR2023-01149 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate unpatentability. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have been obvious over the proposed combinations of prior art. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 4
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner “does not dispute” these qualifications. Prelim. Resp. 10. We are persuaded, on the present record, that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’122 patent and prior art of record. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that the example of “a fluid line that provides gas or liquid to expansion chamber 38 from [the] surface” in the specification, does not require that a fluid line be a source of fluid pressure. We further agree that Petitioner’s analysis ignores the fact that this example makes clear that the source of fluid pressure is at the surface. Prelim. Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 66–67). Both Patent Owner and Petitioner agree that “source” should be construed in accordance with its ordinary meaning. Prelim. Resp. 13, 18; Pet. 18–19 (Patent Owner has not “identified any clear definition or clear and unambiguous disclaimer that would justify departing from the ordinary meaning of the claim language.”). ordinary meaning of “source.”2 See Prelim. Resp. 13–18 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:55–65, 4:5–12, Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 52–63, Ex. 2003, 7, 8, Ex. 2004, 5, Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 29–30, Fig. 1, Ex. 2006, 4:64–5:9, Fig. 1, Ex. 2007, 13:23–35, Ex. 2009, Abstr., 3:54–60, Ex. 2010. Patent Owner provides dictionary and declaratory evidence that the ordinary meaning of “source” is ‘“origin’— i.e., the place from which something originates.” Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 52, Ex. 2003, 7, 8, Ex. 2004, 5). Patent Owner provides further evidence and explanation as to why that definition is consistent with the usage of “source of fluid pressure” in the ’122 patent. Id. at 13–15 (citing e.g., Ex. 1001, 3:55–65, 4:5–12). Patent Owner provides further evidence of how the term “source” is used in other patents and documents “in the oil and gas industry” that is consistent with its definition. Id. at 15–18 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 57–63, Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 29–30, Fig. 1, Ex. 2006, 4:64–5:9, Fig. 1, Ex. 2007, 13:23–35, Ex. 2009, Abstr., 3:54–60, Ex. 2010). Thus, based on the current record, we construe “source of fluid pressure” to mean the place from which the fluid pressure originates.” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“As noted by Patent Owner, Petitioner’s declarant merely asserts that Bebak’s hydraulic pump would have been considered part of the second part of a releasable connection, and thus it is entitled to little weight. Prelim. Resp. 28; see also Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper No. 9 at 15 (Aug 24, 2022) (precedential) (“Dr. Jones does not cite to any additional supporting evidence or provide any technical reasoning to support his statement. Thus, the cited declaration testimony is conclusory and unsupported, adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight.”) (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a)). For all of the above reasons, we determine that the Petition does not provide a reasonable basis to determine that Bebak teaches “a second part [of the releasable connection] comprising: . . . a source of fluid pressure,” as required by independent claims 1 and 13.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,794,122 - PTAB · Dec 12, 2023 · IPR2023-00798 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–24 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 13 are unpatentable over Wright and Daswani.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“and its preliminary invalidity contentions do not include the two references asserted in this proceeding, Wright and Daswani. Pet. 67. Petitioner also “stipulates that, if the Board institutes trial in this IPR, Petitioner will not pursue, in the [district court case], the specific grounds asserted in the IPR petition, nor any ground based on any prior art reference asserted in the IPR petition.” Paper 7. On November 27, 2023, the district court issued an Order granting a Joint Motion to Stay All Deadlines and Notice of Settlement filed by the parties in the district court case. Ex. 3001. The Order states that “the parties represent that they have reached a settlement in principle and request a stay of all case deadlines for thirty-five days for the parties to finalize such settlement and file dismissal papers with the Court.” Id. The parties also notified the Board of the settlement and timing with respect to the Joint Motion by email on November 27, 2023. Given the parties’ settlement in the district court case, there will be no trial of Patent Owner’s asserted claims against Petitioner in the district court case, and thus there is no basis to deny institution under § 314(a). We decline to exercise our discretion to deny the Petition.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“combined teachings of Wright and Daswani that we find persuasive based on the current record. Pet. 34–36. Petitioner contends that “[w]hile Wright indicates that the combination or series of behaviors will be ranked to create increasing levels of confidence that an application is malware, Daswani application is malicious, and thus poses a threat to the system.” Id. at 34. Petitioner relies on Daswani’s teachings of “hard and soft signals that represent indications of how much a system call or action is likely to contain malware, a significant indicator of risk,” modeling behaviors as signals, and calculating a value called the “probability of maliciousness,” or “X,” based on a set of observed signals. Id. at 34–36 (citing Ex. 1006, code (57), col. 6, ll. 47–55, col. 7, ll. 9–20). According to Petitioner and Dr. Nielson, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the calculated probability of maliciousness to be a “behavior score.” Id. at 36 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 174). Petitioner also provides an explanation for why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to “use Daswani’s approach in Wright’s system.” Id. at 12–17; see Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 103–115. For example, Petitioner argues that Wright ranks phenotypes “based on confidence,” Daswani “discloses how to create these confidence levels,” and using Daswani’s method would maximize classification flexibility while minimizing false positives. Pet. 12–16. Patent Owner argues that “Petitioner does not explain how a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would identify Daswani’s ‘calculated probability of maliciousness’ based on Wright’s ‘identification of a known family of malware,’” as Daswani’s probabilities of maliciousness are calculated based on hard and soft signals “prior to classifying an application as malicious.’” Prelim. Resp. 23–24 (citing Ex. 1006, col. 8, ll. 13–27). We disagree based on the current record. As explained above in connection with limitation 1[d], we are persuaded on this record that Wright identifies a runtime risk by monitoring actions at runtime and determining that a pattern of actions matches a stored phenotype, where the phenotype has a recognized other phenotypes that may indicate the presence of malware with different levels of confidence. See Pet. 28–31. Daswani discloses a specific method of scoring such confidence levels (i.e., calculating a probability of maliciousness). See id. at 34–36; Ex. 1006, col. 7, ll. 9–28. Daswani’s calculated probability of maliciousness is based on observed soft signals that occur at runtime, similar to Wright’s determination of a particular phenotype based on observed behaviors occurring at runtime. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 82–88; Ex. 1006, col. 8, ll. 6–16. Petitioner’s asserted combination is to use Daswani’s calculated probability of maliciousness (i.e., a “behavior score” in Petitioner’s view) in Wright’s system as a numerical measure of the connection to the known family of malware, and Petitioner provides sufficient explanation at this stage as to why doing so would have been advantageous. See Pet. 12–17, 34–36. Petitioner’s contentions regarding claim 1 are supported by the testimony of Dr. Nielson and are persuasive based on the current record. See Pet. 9–39; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 102–192. Petitioner has made a sufficient showing on this record that Wright and Daswani collectively teach all of the limitations of claim 1 and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Wright’s system, based on the teachings of Daswani, to identify a behavior score, with a reasonable expectation of success in doing so to achieve the claimed method. We are persuaded that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that claim 1 is unpatentable over Wright and Daswani. Accordingly, we institute review “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 24
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner argues that at the time of the ’517 patent (January 2013), a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, or a related field, or an equivalent technical degree or equivalent work experience, and an additional one to two years of education or experience in the field of computer security,” where “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 87). Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s definition for purposes of including our review of the ’517 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’517 patent and cited prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art and apply it for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, col. 1, ll. 5–39. We note that a slightly different definition was adopted in the -704 case (“a bachelor’s degree in computer science or computer engineering, or an equivalent field and at least two to three years of experience in computer and network security”). See -704 Dec. on Inst. 16–17. Our conclusions herein, however, would be the same if that definition is used.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“D. Claim Interpretation We interpret each challenged claim using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Petitioner does not propose interpretations of any claim terms. Pet. 8. Patent Owner only notes that the parties agreed in the district court case that the term “runtime” in claims 1, 10, 13, and 22 means “the time the application is running.” Prelim. Resp. 11 (citing Ex. 2003, 45–54). No claim terms were interpreted in the -704 case. See -704 Dec. on Inst. 17–18. We conclude that no express claim interpretation is necessary to determine whether to institute an inter partes review in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are we need not construe [a particular claim limitation] where the construction is not ‘material to the . . . dispute.’” (citation omitted) (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,850,517 - PTAB · Dec 1, 2023 · IPR2023-00922 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–11, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on Amanatides and Kohn for claims 1–11 and Selzer and Fiske for claim 2.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Decision on Institution is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” A decision to institute under § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). In addition, per Board practice, if the Board institutes trial, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Having considered the arguments and the associated evidence presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response., for the reasons described below, we institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“The ’454 patent explicitly defines its unified shader stating “[t]he shader of the present invention is referred to as a ‘unified’ shader because it is configured to perform both vertex and pixel operations.” Ex. 1001, 3:10– 12. This definition does not limit the unified shader to one that switches back and forth between executing vertex and pixel threads. The ’454 patent also describes the embodiment in Figure 4A and Figure 5 as “exemplary.” In this “exemplary” embodiment, the unified shader “has ability to simultaneously perform vertex manipulation operations and pixel manipulation operations at various degrees of completion by being able to freely switch between such programs or instructions, maintained in the instruction store, very quickly.” Id. at 5:32–37. Claim 11 explicitly recites this feature. Id. at 8:26–30 (reciting “wherein the processor unit of the unified shader performs the vertex manipulation operations and pixel switching between instructions in the instruction store”). Based on the explicit definition of a unified shader in the ’454 patent and the explicit recitation in claim 11, we decline to adopt a construction that imports additional limitations into the term “unified shader.” The limiting term “unified shader” appears in the preamble of all the claims. We construe the claimed “unified shader” to mean a shader that is configured to perform both vertex and pixel operations. Ex. 1001, 3:10–12.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached
“The test for conception is whether the inventor had an idea that was definite and permanent enough that one skilled in the art could understand the invention.” Tyco Healthcare Grp. LP v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 774 F.3d 968, 974–975 (Fed. Cir. 2014). As to conception of the subject matter claimed in the ’454 patent, Patent Owner cites (i) the R400 Top Level Specification dated March 14, 2001 authored by inventor Steve Morein (Ex. 2103), (ii) the R400 Shader Processor Specification dated January 23, 2001 authored by inventors Andrew Gruber and Andi Skende (Ex. 2012), and (iii) the R400 Sequencer Specification dated August 24, 2001 authored by inventor Laurent Lefebvre (Ex. 2010). Prelim. Resp. 25–30. According to Patent Owner the R400 Top Level Specification describes the R400 as including a shader processor and a sequencer, and explains that the R400 implements a unified processing pipe that includes a processor unit to perform 3D vertex and pixel operations. Id. at 28–29 (citing Ex. 2013, 9–10; Ex. 2001, Declaration of Dr. William Mangione-Smith (“Mangione-Smith Decl.”) ¶¶ 79, 98, 121, 133, 145, 182). Patent Owner cites the R400 Shader Processor Specification as describing general purpose registers configured to store both vertex and pixel data. Id. at 29 (citing Ex. 2001, Mangione-Smith Decl. ¶¶ 103, 125, 137). slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“3. Reasons to Combine the Teachings of Lindholm ’685 and Lindholm ’913 Noting that Lindholm ’685 and Lindholm ’913 are both directed to a multithreaded shader and much of their Specifications and figures are the same, Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill would have recognized the Lindholm references disclose different details of the same ordinarily skilled artisan would have looked to the additional disclosure in Lindholm ’913 for additional details about scheduling threads for execution independent of other threads. Id. at 22. We agree that a person of ordinary skill would have had reason to combine the teachings of the Lindholm references.” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,760,454 - Trend Micro, Inc. v. Taasera Licensing LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 1, 2023 · IPR2023-00801 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
Denied institution because neither Munetoh and Rajan nor Rajan and Munetoh showed a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–7 and 9 obvious under § 103.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Ex. 1005, 2–3. Petitioner maps the claimed “one or more executable file binaries of the application and loaded components of the application” to the “software components” executed during Munetoh’s trusted-bootstrap process. Pet. 23. Petitioner maps the claimed “attestation server” to Munetoh’s server-PVA. Id. at 19, 21, 27. But Petitioner fails to show that Munetoh’s server-PVA receives the “software components” executed during Munetoh’s trusted-bootstrap process. See id. at 22–24; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 158–165.” slip op. at 33
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, or a related field, or an equivalent technical degree or equivalent work experience, and an additional one to two years of education or experience in the field of computer security topics.” Pet. 10. Petitioner also asserts that “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Id. Dr. Nielson’s testimony supports Petitioner’s assertions. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 81. For purposes of the Preliminary Response only, “Patent Owner utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 11–12 (quoting Pet. 10). Based on the current record and for purposes of this decision, we accept Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan because it comports with the technology and claims of the ’441 patent as well as the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“For purposes of this proceeding only, “Petitioner proposes that all claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meanings.” Pet. 10. Further, Petitioner asserts that “no specific claim constructions are necessary to apply the asserted prior art to” the challenged claims. Id. For purposes of the Preliminary Response only, “Patent Owner believes that claim construction is not required to resolve any issues.” Prelim. Resp. 9. Additionally, Patent Owner notes that in the Consolidated Litigation Patent Owner and Petitioner have proposed constructions for certain claim language, including the following terms and limitations in claim 1: (Fed. Cir. 2017). Based on the current record, we determine that no claim term requires an explicit construction to decide whether Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,327,441 - Hebei Huatong Wires And Cables Group Co, Ltd. v. Gulf Coast Downhole Technologies LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 22, 2023 · IPR2023-00908 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable on the asserted anticipation and obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“For institution, “[t]he ‘reasonable likelihood’ standard is a somewhat flexible standard that allows the Board room to exercise judgment.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 53 (Nov. 2019), available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated.” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We find, upon review of the information in the Petition and evidence of record, that Petitioner fails to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Hurley discloses that its separation layer 52, even when formed of flexible armor (see Pet. 26) is structured to be hermetically sealed or maintain a positive or negative pressure as required by claim 1. Petitioner fails to direct us to sufficient evidence to support a finding that separation layer 52 is structured to be hermetically sealed or maintain a positive or negative pressure. Dr. Ballato does not provide any testimony in support.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner’s contention with respect to motivation is directed merely to a motivation to consult Bowker. That is, Petitioner’s contention is directed to whether Bowker is analogous art to the ’565 patent. We agree it is. However, “[o]bviousness requires, inter alia, a finding that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of prior art in such a way that the combination discloses the claimed limitations.” Elekta Ltd. v. ZAP Surgical Sys., Inc., 81 F.4th 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (emphasis added). This inquiry is separate from the requirement that the prior art is analogous. See Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 1003–04 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“Prior art references are applicable to the obviousness inquiry only when they are analogous to the claims being challenged.”); Johns Manville Corp. v. Knauf Insulation, Inc., (denying institution after determining that showing that the references are analogous art and could be combined does not necessarily establish a sufficient rationale for combining the references). The Petition does not provide any contentions directed to why a person having ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Bowker’s teachings with Hurley to arrive at the claimed invention. As such, the Petition fails to provide a reason, supported by rational underpinnings, to combine the teachings of Hurley and Bowker and, accordingly, fails to demonstrate obviousness. Cf. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418 (stating that, to facilitate the analysis of an obviousness position, the proponent should provide “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”). Dr. Ballato’s Declaration adds nothing to Petitioner’s analysis. The Declaration merely repeats what is in the Petition and provides no support for the testimony. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see also Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15–17 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential) (according “little weight” to declaration testimony that contains a verbatim restatement of a petition’s conclusory assertions without additional supporting evidence or reasoning). Accordingly, the Petition fails to provide information sufficient to demonstrate for institution that the combination of Hurley and Bowker renders claims 1–5, 11, 13, 18–20, and 22 unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Hurley and Bowker. Cf. Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics, Ltd., 81 F.4th 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“We held that, under the [Administrative” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s contention with respect to motivation is directed merely to a motivation to consult Bowker. That is, Petitioner’s contention is directed to whether Bowker is analogous art to the ’565 patent. We agree it is. However, “[o]bviousness requires, inter alia, a finding that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of prior art in such a way that the combination discloses the claimed limitations.” Elekta Ltd. v. ZAP Surgical Sys., Inc., 81 F.4th 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (emphasis added). This inquiry is separate from the requirement that the prior art is analogous. See Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 1003–04 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“Prior art references are applicable to the obviousness inquiry only when they are analogous to the claims being challenged.”); Johns Manville Corp. v. Knauf Insulation, Inc.,” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,581,565 - PTAB · Nov 21, 2023 · IPR2023-01165 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Peloton would show at least one claim obvious over Morris and Ray.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons given below, on this record, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the Challenged Claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“G. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner, supported by Mr. Rawl’s testimony, proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “is a person having: (i) a bachelor’s degree in an exercise related field or mechanical or electrical engineering and (ii) three to five years of industry experience in designing cardiovascular exercise equipment (such as treadmills, bicycles, steppers, ellipticals) or in a similar field.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 31–34).6 Petitioner also asserts that a person could qualify as an ordinarily skilled artisan with less education but more experience or less experience but more education. Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 31–34). Patent Owner has not taken a position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art at this stage of the proceeding. At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we find that Petitioner’s uncontested level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’340 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner “does not believe construction of any term is necessary to resolve the invalidity challenges in this Petition.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 29–30). Petitioner explains that, as of the filing of the Petition, none of the claim terms recited in the ’340 patent have been construed in a prior proceeding. Id. Patent Owner has not taken a position as to claim construction at this stage of the proceeding. On the present record, we need not construe any claim terms expressly because none are in dispute. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“3. Motivation to Combine and Reasonable Expectation of Success Petitioner contends Morris and Ray describe exercise equipment (e.g., treadmills) that detect a user’s presence while using the equipment and present the user’s exercise data on a display while a user is exercising to motivate the user to exercise and improve the user’s exercise experience. Pet. 12. Petitioner asserts one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the complementary teachings of Morris and Ray by incorporating Ray’s camera and software instructions for validating user exercise data in Morris’ treadmill apparatus with a reasonable expectation of success. Id. at 13. In particular, Petitioner contends Morris provides an express motivation to install and use Ray’s camera for user detection by teaching that “its exercise equipment could be fitted with optical sensor(s).” Id. (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 33). Additionally, Petitioner asserts Morris’ treadmill includes an information processing system that processes sensor signals and includes virtual reality content on a screen displayed to the user. Id. (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 32, 34–36, 50, 56–58, Figs. 6, 11–12C, claims 29–37). Thus, Petitioner contends “the signal processing and display system of Morris had the necessary capabilities to accommodate Ray’s user detection/validation software and implement, with a reasonable expectation of success, its functionalities that included producing and presenting the motivational image of the user exercising.” Id. at 13–14. Additionally, Petitioner contends one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Morris and Ray because of “Ray’s express teachings that its user validation/motivation technology could be ‘easily and affordably merged’ into a treadmill.” Pet. 14 (quoting Ex. 1004, 9:55–57). Petitioner asserts incorporating these features into Morris’ treadmill “would have been obvious and produced predictable results with a reasonable expectation of success.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 142–143).” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,227,340 - PTAB · Nov 21, 2023 · IPR2023-01164 · APJ James P Calve · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 because Peloton showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on claims 1, 2–7, and 10–20 over Morris and Ray.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We therefore grant institution of an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“degree in an exercise related field or mechanical or electrical engineering and (ii) three to five years of industry experience in designing cardiovascular exercise equipment (such as treadmills, bicycles, steppers, ellipticals) or in a similar field” Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 31–34). Petitioner also asserts that a person could qualify as an ordinarily skilled artisan with less education but more experience or less experience but more education. Id. At this stage, Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art. On the present record, we find that Petitioner’s uncontested level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the ’375 patent and the prior art of record. Therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner does not propose any claim constructions and asserts that” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“such as treadmills that detect a user’s presence on the treadmill and present the user’s exercise data on a display while the user is exercising to provide a number of similar benefits including motivating a user to exercise. Pet. 16– 17 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 5, 26, 35, Abstr.; Ex. 1004, 5:41–48, 8:22–26, 11:56– 61, 13:20–30, Abstr.). Petitioner contends that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the complementary teachings of Morris and Ray that addressed these similar objectives to achieve predictable results. Id. at 16–17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 137–140). Petitioner asserts that a skilled artisan would have incorporated Ray’s camera and software instructions to validate a user’s exercise data into Morris’ treadmill with a reasonable expectation of success because Morris expressly taught that “its exercise equipment could be fitted with optical sensor(s).” Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 33).” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,796,375 - PTAB · Nov 21, 2023 · IPR2023-01163 · APJ Juliet Mitchell Dirba · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–9, 12, and 14–20 would have been obvious over Morris and Ray.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“record, Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Morris and Ray, in combination, teach or suggest each element of independent claim 1. Petitioner has also sufficiently shown that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Morris and Ray as proposed and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over Morris and Ray.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“have been motivated to combine Morris and Ray by adding several of Ray’s features to Morris’ treadmill, including Ray’s camera, its functionality of displaying a motivational image, and its ability to transmit exercise data to a remote location, and that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in achieving the combination proposed. Pet. 16–18. Petitioner asserts that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Morris and Ray because they provide complementary teachings and address similar objectives. Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1004, Abstr., 5:41–48, 8:22–26, 11:56–61, 13:20–30; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 6, 25, 33, 35, Abstr.; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 135–138). Petitioner also asserts that Morris contemplates use of an optical sensor, provides exercise data and “a human analog display that mimic[s] the user’s bouncing motion,” and includes a signal processing and display system with the necessary capabilities to implement the combination. Id. at 16–17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 139–143; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 32–36, 50, 56–58, claims 29–37, Figs. 6, 11–12C). Petitioner further asserts that Ray expressly teaches that “its user validation and motivation technology could be ‘easily and affordably merged’ into a treadmill.” Id. at 18 (quoting Ex. 1004, 9:55–57) (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 143–144). Finally, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to make the proposed combination because it would have improved Morris’ the user as the intensity and duration of exercise increased” and Ray’s ability to share exercise data with a remote location. Id. (citing Ex. 1004, 7:11–22, 11:55–59, 13:50–57; Ex. 1006 ¶ 50; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 138, 145); see also id. at 16 (arguing user motivation would have motivated the combination) (citing Ex. 1004, 8:22–26, 11:56–61; Ex. 1006 ¶ 25). At this stage, we are persuaded that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Morris and Ray with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner does not propose any express claim constructions and states that the “claims . . . have not been construed by any courts as of the filing of th[e] Petition.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 29–30). At this stage, Patent Owner does not address the construction of any term or phrase. We determine that it is not necessary to expressly construe any claim terms or phrases for purposes of this Decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to necessary to resolve the controversy.”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“steppers, ellipticals) or in a similar field.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 31– 34). Petitioner also asserts that a person could qualify as an ordinarily skilled artisan with less education but more experience or less experience but more education. Id. At this stage, Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art. At this stage of the proceeding and on this record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that it comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’227 patent.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,032,227 - PTAB · Nov 14, 2023 · IPR2023-00718 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1, 4, and 11–16 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialNot reached
“We authorized the parties to submit additional briefing to address Patent Owner’s request for discretionary denial under 35 U.S.C. § 314. See Prelim. Resp. 5–11. Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 7, “Prelim. Reply”) and Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply (Paper 8, “Prelim. Sur-reply”). We note that in the Sur-reply, Patent Owner has withdrawn its request for discretionary denial and the request is now moot. Prelim. Sur-reply 1.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims of the ’825 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1, 4, and 11–16 of the ’825 patent on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelOther
“We perceive no significance to how any difference between the two definitions might affect our analysis. To the extent either party believes its proposed level of skill affects part of the unpatentability analysis, it should explain how during the instituted trial.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Term construed petitioner construction§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes to construe the term “means coupling” as governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, with a function of “coupling suitable power for energizing said thermostat from said space conditioning equipment to said thermostat” and a structure of “a (power) line and any equivalents.” Pet. 10–11. Patent Owner does not dispute this construction. Prelim. Resp. 4. Based on the record at this stage of the proceeding, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed constructions of this term.” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,185,825 - PTAB · Nov 14, 2023 · IPR2023-00716 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3 and 6–9 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’739 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–3 and 6–9 of the ’739 patent on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialNot reached
“1 We authorized the parties to submit additional briefing to address Patent Owner’s request for discretionary denial under 35 U.S.C. § 314. See Prelim. Resp. 5–11. Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 7) and Patent Owner filed a Surreply (Paper 8). In its Sur-Reply, Patent Owner withdraws its request for discretionary denial and the issue, therefore, is moot. Paper 8, 1.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art as it is consistent with the ’739 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Additionally, Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill is supported by the testimony of its declarant Dr. Baker. Ex. 1002 ¶ 54. Patent Owner’s asserted level of ordinary skill is overly narrow as it requires at least two years’ experience in temperature controls, electronic thermostats, and HVAC controls. Prelim. Resp. 4. Independent claim 1 recites an “environmental controller,” which is not limited controlling HVAC or temperature functions. Ex. 1001, 8:52–56. The ’739 patent explains that an environmental control may also turn lighting on or off and sense and responds to environmental gases or smoke. Id. at 6:62–7:2. Unlike Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill in the art, which is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker, at this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner provides no support for its asserted level of ordinary skill. See Prelim. Resp. 4.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that two terms are means plus function terms, governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6: “storage means” and “transmitter means.” Pet. 8. For the term “storage means,” Petitioner contends that the function is “storing as location data a physical location of the environmental controller” and the corresponding structure is “memory.” Pet. 9. Petitioner notes that this is Patent Owner’s proposed construction from the related district court litigation. Id. For the term “transmitter means,” Petitioner contends that the corresponding structure is “a modem with Internet or network connection.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 7:2–9, 7:20). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed constructions. Prelim. Resp. 5. Based on the record at this stage of the proceeding, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed constructions of these terms.” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,789,739
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.