• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Ouraring, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00147 · APJ Linda E Horner · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board found claims 1–6 and 8–20 not shown unpatentable under three obviousness grounds, principally because the proposed combinations did not establish a feasible curved battery or transparent potting encapsulating the components.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, biomedical engineering, optical engineering, or related field of study, or equivalent experience, and at least two years’ experience in academia or industry studying or developing physiological monitoring devices such as non-invasive biosensors. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 29). Petitioner also contends that a person of ordinary skill would have been “familiar with, e.g., sensor system design, including inertial and other motion sensor system design, and signal processing” and that “[a] higher level of education or skill might make up for less experience, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Resp. 25. We adopt this uncontested definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. This definition is supported by the record and consistent with the disclosure in the ’124 patent and the references cited in the Petition.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We need not reach the issue of whether the preamble is limiting for purposes of determining patentability of the challenged claims. Even were we to agree with Patent Owner that the preamble is limiting and the claims are limited to a finger-worn ring wearable computer device, Petitioner has relied on Schröder in each ground to disclose a “wearable computing device configured to be worn around a finger of a wearer.” Pet. 22 (Ground 1), 45 (Ground 2, relying on Yuen for adding the functionality of light sources with a photodetector, temperature sensors, and varying the sampling frequency of sensor data acquisition), 56 (Ground 3). We agree with Petitioner that Schröder discloses such a device. Thus, no explicit claim construction is necessary for this decision.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments and find that Patent Owner has the better position for several reasons. First, the record supports Patent Owner’s argument that Mestas’s batteries are much too large to fit within a ring form factor, and “would have to be reduced in size on the 6 There is no Exhibit 2022 in the record of this case. magnitude of 5-10x from its current size to fit in a ring of Schröder.” Resp. 38 (citing Dr. Anthony’s cross-examination testimony at Ex. 2021, 313:12). Second, Petitioner relies on evidence in the Reply that Petitioner failed to specifically identify in the Petition. Compare Reply 3–5 (citing Ex. 1369 ¶¶ 7–14; Ex. 1079 ¶¶ 47, 71; Ex. 2022, 138:7–143:1; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 96, 337; Ex. 2021, 12–13, 307:7–17; Ex. 2020, 212:6–214:13; Ex. 1081, 130:18–131:14; Ex. 1010 ¶ 168), 9 (referring back to Section § II.B.2) with Pet. 25–26 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 193–99; Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 157, 163, 168, 201, Fig. 6). More specifically, while the portion of Dr. Anthony’s Declaration cited in the Petition (see Pet. 25–26 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 193–99)) mentions the Technology Background Section V of his Declaration (Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 42–147), neither Petitioner nor Dr. Anthony sufficiently explains what evidence supports his opinion that it was feasible to incorporate batteries or battery-like devices into finger-rings, or how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have miniaturized a curved battery for incorporation into Schröder’s ring. Ex. 1002 ¶ 196 (describing that rechargeable batteries powering wearable electronic devices were “well-known by 2013” and “had also undergone significant advances in terms of miniaturization and energy density [that] made it feasible to incorporate batteries or battery-like devices such as supercapacitors into smaller form factors, such as finger rings, without sacrificing functionality” such as “lithium-polymer (Li-Po) batteries and solid-state batteries.”). Moreover, some of Petitioner’s citations in the Reply appear to be incorrect as there is no Exhibit 2022 of record in this case, as noted above. These issues undermine the strength of Petitioner’s showing by making it difficult to follow its reasoning, much less identify where in the record that reasoning finds support. See DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 866–67 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A brief must make all arguments accessible to the judges, rather than ask them to play archaeologist with the record.”); United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”). Third, even considering Petitioner’s new Reply arguments and” slip op. at 27

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “We credit Dr. Mercier’s testimony over Dr. Anthony’s and agree that Dr. Anthony’s testimony fails to account for the constraints of a substantially smaller form factor in Schröder’s finger-ring as compared to Mestas’s wrist device. Ex. 2018 ¶ 140. Although large curved batteries suitable for use in a wrist band or other larger wearable device, such as shown in Mestas, were known at the time of the ’124 patent, we also have evidence that prior art “finger ring wearables up to the ’124 patent had used ‘coin’ type batteries.” Resp. 40 (citing Ex. 2018 ¶ 140). We credit Dr. Mercier’s testimony that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have looked to a coin type battery for the necessary power requirements of Schröder’s device. Ex. 2018 ¶ 141. Indeed, this testimony is consistent with the other art of record that consistently shows the use of flat batteries in finger-ring devices, often stacked above and protruding from the general ring shape of the device. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 (Niwa), Figs. 22, 28; Ex. 2025 (Asada ’701 patent), Fig. 4; Ex. 1035 (Rhee), Figs. 7-1, 8-1, 8-2; Ex. 1037 (Asada article), Fig. 9; Ex. 1034 (Asada ’199 patent), Fig. 2; Ex. 1028 (Kimura patent), Fig. 24; Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 74–84. In fact, Oura’s first-generation ring design, released in 2015, used a Superbowl ring type design, with the battery and other components mounted on top of the ring. Ex. 2034; Ex. 2018 ¶ 85. We also agree with Dr. Mercier that Dr. Anthony’s testimony lacks evidence or a technical analysis of the power requirements for the various sensors he suggests including in a wearable device and the capacity of the proposed GMBPow battery. See, e.g., Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 94, 210, 214–17; Ex. 2018 ¶ 97. Moreover, Dr. Anthony does not address the issues with the batteries that are identified in the references he discusses. For example, Dr. Anthony does not address Lee’s disclosure that “direct coating of electrode slurry onto plain paper led to the occasional internal-shorting of the device due to the leakage of the electrode material through a large-sized hole in the paper.” Ex. 1019, 2415. In contrast, Dr. Mercier discusses the pitfalls the skilled artisan faced in developing finger-ring devices. See, e.g., Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 77–79 (discussing the issues Rhee’s and Asada’s large rings), 83 (identifying power requirements as a design constraint). For example, Dr. Mercier explains that “flexible or curved batteries include flexible packaging materials such as aluminum laminated films that house the electrodes and electrolyte” such that “once the battery packaging is added to a battery such as GMBPow and then placed within a housing (e.g., external housing shell and internal potting), the resulting device would have dimensions that are not suitable for a finger-worn ring.” Id. ¶ 96 (citing Ex. 2026).” slip op. at 34

  Patent outcomesUS 11,188,124 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,188,124
• Resmed Corp. v. Cleveland Medical Devices, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 29, 2026 · IPR2025-00247 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 were not shown unpatentable under any of six obviousness grounds because Truitt did not teach or suggest the claimed severity calculation and index, and the Mumford combinations lacked the required sensor disclosures.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner filed an authorized Motion to Terminate, alleging that Petitioner failed to name its corporate parent, Resmed Inc., as a real party in interest. Paper 29. Petitioner filed an opposition. Paper 31. Patent Owner filed a reply. Paper 32. We denied the Motion to Terminate. Paper 40.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “disorder symptoms” require a “quantitative” calculation or use of an algorithm, we also disagree. See PO Resp. 14–16. First, nothing in the language of the claims themselves describes or requires a “quantitative” calculation or an algorithm. See generally Ex. 1001, 23:6–26:59. To be sure, the ’029 patent discloses embodiments that use known algorithms to “quantify the level of severity of the subject’s sleeping disorder or symptoms.” See, e.g., id. at 20:16–19. But the Specification does not require an algorithm. The Specification also indicates that quantification is merely “preferable” (i.e., not required), and is merely one embodiment. See, e.g., id. at 19:8–12 (“The signals from the one or more sensors used in various embodiments of the present invention are preferably analyzed using a processor and software that can quantitatively estimate or determine the severity of the subject’s sleeping disorder or symptoms.”) (emphasis added), 4:51–59 (“Finally, in still another embodiment, the present invention includes a sleeping disorder treatment system comprising a device for diagnosing and creating a quantitative output of a level of severity of a subject’s sleeping disorder or symptoms . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Reply 5–6 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:3–59 and 19:8–12 and stating that the ’029 patent lists “numerous embodiments where only one of seven include a quantitative assessment”). Elsewhere, the Specification more generally states that signals from sensors are “analyzed to determine the level of severity of the symptoms,” without specifying that such analysis must be “quantitative” or performed by an algorithm. See Ex. 1001, 3:41–44. In view of these disclosures, Patent Owner does not persuade us to adopt its narrowing claim construction. Indeed, our reviewing court has “repeatedly warned against confining the claims” to specific embodiments disclosed in the Specification. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. Patent Owner’s reliance on a prior Board decision in PGR2024- 00012, which related to the parent of the ’029 patent, is unavailing. See PO Resp. 15–16. We agree with Petitioner that in the cited case, “[t]he Board made no findings about the meaning of the term calculating ‘the data of a severity of the sleep disorder symptoms of the subject’ for claim construction.” Reply 8. Indeed, neither party offered any claim construction, and the Board determined that no claim construction was necessary for purposes of that decision. See ResMed Corp., PGR2024- 00012, Paper 7 at 8. The page of the decision Patent Owner cites addresses written description support in the specification for the claims challenged in that PGR, not claim construction. See id. at 16. In any event, the cited decision is a decision on institution. The Board’s statements there are, by nature, preliminary findings and conclusions based on a preliminary record, and are not binding here. For at least the above reasons, Patent Owner does not persuade us to adopt its narrowing claim construction and we find that the term “data of a severity” does not need construction because the words of the term are clear on their face.” slip op. at 31

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “skilled artisan would have incorporated only portions of Mumford’s algorithm into Truitt’s PAP (i.e., only those portions related to “the detection of sleep disordered events” and not the portions of the algorithm related to “determin[ing] sleep stage”) comes too late because this argument was not in the Petition. See, e.g., Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1286–87 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (rejecting petitioner’s “attempts to cure the petition’s deficiencies in its subsequent briefing to the Board”). The Petition does not discuss modifying Mumford’s sleep efficacy algorithm before incorporating it into Truitt’s PAP device or incorporating only certain features of the algorithm. Indeed, the Petition and Dr. Kirkness rely on Mumford’s ability to detect sleep arousals when mapping Mumford to the claimed “data of a severity” and “index.” See Pet. 69–70; Ex. 1003 (Kirkness Decl.) ¶¶ 323–325. Mumford discloses that the mask electrodes detect arousals. See Ex. 1009 (Mumford) 2:4–10, 11:39–48. The same lack of disclosure plagues Petitioner’s belated Reply argument that Truitt’s ports 74 and 76 can incorporate electric sensing elements that would have functioned similar to Mumford’s electrodes. See Reply 22. The Petition did not mention ports 74 and 76 or otherwise suggest that a skilled artisan would have added functionality similar to Mumford’s electrodes to Truitt’s PAP, and we find that it is too late on Reply for Petitioner to posit this modification.” slip op. at 40

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert creditedMixed

    “significant than the intrinsic record in determining ‘the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005). This is especially applicable to Dr. Jafari’s opinions. His declaration was not prepared for this proceeding and thus Dr. Jafari was not subject to cross examination in this proceeding. See Reply 6 n.3. Moreover, Dr. Jafari was not opining on claim construction; rather, he was addressing the alleged indefiniteness. See Ex. 2020 (Jafari Decl.) 12 (heading addressing definiteness), ¶¶ 41–42, 46. Additionally, paragraphs 41–42 of Dr. Jafari’s declaration discuss claim terms phrases in a different patent (US 11,375,921), which explicitly include the terms “quantified” and “quantitative.” See Reply 6–7; Ex. 2020 (Jafari Decl.) ¶ 34. For at least these reasons, Patent Owner has not persuaded us that Dr. Jafari’s testimony is applicable here. Further, regarding the portion of Patent Owner’s proposed construction reciting “the degree of deviation from the baseline characteristics of a patient without sleep disorder symptoms,” Dr. Borkholder does not do his own analysis, but instead simply states that he “agree[s] with the litigation claim construction opinions of Dr. Jafari.” Ex. 2019 (Borkholder Decl.) ¶ 53. This is insufficient, and thus we do not credit Dr. Borkholder’s testimony regarding claim construction. We instead credit Dr. Kirkness’s statement that “[s]everity data is frequently calculated as the deviation from baseline characteristics of the patient himself, not a generic person ‘without sleep disorder symptoms.’” Ex. 1071 (Kirkness Reply Decl.) ¶ 13; Reply 9. As Dr. Kirkness explains, and Patent Owner does not dispute (see generally Sur-reply), “[t]he ‘baseline characteristics of a [generic] patient without sleep disorder symptoms’ would be irrelevant to any particular patient with their own unique breathing patterns and sleep disorder symptoms.” Ex. 1071 (Kirkness Reply Decl.) ¶ 13 (second alteration in original). For at least these reasons, we reject Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 11,872,029 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,872,029
• Prime Time Toys LLC / Prime Time Toys Ltd. et al. v. Spin Master, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2023-01461 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 13, and 15–20 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to establish a sufficient motivation to combine Peev and Spitballs, including with Moorhouse.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “The parties do not address the adopted level of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp.; Pet. Reply; PO Sur-reply. Based on the full record, we maintain and affirm that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had: a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, industrial design, or equivalent, with at least one year of relevant experience designing projectile launching systems but would also be a member of a team, which would include a person with a chemical engineering), or has at least one year experience working with materials for use in consumer products and that “equivalent work experience may substitute for educational experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 21–22 (quoting Ex. 1015, 7–8); see also Ex. 1016 ¶ 55 (stating that “Patent Owner’s and Petitioner’s definitions of the [person of ordinary skill in the art] are similar, and my opinions in this Declaration would not change if I used Patent Owner’s definition of the [person of ordinary skill in the art] rather than Petitioner’s definition”). We find that the proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the ’255 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner proposes any interpretation for any claim term. Pet. 23; see PO Resp. Petitioner notes that the ALJ in the ITC proceeding construed two terms used in the ’282 and ’683 patents, specifically “super absorbent polymer” and “a firing mechanism that directly applies a force to the ammunition.” Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1015, 12, 14). Based on the full record, we determine that no term requires express construction to resolve the parties’ dispute. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedMixed

    “we give little weight to the opinion of Dr. Courtney on whether Spitballs would have been considered liquid filled by one of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. Reply 15–16; PO Sur-reply 18; Ex. 1037 ¶ 55; Ex. 2121, 61:12–13; see also PO Sur-reply 14–15 (arguing that Dr. Courtney does not meet the adopted level of ordinary skill in the art). We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s list of “rubber, cork, foam, and soft plastics, such as SAPs” “does not exclude all of the other types of materials Petitioner failed to address—e.g., the gelatin materials used to make paintballs.” PO Resp. 24 (citing Ex. 2117, 1). The “openended” list “has no meaningful evidentiary support” because the cited paragraphs from its declaration “make no reference at all to potential airsoft ammunition.” Pet. 38; PO Resp. 24; Ex. 1016 ¶ 77; Ex. 1017 ¶¶ 36–39, 46– 48. Petitioner’s declarant Dr. Reitman also “acknowledged that airsoft considerations are beyond the scope of her testimony.” Ex. 2030, 117:17– 118:20. We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s list would include “countless distinct polymers.” PO Resp. 25; Ex. 2120, 27–28.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “In other words, Petitioner does not squarely address the testimonial evidence that the softness of Spitballs would not have been equated with safety, because of its higher weight and kinetic energy. Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 44–55. We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner does not assert fragmentation and deformation would have overcome the greater kinetic energy of the heavier Spitballs, and that Petitioner’s declarant admitted such calculation was not done. PO Sur-reply 7 (citing Ex. 2121, 48:11–49:7); Ex. 2121, 48:11–49:7 (Petitioner’s declarant testifying that calculations of how much kinetic energy is absorbed when Spitballs bounce or explode were not done). Petitioner’s declarant also identified that back splatter can create an additional safety concern. Ex. 2121, 101:14–104:4. We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner failed to discuss the deformation and fragmentation of Spitballs in its Petition and declarations. PO Sur-reply 6 (citing Pet. Reply 10–11; Ex. 1037 ¶ 43). We also agree that Petitioner did not explain how one of ordinary skill in the art could have reliably assessed the safety of Spitballs and airsoft rounds. Id.; see also Ex. 2121, 47:1–48:10 (Petitioner’s declarant testifying that experimentation would be the best way to quantify how much kinetic energy is absorbed through deformation and fragmentation of a given projectile). focused on the mass and diameter calculations provided by Petitioner’s declarant, and Petitioner has the burden to analyze a projectile other than the one disclosed in Spitballs, not Patent Owner. PO Sur-reply 10–11 (citing Pet. Reply 13; Ex. 1017 ¶ 67; Ex. 2015 ¶ 59). Petitioner failed to do such an analysis of a 6mm Spitball or SAP projectile. Regarding Petitioner’s reliance on deposition testimony from the ITC proceedings, as argued by Patent Owner, its declarant agreed that making ammunition softer would make injury less likely, if all other parameters were equal, not larger and heavier like a substitution with Spitballs. PO Resp. 16–17 (citing Pet. 37; Ex. 1004, 531:25–532:9; Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 60–61); Ex. 1017 ¶ 67 (Petitioner’s declarant opining that Spitballs can “grow up to 200 times their original size” to reach a mass of 1.844g); Ex. 1037 ¶ 39 (Petitioner’s declarant agreeing that “when all other variables are held constant, heavier is less safe, meaning injury potential is increased”); Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 54–59 (Patent Owner’s declarant opining that heavier and softer ammunition can pose more injury risk); Ex. 2016, 11 (indicating that airsoft ammunition typically comes in weights from 0.12g to 0.25g). We, thus, agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to prove that” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 8,596,255 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,596,255
• Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Sitnet LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-00529 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 and 20 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 10–19 are cancelled by adverse judgment after Patent Owner’s request.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “had a bachelor’s degree in Computer or Electrical Engineering or equivalent discipline, and approximately two years’ experience in telecommunications or computer networking,” adding that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 45–46).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “proposed constructions, and determined that “event node” does not need construction. Ex. 2007, 5. In the Institution Decision, we agreed with the District Court that “event node” does not need construction, and we continue to do so here. See Inst. Dec. 8. Independent claim 1 recites “creating, by an event node server, an event node in a multi-dimensional personal information network, the event node corresponding to a situation,” “transmitting an invitation to establish a link with the event node server to the devices corresponding to each node in the projection formed in step (b),” “receiving a response from at least one of the devices from step (c) accepting the invitation to establish a link with the event node server,” and “establishing a link with each device accepting the invitation.” Ex. 1001, 33:21–35; see also PO Resp. 3 (emphasizing claim 1’s recitations that the “event node” is “in a multi-dimensional personal information network” and “correspond[s] to a situation.”). Claim 20 includes similar recitations related to the “event node.” Ex. 1001, 34:45–64. In view of this, we determine that the claim language itself provides sufficient meaning for the term “event node” and further construction is not necessary.9” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “event node.” Petitioner persuades us that Amidon’s architecture provides a social network (the recited “situational network”) and the social network conference within the social network is the event node. In particular, the evidence demonstrates that Amidon separately teaches a social network and a social network conference. For example, as Petitioner notes, Amidon suggests that a conference may include a subset of the users in its social network, such as “all users currently listening to the same song” or “a subset of a social network circuit related to a game when the subset includes three or more people.” Ex. 1005, 13:6514:3, 14:22–27; Pet. 20–22; see also Ex. 1005, 13:57–14:29. Therefore, Patent Owner’s argument that the social network conference is the social network (see Sur-reply 6–8), rather than the event node, does not persuasively address Petitioner’s contentions.10 Patent Owner’s argument that Amidon’s social network conference merely comprises a group of individuals communicating with each other so it cannot be an event node does not take into account that Amidon’s social network conference is also defined by a data structure, such as the data structure shown in Figure 3. See PO Resp. 7–10; Pet. 19–20; Reply 7–8. The parties do not dispute that Amidon’s social network conference is defined by a data structure. PO Resp. 11–13 (e.g., “Fig. 3 shows a database entry for a conference.”); Reply 7. We find persuasive Petitioner’s argument that “the conference itself (as defined by the stored data and accessible via window 200) is the claimed event node.” Reply 7. slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Weighing the Parties’ arguments and evidence, Petitioner persuades us that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had motivation to configure Wong’s social network with an ad-hoc communication network like Gogic’s, as well as a reasonable expectation of success. As Petitioner argues, Gogic’s disclosure that the ad-hoc communication network “may allow emergency services to be more efficiently or more appropriately deployed” would have motivated adding such an ad-hoc communication network to Wong’s system. Pet. 48; Ex. 1007, 4:20–24. Additionally, contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, Petitioner’s evidence demonstrates technical compatibility of the references’ disclosures. As Petitioner notes, Gogic discloses using its approach with a wide range of technologies, including “portable or desktop computers.” Ex. 1007, 4:46– 49; Pet. 48. Wong likewise discloses implementing its social network with a wide range of technologies, such as “laptops, desktops, handheld, personal digital assistants, personal digital assistants, [or] mobile telephones.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 17; Pet. 49. These disclosures show that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success implementing Gogic’s method in Wong’s social network using, for example, desktop computers.11 Patent Owner recognizes that Gogic discloses implementing its system with desktop computers. PO Resp. 22. But Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have known how to implement Gogic’s invention, such as its location determination, using desktop computers. Id. This argument does not recognize that, as a prior art patent, Gogic is presumed enabled, including its disclosure of using desktop computers to implement its system. Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics, Ltd., 861 F. App’x 443, 450 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (nonprecedential; inter partes review context); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Patent Owner’s arguments and evidence do not rebut this presumption. For example, Dr. Rubin’s testimony that “from the descriptions and figures provided in Gogic it would suggest that location is determined via technologies specific to wireless networks and telecommunications” does not persuade us that Gogic fails to enable 11 Accordingly, Patent Owner’s argument about the difficulties of modifying Gogic to use Wong’s social network are inapposite. PO Resp. 24. implementing its approach with desktop computers, such as those used in Wong. Ex. 2009 ¶ 87 (emphasis added). To the extent Gogic suggested wireless technologies as a way to determine location, that does not detract from Gogic’s disclosure of using other technologies, including desktop computers, to implement its invention.” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 8,332,454 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,332,454
• Microsoft Corporation v. Eyesmatch Ltd.Instituted
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2025 · IPR2025-00297 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted review of claims 1–18 on all petition grounds and granted Microsoft’s motion to join IPR2024-00856.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “III. DECISION ON INSTITUTION Petitioner represents that the challenges to the claims of the’109 patent in the Petition are “intentionally identical . . . in all substantive aspects” to the challenges in the ’856 IPR. See Joinder Motion 2; compare ’856 IPR, Paper 1, 2–4, with Pet. 2–3. Petitioner further represents that this proceeding and the ’856 IPR “rely upon the same analytical framework (e.g., same expert declarant and prior art) in addressing the Challenged Claims.” Joinder Motion 2. Additionally, Patent Owner does not present an opposition to the Petition on the merits and does not oppose joinder. See, e.g., Notice, 1. In view of the foregoing, for the reasons given above and in the ’856 Institution Decision, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge to at least one claim of the ’109 patent. We therefore institute inter partes review of all challenges in the Petition. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 5

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

    “Joinder is a matter within the Board’s discretion based on the particular circumstances of each proceeding. For the reasons given above, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated that permitting Petitioner to join the ’856 IPR would avoid duplication and promote the efficient resolution of both proceedings and is therefore in the interests of justice.” slip op. at 6

  • BurdenInstituted

    “III. DECISION ON INSTITUTION Petitioner represents that the challenges to the claims of the’109 patent in the Petition are “intentionally identical . . . in all substantive aspects” to the challenges in the ’856 IPR. See Joinder Motion 2; compare ’856 IPR, Paper 1, 2–4, with Pet. 2–3. Petitioner further represents that this proceeding and the ’856 IPR “rely upon the same analytical framework (e.g., same expert declarant and prior art) in addressing the Challenged Claims.” Joinder Motion 2. Additionally, Patent Owner does not present an opposition to the Petition on the merits and does not oppose joinder. See, e.g., Notice, 1. In view of the foregoing, for the reasons given above and in the ’856 Institution Decision, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge to at least one claim of the ’109 patent. We therefore institute inter partes review of all challenges in the Petition. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 5

  None
  Patents in suitUS 8,982,109
• Microsoft Corporation v. Eyesmatch Ltd.Instituted
  PTAB · May 28, 2025 · IPR2025-00296 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted review of claims 1–18 on all petition grounds and granted Microsoft’s motion to join IPR2025-00296 with IPR2024-00810.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “II. DECISION The challenges to the ’110 patent’s claims in this Petition are identical to the challenges in the ’810 IPR’s petition. See, e.g., Pet. 6; ’810 IPR, Paper 1, 8. Additionally, in this proceeding, Patent Owner has not argued that the Petition’s challenges lack sufficient merit to institute trial. See, e.g., Notice 1. For the same reasons we explained in the ’810 Institution Decision, we institute inter partes review of all challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 4

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

    “Joinder is a matter within the Board’s discretion based on the particular circumstances of each proceeding. In this proceeding, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated that joinder with the ʼ810 IPR would avoid duplication and promote the efficient resolution of both proceedings.” slip op. at 5

  None
  Patents in suitUS 8,982,110
• Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Sitnet, LLCAdverse judgment
  PTAB · Apr 18, 2025 · IPR2024-00528 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Adverse judgment

  The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment, canceled claims 1–11, 22, and 23, and terminated the IPR.

  RulingsAdverse judgment

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

    “A patent owner may request judgment against itself “at any time during a proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b). Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include cancellation of patent claims such that a party has no remaining claim in the trial. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). Patent Owner’s request to cancel claims 1–11, 22, and 23 of the ’932 patent leaves no claims remaining in the trial. Accordingly, entry of adverse judgment to Patent Owner pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) is appropriate. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment (Paper 22) is granted; FURTHER ORDERED that claims 1–11, 22, and 23 of the ’932 patent shall be cancelled;1 FURTHER ORDERED that adverse judgment is entered against Patent Owner with respect to claims 1–11, 22, and 23 of the ’932 patent pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2);” slip op. at 2

  None
  Patents in suitUS 8,249,932
• Simpson Strong-Tie Company Inc. v. Columbia Insurance CompanySome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 28, 2025 · PGR2023-00047 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–37, 39–90, and 92–105 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 38 and 91 were not shown unpatentable because the cited art did not teach flanges physically touching along a juncture.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The level of ordinary skill in the art also may be reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Neither party argues that the outcome of these cases would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Considering the subject matter of the ’626 patent, the background technical field, the prior art, and Petitioner’s proposed and undisputed definition of the skilled artisan, we apply the level of skill set forth above, which is consistent with the testimony of Mr. Fennell (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 12–15).” slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “But Patent Owner then urges us to narrow the meaning of “portion” itself such that “channel-shaped portion” requires “all portions of the hanger which directly bound the channel that receives the structural component.” PO Resp. 19 (emphases added). Patent Owner argues the Specification makes this “clear.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 2:28–31). Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments (PO Resp. 19), we find no support in claim 1 to further narrow the interpretation of “portion” in “channel-shaped portion” to mean every portion of the hanger which directly bounds the channel that receives the structural component. See Ex. 1001, 12:14–36 (claim 1). We, like Petitioner, similarly find no support in the Specification or limited prosecution history (see Pet. 5–6), and Patent Owner does not direct us to any, showing that the inventor acted as its own lexicographer or disavowed any claim scope to allot this narrowed interpretation to the subject limitation. See Pet. Reply 3 (“Nowhere does the ’626 patent specification describe that all portions of the hanger directly bounding channel 52 constitute the channel-shaped portion.” (citing Ex. 1046 ¶¶ 16–18; Ex. 1001, 4:39–47)); PO Resp. 19. Further, as argued by Petitioner (Pet. Reply 4–5), Patent Owner’s proposed construction limiting “portion” to “all portions” of the hanger that “directly bound the channel that receives the structural component” could cause the “channel-shaped portion” on the same physical hanger to change depending on which type of structural component an installer were to choose to use in construction: Patent Owner’s claim construction improperly focuses on the wall assembly intended to be used with the recited hanger. The claims, however, are directed to a hanger, not a wall assembly. When assessing what part of a hanger constitutes a “channel-shaped portion” and an “extension portion,” [the skilled artisan] would consider the physical features of the hanger itself and the natural divisions between those features. [The skilled artisan] would not assess the claim language and its application to the prior art by speculating how an installer might later install the hanger with a joist or an entire wall assembly, which may differ from installation to installation. Pet. Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1046 ¶ 19). We find this defect further supports a broader interpretation of “channel-shaped portion” as discussed above. Accordingly, based on the complete record before us, we determine” slip op. at 34

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues, inter alia, that Yamaguchi teaches a joist hanger with an extension portion defining a space between its back flange and channel-shaped portion, and Bundy teaches to size a space created by an extension portion of its joist hanger to receive two layers of ⅝-inch-thick drywall between its back flange plane and channel-shaped portion. Pet. 16–18 (citing 1003 ¶¶ 75–78; Ex. 1007, 5:16–18, Fig. 1; Ex. 1041 (“Perspective View”; “Usage View”)); see id. at 17–18 (discussing “advantages” of two layers of 5/8" drywall as “fire resistance in a fire separation wall”). Petitioner argues the skilled artisan “would have been motivated to receive drywall between Yamaguchi’s back flange and channel-shaped portion to provide a shielded fire resistant wooden frame wall.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 78–79; Ex. 1007, 2:10–24); see id. ([“The skilled artisan] would have optimized the size of the spacing between Yamaguchi’s back flange and channel-shaped portion to accommodate two layers of 5/8”-thick-drywall according to the size preference described by Bundy for optimal fire protection and wall integrity.” (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 80; Ex. 1007, 5:10–22)). Petitioner concludes: This modification to Yamaguchi would have been nothing more than applying a known technique (Bundy’s spacing a hanger seat from a wall frame by distance sufficient to accommodate two 5/8”-thick-drywall sheets for fire resistance) to a similar device (Yamaguchi’s hanger having a spacing of indeterminate length) to obtain the predictable result of a firewall hanger having a space between its channel-shaped portion and a wall frame large enough for receiving drywall therebetween, thereby “protect[ing] the structural members of a building.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1007, 5:18–20; Ex. 1003 ¶ 80). Petitioner argues the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in modifying Yamaguchi as discussed above, “because doing so would still allow Yamaguchi’s hanger to perform its intended function of securing a joist to a wall.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1041, 1; Ex. 1003 ¶ 81). Petitioner argues, “[r]ecognizing that Yamaguchi’s and Bundy’s hangers are constructed from sheet metal,” the skilled artisan “would have understood how to modify the size of Yamaguchi’s extension portions to accommodate two layers of 5/8”-thick-drywall while still allowing Yamaguchi’s hanger to secure a joist’s end to a frame wall.” Pet. 18–19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 81–83; Ex. 1007, 4:47–51); see id. at 19–20 (discussing that although “Yamaguchi’s described setting is a sill plate,” the skilled artisan “would have been motivated to use Yamaguchi’s hanger on a wood frame wall in particular so that sheathing could be installed in the space behind the joist as taught by Bundy” (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 81–82)). Based on the foregoing and the complete record before us, we find” slip op. at 46

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “artisan would have interpreted or understood the teachings of Yamaguchi and Bundy, as well as of the combination of those references, are unsupported attorney-arguments. See In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974) (“Attorney’s argument in a brief cannot take the place of evidence.”). Patent Owner cites no evidence of how the skilled artisan would have understood the combined teachings of Yamaguchi and Bundy, or how such an understanding would support Patent Owner’s attorney arguments. Indeed, Patent Owner did not file any expert testimony in any of the three subject cases, despite that we must resolve the legal question of obviousness on the basis of underlying factual determinations, particularly the scope and content of the prior art and any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art from the vantage point of the skilled artisan. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18; see Pet. Reply 2 (“As a threshold matter, the Board’s findings in its Institution Decision should be carried forward to its final written decision because Patent Owner did not submit an expert declaration in support of its arguments.”); but see PO Sur-reply 1–4 (“[T]here is no requirement that a party rely exclusively on expert testimony in Post Grant Review proceedings or that attorney argument must be disregarded.”). To the contrary, Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Fennell, persuasively testifies in detail how and why the skilled artisan would have combined the teachings and suggestions of Yamaguchi and Bundy to achieve the invention of claim 1, including the features of limitation 1.3.B. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 73–83, 96; Ex. 1046 ¶¶ 30–40. We find Mr. Fennell’s testimony credible (and uncontroverted).” slip op. at 40

  Patent outcomesUS 11,649,626 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,649,626
• Lifecore Fitness, LLC D/B/A Assault Fitness v. Woodway USA, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 24, 2024 · IPR2023-00849 · APJ Amee A Shah · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4, 7–12, 14, 17, and 21–25 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 18, 20, 26, and 27 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedOther

    “1. “safety device” For the ’745 patent, the District Court construed “safety device” as “a” slip op. at 20

  • Skill levelOther

    “B. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various non-” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusNot shown unpatentable

    “5. Objective Indicia of Nonobviousness a) Legal Standards Objective evidence of non-obviousness “may often be the most probative and cogent evidence in the record” and “may often establish that an invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the prior art was not.” Transocean, 699 F.3d at 1349. Thus, notwithstanding what the teachings of the prior art would have suggested to one skilled in the art, objective evidence of nonobviousness (or “secondary considerations”) may lead to a conclusion that the challenged claims would not have been obvious. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1471–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Thus, our obviousness analysis includes consideration and weighing of Patent Owner’s indicia of nonobviousness.” slip op. at 72

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “cited by Petitioner, we find that on this record, Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence obviousness of claims 1, 4, 7–12, 14, 17, and 21–25 but has not demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence obviousness of claims 18 and 20 based on Socwell, Magid, and Sclater.” slip op. at 82

  Patent outcomesUS 10,799,745 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,799,745
• Lifecore Fitness, LLC D/B/A Assault Fitness v. Woodway USA, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 22, 2024 · IPR2023-00843 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 30–34, 37–39, 41, 45–49, 57, and 59 are unpatentable under § 103 over Chickering, Magid, and Sclater; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We do not adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art because it is overly broad. During oral argument, Patent Owner clarified that its proposed level of ordinary skill includes a person with a mechanical engineering degree and no experience in the treadmill industry. See, e.g., Tr. 73:1–6. A POSA should have some knowledge related to treadmills as the ’884 patent and the prior art all relate to the field of treadmills. See generally Exs. 1001, 1009–1013; See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Both Petitioner and Patent Owner’s definitions encompass a person who has at least a degree in mechanical engineering degree. Pet. 5; PO Resp. 3–4. Petitioner’s definition additionally requires knowledge of exercise biomechanics, including anthropometry, and Patent Owner’s additionally requires knowledge of design, construction, testing, and operation of manual treadmills. Patent Owner argues that “any definition that requires a POSA to be a degreed engineer with ‘a demonstrated understanding of exercise biomechanics, including anthropometry’. . . — would necessarily exclude certain named inventions.” PO Sur-reply 2–3. We agree with Patent Owner that that experience and knowledge of treadmills is require, but the knowledge of exercise biomechanics is not. Ex. 2018 ¶ 70. Accordingly, we determine that a POSA would have a Bachelor’s of Science degree in mechanical engineering and at least one year of experience in the treadmill industry, including experience and knowledge of the design, construction, testing, and operation of manual treadmills overall.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “1. “substantially prevent” The District Court construed “substantially prevent” as “restricts rotation to allow for only one rotational direction of movement.” Ex. 1033, 16. In this proceeding, we need not construe this claim term as there is no related dispute. 2. “safety device” For the ’884 patent, the District Court construed “safety device” as “a device that includes the elements recited [in the claims] and restricts rotation to allow for only one rotational direction of movement.” Ex. 1033, 23. Both parties indicate that we should adopt the District Court’s construction. PO Resp. 5; Pet. Reply 2. We, thus, construe “safety device” as “a device that includes the elements recited [in the claims] and restricts rotation to allow for only one rotational direction of movement We need not construe explicitly any other claim terms to reach our” slip op. at 13

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “2. “safety device” For the ’884 patent, the District Court construed “safety device” as “a device that includes the elements recited [in the claims] and restricts rotation to allow for only one rotational direction of movement.” Ex. 1033, 23. Both parties indicate that we should adopt the District Court’s construction. PO Resp. 5; Pet. Reply 2. We, thus, construe “safety device” as “a device that includes the elements recited [in the claims] and restricts rotation to allow for only one rotational direction of movement We need not construe explicitly any other claim terms to reach our” slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “We find Patent Owner’s arguments and the testimony of Dr. Blair to be unpersuasive, because we do not agree that the claimed running surface is required to be a surface with which a runner’s feet are intended to make contact when using a treadmill. Dr. Blair testifies that “[a] POSA would understand a treadmill’s ‘running surface’ to be a surface that a runner’s feet would typically make contact when the user is running on the treadmill during normal use” and that, because a runner’s feet is not intended to contact the belt at the area where the forward rollers meet the rearward rollers, that area is not part of the running surface. Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 90–92. Dr. Blair’s testimony, however, contains no sufficient explanation to support his conclusion of what a POSA would understand by the term “running surface.” See id. ¶ 90. Further, Dr. Blair’s testimony is inconsistent with the language of claim 30. Claim 30 recites: “the running belt comprises a curved running surface.” Ex. 1001, 35:58–59. The language of claim 30 does not require the running belt’s running surface to only be portions that the runner typically or is intended to run upon. Dr. Blair’s testimony is also inconsistent with the ’884 patent which does not describe the running surface as being limited to the surface that a runner’s feet would typically make contact when the user is running on the treadmill during normal use. See generally id. The ’884 patent describes numerous examples of continuous running surfaces with a wide variety of” slip op. at 37

  Patent outcomesUS 10,561,884 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,561,884

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.