• Medivis, Inc. v. Novarad Corp.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 1, 2026 · IPR2023-00042 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Remand

  Claims 1–6, 11, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Doo and Amira; claims 12–19 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted tissue properties were not shown in Amira.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “Federal Circuit. The court issued its decision in Medivis, Inc. v. Novarad Corp., No. 2024-1794, 2026 WL 587294 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 3, 2026) (“Medivis”) (Paper 40),1 affirming-in-part, reversing-in-part, and remanding our Final Written Decision (Paper 35) for further proceedings. In its opinion, the Federal Circuit reversed our “determination of no motivation to combine Doo and Amira” and remanded for further proceedings to evaluate whether claims 1–6 and 11–20 (“the Remanded Claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 11,004,271 B2 (“the ’271 patent,” Ex. 1001) are unpatentable in view of Petitioner’s obviousness challenge over Doo and Amira. Medivis, slip op. at 9–10. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We issue this Final Written Decision on Remand pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 144, 318 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73 in an inter partes review involving Medivis, Inc. (“Petitioner”) and Novarad Corp. (“Patent Owner”). For the reasons discussed below, after considering the entirety of the record in light of the Federal Circuit’s directives in Medivis, we hold that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1–6, 11, and 20 are unpatentable; however, Petitioner has not demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 12–19 are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, except that we excise part of Petitioner’s definition to produce the following modified version: 4 Throughout this decision, we eliminate the parties’ italicization of reference names from quotations without noting “emphasis omitted.” 5 Doo, WO 2015/164402 A1, published October 29, 2015 (Ex. 1008). 6 Excerpt of Amira 5 User’s Guide, title through Chapter 2 (Visual Imaging 2009) (Ex. 1005). engineering, or a related field with several years of experience in the design, development, and study of augmented reality devices and . . . familiarity with conventional medical imaging data and visualization of data for medical procedures . . . . Our edit removes the alternative of “working with a team including someone with such familiarity” because one’s role in a team may be tangential to their personal experience with medical imaging. Regardless, had we adopted Petitioner’s original definition, our decision would not have changed.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that the term “3D slices” has no apparent connection to the phrase “direct volume rendering.” Patent Owner’s argument appears to be that DVR “requires an image of the entire anatomical volume that is neither feature-specific nor segmented, [which] would seemingly require that all inner layers be displayed.” Reply 4; see Sur-reply 6–10 (not disputing Petitioner’s characterization). But, as Petitioner notes, the specification directly undermines this by teaching “display [of] a slice of the 3D data instead of a volume of the 3D data.” See Reply 4 n.2 (quoting Ex. 1001, 5:34–35). In other words, to the extent DVR would depict an image of the entire anatomical volume, displaying 3D slices “instead of a volume of the 3D data” implies the opposite of DVR. Even if “3D slices” somehow implied DVR, Patent Owner’s position is still untenable. Claim 1 does not recite “3D slices.” Instead, claim 1 recites “3D data” and “inner layers.” Ex. 1001, 18:54–65. Patent Owner fails to clarify the relationship between “slices,” “3D data,” and “layers,” and its expert even admits that slices and layers are two different things. See PO Resp. 13; Ex. 1022, 32:7–16 (agreeing that the words “slice” and “layer” are not “synonyms”), cited in Reply 4. We also agree with Petitioner that dependent claim 3 distinguishes slices and layers by reciting “slices of the projected inner layer.” Reply 4 (quoting Ex. 1001, 19:3–10). Thus, even if 3D slices somehow implied DVR, the language of claim 1 does not support limiting the claim this way.” slip op. at 12

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “The determination of whether a document was publicly accessible “involves a case-by-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Barry, 891 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2018). For instance, courts routinely rely on the Wayback Machine to determine when a reference was first made available to the public. Valve Corp. v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd., 8 F.4th 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“District courts have taken judicial notice of the contents of webpages available through the Wayback Machine ‘as facts that can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.’”). We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that “Medivis cannot rely on additional prior art”—Exhibits 1023 and 1024—“that was submitted after its Petition to carry its burden without leave from the Board.” Sur-reply 4. As Patent Owner did not file a motion to exclude these exhibits, we decline Patent Owner’s invitation to disregard them. We also find Petitioner’s Reply argument proper because it directly responds to Patent Owner’s contention that Petitioner did not prove the public accessibility of Amira. See Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. One World Techs., Inc., 944 F.3d, 919, 925 on issues previously raised.”). Petitioner’s Reply argument appropriately elaborates on the Petition’s contention that Amira was publicly accessible. Patent Owner also does not dispute the substance of Petitioner’s evidence. For example, Patent Owner does not address the substance of Mr. Frank-White’s declaration. We find that this evidence, including Mr. Frank- White’s declaration testimony, persuasively supports the public availability of Amira as of the date shown in the Wayback Machine URL. See Ex. 1024.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 11,004,271 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,004,271
• Røde Microphones, LLC / Freedman Electronics Pty Ltd. v. Zaxcom, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2026 · IPR2025-00232 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held that Petitioner did not prove any challenged claims of the ’207 patent unpatentable under the Strub, Woo, Nagai, and Gleissner obviousness ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “in these respects. The preambles of claims 17 and 59 recite the “audio device wearable by a user for storing locally generated audio.” There is neither mention of “multi-track” audio in the claim, nor is the audio device limited to capturing a single source of sound, such as a single performer. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the ’443 and ’207 patent claims support the limited scope that Patent Owner urges for the term “locally generated audio.” None of Patent Owner’s citations to the specification define or require that the “locally generated audio” correspond to audio generated only by a single performer. See, e.g., 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 8:59−62 (stating that the local audio input device “may be worn by the performer and connects to local audio device 102 at local audio input device port 314”). Patent Owner’s argument that the specification “teaches a single creator/performer per local audio device” is well-taken, but the teachings do not indicate the intent to exclude other sounds from being captured at the local audio device (or indicate how the device would prevent the capture of other sounds, such that the audio would be “isolated” as Patent Owner contends). See 230 Sur-Reply 10 (citing 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 4:28−32, 10:29−34, and Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contr., Inc., 99 F.3d 1098, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[C]laim 1 refers to ‘a cup’ and ‘the cup’ repeatedly, suggesting that only one cup is involved . . . . [N]either the specification nor the drawings disclose the use of more than one cup.”)). For instance, the specification describes that the “independent track of audio is received from one of the performer’s local audio device 102.” 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 10:33−34. Thus, in this description the audio track corresponds to the audio captured by a particular audio device—which was worn by the performer— but does not limit that captured audio to only sounds made by the performer. As to the “local audio data” term, Patent Owner argues that “audio data” means “mono or stereo audio files created from independent, isolated locally generated audio files, such files suitable for creation of a multi-track audio file.” 230 PO Resp. 9−10 (citing Ex. 2140 ¶¶ 131, 134). This argument is unsupported by the claim language or specification. The claim does not require the creation of audio files, much less a “multi-track audio file.” The specification describes storing audio files in memory without the specificity that Patent Owner urges we adopt. See 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 13:1−14. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “local audio data.” Rather, we understand “audio data” to have a plain and ordinary meaning, such as the one given to the term by the District Court in the underlying litigation. 230 IPR, Ex. 1037, 10. We adopt the District Court’s construction of “audio data” to mean “data comprising audio signals in digital form.” Id. This finds support in the specification as the audio is described as being converted into digital audio and stored in a file. See 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 13:1−14. Our conclusion is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term as that would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, and we see no reason to deviate from the conclusions of the District Court on this point.” slip op. at 20

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “data” means “mono or stereo audio files created from independent, isolated locally generated audio files, such files suitable for creation of a multi-track audio file.” 230 PO Resp. 9−10 (citing Ex. 2140 ¶¶ 131, 134). This argument is unsupported by the claim language or specification. The claim does not require the creation of audio files, much less a “multi-track audio file.” The specification describes storing audio files in memory without the specificity that Patent Owner urges we adopt. See 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 13:1−14. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “local audio data.” Rather, we understand “audio data” to have a plain and ordinary meaning, such as the one given to the term by the District Court in the underlying litigation. 230 IPR, Ex. 1037, 10. We adopt the District Court’s construction of “audio data” to mean “data comprising audio signals in digital form.” Id. This finds support in the specification as the audio is described as being converted into digital audio and stored in a file. See 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 13:1−14. Our conclusion is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term as that would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, and we see no reason to deviate from the conclusions of the District Court on this point.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Skepticism / industry praiseObjective indicia with nexusDecided for patent owner

    “1. Industry Praise: Academy and Emmy Awards Patent Owner argues that it “revolutionized [the] industry with the” slip op. at 97

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Long-felt need / failure of othersDecided for patent owner

    “2. Long-Felt Need Patent Owner further proffers the testimony of two witnesses as” slip op. at 104

  Patent outcomesUS 10,276,207 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,276,207
• Røde Microphones, LLC / Freedman Electronics Pty Ltd. v. Zaxcom, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2026 · IPR2025-00230 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board determined that Petitioner had not shown any challenged claims of the ’443 or ’207 patents unpatentable, including under the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonySkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “E. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Based on the argument and evidence presented in the Petition and Patent Owner’s preliminary response, we determined, as stated in our Decision on Institution, that “a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two or more years of experience working with audio and wireless communications systems.” 230 Dec. on Inst. 16; 232 Dec. on Inst. 22−23. Patent Owner reiterates its position that a person of ordinary skill the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related subject and two to five years’ experience working with multi-track audio and wireless communications systems in the professional performance industry.” 230 IPR, PO Resp. 6−7 (emphasis added) (identical passage in 232 PO Resp. 8). Thus, the dispute centers on whether the level or ordinary skill includes specific work experience with multi-track audio in the professional performance industry. We do not agree that this specific work experience is necessary to the level of ordinary skill in the instant proceedings. In determining whether an invention would have been obvious at the time it was made, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17−18 (1966). “The importance of resolving the level of ordinary skill in the art lies in the necessity of maintaining objectivity in the obviousness inquiry.” Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu‑Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The “person of ordinary skill in the art” is a hypothetical construct, from whose vantage point obviousness is assessed. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In determining the level or ordinary skill, we may consider various factors including “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 1579, (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). Patent Owner’s proposed specificity of work with multi-track audio in a professional performance industry is not supported by the record. First, Patent Owner submits conclusory declaration testimony of James DeFilippis—repeating verbatim, and without any supported reasoning, Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. Ex. 2140 ¶ 15. As such, the testimony is not persuasive. Second, Patent Owner’s additional declaration testimony of Jack” slip op. at 12

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “data” means “mono or stereo audio files created from independent, isolated locally generated audio files, such files suitable for creation of a multi-track audio file.” 230 PO Resp. 9−10 (citing Ex. 2140 ¶¶ 131, 134). This argument is unsupported by the claim language or specification. The claim does not require the creation of audio files, much less a “multi-track audio file.” The specification describes storing audio files in memory without the specificity that Patent Owner urges we adopt. See 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 13:1−14. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “local audio data.” Rather, we understand “audio data” to have a plain and ordinary meaning, such as the one given to the term by the District Court in the underlying litigation. 230 IPR, Ex. 1037, 10. We adopt the District Court’s construction of “audio data” to mean “data comprising audio signals in digital form.” Id. This finds support in the specification as the audio is described as being converted into digital audio and stored in a file. See 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 13:1−14. Our conclusion is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term as that would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, and we see no reason to deviate from the conclusions of the District Court on this point.” slip op. at 21

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “irrelevant under Federal Rules of Evidence 401–403. Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner has failed to establish that these documents reflect the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art, or that they are consumer-oriented documents, but not technical references or sources for understanding the meaning of claim terms. 230 IPR, Paper 64, 3−4. According to Patent Owner, these exhibits lack a “technical foundation” that establishes the technical meaning of a claim term. Id. We do not agree with Patent Owner as it conflates relevance with sufficiency of evidence to prove a contention on claim construction. Dictionary definitions are often useful when determining a claim term’s plain and ordinary meaning in the context of the specification, and as such are relevant when claim terms are disputed. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. Furthermore, the evidence of record shows testimony as to whether the “Sweetwater” glossary entry for “body pack” would be relevant to the meaning of the term in the “world of wireless performance.” 230 IPR, Paper 67, 4 (citing Ex. 1073 ¶ 42). Patent Owner’s objections are overruled as to relevance.” slip op. at 116

  • BurdenFwd all claims patentableNot shown unpatentable

    “after a full and fair hearing, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that any of the challenged claims are unpatentable.” slip op. at 125

  Patent outcomesUS 7,711,443 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,711,443
• Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 4, 2026 · IPR2024-01223 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 34–37 and 40–46 were not shown unpatentable because Suzuki’s organic barrier layer was not shown to meet the agreed construction of “planarization layer.”

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “layer of material that planarizes such that the propagation of defects from one layer to another layer can be interrupted and the topography of the underlying layer and/or structure is not reproduced.” PO Resp. 10. According to Patent Owner, we should adopt this construction because the parties agreed to it in a related district court proceeding and it is supported by the intrinsic evidence. Id. at 10–14. Petitioner does not dispute this 1 Japanese Published Application No. H09-245964, Pub. Sep. 19, 1997 (Ex. 1010, “Kijima”) (English translation). 2 US 6,198,217, Pub. Mar. 6, 2001 (Ex. 1012, “Suzuki”). 3 US 6,087,196, Pub. July 11, 2000 (Ex. 1013, “Sturm”). 4 WO 2001/08242, Pub. Feb. 1, 2001 (Ex. 1016, “Duthaler”). 5 Japanese Published Application No. H10-41069, Pub. Feb. 13, 1998 (Ex. 1014, “Fujimori”) (English translation). construction. Paper 33, 6:17–8:1; see Pet. Reply 5. We adopt the parties’ agreed-to construction.” slip op. at 4

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner argues Suzuki’s organic barrier layer does not reproduce the underlying layer’s/structure’s topography because “Suzuki’s organic barrier layer 20 ‘makes a smooth surface on the relatively irregular surface of the cathode 18.’” Pet. Reply 7 (quoting Ex. 1012, 5:59–67). We disagree. Instead, we agree with Patent Owner that Suzuki’s irregular-surface smoothing describes covering defects, not suppressing the underlying cathode’s topography. PO Sur-reply 5. The smooth-surface passage that Petitioner highlights comes immediately after two sentences describing inevitable “defects,” “pinholes,” and “foreign matter” on the cathode surface and before a sentence describing “ensuring the formation of the layer 22, which is substantially defect-free.” Ex. 1012, 5:52–67. Suzuki’s organic barrier 20 “makes a smooth surface” by covering defects because the defects are the only source of the “irregularity” that Suzuki refers to here. Id. We note Mr. Humphrey’s testimony, which we credit in this regard, that the “defects are created incidentally on the surface of the underlying layer and are generally not considered to be part of the underlying layer’s topography, which is a macroscopic property by design” and that the organic layer is not a planarization layer because it would reproduce the topography of the underlying layer. Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 47–48. Because the parties’ agreed-to construction of “planarization layer” “requires ‘a layer of material that planarizes’ for two distinct functions,” Petitioner’s showing of just one of those functions is insufficient. PO Sur-reply 2.” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “G. Level of Skill in the Art Petitioner argues a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Materials Science, or a related field, and at least one year of experience in display technologies” and that “[a]dditional education might compensate for a deficiency in experience, and vice-versa.” Pet. 14–15. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. We agree with and adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the level of skill reflected in both the prior art and the ’389 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 6

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “which is substantially defect-free.” Ex. 1012, 5:52–67. Suzuki’s organic barrier 20 “makes a smooth surface” by covering defects because the defects are the only source of the “irregularity” that Suzuki refers to here. Id. We note Mr. Humphrey’s testimony, which we credit in this regard, that the “defects are created incidentally on the surface of the underlying layer and are generally not considered to be part of the underlying layer’s topography, which is a macroscopic property by design” and that the organic layer is not a planarization layer because it would reproduce the topography of the underlying layer. Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 47–48. Because the parties’ agreed-to construction of “planarization layer” “requires ‘a layer of material that planarizes’ for two distinct functions,” Petitioner’s showing of just one of those functions is insufficient. PO Sur-reply 2.” slip op. at 9

  Patent outcomesUS 6,949,389 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 6,949,389
• Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 4, 2026 · IPR2024-01222 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 34–37 and 40–46 are unpatentable as obvious over the Yamazaki-based and Weaver-based grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner bears the burden of production to establish that its claimed invention is entitled to an earlier priority date for this fact-intensive issue. See In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We agree with Petitioner that the email chain does not support Patent Owner’s conception claim because it “does not discuss depositing a planarization layer, as required by both independent claims.” Pet. Reply 3. Patent Owner asserts that the inventor’s discussion of “PML” (polymer multi-layer) encapsulation in the email chain shows their conception of the claimed planarization layer because the ’389 patent describes that PMLs “‘[t]ypically’ include[e] ‘a planarization layer’ that ‘is provided to give a planar surface’ for deposition of an upper layer,” and “‘address ‘any point defects (i.e. pin holes)’ that might appear in the barrier layer’s surface.” PO Resp. 6 (quoting Ex. 1001, 1:31–37, 1:41–44, 1:56–62). We disagree with Patent Owner for two reasons. First, the challenged patent’s specification does not corroborate that the inventors conceived the claimed planarization before the challenged patent’s priority because it did not exist at the time of the email. Whether the inventors, at the time of filing, considered PMLs to typically include a planarization layer as of the claimed priority date does not support the allegation that they conceived of that same planarization layer more than a year earlier. Moreover, the ’389 patent’s teaching that “[t]ypically, for PML structures, a planarization layer 106 is formed” (Ex. 1001, 1:30–31) shows that the inventors recognized PML structures and planarization layers were distinct because only a subset of PML structures formed planarization layers, even if they do so typically. Thus, the inventor’s discussion of a PML layer in the email chain does not evidence their conception of the claimed planarization layer, as Patent Owner contends. Additionally, even if we were to understand the inventors’ mention of PML encapsulation in the emails, together with the discussion of patterning techniques for an organic layer, as discussing a planarization layer, such discussions are evidence of brainstorming ideas, rather than documenting the path taken with the claimed invention. For instance, the inventors use phrases like “don’t know if this will work,” “these are all just ‘undeveloped’ ideas,” and “looking forward to keep this discussion rolling.” Ex. 2006, 1; see also Ex. 1034, 59:22−59:18. As Petitioner argues, and we agree, these are more theoretical and future-development discussions than an exchange of a definite idea. Pet. Reply 2−3 (citing Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986). For these reasons, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner has not” slip op. at 6

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Applicant-admitted prior artDecided for petitioner

    “B. Whether Petitioner Relies on Applicant Admitted Prior Art Patent Owner asserts we should “not consider” Yamazaki-based challenges because Petitioner included Applicant Admitted Prior Art (AAPA) in those grounds. See PO Resp. 16 (citing Qualcomm Incorporated v. Apple Inc., 134 F.4th 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2025)) (holding that AAPA may not be part of the basis for an inter partes review). We disagree. As Petitioner notes, it “utilizes the AAPA in the alternative with Ghosh, to show that it was known to manufacture OLED devices in bulk (which [Patent Owner] does not dispute).” Pet. Reply 9. Because “[t]he Petition identifies disclosures in Ghosh that independently demonstrate the same teachings for which the AAPA is cited,” we agree with Petitioner that it does not improperly rely on AAPA for any of its challenges. Id.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “C. Whether Yamazaki, Weaver, and Palanisamy Are Printed Publications under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) Patent Owner asserts that Yamazaki, Weaver, and Palanisamy do not qualify as printed publications under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) because they only qualify as prior art under § 102(e). PO Resp. 17. According to Patent Owner, “[e]ven though the Federal Circuit has held that such references are ‘printed publications’ under 311(b), to preserve arguments on appeal, Patent Owner submits that such an interpretation is inconsistent with the plain statutory language, the precedent, and non-public accessibility of an unpublished patent application.” Id. We disagree with this argument because the Federal Circuit has rejected it, as Patent Owner acknowledges. See Lynk Labs, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 2023-2346, Slip. Op. (Fed. Cir. Jan. 14, 2025).” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Yamazaki does not involve multiple devices on a substrate” and Ghosh teaches “non-selective deposition of at least the barrier layer.” PO Resp. 31. We disagree with this argument because it attacks Yamazaki and Ghosh individually, rather than the combination of Yamazaki’s selective deposition and Ghosh’s plurality of devices that Petitioner asserts. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). We also disagree with Patent Owner’s criticism that Petitioner fails to explain why skilled artisans would have ignored Ghosh’s non-selective deposition method for barrier layers on multiple devices. PO Resp. 32. This argument attacks a straw man as Petitioner does not propose modifying Ghosh’s method with Yamazaki’s selective deposition. See Pet. 21–23. Rather, Petitioner proposes modifying Yamazaki’s selective deposition method by applying it to Ghosh’s teaching of encapsulating a plurality of OLED devices. Id. Next, Patent Owner asserts that skilled artisans would not have extended Yamazaki’s single-device fabrication/encapsulation method to a plurality of devices on a substrate because doing so would “multiply defects and errors, drop the yield exponentially, and increase the cost.” PO Resp. 34. Patent Owner asserts that precision/defect problems would be particularly acute when using Yamazaki’s inkjet method to print devices’ electro luminescence layers. Id. at 35–36. We disagree. Even if extending Yamazaki’s method to Ghosh’s multiple devices comes at a cost of potential defects, that tradeoff would not undermine Petitioner’s proffered combination given Petitioner’s articulated benefits outline above, including facilitating manufacturing display panels for OLEDs with improved throughput, improved productivity, and reduced manufacturing costs, as compared to fabricating/encapsulating just a single device. See Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another.”). It also does not matter that “inkjet printing yielded devices of half the efficiency than spin coating,” as Patent Owner asserts (PO Resp. 35), because Petitioner does not need to show that Yamazaki’s inkjet printing would be the best option for batch fabrication/encapsulation, only that it would was a suitable one from which the prior art did not teach away. See Par Pharm., Inc. v. TWi Pharms., Inc., 773 F. 3d 1186, 1197–98 (Fed. Cir 2014). That is, Petitioner does not need to show that Yamazaki’s inkjet method was an improvement over other known fabrication/encapsulation methods, so long as it was a known fabrication/encapsulation method and skilled artisans would understand that implementing it for a plurality of devices had known advantages over fabricating/encapsulating a single device, which Petitioner identifies. See Pet. 22. We also agree with Dr. Subramanian that skilled artisans would have a reasonable expectation of success in making the proposed combination given similarities between the references (both are directed to encapsulation of an OLED display device with multiple thin-film layers and at least the first encapsulation is selectively deposited) and because “as the ’389 patent admits, in the prior art it was conventional to use batch fabrication to manufacture OLED display devices with thin-film encapsulation.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 86. As Dr. Subramanian explains, a particular advantage of inkjet printing is that it scales well to larger areas and it was known at the time of the ’389 patent that inkjet could be used to print multiple devices on a glass substrate. Ex. 1032 ¶¶ 2, 27–28. Patent Owner’s argument that “Yamazaki’s methods are far from ready for manufacturing” (PO Resp. 34) goes well beyond what is necessary to show that skilled artisans would have had a reasonable expectation of achieving what is claimed. See Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Given Petitioner’s analysis outlined above, we agree with Petitioner that it would have been obvious to skilled artisans to fabricate and encapsulate multiple OLED devices on a substrate using Yamazaki’s ink-jet methods. slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 6,949,389 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 6,949,389
• Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 24, 2026 · IPR2024-01256 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6, 10–14, 16, and 17 were not shown unpatentable because Ahn and Chaudhri did not teach or suggest the claimed movement of an object during the gesture.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “interface objects and, more specifically, the display of user interfaces on applications, in accordance with contacts on the touch-sensitive surface of a display. Ex. 1001, (54), Abstr. Consistent with the scope of the ’727 patent, we find that the level of skill in the art is reflected in a person having a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, human-computer interaction, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience working with graphical user interfaces, human-computer interfaces, or equivalents.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Because there is no dispute as to the scope and meaning of these terms, and for consistency with the Decision on Institution, we apply the meaning of the terms “blur” and “distance magnitude” as stated above where applicable. However, we note that our determination does not hinge on the meaning of these terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (only those terms that are in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “it was “known to utilize ‘cues’ to help the user know what gesture to utilize and whether they are correctly performing the gesture (e.g., graphics such as movable images that help the user visualize the correct gesture and how to complete it successfully).” Pet. 40 (citing Ex. 1005, Abstract, ¶¶ 54, 62, 73). This sentence does not cure the deficiency noted above regarding Petitioner’s reliance on Ahn’s graphic shadow moving with a gesture. Chaudhri is relied on for the proposition that, Ahn’s graphic shadow is “[i]ndeed” a movable image known to give a user a visual cue. Id. But no such “cue” is provided in Ahn by the graphical shadow alone, because there is no movement of that object. The Petition does not present argument that a Chaudhri object is the movable object or how any of Chaudhri’s teachings of movable objects would have suggested to modify Ahn “to thereby move” the graphical shadow.” slip op. at 18

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “the theory that Ahn’s graphic shadow moves. Reply 3−4. Petitioner interprets the sentences in Ahn we have analyzed above in conjunction with testimony of Dr. Terveen to argue that temporal descriptions in Ahn make it obvious for a person of ordinary skill in the art to drag in the right direction while continuing to press the graphic 1800. Id. (citing Exs. 1004 ¶¶ 117−119, Ex. 1023 ¶ 10). The Petition, however, relies on an Ahn disclosing a moving graphic shadow according to the embodiment of Figure 18(a), as described in paragraph 118. Petitioner now changes its theory of how Ahn’s graphic shadow would move according to paragraph 119, i.e., that although the graphic shadow is merely pressed (in the embodiment shown in Figure 18(b)) it would also be dragged while pressed. Reply 3. Not only is this a shift from the theory Petitioner presents in the Petition, it is not persuasive. As Patent Owner argues, and we agree, there is no cogent explanation for modifying the graphic shadow embodiment of Figure 18(b), especially in light of Ahn’s disclosure that the graphic shadow disappears when pressed and the menu list is displayed as emerging. Sur-reply 2−3. In other words, Petitioner’s new argument does not account for Ahn’s teaching that the objective of the graphic shadow is merely to notify the user of the start of the gesture, and once that start of the gesture is detected (the press on the graphic shadow), paragraph 119 informs us that there is no longer a need for the graphic shadow—it disappears from the display. Ex. 1004 ¶ 119. The Petition does not offer any argument for a theory in which the gesture of paragraph 119 (the press, not a touch and drag operation) results in graphic 1800 disappearing, while also moving during the disappearance. We are mindful that “[i]t is impermissible within the framework of section 103 to pick and choose from any one reference only so much of it as will support a given position to the exclusion of other parts necessary to the full appreciation of what such reference fairly suggests to one skilled in the art.” Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind / Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 448 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). Consequently, we determine that Petitioner’s argument in Reply belatedly relying on the different embodiment of paragraph 119 is improper new argument, and that even if considered it is not persuasive.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 11,740,727 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,740,727
• Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 17, 2026 · IPR2024-01187 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 8–11, and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over Ingle and Hasei; claims 3, 5, and 6 were not shown unpatentable because the Hanamura-based grounds lack the claimed trench.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “isolation, rather than in the claims’ context, and in light of the ’492 patent’s specification. In the trench/layers context of the ’492 patent, the word in requires more than it does in the circle/square context.” slip op. at 6

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Physics, or a comparable field of study, and at least three years of research or industrial experience with semiconductor (organic or inorganic) optoelectronic devices and/or lighting or displays. An individual with additional education could have less research or industrial experience and vice-versa. Pet. 9. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition. We adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed definition because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “rather than the combination of Ingle’s capacitor and Hasei’s droplet discharge application that Petitioner asserts. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). Even if Ingle falls short of teaching structured application for its capacitor’s cathode, as Patent Owner argues, that does not undermine Petitioner’s challenge because Petitioner proposes using Hasei’s structured application (i.e., a droplet discharge device) to form the cathode of Ingle’s capacitor. See Pet. 24–25. Patent Owner’s additional argument that “Hasei contains no discussion of forming capacitors” (PO Resp. 36; see PO Sur-reply 17–18) is similarly flawed—it attacks Hasei individually, while ignoring Ingle’s capacitor teaching. We agree with Petitioner—the combination of Ingle and Hasei teaches structured application of the capacitor’s cathode. In addition, we disagree with Patent Owner that “Petitioner provides no reason why a POSITA would have extended Hasei’s method for producing its OLED to a capacitor.” PO Resp. 36; see PO Sur-reply 17 (asserting “pure conjecture”). To the contrary, as noted above, Petitioner explains, with relevant support from Hasei, that its structured application method reduced electrode-material waste and shortened manufacturing times as compared to photolithography. Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 5, 7). Given those benefits, Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to support that its proffered combination would have been obvious. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).” slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 9,257,492 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 9,257,492
• Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 10, 2026 · IPR2024-01119 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 27, 37, 58, 60-64, 67-79, 186, 187, 189, 191, 192, 197, 199-204, 208-216, 223, 225, and 230 were not proven unpatentable over the asserted combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner “does not agree with all aspects of Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill” but did not propose an alternative definition. PO Resp. 10–11. Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Rosenberg, adopted Dr. Terveen’s definition for the purposes of his declaration. Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 32–33. We again adopt the main portion of Dr. Terveen’s definition, and determine that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, human-computer interaction, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience working with graphical user interfaces and applications for computers.” This definition is commensurate with the problems and solutions in the ’754 patent and prior art of record and is supported by declarant testimony.” slip op. at 9

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “Given our determination of how Ahn consistently describes the “touch and drag” gesture and “dragged” to mean the movement of a finger (or other object external to the touch screen), and in the absence of persuasive evidence in the figures or in other portions of Ahn to support the movement or appearance of a menu during a user input gesture, we determine that the present record does not support a conclusion that Ahn teaches or suggests a menu sliding onto a display or appearing during an input gesture such as a touch and drag gesture, as opposed to being displayed after such a gesture is completed.” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Given our determination of how Ahn consistently describes the “touch and drag” gesture and “dragged” to mean the movement of a finger (or other object external to the touch screen), and in the absence of persuasive evidence in the figures or in other portions of Ahn to support the movement or appearance of a menu during a user input gesture, we determine that the present record does not support a conclusion that Ahn teaches or suggests a menu sliding onto a display or appearing during an input gesture such as a touch and drag gesture, as opposed to being displayed after such a gesture is completed.” slip op. at 27

  • Expert testimonyDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner argues that “even under [this] interpretation of Ahn, the only difference between Ahn and the claims is whether the animation occurs in direct correspondence with a user’s dragging gesture or after the dragging gesture is complete – a straightforward design choice if ever there was one.” Pet. Reply 3–4 (citing Ex. 1024, 99:16–108:20; Ex. 1023 ¶ 12). However, as Patent Owner argues (PO Sur-reply 7–8) this argument is presented in Reply and is an improper shift of theory from the Petition. Nevertheless, were we to consider it, we would not find it compelling; Dr. Terveen’s cited testimony repeats this bare statement and is not supported by any evidence or additional explanation. Ex. 1023 ¶ 12; see 37 CFR § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential) (assigning little weight to opinion testimony that “merely repeats” conclusory statements in a brief, without “cit[ing] any additional supporting evidence or provid[ing] any technical reasoning to support [the declarant’s] statement”).” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 10,656,754 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,656,754
• Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 10, 2026 · IPR2024-01116 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision

  Petitioner did not prove claims 1, 2, 27, 37, 58, 60–64, 67–79, 186, 187, 189, 191, 192, 197, 199–204, 208–216, 223, 225, or 230 unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the claimed blurring …

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “(Ex. 1003), that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had “a Bachelor of Science degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, human-computer interaction, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience in the design and development of graphical user interfaces (GUIs), human-computer interfaces, or equivalents thereof,” and that “[a]dditional years of experience could substitute for an advanced-level degree (and vice-versa).” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 29–30).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction In these proceedings, there is no controversy that would require us to decide any claim construction issue. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D. Obviousness of Claims 2, 27, 37, 58, 60–64, 67–79, 186, 187, 189, 191,” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “obviousness of the menus in the Ahn-Chaudhri combination following a user’s finger as the user performs the dragging gesture to open the menu.” Pet. Reply 2 (citing 01119-Petition, 26–33, substantially identical to Pet. 32– 40). However, again, the Petition does not explain an alternative theory in which Chaudhri supplements Ahn’s menu functionality to move that menu onto the screen, as opposed to teaching visual cues provided by gradual changes of the display during a gesture or the visual cue that an unlock image may provide during the unlock gesture. See Pet. 14–18 (describing Chaudhri teaching “visual differentiation” or “transitioning an optical intensity” between a user-interface object and the background, based on, e.g., transparency), 35–40 (same). In Reply, Petitioner adds evidence to attempt to support its contention that the combination teaches a menu following a user’s finger during a dragging gesture, involving references to Chaudhri’s discussion of a visual cue, further discussing Chaudhri’s unlock image. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 54, 62, 74–79, Figs. 5A-5C (cited at Pet. Reply 4–5). With respect to these citations and arguments, even if they had been timely presented in the Petition, we agree with Patent Owner that they do not articulate a modification of Ahn with Chaudhri or a motivation to combine. PO Sur-reply 6. Additionally, we agree that these embodiments of Chaudhri are distinct from the cited portions of Chaudhri discussed with respect to this theory in the Petition, which relate not to the movement of displayed graphics, but to variations of optical intensity and visual cues. Id. at 6–7. We evaluate the Petition’s arguments in light of Petitioner’s statement in Reply that they require a teaching regarding “menus . . . following a user’s finger as the user performs the dragging gesture.” Pet. Reply 2. To the extent that the Petition shows that the combination of Ahn and Chaudhri would show visual changes as the user performs a dragging gesture, these do not relate to the movement of a menu, but rather to other optical effects. Thus, as we do not find that the Petition supports an Ahn-Chaudhri combination in which a menu follows a user’s finger as the user performs the dragging gesture to open the menu, as Petitioner argues, we determine that Petitioner has not shown limitation 2.d of claim 2 taught or suggested by the combination of Ahn and Chaudhri according to this theory.” slip op. at 31

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner argues that “even under [this] interpretation of Ahn, the only difference between Ahn and the claims is whether the animation occurs in direct correspondence with a user’s dragging gesture or after the dragging gesture is complete – a straightforward design choice if ever there was one.” Pet. Reply 3–4 (citing Ex. 1024, 99:16–108:20; Ex. 1023 ¶ 12). However, as Patent Owner argues (PO Sur-reply 7–8) this argument is presented in Reply and is an improper shift of theory from the Petition. Nevertheless, were we to consider it, we would not find it compelling; Dr. Terveen’s cited testimony repeats this bare statement and is not supported by any evidence or additional explanation. Ex. 1023 ¶ 12; see 37 CFR § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential) (assigning little weight to opinion testimony that “merely repeats” conclusory statements in a brief, without “cit[ing] any additional supporting evidence or provid[ing] any technical reasoning to support [the declarant’s] statement”).” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 10,656,754 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,656,754
• Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 10, 2026 · IPR2024-01115 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision

  Apple did not prove claims 1, 2, 27, 37, 58, 60–64, 67–79, 186, 187, 189, 191, 192, 197, 199–204, 208–216, 223, 225, and 230 unpatentable over the asserted Ahn combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “In the Decision on Institution in each proceeding, we noted that Petitioner’s definition left it unclear whether the bachelor’s degree in the proposed definition would be considered by Petitioner to be “an advancedlevel degree,” and did not adopt the portion of the definition relating to the substitution of years of experience for a degree. Dec. on Inst. 15–16. Patent Owner “does not agree with all aspects of Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill” but did not propose an alternative definition. PO Resp. 10–11. Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Rosenberg, adopted Dr. Terveen’s definition for the purposes of his declaration. Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 32–33. We again adopt the main portion of Dr. Terveen’s definition, and determine that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, human-computer interaction, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience working with graphical user interfaces and applications for computers.” This definition is commensurate with the problems and solutions in the ’754 patent and prior art of record and is supported by declarant testimony.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction In these proceedings, there is no controversy that would require us to decide any claim construction issue. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D. Obviousness of Claims 2, 27, 37, 58, 60–64, 67–79, 186, 187, 189, 191,” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “obviousness of the menus in the Ahn-Chaudhri combination following a user’s finger as the user performs the dragging gesture to open the menu.” Pet. Reply 2 (citing 01119-Petition, 26–33, substantially identical to Pet. 32– 40). However, again, the Petition does not explain an alternative theory in which Chaudhri supplements Ahn’s menu functionality to move that menu onto the screen, as opposed to teaching visual cues provided by gradual changes of the display during a gesture or the visual cue that an unlock image may provide during the unlock gesture. See Pet. 14–18 (describing Chaudhri teaching “visual differentiation” or “transitioning an optical intensity” between a user-interface object and the background, based on, e.g., transparency), 35–40 (same). In Reply, Petitioner adds evidence to attempt to support its contention that the combination teaches a menu following a user’s finger during a dragging gesture, involving references to Chaudhri’s discussion of a visual cue, further discussing Chaudhri’s unlock image. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 54, 62, 74–79, Figs. 5A-5C (cited at Pet. Reply 4–5). With respect to these citations and arguments, even if they had been timely presented in the Petition, we agree with Patent Owner that they do not articulate a modification of Ahn with Chaudhri or a motivation to combine. PO Sur-reply 6. Additionally, we agree that these embodiments of Chaudhri are distinct from the cited portions of Chaudhri discussed with respect to this theory in the Petition, which relate not to the movement of displayed graphics, but to variations of optical intensity and visual cues. Id. at 6–7. We evaluate the Petition’s arguments in light of Petitioner’s statement in Reply that they require a teaching regarding “menus . . . following a user’s finger as the user performs the dragging gesture.” Pet. Reply 2. To the extent that the Petition shows that the combination of Ahn and Chaudhri would show visual changes as the user performs a dragging gesture, these do not relate to the movement of a menu, but rather to other optical effects. Thus, as we do not find that the Petition supports an Ahn-Chaudhri combination in which a menu follows a user’s finger as the user performs the dragging gesture to open the menu, as Petitioner argues, we determine that Petitioner has not shown limitation 2.d of claim 2 taught or suggested by the combination of Ahn and Chaudhri according to this theory.” slip op. at 31

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “(3) Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner has not shown limitation 2.d to be taught, suggested, or otherwise rendered obvious by Ahn and Chaudhri. Thus, we determine that Petitioner does not show by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 2 would have been obvious over the combination of Ahn and Chaudhri.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 10,656,754 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,656,754

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.