• Fluidmaster, Inc. v. Danco, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 5, 2026 · IPR2024-00634 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 8–13, 15, 16, and 19–24 are unpatentable over Brown and Ho, with claims 16 and 19 also relying on the Quick Connection Art; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner proposes that: A [person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”)] in the field to which the ’105 Patent is directed would have had at least a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering or a related field or, as a substitute, at least two years of work or” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “of “integrally molded with” as “molded together as a single structure.” Paper 21, 15.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Patent Owner responds that: a POSITA would not have been motivated to make the proposed modification, nor does the Petition include any analysis regarding why a POSITA would be motivated to move from a vertical extended portion to a radial extended portion. Indeed, a radial extended portion is directly counter to the stated goals of Brown (e.g., reducing noise caused by turbulence), at least insofar as it introduces another sudden directional change into the fluid flow system. PO Resp. 58–59 (citing Ex. 2013 ¶ 242).” slip op. at 32

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner argues that the ’105 patent claims were “fully supported as of the filing date of at least the ’606 Application . . . March 11, 2004” because the ’606 Application discloses regulating water flow and a POSITA would know that appropriate devices for regulating water flow includes nonadjustable waterflow restrictors. PO Resp. 63–65; PO Sur-reply 26–29. Patent Owner’s argument is persuasive. The ’606 Application discloses: [W]hen the toilet fill valve 100 is open and water flows from the water inlet 103 to the water outlets 106 and into a toilet tank, an amount of water is also supplied to the bowl fill valve inlet 113 that flows through the bowl fill valve 109 and out the bowl fill valve outlet 116. By virtue of the manual setting of handle 119 of the bowl fill valve 109, the flow of water through the bowl fill valve 109 is regulated. In this manner, the flow of water is regulated so that enough water flows out of the bowl fill valve 109 to fill a toilet bowl without wasting any water down a drain. seen from the passage above, the ’606 Application discloses regulating an amount of water supplied to a toilet bowl using a valve (i.e., a water flow regulator). Ex. 2013 ¶ 288. Further, the ’606 Application states: The bowl fill valve 109 may be, for example, a ball valve, a gate valve, a globe valve, a plug valve, a diaphragm valve, a butterfly valve, a needle valve, a sliding gate, a quick turn valve, a knife valve or any other appropriate type of valve as can be appreciated by those with ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 42

  Patent outcomesUS 9,103,105 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,103,105
• Mobileye Global, Inc. / ZF Active Safety And Electronics US LLC v. Facet Technology Corp.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 23, 2026 · IPR2025-00749 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4 and 8–13 are unpatentable as obvious over Gallagher and Schofield; claims 5–7 and 14–16 were not shown unpatentable on the asserted combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “skilled artisan would have, with Petitioner contending four years and Patent Owner contending two years. Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Papanikolopoulos, does not provide an explanation for his opinion or support his definition of the level of ordinary skill with citations to evidence. See Ex. 2023 ¶ 57 (“In my opinion, [Petitioner’s definition] is an excessive level of ordinary skill in the art, and I believe instead [an ordinarily skilled artisan] would more likely have two years of experience rather than four years.”). On the other hand, Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Thorpe, does provide an explanation for his opinion, explaining that his assertion that four years of experience is required is based on the state of the art, typical undergraduate curricula, and his supervision of doctoral students. Ex. 1030 ¶ 21. Based on the arguments presented and the cited references, we find Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill reasonable and for purposes of this Decision, adopt it as our own. We note that we would reach the same conclusions under either proposed standard.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “As a general rule, unless the steps of a method claim actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.” Mformation Techs., Inc. v. Rsch. in Motion Ltd., 764 F.3d 1392, 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citation modified). “However, a claim requires an ordering of steps when the claim language, as a matter of logic or grammar, requires that the steps be performed in the order written, or the specification directly or implicitly requires an order of steps.” Id. (cleaned up). “[O]rdinarily in process claims steps taken concurrently are the equivalent of steps taken successively.” In re White, 39 F.2d 974, 975 (CCPA 1930); see also Cybersettle, 243 F. App’x. at 609 (finding “the step of calculating the differences between demands and offers can occur concurrently with the [next enumerated step of] receipt of multiple demands and offers” and “the testing step of ‘determining whether any of the differences fall within the predetermined settlement range’ may occur concurrently with the receipt and comparison of the bids” (citation modified)). This is especially true here, given that the recitations at issue are functional language in an apparatus (system) claim. We further agree with Petitioner that the ’328 patent discloses such concurrent performance of these steps: Either concurrent with or subsequent to the identification of road signs 30 and generation of asset management database 24, the computer processor 22 evaluates that portion 32 of each video frame or image that depicts a road sign 30 to determine a set of color values 40, 42 for each of a plurality of colors on the road sign 32. A retroreflectivity value is generated for each color portion 34, 36 on each frame of the tagged videostream 20 containing the road sign 30 that represents a different color value 40, 42. slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Petitioner is correct to the extent that it need not show that “the features of [Schofield] may be bodily incorporated into the structure of [Gallagher],” but Petitioner must prove that “a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention.” Allied Erecting, 825 F.3d at 1381. For claim 9, Petitioner proposes to modify Gallagher’s system to use “Schofield’s determination of a light source’s location within a field of view” in Gallagher’s system. Pet. 23. Thus, Petitioner’s combination does not require the combination of Gallagher’s and Schofield’s sensors into a single system, and Patent Owner’s “sensor fusion” argument is inapposite. See Tr. 48:8–49:6 (Patent Owner’s counsel confirming that the problem of “sensor fusion” stems from combining disparate sensors in a single system). As noted above, Schofield teaches considering the relative location of the light source in determining whether the light source is from headlights or taillights (that is, an object of interest). See Ex. 1006, 9:26–35. We are persuaded that an ordinarily skilled artisan would be motivated to use this teaching in Gallagher’s device to help distinguish between road markers that are arranged side-by-side and have a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. See Ex. 1005 ¶ 40; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 77 (“[An ordinarily skilled artisan] would have seen Schofield’s determination of a light source’s location within the field of view as advantageous because it would have allowed Gallagher’s computer to associate the measured reflectance level with the appropriate road marker.”), 79 (“[I]mplementing this determination would have required [an ordinarily skilled artisan] to implement only conventional techniques of image processing (identifying a location of a particular pixel within an array), which was well known by [an ordinarily skilled artisan], to predictably yield the result of the location within a field of view indicating an intensity value associated with a road marker. Given that Schofield and Gallagher disclose similar types of arrays, this combination would have merely required the use of Schofield’s known technique to improve Gallagher’s similar device in the same way.”).” slip op. at 30

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNon analogous artNot shown unpatentable

    “A reference qualifies as prior art for a determination under § 103 when it is analogous to the claimed invention. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 442 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).” slip op. at 49

  Patent outcomesUS 9,671,328 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,671,328
• Mobileye Global, Inc. / ZF Active Safety And Electronics US LLC v. Facet Technology Corp.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 23, 2026 · IPR2024-01111 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4 and 8–13 are unpatentable as obvious over Gallagher and Schofield; claims 5–7 and 14–16 were not shown unpatentable on the asserted grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The parties disagree only on the length of experience an ordinarily skilled artisan would have, with Petitioner contending four years and Patent Owner contending two years. Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Papanikolopoulos, does not provide an explanation for his opinion or support his definition of the level of ordinary skill with citations to evidence. See Ex. 2023 ¶ 57 (“In my opinion, [Petitioner’s definition] is an excessive level of ordinary skill in the art, and I believe instead [an ordinarily skilled artisan] would more likely have two years of experience rather than four years.”). On the other hand, Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Thorpe, does provide an explanation for his opinion, explaining that his assertion that four years of experience is required is based on the state of the art, typical undergraduate curricula, and his supervision of doctoral students. Ex. 1030 ¶ 21. Based on the arguments presented and the cited references, we find Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill reasonable and for purposes of this Decision, adopt it as our own. We note that we would reach the same conclusions under either proposed standard.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITANo construction needed

    “As a general rule, unless the steps of a method claim actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.” Mformation Techs., Inc. v. Rsch. in Motion Ltd., 764 F.3d 1392, 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citation modified). “However, a claim requires an ordering of steps when the claim language, as a matter of logic or grammar, requires that the steps be performed in the order written, or the specification directly or implicitly requires an order of steps.” Id. (cleaned up). “[O]rdinarily in process claims steps taken concurrently are the equivalent of steps taken successively.” In re White, 39 F.2d 974, 975 (CCPA 1930); see also Cybersettle, 243 F. App’x. at 609 (finding “the step of calculating the differences between demands and offers can occur concurrently with the [next enumerated step of] receipt of multiple demands and offers” and “the testing step of ‘determining whether any of the differences fall within the predetermined settlement range’ may occur concurrently with the receipt and comparison of the bids” (citation modified)). This is especially true here, given that the recitations at issue are functional language in an apparatus (system) claim. We further agree with Petitioner that the ’328 patent discloses such concurrent performance of these steps: Either concurrent with or subsequent to the identification of road signs 30 and generation of asset management database 24, the computer processor 22 evaluates that portion 32 of each video frame or image that depicts a road sign 30 to determine a set of color values 40, 42 for each of a plurality of colors on the road sign 32. A retroreflectivity value is generated for each color portion 34, 36 on each frame of the tagged videostream 20 containing the road sign 30 that represents a different color value 40, 42. Ex. 1001, 5:52–60. Thus, the ’328 patent discloses concurrently detecting objects of interest (road signs) and determining whether the object of interest has a particular color value. slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner is correct to the extent that it need not show that “the features of [Schofield] may be bodily incorporated into the structure of [Gallagher],” but Petitioner must prove that “a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention.” Allied Erecting, 825 F.3d at 1381. For claim 9, Petitioner proposes to modify Gallagher’s system to use “Schofield’s determination of a light source’s location within a field of view” in Gallagher’s system. Pet. 23. Thus, Petitioner’s combination does not require the combination of Gallagher’s and Schofield’s sensors into a single system, and Patent Owner’s “sensor fusion” argument is inapposite. See Tr. 48:8–49:6 (Patent Owner’s counsel confirming that the problem of “sensor fusion” stems from combining disparate sensors in a single system). As noted above, Schofield teaches considering the relative location of the light source in determining whether the light source is from headlights or taillights (that is, an object of interest). See Ex. 1006, 9:26–35. We are persuaded that an ordinarily skilled artisan would be motivated to use this teaching in Gallagher’s device to help distinguish between road markers that are arranged side-by-side and have a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. See Ex. 1005 ¶ 40; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 77 (“[An ordinarily skilled artisan] would have seen Schofield’s determination of a light source’s location within the field of view as advantageous because it would have allowed Gallagher’s computer to associate the measured reflectance level with the appropriate road marker.”), 79 (“[I]mplementing this determination would have required [an ordinarily skilled artisan] to implement only conventional techniques of image processing (identifying a location of a particular pixel within an array), which was well known by [an ordinarily skilled artisan], to predictably yield the result of the location within a field of view indicating an intensity value associated with a road marker. Given that Schofield and Gallagher disclose similar types of arrays, this combination would have merely required the use of Schofield’s known technique to improve Gallagher’s similar device in the same way.”).” slip op. at 30

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedOther

    “The parties disagree only on the length of experience an ordinarily skilled artisan would have, with Petitioner contending four years and Patent Owner contending two years. Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Papanikolopoulos, does not provide an explanation for his opinion or support his definition of the level of ordinary skill with citations to evidence. See Ex. 2023 ¶ 57 (“In my opinion, [Petitioner’s definition] is an excessive level of ordinary skill in the art, and I believe instead [an ordinarily skilled artisan] would more likely have two years of experience rather than four years.”). On the other hand, Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Thorpe, does provide an explanation for his opinion, explaining that his assertion that four years of experience is required is based on the state of the art, typical undergraduate curricula, and his supervision of doctoral students. Ex. 1030 ¶ 21. Based on the arguments presented and the cited references, we find Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill reasonable and for purposes of this Decision, adopt it as our own. We note that we would reach the same conclusions under either proposed standard.” slip op. at 11

  Patent outcomesUS 9,671,328 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,671,328
• Mobileye Global, Inc. / ZF Active Safety And Electronics US LLC v. Facet Technology Corp.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 23, 2026 · IPR2025-00748 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 15 was not shown unpatentable under § 103 over Gallagher and Lumia because Petitioner did not persuasively explain why a skilled artisan would combine their teachings.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The parties disagree only on the length of experience an ordinarily skilled artisan would have, with Petitioner contending four years and Patent Owner contending two years. As noted by Petitioner, Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Papanikolopoulos, does not provide an explanation for his opinion or support his definition of the level of ordinary skill with citations to evidence. See Ex. 2023 ¶ 57 (“In my opinion, [Petitioner’s definition] is an excessive level of ordinary skill in the art, and I believe instead [an ordinarily skilled artisan] would more likely have two years of experience rather than four years.”). On the other hand, Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Thorpe, does provide an explanation for his opinion, explaining that his assertion that four years of experience is required is based on the state of the art, typical undergraduate curricula, and his supervision of doctoral students. Ex. 1030 ¶ 23. Based on the arguments presented and the cited references, we find Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill reasonable and for purposes of this Decision, adopt it as our own. We note that we would reach the same conclusions under either proposed standard.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no construction of any term is necessary. slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not articulated persuasive reasoning for combining the teachings of Gallagher and Lumia. Petitioner argues that implementing Lumia’s teaching of determining the luminance of traffic signs in Gallagher’s system would allow Gallagher’s system to calculate the retroreflectivity of road markers as a means of identifying any markers that do not meet minimum acceptable reflectance levels for countries that require a minimum retroreflectivity level for road markers. Pet. 46 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 116; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 49, 77; Ex. 1019, 6, 8–11).7 However, Gallagher already discloses determining whether the 7 Petitioner and Dr. Thorpe cite to the original pagination of Exhibit 1019 rather than the added exhibit pagination. reflectance level of each road marker meets a predetermined minimum acceptable reflectance level and tagging those road markers that do not meet the minimum acceptable reflectance level to identify them for replacement. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 3, 67–68; see also id. ¶¶ 12–13, 18, 21, 49, 51, 76, 79, Fig. 5. Indeed, both Petitioner and Dr. Thorpe describe Gallagher’s system as ensuring that road markers meet minimum retroreflectivity standards: “Gallagher’s apparatus tests ‘road markings and road markers such as, for example, road signs and posts, reflective painted lines whether continuous or broken, and . . . raised pavement markers’ ‘to ensure they continue to meet minimum standards of reflectivity/retroreflectivity.’” Pet. 9 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 3, 6, 31–33); Ex. 1003 ¶ 55 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 3, 6, 31–33). Thus, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not identified persuasively why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have modified Gallagher’s system to include Lumia’s process for measuring retroreflectivity of traffic signs.” slip op. at 19

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “coefficient of luminous intensity rather than the coefficient of retroreflectivity, and Lumia teaches how to calculate retroreflectivity based on the coefficient of luminance intensity. Pet. Reply 20–21. During the hearing, counsel for Petitioner clarified that this reliance on Lumia entails using the equations disclosed in Lumia without altering Gallagher’s hardware. Tr. 27:18–29:24. During his deposition , Dr. Thorpe confirmed that this obviousness theory relies only on Lumia’s equations. See Ex. 2025, 60:5–65:2. This is an improper new argument. See, e.g., Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC, 938 F.3d 1324, 1330–31 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[A]n IPR petitioner may not raise in reply ‘an entirely new rationale’ for why a claim would have been obvious.”). Notably, this new obviousness theory appears to stem from Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Papanikolopoulos, noting differences in Gallagher’s and Lumia’s disclosures. See Pet. Reply 21 (citing Ex. 2023 ¶¶ 71 n.2, 89). Even considering Petitioner’s new theory, we find it unpersuasive because Petitioner does not explain adequately how the “determining a luminance value” recitation is met. Per Petitioner, Gallagher measures the coefficient of luminous intensity, but Petitioner does not identify a “luminance value” as recited in claim 15. Dr. Papanikolopoulos testifies that the coefficient of luminous intensity is not a luminance value: “As is well established, coefficient of luminous intensity—which is what Gallagher calculates—is a measurement of retroreflectivity (usually expressed in units of candelas, or millicandelas, per lux per square meter, i.e., cd/lx/m2), not luminance (usually expressed in candelas per square meter, i.e., cd/m2). Ex. 2023 ¶ 91. Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Thorpe, does not contest this testimony. See, e.g., Ex. 1030 ¶ 35. Thus, Petitioner’s new theory is unpersuasive.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 9,335,255 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,335,255
• Mobileye Global, Inc. / ZF Active Safety And Electronics US LLC v. Facet Technology Corp.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 23, 2026 · IPR2024-01110 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 15 was not shown unpatentable under § 103 over Gallagher and Lumia because Petitioner did not persuasively explain why a skilled artisan would combine their teachings.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The parties disagree only on the length of experience an ordinarily skilled artisan would have, with Petitioner contending four years and Patent Owner contending two years. As noted by Petitioner, Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Papanikolopoulos, does not provide an explanation for his opinion or support his definition of the level of ordinary skill with citations to evidence. See Ex. 2023 ¶ 57 (“In my opinion, [Petitioner’s definition] is an excessive level of ordinary skill in the art, and I believe instead [an ordinarily skilled artisan] would more likely have two years of experience rather than four years.”). On the other hand, Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Thorpe, does provide an explanation for his opinion, explaining that his assertion that four years of experience is required is based on the state of the art, typical undergraduate curricula, and his supervision of doctoral students. Ex. 1030 ¶ 23. Based on the arguments presented and the cited references, we find Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill reasonable and for purposes of this Decision, adopt it as our own. We note that we would reach the same conclusions under either proposed standard.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no construction of any term is necessary. slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not articulated persuasive reasoning for combining the teachings of Gallagher and Lumia. Petitioner argues that implementing Lumia’s teaching of determining the luminance of traffic signs in Gallagher’s system would allow Gallagher’s system to calculate the retroreflectivity of road markers as a means of identifying any markers that do not meet minimum acceptable reflectance levels for countries that require a minimum retroreflectivity level for road markers. Pet. 46 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 116; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 49, 77; Ex. 1019, 6, 8–11).7 However, Gallagher already discloses determining whether the 7 Petitioner and Dr. Thorpe cite to the original pagination of Exhibit 1019 rather than the added exhibit pagination. reflectance level of each road marker meets a predetermined minimum acceptable reflectance level and tagging those road markers that do not meet the minimum acceptable reflectance level to identify them for replacement. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 3, 67–68; see also id. ¶¶ 12–13, 18, 21, 49, 51, 76, 79, Fig. 5. Indeed, both Petitioner and Dr. Thorpe describe Gallagher’s system as ensuring that road markers meet minimum retroreflectivity standards: “Gallagher’s apparatus tests ‘road markings and road markers such as, for example, road signs and posts, reflective painted lines whether continuous or broken, and . . . raised pavement markers’ ‘to ensure they continue to meet minimum standards of reflectivity/retroreflectivity.’” Pet. 9 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 3, 6, 31–33); Ex. 1003 ¶ 55 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 3, 6, 31–33). Thus, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not identified persuasively why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have modified Gallagher’s system to include Lumia’s process for measuring retroreflectivity of traffic signs.” slip op. at 19

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “coefficient of luminous intensity rather than the coefficient of retroreflectivity, and Lumia teaches how to calculate retroreflectivity based on the coefficient of luminance intensity. Pet. Reply 20–21. During the hearing, counsel for Petitioner clarified that this reliance on Lumia entails using the equations disclosed in Lumia without altering Gallagher’s hardware. Tr. 27:18–29:24. During his deposition , Dr. Thorpe confirmed that this obviousness theory relies only on Lumia’s equations. See Ex. 2025, 60:5–65:2. This is an improper new argument. See, e.g., Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC, 938 F.3d 1324, 1330–31 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[A]n IPR petitioner may not raise in reply ‘an entirely new rationale’ for why a claim would have been obvious.”). Notably, this new obviousness theory appears to stem from Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Papanikolopoulos, noting differences in Gallagher’s and Lumia’s disclosures. See Pet. Reply 21 (citing Ex. 2023 ¶¶ 71 n.2, 89).” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 9,335,255 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,335,255
• Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00652 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–23 and 25–30 were unpatentable over the asserted grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’403 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The parties assert that each claim term should be construed in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 10; Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 73); see Ex. 1002 ¶ 22 (opining the same). And, in the respective claim construction sections of their briefs, the parties do not propose any claim terms for express construction. We agree with the parties that no claim terms require express construction to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Kahn discloses element [1.2] because the evidence cited does not disclose a “first computer system being configured to provide remote control of the first pump or first valve” (i.e., a fluid-handling device). Kahn is directed to providing access to fluid sensing data and analyzing and providing visual information on that data, but Petitioner has not identified any disclosure of the capability to remotely control fluid-handling devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:27–36, 2:50–3:2. More specifically, Kahn’s disclosures that Petitioner relies on for allegedly teaching remote control are deficient. We discuss each. First, Petitioner points to the following, “[f]or instance, as illustrated in FIG. 1C, a fluid control device such as a valve 15A is located on the input side of a sen[s]or unit 110.” Ex. 1005, 8:19–21, cited in Pet. 13. This portion of Kahn, however, does not disclose remote control. Second, Petitioner cites to the following: Finally, or in addition to, the communication unit 112B can include on-site alerts such as optical (indicator lights), audible alerts (e.g., alarm sounds), tactile (e.g., vibration of the unit) or can be interfaced to an appropriate control valve for simply shutting off the supply of fluid upon the detection of emergency events, for instance. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1005, 10:62–67). We agree with Patent Owner that this portion of Kahn teaches on-site alerts and local control of the fluid-handling device. See Prelim. Resp. 7. This portion of Kahn does not disclose remote control.” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,294,403
• Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00651 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 6, 7, and 9–20 were unpatentable over any asserted ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’680 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “target value” is part of a command that is sent from a computing device to a server and then to a controller. The controller then receives a measurement of the fluid by a sensor and determines whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” If the measurement does not satisfy the “target value,” further operations are undertaken. The recited operation sequence makes clear that the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” is not as Dr. Wooley opines because the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time is represented by the measurement taken by the sensor, 11 Some claim language less relevant to construing “target value” was omitted for ease of reference. which the controller then uses to determine whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” Additionally, claim 1 recites that the “target value” is sent as part of a command to the controller. The “target value” is not sent to the controller from the sensor, as might be expected if the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” were as Dr. Wooley opines. Petitioner and Dr. Wooley’s construction would also result in “target value” meaning effectively the same thing as the measurement of the fluid by the sensor, a concept that is separately recited in claim 1 and to which the “target value” is compared. The Specification of the ’680 patent does not support Petitioner’s understanding of the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value.” Although the Specification does not recite “target value,” it recites “target state,” and describes “target state” sufficiently to understand the plain and ordinary meaning of “target” as used in “target value” and “target state.” In particular, the ’680 patent explains that “[i]n some embodiments, the process 104 includes receiving, via a network interface, from a remote user device, (e.g., via a command-center server) a command to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state.” Ex. 1001, 11:48–51. This portion reflects that the command is seeking to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state. In other words, the “target value” or “target state” is not generally “the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time”; rather, it is a value or state that the fluid-handling device is desired to be in, as Patent Owner and Dr. Durham explain. Additionally, just as claim 1 recites a directional component for the “target value” to be sent to the controller in a command, so too does the Specification describe a “target state” as being sent in a command from a remote user device. Thus, the Specification clearly supports the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Patent Owner and Dr. Durham and not the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Petitioner and Dr. Wooley. slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “time-stamped process data, report exception therein to the remote host, and extract and transmit time-stamped process data to the remote host.” Ex. 1005, Abst. (emphases added). Almadi explains that its remote field systems must include a plurality of controller units “to issue commands to, and gather and process data from a plurality of field devices, including remote systems and instruments, . . . [and] a database server for the storage of process data retrieved from the remote subsystems and instruments.” Id. at 2:22–30 (emphases added). Based on these disclosures, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not established that Almadi discloses element [1.4]. Specifically, the teachings from Almadi identified by Petitioner refer to process data, which is data retrieved from the remote subsystems/field devices. Thus, we understand that Almadi’s teaching—of using an Ethernet switch to transmit “process data”—describes transmitting data from the remote subsystems/field devices. See Ex. 1005, 3:13–17, cited in Pet. 15. But claim 1 and particularly element [1.4], recites “sending, with the server, the target value to the network address [which identifies a controller of the fluid-handling device13] via the network,” which is different than sending process data from the field devices to the remote host or database server for storage.” slip op. at 19

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,175,680
• Tanklogix, LLC v. SiteproInstitution denied
  PTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00650 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 18–32 and 34 were unpatentable over Kahn or Kahn and Gutierrez.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’871 patent. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we decline to institute an inter partes review of claims 18–32 and 34 of the ’871 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “The respective proposed levels of qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art are similar, with Patent Owner proposing two years of experience compared to Petitioner proposing significant experience with remotely controlling fluid-handling devices, like SCADA systems. Patent Owner also proposes more extensive experience in lieu of educational experience. While we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications to be acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’871 patent and the asserted prior art. Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the qualifications adopted.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “actuators and the remote control of fluid handling devices, including the receipt with the user-interface module of “a user command to actuate an actuator via a presented control interface” (limitation [18.7]) and “account authorized to send commands to remotely control fluid handling devices” (limitation [18.11]). We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Kahn discloses or teaches these limitations because the evidence does not provide support that there is remote control of fluid handling devices or the use of a user command on a control interface to send a command to a fluid handling device, for instance. Kahn is directed to providing access to fluid sensing data and analyzing and providing visual information on that data, but we do not discern that it teaches or discloses the capability to remotely control fluid handling devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:27–36, 2:50–3:2. More specifically, the Kahn disclosures that Petitioner repeatedly relies upon for allegedly teaching this control are deficient. See Ex. 1005, 10:62–67, 14:35– 15:2, 15:62–16:32; see also Pet. 12–14, 16–18. Kahn discloses that “the communication unit 112B can include on-site alerts such as optical (indicator lights), audible alerts (e.g., alarm sounds), tactile (e.g., vibration of the unit) or can be interfaced to an appropriate control valve for simply shutting off the supply of fluid upon the detection of emergency events, for instance.” Ex. 1005, 10:62–67. Communication unit 112B is part of the local “sensor unit,” wherein the detection conditions determined by the sensor are communicated to remote devices by communication unit 112B. See id. at 3:31–33, 5:62–6:2, 6:27–35, 7:33–37, 13:7–12, Figs. 1A–1C. Kahn discloses that the sensor units, which include communication units 112B, can be located near shut-off valves and can communicate with distant locations. See id. at 11:1–13. There are no disclosures, however, in the above passages that there is remote control of fluid handling devices, that there is a user command on a control interface that actuates an actuator, or that there is a command sent to the facility actuators via a network connection, as required in limitations [18.5]–[18.7] and [18.9]–[18.12], respectively. Rather, the disclosure indicates that the communication unit 112B includes on-site alerts and that the local (non-remote) communication unit 112B can be interfaced with the control valve.” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,488,871
• Samsung Electronics America, Inc. / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Collision Communications, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Mar 21, 2025 · IPR2024-01250 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–5, 7, 9–16, or 20 unpatentable over the asserted grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner, supported by Dr. Min’s testimony, proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “at least a bachelor’s [degree] in [electrical engineering, computer engineering, or computer science], physics, or equivalent, and two years of experience with cellular telecommunications, radio-access network architectures, protocols and signal propagation in wireless networks.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 59). Dr. Min testifies that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 59. Additionally, Petitioner contends that Dr. Min “exceeded this level of experience by the priority date.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1010 (curriculum vitae of Dr. Min)). In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not take a position on the relevant level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which we find consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’946 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Neither party contends that any claim terms require an express construction to resolve the present controversy. Pet. 8 (“For purposes of this Petition only, Petitioner does not believe any terms require a formal construction.”); see generally Prelim. Resp. Nonetheless, Petitioner explains that the Petition is structured such that “Ground 1 is based on Patent Owner’s infringement contentions in the district court litigation, where the claimed ‘MUD module’ is generally mapped to multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) receivers in a wireless network.” Pet. 2. Petitioner contends that “[u]nder this broad interpretation of a ‘MUD module,’ Walton’s MIMO receiver renders every challenged claim obvious.” Id. In contrast to Ground 1, the Petition states that “Ground 2 is based on the plain meaning of ‘MUD module,’ which is a component that detects, separates, and decodes signals from multiple users transmitting simultaneously over the same frequency band.” Id. Petitioner contends that, “[a]pplying the correct meaning of the term, Walton’s MIMO receiver does not necessarily comprise a MUD module.” Id. Therefore, Petitioner explains that “Ground 2 combines Walton with Learned, which expressly discloses [a] multi-user detector, and thus renders every challenged claim obvious in combination with Walton.” Id. at 2–3.7 In other words, the Petition presents Ground 1 and Grounds 2/3 as alternatives depending on the meaning of 7 Although not specifically relevant to claim construction, Petitioner explains that “Ground 3 further combines Walton and Learned with Quigley, to the extent Patent Owner argues Walton does not disclose providing a burst control input.” Pet. 3. “MUD module,” where Ground 1 is based on Petitioner’s understanding of Patent Owner’s interpretation of the term and Grounds 2 and 3 are based on Petitioner’s interpretation of the term as having its plain meaning. Petitioner further contends that “[e]very other claim term carries its ‘ordinary and customary meaning’ . . . .” Id. at 8. Although Petitioner presents a potential dispute regarding the meaning of “MUD module,” we need not construe this term expressly because the determination we reach herein does not depend on which meaning MUD module is applied. Accordingly, we do not construe any claim terms expressly because express constructions are not necessary to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 12

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached

    “IV. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL Patent Owners contends that the factors set forth in Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 9 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential), weigh heavily in favor of discretionary denial. Prelim. Resp. 40–46; Paper 10. Petitioner disagrees. Pet. 74–77; Paper 9. In light of the conclusion reached above, we need not address the parties’ arguments regarding discretionary denial.” slip op. at 25

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,089,946
• Samsung Electronics America, Inc. / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Collision Communications, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Mar 21, 2025 · IPR2024-01248 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–11, 16, and 21 unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which we find consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’071 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Neither party proposes a specific construction of any claim term, although Petitioner contends each term should be construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 16; see generally Prelim. Resp. Accordingly, we need not construe any claim terms expressly because the meaning of the terms is not in dispute and an express construction is not necessary to resolve the controversy before us.” slip op. at 13

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “We find the Petition lacking in particularity because it does not clearly identify what aspect of Jin is alleged to teach the unique signal parameters (or unique estimated signal parameters) recited in claim 1. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (“A petition filed under section 311 may be considered only if — (3) the petition identifies, in writing and with particularity, . . . the evidence that supports the ground for the challenge to each claim . . . .”). First, as reflected above, the Petition asserts that something called a “unique pilot parameter” teaches the recited unique estimated signal parameters. But “unique pilot parameter” is not a term or phrase recited in Jin. See Prelim. Resp. 19 (arguing the same). So, when Petitioner states “Jin discloses that the base station uses the unique pilot parameter (i.e., ‘unique estimated signal parameters’) to ‘identify which user (i.e., mobile terminal) has transmitted the received data,’” it is not clear what element in Jin Petitioner intends to identify by the term “unique pilot parameter.” Dr. Min’s testimony does not help resolve the ambiguity in the Petition. In particular, Dr. Min also refers to a “unique pilot parameter (i.e., ‘unique signal parameter’) for each user.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 89. But, as noted above, Jin does not disclose an element referred to as a “pilot parameter” and it is not clear what element Dr. Min intended to identify in Jin.8” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,814,071

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.