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  • PTAB · Aug 20, 2026 · PGR2026-00036 · APJ John A Squires · PGR · Institution

    The Director denied institution because the petition did not show that Biomed was publicly accessible as prior art, so it failed to show any challenged claim was unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “sufficiently that Biomed qualifies as a prior art printed publication. The Board’s precedential decision in Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential), addresses prior-art qualification in the related context of instituting an inter partes review. Hulu states that “the petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Id. at 13; see also Jazz Pharm. Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC. 895 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[T]he IPR petitioner . . . had the burden to prove that a particular reference is a printed publication.”). The same guidance applies to post-grant reviews, albeit with the “more likely than not” standard applicable. See 35 U.S.C. § 324(a); Hulu, Paper 29 at 13 n.5. Hulu also states that “there is no presumption in favor of institution or in favor of finding a reference to be a printed publication under [37] § 42.108(c).” Hulu, Paper 29 at 16.” slip op. at 3

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable

      “sufficiently that Biomed qualifies as a prior art printed publication. The Board’s precedential decision in Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential), addresses prior-art qualification in the related context of instituting an inter partes review. Hulu states that “the petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Id. at 13; see also Jazz Pharm. Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC. 895 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[T]he IPR petitioner . . . had the burden to prove that a particular reference is a printed publication.”). The same guidance applies to post-grant reviews, albeit with the “more likely than not” standard applicable. See 35 U.S.C. § 324(a); Hulu, Paper 29 at 13 n.5. Hulu also states that “there is no presumption in favor of institution or in favor of finding a reference to be a printed publication under [37] § 42.108(c).” Hulu, Paper 29 at 16. In this case, Petitioner merely cites a “date of revision” appearing within Biomed. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1005, 11). Yet, a revision date alone does not establish that Biomed was disseminated or made publicly available. And, although indicia appearing within a reference can sometimes support the printed publication status of the reference, I find the record to be devoid of any such indicia, or other evidence, supporting that Biomed was publicly disseminated or accessible by the June 15, 2021 “date of revision.” See Hulu, Paper 29 at 16–18. Thus, Petitioner fails to show that it is more likely” slip op. at 3

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNot reached

      “sufficiently that Biomed qualifies as a prior art printed publication. The Board’s precedential decision in Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential), addresses prior-art qualification in the related context of instituting an inter partes review. Hulu states that “the petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Id. at 13; see also Jazz Pharm. Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC. 895 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[T]he IPR petitioner . . . had the burden to prove that a particular reference is a printed publication.”). The same guidance applies to post-grant reviews, albeit with the “more likely than not” standard applicable. See 35 U.S.C. § 324(a); Hulu, Paper 29 at 13 n.5. Hulu also states that “there is no presumption in favor of institution or in favor of finding a reference to be a printed publication under [37] § 42.108(c).” Hulu, Paper 29 at 16. In this case, Petitioner merely cites a “date of revision” appearing within Biomed. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1005, 11). Yet, a revision date alone does not establish that Biomed was disseminated or made publicly available. And, although indicia appearing within a reference can sometimes support the printed publication status of the reference, I find the record to be devoid of any such indicia, or other evidence, supporting that Biomed was publicly disseminated or accessible by the June 15, 2021 “date of revision.” See Hulu, Paper 29 at 16–18. Thus, Petitioner fails to show that it is more likely” slip op. at 3

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 12,370,153
  • Ipr2026-00305Institution denied
    PTAB · Jul 14, 2026 · IPR2026-00305 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

    Institution of IPR2026-00305 was denied because the petitioner failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsDirector review decision
    • Director reviewDirector review, deniedDenied

      “NOTICE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), after review of discretionary and non- merits considerations, institution of inter partes review is denied in the following proceedings: IPR2026-00255 IPR2026-00284 IPR2026-00307 IPR2026-00261 IPR2026-00300* IPR2026-00308 IPR2026-00281 IPR2026-00305 IPR2026-00309” slip op. at 1

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Other

      “NOTICE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), after review of discretionary and non- merits considerations, institution of inter partes review is denied in the following proceedings: IPR2026-00255 IPR2026-00284 IPR2026-00307 IPR2026-00261 IPR2026-00300* IPR2026-00308 IPR2026-00281 IPR2026-00305 IPR2026-00309” slip op. at 1

    None
    Patents in suitUS 7,840,427
  • PTAB · Jun 24, 2026 · IPR2026-00241 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

    The Director denied institution of the IPR, finding Apple's unexplained inconsistent claim-construction positions before the Board and district court problematic.

    RulingsDirector review decision
    • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied

      “As I have indicated previously, petitioners should be presenting a single construction and applying that construction consistently. See Infineon Techs. Americas Corp. v. Mosaid Techs. Corp., IPR2025-01456, Paper 27 at 3–4 (Director Mar. 17, 2026). Failure to do so, without adequate explanation, is problematic and raises concerns of strategic litigation behavior spill-over into the PTAB inconsistent with Congress’s intent to provide a quick and cost-effective alternative to district court litigation. Id.; Revvo, Paper 20 at 3–4; see H.R. Rep. No. 112-98 at 48 (2011). Here, Petitioner offers no explanation for its divergent positions.” slip op. at 3

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

      “that “[a]ll claim terms should be construed according to their ordinary and customary meaning,” and that “no claim terms need be construed to resolve issues of controversy in the present Petition.” Paper 2, 4 (emphasis added). Petitioner also states, as part of its analysis of the challenged claims, that “Petitioner does not concede that the preambles of the Challenged Claims are limiting.” Id. at 9 n.5 (emphasis added). In district court, however, Petitioner tells a different story, arguing there that the preamble is limiting. Ex. 2016, 6, 7, 9, 12. Indeed, Petitioner specifically denotes that “[r]eview of ‘the entirety of the patent’ makes clear that the preamble phrase ‘high speed memory chip module’ contains the core of what the inventors ‘actually invented and intended to encompass by the claims,’ . . . and so the preamble should be limiting.” Id. at 7 (internal citations omitted, emphasis added).” slip op. at 2

    Claim constructionDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 10,998,017
  • PTAB · Jun 24, 2026 · IPR2026-00240 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

    The Director denied Apple’s petitions and instituted no trial, exercising discretion based on Apple’s unexplained inconsistent claim-construction positions before the Board and district court.

    RulingsDirector review decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

      “As I have indicated previously, petitioners should be presenting a single construction and applying that construction consistently. See Infineon Techs. Americas Corp. v. Mosaid Techs. Corp., IPR2025-01456, Paper 27 at 3–4 (Director Mar. 17, 2026). Failure to do so, without adequate explanation, is problematic and raises concerns of strategic litigation behavior spill-over into the PTAB inconsistent with Congress’s intent to provide a quick and cost-effective alternative to district court litigation. Id.; Revvo, Paper 20 at 3–4; see H.R. Rep. No. 112-98 at 48 (2011). Here, Petitioner offers no explanation for its divergent positions.” slip op. at 3

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notOther

      “that “[a]ll claim terms should be construed according to their ordinary and customary meaning,” and that “no claim terms need be construed to resolve issues of controversy in the present Petition.” Paper 2, 4 (emphasis added). Petitioner also states, as part of its analysis of the challenged claims, that “Petitioner does not concede that the preambles of the Challenged Claims are limiting.” Id. at 9 n.5 (emphasis added). In district court, however, Petitioner tells a different story, arguing there that the preamble is limiting. Ex. 2016, 6, 7, 9, 12. Indeed, Petitioner specifically denotes that “[r]eview of ‘the entirety of the patent’ makes clear that the preamble phrase ‘high speed memory chip module’ contains the core of what the inventors ‘actually invented and intended to encompass by the claims,’ . . . and so the preamble should be limiting.” Id. at 7 (internal citations omitted, emphasis added).” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Other

      “IPR2026-00243 are similarly problematic. In its Petitions, Petitioner identifies “input/output unit” as a means-plus-function limitation and identifies the corresponding structure as input/output unit 106 in the challenged patent. See, e.g., IPR2026-00241, Paper 2, 4. Petitioner also asserts “the applied prior art anticipates or renders obvious the Challenged Claims, regardless of whether ‘input/output unit’ is construed as a §112(f) means-plus-function limitation,” and that “Petitioner is not conceding . . . that the ’017 Patent provides adequate structure for the ‘input/output unit.’” Id. at 5 (emphasis added). In District Court, however, Petitioner once again takes a different position, arguing that the claim term “input/output unit” should be construed as a means-plus-function limitation, identifying the function as “performing input and/or output functions with respect to memory,” and asserting that the challenged patent “[l]acks sufficient structure (indefinite).” IPR2026-00241, Ex. 2016, 12. According to Petitioner, “[t]he specification fails to disclose sufficient corresponding structure for performing input and output operations with respect to memory, much less for performing those operations within any particular voltage range.” Id. at 19. Petitioner fails to adequately explain its different positions here before the Board and those it propounds in district court. See, e.g., IPR2026-00241, Paper 9. Patent Owner well states the issue; that “[t]o the extent § 112(f) governs, then either input/output unit 106 is sufficient corresponding structure (in which case [Petitioner’s] district-court indefiniteness argument fails), or it is not (in which case [Petitioner’s] IPR mapping relies on a structure [Petitioner] itself maintains is inadequate).” IPR2026-00241, Paper 8, 8–9. I agree. Petitioner’s statement that it does not concede the challenged patent provides adequate structure for the “input/output unit” thus only compounds the problem.” slip op. at 3

    Claim constructionDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 9,201,834
  • PTAB · May 15, 2026 · IPR2026-00133 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

    The Director denied the petitions and instituted no trial, exercising discretion based on the complete record and the petitioner’s failure to present a consistent claim construction position.

    RulingsDirector review decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

      “As I have indicated previously, a petitioner should present a single construction and apply that construction consistently. See Infineon Techs. 1 Citations are to papers in IPR2026-00133. The parties filed similar papers in IPR2026-00134 and IPR2026-00135. Americas Corp. v. Mosaid Techs. Corp., IPR2025-01456, Paper 27 at 3–4 (Director Mar. 17, 2026). Failure to do so, without adequate explanation, is problematic. Id.; Revvo, Paper 20 at 3–4. A petitioner may not avoid presenting its own claim construction position in a proceeding before the Office by presenting an analysis based on claim construction positions taken by other parties in a different proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) (requiring that the petition must “set forth . . . [h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed”); Trial Practice Guide2 §§ II.B.(3) and (6). Permitting such conduct would allow a petitioner to avoid taking a consistent claim construction position. Such conduct would undermine the purpose of inter partes review proceedings and detract from the Office’s goal of “providing greater predictability and certainty in the patent system.” Revvo, Paper 20 at 4–5. While certain arguments are highlighted above, the determination to exercise discretion to deny institution is based on the complete record and a holistic assessment of all of the evidence in light of the arguments presented.” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

      “As I have indicated previously, a petitioner should present a single construction and apply that construction consistently. See Infineon Techs. 1 Citations are to papers in IPR2026-00133. The parties filed similar papers in IPR2026-00134 and IPR2026-00135. Americas Corp. v. Mosaid Techs. Corp., IPR2025-01456, Paper 27 at 3–4 (Director Mar. 17, 2026). Failure to do so, without adequate explanation, is problematic. Id.; Revvo, Paper 20 at 3–4. A petitioner may not avoid presenting its own claim construction position in a proceeding before the Office by presenting an analysis based on claim construction positions taken by other parties in a different proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) (requiring that the petition must “set forth . . . [h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed”); Trial Practice Guide2 §§ II.B.(3) and (6). Permitting such conduct would allow a petitioner to avoid taking a consistent claim construction position. Such conduct would undermine the purpose of inter partes review proceedings and detract from the Office’s goal of “providing greater predictability and certainty in the patent system.” Revvo, Paper 20 at 4–5.” slip op. at 2

    Claim constructionDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 9,517,782
  • PTAB · May 12, 2026 · IPR2025-01391 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

    Director Review was granted, the institution notice vacated, and institution denied because Petitioner took inconsistent claim-construction positions in the IPR and district court.

    RulingsDirector review decision
    • Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted

      “For the reasons below, Patent Owner’s requests for Director Review are granted.” slip op. at 3

    • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

      “Petitioner’s conduct, which ensued following institution, demonstrates that this dispute is less about a litigation alternative, as Congress intended, and more about inconsistent positions to gain an upper hand in the overall litigation. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, at 48 (2011) (explaining that IPRs were intended to provide “quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation”). Such conduct has negative consequences: It multiplies litigation expense, reduces patent value, discourages innovation, diminishes the integrity of the patent system, and depletes the Office’s resources. Discretion is afforded to the USPTO Director to ensure fairness, efficiency, and predictability in patent disputes in a focused inter partes context—as Congress envisioned—as distinct from the broad adversarial context in district court litigation. The Office’s review under Article I is ultimately regulatory; proceedings under Article III are adjudicatory. I would not have instituted these IPRs in the first instance had Petitioner engaged in this strategic litigation-style behavior before institution. Accordingly, the appropriate course of action is to grant Director Review, vacate the Notice granting institution of these IPRs, and deny institution.” slip op. at 4

    • Strike new argumentOther

      “Petitioner’s assertion that the term “controller” is not in controversy in these IPRs and so it was not required to construe the term in the Petitions is an inadequate justification for the different positions. As I have stated repeatedly, a petitioner should present a single construction and apply that construction consistently before the Board and the district court. See, e.g., Infineon Techs. Am. Corp. v. Mosaid Techs. Corp., IPR2025-01456, Paper 27 at 3–4 (Director Mar. 17, 2026) (“[A] petitioner should pick one [construction], and one consistent with its asserted District Court position.”). Failure to do so detracts from the Office’s goal of “providing greater predictability and certainty in the patent system.” Revvo, Paper 20 at 4–5. I also disagree with Petitioner’s assertion that these IPRs do not implicate Rule 42.104(b)(3). Rule 42.104(b)(3) requires a petition to “[p]rovide a statement of the precise relief requested for each claim challenged,” and to identify how each challenged claim is to be construed. The rule continues to state that “[w]here the claim to be construed contains a means-plus-function or step-plus-function limitation as permitted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f), the construction of the claim must identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). Petitioner’s position in the district court that the term “controller” is a means-plus-function limitation undercuts its position that Rule 42.104(b)(3) does not apply here. Further, Petitioner’s citation to Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) as support for its position is inapposite, as the holding in that case addresses when the Board is required to construe a claim term, not when a party is required to follow Board rules. DR Response 7–8.” slip op. at 3

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 10,758,652
  • Ipr2025-01597Institution denied
    PTAB · Mar 10, 2026 · IPR2025-01597 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

    The Director discretionarily denied institution in several listed proceedings; IPR2025-01597 is not listed, so this notice states no outcome for it.

    RulingsDirector review decision
    • Director reviewOther

      “NOTICE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and § 324(a), after review of discretionary and non-merits considerations, institution of inter partes review or post-grant review is denied in the following proceedings:” slip op. at 1

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 11,069,337
  • PTAB · Mar 3, 2026 · IPR2025-01303 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

    Director Review was granted, the institution determination was vacated, and institution was denied because the Patent Owner had disclaimed the entire patent before institution.

    RulingsDirector review decision
    • Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted

      “Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that Director Review is granted; FURTHER ORDERED that the determination in the Notice granting institution of inter partes review (Paper 11) is vacated; and FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 3

    • Adverse judgmentOther

      “Patent Owner filed a statutory disclaimer of the entire term of the challenged patent before the Notice was entered. See Ex. 2011. Although 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) permits the Office to enter an adverse judgment when a patent owner cancels all claims at issue, denying institution under these circumstances is a more efficient use of the Office’s resources. Denying institution also encourages similarly situated patent owners to file a disclaimer prior to institution. As such, the appropriate course of action is to vacate the determination in the Notice and deny institution.” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 11,368,537
  • Ipr2025-01595Institution denied
    PTAB · Jan 27, 2026 · IPR2025-01595 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

    The Director denied institution of IPR2025-01595 after review of discretionary considerations.

    RulingsDirector review decision
    • Director reviewDirector review, deniedOther

      “Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), after review of discretionary considerations, institution of inter partes review is denied in the following proceedings: IPR2025-012721 IPR2025-01532 IPR2025-01565 IPR2025-013842 IPR2025-01539 IPR2025-01569 IPR2025-01423 IPR2025-01551 IPR2025-01594 IPR2025-01436 IPR2025-01552 IPR2025-01595 IPR2026-000023 IPR2025-01437 IPR2025-01553 IPR2025-01438 IPR2025-01554 IPR2026-00025 IPR2025-01463 IPR2025-01555 IPR2026-00026 IPR2025-01509 IPR2025-01564 IPR2026-00027 IPR2025-01511 1 Although previously referred, this case is now discretionarily denied in view of Revvo Technologies, Inc. v. Cerebrum Sensor Technologies, Inc., IPR2025-00632, Paper 20 (Director Nov. 3, 2025) (precedential). 2 Although previously referred, this case is now discretionarily denied in view of Revvo Technologies, Inc. v. Cerebrum Sensor Technologies, Inc., IPR2025-00632, Paper 20 (Director Nov. 3, 2025) (precedential).” slip op. at 1

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

      “Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), after review of discretionary considerations, institution of inter partes review is denied in the following proceedings: IPR2025-012721 IPR2025-01532 IPR2025-01565 IPR2025-013842 IPR2025-01539 IPR2025-01569 IPR2025-01423 IPR2025-01551 IPR2025-01594 IPR2025-01436 IPR2025-01552 IPR2025-01595 IPR2026-000023 IPR2025-01437 IPR2025-01553 IPR2025-01438 IPR2025-01554 IPR2026-00025 IPR2025-01463 IPR2025-01555 IPR2026-00026 IPR2025-01509 IPR2025-01564 IPR2026-00027 IPR2025-01511 1 Although previously referred, this case is now discretionarily denied in view of Revvo Technologies, Inc. v. Cerebrum Sensor Technologies, Inc., IPR2025-00632, Paper 20 (Director Nov. 3, 2025) (precedential). 2 Although previously referred, this case is now discretionarily denied in view of Revvo Technologies, Inc. v. Cerebrum Sensor Technologies, Inc., IPR2025-00632, Paper 20 (Director Nov. 3, 2025) (precedential).” slip op. at 1

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 8,923,754
  • Ipr2025-01274Institution denied
    PTAB · Jan 9, 2026 · IPR2025-01274 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

    The Director denied institution of IPR2025-01274 after finding the petitioner failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsDirector review decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and § 324(a), after review of the merits, the petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition, or that it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable, as applicable. Accordingly, institution of inter partes review or post-grant review is denied in the following proceedings:” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialOther

      “Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and § 324(a), after review of discretionary considerations, institution of inter partes review or post-grant review is denied in the following proceedings:” slip op. at 1

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 10,946,284
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