- Micron Technology, Inc. / Micron Semiconductor Products, Inc. et al. v. Netlist, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 30, 2023 · IPR2022-00744 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5, 6, 8–10, and 12–14 were not shown unpatentable because Halbert did not disclose the claimed ranks operating at the specified data rate.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not provide a different assessment of the level of ordinary skill, but Dr. Przybylski states that an individual with the level of experience identified by Petitioner “would have less knowledge and familiarity” than presumed by Petitioner’s definition. Ex. 2003 ¶ 46. Dr. Przybylski, however, provides no further discussion explaining this apparent disagreement with Petitioner, nor does he set forth what level of knowledge and familiarity a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had. Based on the complete trial record, we determine that Petitioner’s proposed skill level is consistent with the level of ordinary skill evidenced by the ’314 patent and the asserted prior art, and we adopt that skill level with the exception of the phrases “at least,” which introduce vagueness as to the amount of experience.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“We disagree with Petitioner’s interpretation. Taking Petitioner’s point that “‘specified data rate’ means only that the data rate is specified in some way” (Pet. Reply 4), we do not see how, once the rate is specified, claim 1’s later recitations of “the specified data rate” could refer to any other rate, as Petitioner’s arguments suggest. Petitioner argues that “it is clear that the ‘specified data rate’ that provides antecedent basis for later recitations of that term is merely the data rate specified for ‘communicat[ing] data’ between the ‘memory module’ and the external ‘memory controller of the computer (alteration by Petitioner). We agree with this statement, and later recitations of “the specified data rate,” therefore, refer to the data rate that is so specified. Petitioner provides no persuasive argument to support its position that later recitations of “the specified data rate” could be satisfied by data rates that are not the “specified data rate.”” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“PO Resp. 19; see also Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 68–72 (Dr. Przybylski’s testimony explaining this annotated figure). Halbert’s Figure 5 is a timing diagram for two consecutive read operations (Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 16, 37), and Patent Owner includes annotations to show each of ranks 140 and 142 outputting data onto their respective data busses at half the rate that data are output from data interface circuit 120 on the DQ data line. In particular, Halbert explains that each of ranks 140 and 142 is “capable of performing m-bit-wide data transfers.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 30. On a read command, rank 140 sends m-bit-wide data to bi-directional data register 126 on line RDQ0 at the same time that rank 142 sends m-bit-wide data to bi-directional data register 128 on line RDQ1, as shown in Figure 5 between T7n and T8n. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 31–32, 39. Halbert discloses that register 126 or from register 128 to output to buffer 122, which are then output on line DQ. Ex. 1005 ¶ 33. Halbert explains that “[d]ata is serialized from the data registers onto the memory data bus by reading 2m bits into the data registers during one memory device read cycle, and then driving these bits, m at a time, through MUX 124.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 33. As shown in Halbert’s Figure 5, over one clock cycle (T7n–T8n), each of ranks 140 and 142 outputs one piece of m-bit-wide data, and over one clock cycle (T8–T9), those two pieces of m-bit-wide data are output on line DQ to the system memory data bus. Halbert explains that the second read operation proceeds in the same fashion as the first and that “[t]he net result is that the memory data bus transfers 4m bits of data in two memory bus clock cycles (four mbit transfers), with only two data accesses performed at each memory device on the module.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 42. Thus, Halbert’s memory module outputs data to the system memory data bus at twice the rate that each of ranks 140 and 142 outputs data. See Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 68–73 (Dr. Przybylski’s credible testimony explaining Halbert’s data rates).” slip op. at 11
Patent outcomesUS 10,489,314 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,489,314 - Micron Technology, Inc. / Micron Semiconductor Products, Inc. et al. v. Netlist, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 30, 2023 · IPR2022-00745 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 15–20 and 22–33 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner did not adequately explain how the proposed combination would use active and non-active chip select signals.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“have been someone with an advanced degree in electrical or computer engineering and at least two years working in the field, or a bachelor’s degree in such engineering disciplines and at least three years working the field,” and Petitioner identifies particular knowledge that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had. Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 52).” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“C. Claim Construction We need not construe expressly any claim terms to decide the issues before us. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“As outlined above, Petitioner presents reasoning as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have included chip select signals in Halbert’s Figure 4 device. See Pet. 20–31 (addressing limitations 15.4 and 15.5). But Petitioner’s contentions about the use of chip select signals do not address sufficiently how Halbert’s Figure 4 device would operate with active and non-active chip select signals, as recited in claim 15. Indeed, as Patent Owner points out (PO Resp. 12), Petitioner’s contentions for limitation 15.6 only rely on Halbert’s Figure 2 prior art device. See Pet. 31–32. Petitioner’s lack of explanation as to how active and non-active signals would affect the operation of Halbert’s Figure 4 device is significant, as explained below.” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 10,489,314 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,489,314 - Epic Games, Inc. v. Ingenioshare, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · May 19, 2023 · IPR2022-00291 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9 and 15–17 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not disclose the construed network-based portal residing on a server side of a network.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“network-based portal” as recited in the challenged claims is sufficiently broad to encompass residing at either a client or server side of a network, as Petitioner contends, or is limited to residing at the server side, as Patent Owner contends. On the preliminary record, we declined to adopt Patent Owner’s exclusion of residing at a client side when extending our invitation to the parties to elaborate on their positions. Dec. 11. But we are mindful that “the Board is not bound by any findings made in its Institution Decision. At that point, the Board is considering the matter preliminarily without the benefit of a full record. The Board is free to change its view of the merits after further development of the record, and should do so if convinced its initial inclinations were wrong.” TriVascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The full record developed at trial includes the Declaration of Dr. Rouskas (Patent Owner’s expert), who directly opines on this issue. Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 46–64. Although the record also includes a Declaration by Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Almeroth, that Declaration was filed with the Petition and neither responds to Dr. Rouskas’s opinions nor provides any testimonial evidence to support Petitioner’s positions beyond what was available at the preliminary stage of the proceeding.3 See generally Ex. 1003. In evaluating the fully developed record, we necessarily accord greater weight to Dr. Rouskas’s testimony than to Petitioner’s attorney argument as advanced in Petitioner’s Reply. See, e.g., Gemtron Corp. v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 572 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[U]nsworn attorney argument . . . is not evidence and cannot rebut . . . other admitted evidence . . . .”). slip op. at 14
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“The full record developed at trial includes the Declaration of Dr. Rouskas (Patent Owner’s expert), who directly opines on this issue. Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 46–64. Although the record also includes a Declaration by Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Almeroth, that Declaration was filed with the Petition and neither responds to Dr. Rouskas’s opinions nor provides any testimonial evidence to support Petitioner’s positions beyond what was available at the preliminary stage of the proceeding.3 See generally Ex. 1003. In evaluating the fully developed record, we necessarily accord greater weight to Dr. Rouskas’s testimony than to Petitioner’s attorney argument as advanced in Petitioner’s Reply. See, e.g., Gemtron Corp. v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 572 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[U]nsworn attorney argument . . . is not evidence and cannot rebut . . . other admitted evidence . . . .”).” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, or an equivalent field, and three to five years of experience working with Internet communication systems.” Pet. 25. According to Petitioner, “[a]dditional education might compensate for less experience, and vice-versa.” Id. Dr. Almeroth supports this articulation. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 92–97. Patent Owner does not propose any different expression of the level of ordinary skill, and Dr. Rouskas testifies that he has “employed Dr. Almeroth’s definition” in his Declaration. Ex. 2005 ¶ 21. Because we find Petitioner’s proposal reasonable, consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art, and supported by the testimony of Dr. Almeroth, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Both the preamble and the body of independent claim 1 recite “a network-based portal.” Ex. 1001, 19:63, 20:4, 20:6, 20:11, 20:15–16, 20:21–22, 20:29–30, 20:42–43, 20:46–47; see PO Resp. 19 (Patent Owner contending that, because of the repeated recitation of “network-based portal” throughout the body of independent claim 1, the “preamble therefore breath[e]s life and meaning into claim 1”). Contending that a “network-based portal” is “a web page or interface that connects multiple users to a network,” Petitioner identifies client-resident user-interface 112 of Diacakis as meeting the claim’s requirement for such a feature. Pet. 36. As explained above, after evaluating the record evidence developed during the trial, we do not adopt such a broad construction of “network-based portal.” Supra § II.D. Instead, we construe “network-based portal” as Patent Owner advocates, namely as residing on a server side of a network. Id. Because Petitioner does not show that Diacakis discloses a “network- based portal” as so construed, we conclude that Petitioner does not show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that independent claim 1 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Diacakis. Because the deficiency in Petitioner’s showing applies to the claims that depend from claim 1 because they inherit the “network-based portal” limitations, we also conclude that Petitioner does not show that any of claims 2–5, 15, or 17 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Diacakis; that any of claims 7–9 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Diacakis and Loveland; nor that” slip op. at 38
Patent outcomesUS 10,708,727 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,708,727 - Epic Games, Inc. v. Ingenioshare, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · May 19, 2023 · IPR2022-00202 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted obviousness grounds did not show a network-based portal residing on the server side of a network.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Drinkware, LLC v. National Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). Against this backdrop, we address the parties’ arguments, ultimately concluding that Patent Owner articulates the more persuasive position that a “network-based portal” as recited in the claims is limited to residing at a server side of a network.” slip op. at 16
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“The full record developed at trial includes the Declaration of Dr. Rouskas (Patent Owner’s expert), who directly opines on this issue. Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 46–64. Although the record also includes a Declaration by Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Almeroth, that Declaration was filed with the Petition and neither responds to Dr. Rouskas’s opinions nor provides any testimonial evidence to support Petitioner’s positions beyond what was available at the preliminary stage of the proceeding.3 See generally Ex. 1003. In evaluating the fully developed record, we necessarily accord greater weight to Dr. Rouskas’s testimony than to Petitioner’s attorney argument as advanced in Petitioner’s Reply. See, e.g., Gemtron Corp. v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 572 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[U]nsworn attorney argument . . . is not evidence and cannot rebut . . . other admitted evidence . . . .”). Our evaluation also necessarily remains cognizant that “[i]n an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic 3 Petitioner filed a second Declaration by Dr. Almeroth after institution (such that it was not available on the preliminary record), but that Declaration is provided primarily as supplemental evidence under 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2) to address objections by Patent Owner to the authenticity of various other exhibits. Ex. 1038 ¶ 2. Dr. Almeroth’s second Declaration otherwise merely incorporates Dr. Almeroth’s “technical opinions” by reference to his first Declaration, without providing any further facts or expressing any further opinions that bear on the merits, including claim construction. Id. ¶ 1. Drinkware, LLC v. National Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). Against this backdrop, we address the parties’ arguments, ultimately concluding that Patent Owner articulates the more persuasive position that a “network-based portal” as recited in the claims is limited to residing at a server side of a network.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, or an equivalent field, and three to five years of experience working with Internet communication systems.” Pet. 24. According to Petitioner, “[a]dditional education might compensate for less experience, and vice-versa.” Id. Dr. Almeroth supports this articulation. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 70–75. Patent Owner does not propose any different expression of the level of ordinary skill, and Dr. Rouskas testifies that he has “employed Dr. Almeroth’s definition” in his Declaration. Ex. 2005 ¶ 21. Because we find Petitioner’s proposal reasonable, consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art, and supported by the testimony of Dr. Almeroth, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Both the preamble and the body of independent claim 1 recite “a network-based portal.” Ex. 1001, 20:3, 20:11, 20:20, 20:23, 20:29, 20:31, 20:48, 20:54; see PO Resp. 19 (Patent Owner noting repeated recitation of “network-based portal” in independent claim 1). Contending that a “network-based portal” is “a web page or interface that connects clients to a network,” Petitioner identifies client-resident user-interface 112 of Diacakis as meeting the claim’s requirement for such a feature. Pet. 34. As explained above, after evaluating the record evidence developed during the trial, we do not adopt such a broad construction of “network-based portal.” Supra § II.D. Instead, we construe “network-based portal” as Patent Owner advocates, namely as residing on a server side of a network. Id. Because Petitioner does not show that Diacakis discloses a “network- based portal” as so construed, we conclude that Petitioner does not show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that independent claim 1 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Diacakis. The same deficiency exists with respect to Petitioner’s analysis of independent claims 11 and 19. See Pet. 55–57 (Petitioner’s analysis of claim 11 relying substantially on analysis of claim 1), 59–60 (Petitioner’s analysis of claim 19 relying substantially on analysis of claim 1). Because the deficiency in Petitioner’s showing also applies to the dependent claims, which inherit the “network-based portal” limitations, we conclude that Petitioner does not show that any of claims 1– 20 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Diacakis.” slip op. at 36
Patent outcomesUS 10,142,810 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,142,810 - Epic Games, Inc. v. Ingenioshare, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · May 19, 2023 · IPR2022-00295 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 7–12, 22–24, and 33–67 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the claimed server-side network-based portal.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“The issue before us is therefore well-defined, namely whether a “network-based portal” as recited in the challenged claims is sufficiently broad to encompass residing at either a client or server side of a network, as Petitioner contends, or is limited to residing at the server side, as Patent Owner contends. On the preliminary record, we declined to adopt Patent Owner’s exclusion of residing at a client side when extending our invitation to the parties to elaborate on their positions. Dec. 23–25. But we are mindful that “the Board is not bound by any findings made in its Institution Decision. At that point, the Board is considering the matter preliminarily without the benefit of a full record. The Board is free to change its view of the merits after further development of the record, and should do so if” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Both the preamble and the body of independent claim 7 recite “a network-based portal.” Ex. 1001, 21:53, 21:58, 22:2, 22:14–15, 22:19, 22:20–21, 22:27, 22:33, 22:38–39; see PO Resp. 28 (Patent Owner noting repeated recitation of “network-based portal” in independent claim 7). Under our adopted construction, Petitioner does not show that the combination of Tanigawa and Hullfish meets the claim requirements of a “network-based portal.” That is, Petitioner’s reliance on a client-resident interface to meet the claim’s recitation of a “network-based portal” is incompatible with our construction of that phrase. We accordingly conclude that Petitioner does not show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that independent claim 7 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Tanigawa and Hullfish. The same deficiency exists with respect to Petitioner’s analysis of independent claims 38 and 46. See Pet. 64 (Petitioner’s analysis of claim 38 relying substantially on analysis of claim 7), 65–67 (Petitioner’s analysis of claim 46 relying substantially on analysis of claim 7). Because the deficiency in Petitioner’s showing also applies to the dependent claims, which inherit the “network-based portal” limitations, we conclude that Petitioner does not show that any of claims 7, 10–12, 22–24, 33–36, 38–41, 46, 49, 51–53, 55, 57, 58, or 64– 66 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Tanigawa and Hullfish; that any of claims 8, 9, 43, 44, 47, 48, 50, or 54 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Tanigawa, Hullfish, and Loveland; that any of claims 37, 42, 56, 59–63, or 67 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Tanigawa, Hullfish, and Takahashi; or that claim 45 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Tanigawa, Hullfish, Loveland, and Takahashi.” slip op. at 36
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“Dr. Rouskas (Patent Owner’s expert), who directly opines on this issue. Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 60–85. Although the record also includes a Declaration by Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Almeroth, that Declaration was filed with the Petition and neither responds to Dr. Rouskas’s opinions nor provides any testimonial evidence to support Petitioner’s positions beyond what was available at the preliminary stage of the proceeding.3 See generally Ex. 1003. In evaluating the fully developed record, we necessarily accord greater weight to Dr. Rouskas’s testimony than to Petitioner’s attorney argument as advanced in Petitioner’s Reply. See, e.g., Gemtron Corp. v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 572 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[U]nsworn attorney argument . . . is not evidence and cannot rebut . . . other admitted evidence . . . .”). Our evaluation also necessarily remains cognizant that “[i]n an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. 3 Petitioner filed a second Declaration by Dr. Almeroth after institution (such that it was not available on the preliminary record), but that Declaration is provided primarily as supplemental evidence under 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2) to address objections by Patent Owner to the authenticity of various other exhibits. Ex. 1039 ¶ 2. Dr. Almeroth’s second Declaration otherwise merely incorporates Dr. Almeroth’s “technical opinions” by reference to his first Declaration, without providing any further facts or expressing any further opinions that bear on the merits, including claim construction. Id. ¶ 1. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. National Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1326– 27 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). Against this backdrop, we address the parties’ arguments, ultimately concluding that Patent Owner articulates the more persuasive position that a “network-based portal” as recited in the claims is limited to residing at a server side of a network.” slip op. at 15
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, or an equivalent field, and three to five years of experience working with Internet communication systems.” Pet. 25. According to Petitioner, “[a]dditional education might compensate for less experience, and vice-versa.” Id. Dr. Almeroth supports this articulation. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 92–97. Patent Owner does not propose any different expression of the level of ordinary skill, and Dr. Rouskas testifies that he has “employed Dr. Almeroth’s definition” in his Declaration. Ex. 2005 ¶ 21. Because we find Petitioner’s proposal reasonable, consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art, and supported by the testimony of Dr. Almeroth, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 10,492,038 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,492,038 - Epic Games, Inc. v. Ingenioshare, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · May 19, 2023 · IPR2022-00294 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 7–12, 22–24, and 33–67 were not shown unpatentable because the petitioner did not establish that Diacakis disclosed the construed server-side network-based portal.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“entitled to no weight because it “repeats the [Patent Owner Response] nearly verbatim,” “appears to contain opinions he did not develop,” and “is contradicted by Dr. Rouskas’s own deposition testimony.” Reply 3–4. Although Petitioner makes multiple allegations of deficiencies in Dr. Rouskas’s direct testimony, none of these allegations is sufficiently developed with specific examples. First, we disagree that mere verbatim duplication between an expert declaration and an attorney brief defines “a classic example of a cursory expert declaration the Board disregards.” See id. at 3. The Board’s concern is rather whether expert testimony “cite[s] to any additional supporting evidence or provide[s] any technical reasoning to support [its] statement[s].” Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential); see also id. at 16 (“Dr. Jones offers only a verbatim restatement of the assertion being supported, without any supporting evidence or technical reasoning” (emphasis added)). As Patent Owner asserts, “Petitioner fail[s] to provide a single example of how Dr. Rouskas’s testimony is ‘cursory or unsupported.’” Sur-reply 1.” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, or an equivalent field, and three to five years of experience working with Internet communication systems.” Pet. 25. According to Petitioner, “[a]dditional education might compensate for less experience, and vice-versa.” Id. Dr. Almeroth supports this articulation. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 92–97. Patent Owner does not propose any different expression of the level of ordinary skill, and Dr. Rouskas testifies that he has “employed Dr. Almeroth’s definition” in his Declaration. Ex. 2005 ¶ 21. Because we find Petitioner’s proposal reasonable, consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art, and supported by the testimony of Dr. Almeroth, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“5. Summary As we note above, we find certain of Patent Owner’s arguments adequately rebutted by Petitioner, such that we do not consider them in our assessment. Nevertheless, Patent Owner retains compelling arguments for its proposed construction, supported by expert testimonial evidence, including dictionary definitions and the ’038 patent specification’s reference to a “portal or a gateway.” We find such references more compellingly refer to “portal” and “gateway” as synonyms rather than alternatives. In addition, Patent Owner provides convincing evidence and argument that rebuts the concern raised by the Board at institution whether Patent Owner’s proposed construction would exclude preferred embodiments. Petitioner, who bears the overall burden, addresses that concern only with attorney argument, which we accord less weight. In light of these considerations, we construe “network-based portal” as Patent Owner advocates, namely as residing on a server side of a network.” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Both the preamble and the body of independent claim 7 recite “a network-based portal.” Ex. 1001, 21:53, 21:58, 22:2, 22:14–15, 22:19, 22:20–21, 22:27, 22:33, 22:38–39; see PO Resp. 21 (Patent Owner noting repeated recitation of “network-based portal” in independent claim 7). Contending that a “network-based portal” is “a web page or interface that connects clients to a network,” Petitioner identifies client-resident user-interface 112 of Diacakis as meeting the claim’s requirement for such a feature. Pet. 34–35. As explained above, after evaluating the record evidence developed during the trial, we do not adopt such a broad construction of “network-based portal.” Supra § II.D. Instead, we construe “network-based portal” as Patent Owner advocates, namely as residing on a server side of a network. Id. Because Petitioner does not show that Diacakis discloses a “network- based portal” as so construed, we conclude that Petitioner does not show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that independent claim 7 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Diacakis. The same deficiency exists with respect to Petitioner’s analysis of independent claims 38 and 46. See Pet. 55–56 (Petitioner’s analysis of claim 38 relying substantially on analysis of claim 7), 57–58 (Petitioner’s analysis of claim 46 relying substantially on analysis of claim 7). Because the deficiency in Petitioner’s showing also applies to the dependent claims, which inherit the “network-based portal” limitations, we conclude that Petitioner does not show that any of claims 7, 10–12, 22–24, 33–36, 38–41, 46, 49, 51–53, 55, 57, 58, or 64–66 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Diacakis; that any of claims 8, 9, 43, 44, 47, 48, 50, or 54 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Diacakis and Loveland; that any of claims 37, 42, 56, 59–63, or 67 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Diacakis and Takahashi; or that claim 45 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Diacakis, Loveland, and Takahashi.” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 10,492,038 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,492,038 - Platinum Optics Technology Inc. v. Viavi Solutions Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 3, 2022 · IPR2021-00631 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5–8, 10–12, 14, 16–21, and 23 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the claimed hydrogenated silicon properties.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Supported by Mr. Willey’s testimony, Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a Bachelor’s degree or equivalent in physics, or in a related science or engineering field, along with at least 5 years of experience in optical coating design and the manufacturing of optical filters, including various deposition techniques.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 66–68). According to Petitioner, “[a]dditional education (e.g., a Master’s degree with exposure to coating design and manufacturing) may substitute for some industrial experience in optical thin film design, and more industrial experience can substitute for a different educational background. Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 66). Patent Owner neither directly addresses Petitioner’s proposal nor provides its own proposal. See Tr. 35:15–18 (Patent Owner confirming for the record that it has not proposed a different level of ordinary skill than Petitioner’s proposal). Petitioner’s proposal is reasonable and consistent with the prior art presented. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). We accordingly adopt Petitioner’s proposal.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“Based on the statements Dr. Clemens made under oath in his Declaration, we find that he qualifies as a person having at least ordinary skill in the art according to our adopted definition. The questions Petitioner raises about Dr. Clemens’s qualifications were insufficiently explored on cross-examination to impeach that testimony. With respect to Petitioner’s further complaint that Dr. Clemens “did not review all the evidence in rendering his opinions, did not select the materials he reviewed, and did no independent research on the question of enablement,” we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner cites no authority for the propositions that expert witnesses must review all exhibits or perform independent research. Sur-reply 27. Indeed, we do not find it particularly unusual for an expert witness to focus his analysis and opinions on specific issues identified by counsel, and Dr. Clemens properly discloses the underlying facts and data upon which his opinions are based. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). We thus accord due weight to Dr. Clemens’s testimony.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that “the claims do not need an express construction to resolve the issues presented in this proceeding” but nevertheless “provides its proposed interpretations of two terms [namely, ‘center wavelength’ and ‘passband’] to clarify how Petitioner is applying the prior art to the claims.” Pet. 13. Patent Owner does not directly address Petitioner’s proposed constructions for these terms, and appears generally to treat the terms in a manner consistent with Petitioner’s proposals. We conclude that no express claim construction is necessary for any claim term. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“One difficulty with Petitioner’s position is that it treats the refractive index and extinction coefficient as independent variables in its argument. But the prior art is clear that the adjusting the hydrogen content of Si:H to achieve a desired extinction coefficient necessarily affects the refractive index—and, as we discuss above, that such adjustments do so in a direction counterproductive to the combination of parameters the inventors sought. And we agree with Patent Owner that the refractive index and extinction coefficient “are not parameters subject to simple adjustment, but properties resulting from the parameters of the fabrication process.” PO Resp. 52 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 121–122; Ex. 1016, Figs. 2–3). At the Oral Hearing, Petitioner conceded that Patent Owner’s characterization is accurate when considering the hydrogenated silicon material. See Tr. 65:7– 12. When Petitioner refers to the refractive index and extinction coefficient as result-effective variables, Petitioner means that those parameters are variables that can affect the properties of the claimed optical filter. See id. at 64:6–65:12. As we note above, Petitioner’s argument thus presumes that the refractive index and extinction coefficient can be independently adjusted to achieve desired filter properties—but the asserted prior art teaches against such independence because the known method of adjusting the hydrogen content of Si:H not only affects both the refractive index and extinction coefficient, but does so in a manner counterproductive to the inventors’ objective.” slip op. at 35
Patent outcomesUS 9,354,369 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,354,369 - ROKU, Inc. v. Universal Electronics, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 11, 2022 · IPR2021-00455 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9 were not shown unpatentable over Chardon and HDMI 1.3a because the combination does not disclose data that itself identifies a controllable function.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“As Patent Owner observes, the two proposals differ “in terms of the level of experience specifically with home theater systems.” Id. at 10. Because all of the challenged claims make specific reference to a “home theater device,” Petitioner’s proposal is reasonable on the current record, and is additionally supported by the testimony of Dr. Russ. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 15– 19. Patent Owner notes that its expert, Dr. Turnbull, agrees with Patent Owner’s proposed articulation, but that Dr. Turnbull’s “conclusions resulting from his analysis did not change when reviewing the cited references from the perspective of the level of ordinary skill in the art as proposed by the Petition.” PO Resp. 10–11 (citing Ex. 2003, 31–41). We adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill for purposes of this Decision. We note, however, that we would reach the same ultimate conclusion were we to adopt Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“phrase creates a degree of ambiguity, we are mindful that “the claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular claim terms” and that “the context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can be highly instructive.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. In this instance, the related phrasing that appears in the “automatically adding” and “causing” limitations of issued independent claim 1 is illuminating. Both of those limitations refer to “the controllable function of the controllable appliance that was identified by the data received from the controllable appliance.” Ex. 1001, 17:11–14, 17:21–24 (emphasis added). There is no question that the only antecedent for “the data” in these limitations is the “data that functions to identify a controllable function of the controllable appliance” recited in the “receiving” limitation. See id. at 17:8–9. And there is no apparent room in the language “that was identified by the data” for the introduction or consideration of such “other information” that Petitioner would like to use “in connection with” the recited “data” to identify the controllable function. See Reply 2.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Petitioner reasons that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined such teachings from HDMI 1.3a with Chardon’s system because HDMI 1.3a “is a technical guide for the interoperability of the HDMI standard and how HDMI enabled devices operate,” and that “Chardon relies on HDMI capabilities to facilitate communication and monitoring-device state changes in its system.” Pet. 30–31 (citing Ex. 1005, 4:18–21; Ex. 1010, 17; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 130–131). According to Petitioner, “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art would have therefore turned to at least one of the versions of the HDMI Specification to fill in any details in Chardon with respect to how HDMI-capable devices, such as those of Chardon and the ’486 patent operate, and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” Id. at 31. Petitioner supports this reasoning with testimony by Dr. Russ that it is a “well-known industry practice” to rely on HDMI 1.3a as “specification of an industry standard” when “designing and building devices that implement the HDMI standard, incorporating all of the capabilities it offers.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 133. Patent Owner disputes the sufficiency of Petitioner’s showing. In” slip op. at 35
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“The difficulty with Petitioner’s and Dr. Russ’s position is that it is inconsistent with our adopted claim construction that the data itself identify a controllable function of the controllable appliance from which the data is received. See supra § II.C. As Patent Owner asserts, HDMI 1.3a “does not contemplate the exchange of any information that itself functions to identify a controllable function of a playback device.” PO Resp. 24 (emphasis added). All that the “Deck Status” message indicates in the example of Figure 17 is that the current status of the playback device is “Stop.” We also are not persuaded by Petitioner’s and Dr. Russ’s argument that HDMI 1.3a’s Tables 13 and 26 disclose that “Deck Info” information is returned with the “Deck Status” message, and that such “a deck status message includ[es] the features that the device can provide (e.g., play, pause, stop, etc.).” Pet. 41; Ex. 1003 ¶ 117. Reliance on such “Deck Info” information is problematic at least because it is “other information” that would be used in combination with the “Deck Status” to determine controllable functions of the controllable device, which is precluded by our adopted claim construction.” slip op. at 36
Patent outcomesUS 10,325,486 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,325,486 - Apple, Inc. v. Corephotonics Ltd.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 8, 2021 · IPR2020-00906 · APJ John F Horvath · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 19–22 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner did not establish that Ogata’s lens could be scaled for Parulski’s camera with a reasonable expectation of success.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyDecided for patent owner
“first embodiment lens and the data entered into the “Lens Editor Data” spreadsheet are noticeable. First, the Abbe number for the third lens element is 42.72 in Ogata’s first embodiment lens and 26.5 (i.e., 38% smaller) in the “Lens Data Editor” spreadsheet. Compare Ex. 1026, 7:46, with Ex. 1021, 36. Second, the data for the fourth and tenth aspherical surfaces are noticeably different. For example, the fourth order term (A4) for the fourth aspherical surface is 0.66 x 10-4 in Ogata’s first embodiment lens and 151.69 x 10-4 (i.e., 0.015) in the “Lens Data Editor” spreadsheet. Compare Ex. 1026, 7:55, with Ex. 1021, 36. Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Sasián explain these discrepancies.” slip op. at 15
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner. The Petition contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known that Ogata’s lens (using glass lens elements) could have been scaled to focus an image onto a 1/2.5” image sensor for use in Parulski’s camera. See Pet. 24–30; Ex. 1021, 36. Petitioner’s reply evidence and argument is not introduced to support that contention but a different contention—that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known that Ogata’s lens could have been redesigned using aspheric plastic lens elements to focus an image onto a 1/3” image sensor. See n.11, supra. This is a new contention that does not support Petitioner’s 11 We note that Dr. Sasián’s analysis discloses how Kawamura’s lens can be modified by replacing the spherical glass lens elements with aspherical plastic lens elements, moving the aperture stop to the first lens element, changing the F number to 2.8, and reducing the effective focal length to focus an image onto a 1/3” image sensor rather than a 1/2.5” image sensor. See Ex. 1039 ¶¶ 25–30; App’x, 17–18. Dr. Sasián also opines that although this analysis illustrates how Kawamura’s lens could have been modified, a person skilled in the art “would have recognized that Ogata could have been similarly adjusted to yield a miniaturized form-factor.” Id. ¶ 25. because it is a new and untimely contention, we do not consider it further. See Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019)12 (“Petitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g., to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.”); see also Ariosa Diagnostics v. Verinata Heath, Inc., 805 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The Board must make judgments about . . . when a Reply contention crosses the line from the responsive to the new.”); Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d at 1359, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (affirming the Board’s rejection of a reply argument presenting an “entirely new rationale to explain why one of skill in the art would have been motivated to combine” prior art references); Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC, 938 F.3d 1324, 1330–31 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (affirming the Board’s rejection of a reply argument presenting an “entirely new rationale” for why a claim would have been obvious).” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“first embodiment lens and the data entered into the “Lens Editor Data” spreadsheet are noticeable. First, the Abbe number for the third lens element is 42.72 in Ogata’s first embodiment lens and 26.5 (i.e., 38% smaller) in the “Lens Data Editor” spreadsheet. Compare Ex. 1026, 7:46, with Ex. 1021, 36. Second, the data for the fourth and tenth aspherical surfaces are noticeably different. For example, the fourth order term (A4) for the fourth aspherical surface is 0.66 x 10-4 in Ogata’s first embodiment lens and 151.69 x 10-4 (i.e., 0.015) in the “Lens Data Editor” spreadsheet. Compare Ex. 1026, 7:55, with Ex. 1021, 36. Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Sasián explain these discrepancies.” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 10,225,479 not shown unpatentable§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,225,479 - Apple, Inc. v. Corephotonics Ltd.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 8, 2021 · IPR2020-00905 · APJ John F Horvath · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–16, 18, 23–38, and 40 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted obviousness combinations did not establish a fused image with both Wide perspective and position POV.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“In a dual-aperture camera image plane, as seen by each sub-camera (and respective image sensor), a given object will be shifted and have different perspective (shape). This is referred to as point-of-view (POV). The system output image can have the shape and position of either sub-camera image or the shape or position of a combination thereof. If the output image retains the Wide image shape then it has the Wide perspective POV. If it retains the Wide camera position then it has the Wide position POV. The same applies for Tele images position and perspective. As used in this description, the perspective POV may be of the Wide or Tele sub-cameras, while the position POV may shift continuously between the Wide and Tele sub-cameras. In fused images, it is possible to register Tele image pixels to a matching pixel set within the Wide image pixels, in which case the output image will retain the Wide POV ("Wide fusion"). Ex. 1001, 5:10–26.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We find Petitioner sets forth sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to combine the teachings of Parulski and Konno. Parulski lenses, but fails to give lens prescription data for the two camera lenses. Konno discloses lens prescription data for a dual-lens camera utilizing two thin lenses. The combination, therefore, is one of familiar elements according to known methods to obtain predictable results or a substitution of one element for another known in the field to obtain a predictable result. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007).” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner. As we explain in § II.D.1, supra, claims 1 and 23 require generating a fused image having a Wide perspective POV and a Wide position POV. Petitioner’s only argument for how the combination of Parulski and Konno teaches this limitation is Parulski’s teaching of generating a fused image having a Wide position POV, i.e., having the field of view (FOV) of the Wide camera. See Pet. Reply 13 (“Parulski teaches . . . producing an output image that maintains the Wide position POV or the field of view of the Wide camera when the image was captured.”). Petitioner fails to demonstrate how Parulski’s image fusion method would also maintain the Wide perspective POV as required by independent claims 1 and 23. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that claims 1 and 23 are unpatentable as obvious over the combination of Parulski and Konno.” slip op. at 21
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner argues that Petitioner and Dr. Durand have failed to demonstrate that Parulski teaches “the ‘fused image with a point of view (POV) of the Wide camera’ limitation” because their “sole argument that Parulski meets this limitation is based on the output [image] having the ‘wide image’s field of view.’” PO Resp. 29 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 51). Patent Owner further argues that “[n]othing in Parulski suggests that whatever image data from the tele image that might be ‘fused’ into the output would be modified to have the shapes and positions from the wide image POV” and “nothing in Dr. Durand’s declaration even attempts to establish [that] this admitted during his deposition that he had not provided an opinion about whether Parulski generates a fused image having both a Wide perspective POV and a Wide position POV. See PO Sur-Reply 5 (citing Ex. 2041, 52:25–54:20). We agree with Patent Owner. As we explain in § II.D.1, supra, claims 1 and 23 require generating a fused image having a Wide perspective POV and a Wide position POV. Petitioner’s only argument for how the combination of Parulski and Konno teaches this limitation is Parulski’s teaching of generating a fused image having a Wide position POV, i.e., having the field of view (FOV) of the Wide camera. See Pet. Reply 13 (“Parulski teaches . . . producing an output image that maintains the Wide position POV or the field of view of the Wide camera when the image was captured.”). Petitioner fails to demonstrate how Parulski’s image fusion method would also maintain the Wide perspective POV as required by independent claims 1 and 23.” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 10,225,479 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,225,479
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.