- PTAB · Jan 15, 2026 · IPR2025-01231 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–13 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“petition identifies all real parties in interest. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). Whether an unnamed party is a real party in interest “is a highly fact-dependent question.” See Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp., 897 F.3d 1336, 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“AIT”); Ventex Co., Ltd. v. Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc., IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 at 4–5 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (precedential) (citing Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 13 (2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf (CTPG). “A common consideration is whether the non-party exercised or could have exercised control over a party’s participation in a proceeding.” CTPG at 16. Other considerations include whether the non-party is funding or directing the proceeding; the non-party’s relationship with the petitioner; the non-party’s relationship to the petition itself, including the nature and/or degree of involvement in the filing; and the nature of the entity filing the petition. Id. at 17–18.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related field and at least two years of experience with lighting technology.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶ 35). Petitioner makes additional contentions about what a POSITA would have understood. Id. (“A POSITA would understand that all types of cameras (e.g., analog and digital, photo and video) generally involve the same lighting considerations . . . . [and] that it is important to provide light that evenly illuminates the target subject or object to minimize reflected glare and shadows.”). Patent Owner contends that a POSITA would have at least: (a) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, optical engineering, or a related field; (b) two years of practical experience in designing and developing lighting systems, particularly those integrated with electronic devices such as webcams or computer monitors; and (c) knowledge of user-interface considerations for consumer electronics . . . . Additional experience can substitute for education and vice versa. Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 48). Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s contentions regarding what a POSITA would have understood. Prelim. Resp. 12–13 (“[O]ne of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that analog and digital cameras have different operating principles and lighting requirements [and] Petitioner’s lack of appreciation for the suitability and unsuitability of different lights for different applications infects and dooms its invalidity analysis.” (citing Ex. 2036 ¶¶ 36–47)). and years of experience required for a POSITA. Pet. 2; Prelim. Resp. 12. For purposes of this Decision, we consider a person of ordinary skill in the art to have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or related field and two years of practical experience in lighting technology, and that additional experience may substitute for education and vice versa, which is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’729 patent and prior art of record. See Exs. 1001, 1005–1010, 1012–1015; see also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner agrees that the Board need not formally construe any claim terms in order to adjudicate the merits of the Petition and argues Petitioner fails to show unpatentability of any claim under any reasonable construction of the claims. Prelim. Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 51). We determine that no express claim construction is necessary to determine whether institution is warranted in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only terms in controversy must be construed “and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“claimed subject matter and the prior art are “such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). When a ground in a petition is based on a combination of references, we consider “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We base our obviousness inquiry on factual considerations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) any objective indicia of obviousness or non-obviousness that may be in evidence.14 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,841,729 - PTAB · Dec 12, 2025 · IPR2025-01327 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–19 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the Schwan-Lee and Schwan-Lee-Strickland obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We therefore institute inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’655 patent and all of the asserted grounds of unpatentability in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“III. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art: would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent, and two years of work experience with network devices and communication technologies. EX1003, ¶¶17–19. Additional education might compensate for less experience, and vice versa. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 17–19).” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“The ’655 patent Specification states that: The topology data table 21 of the online server 20 is mainly recorded with a link data 49 between each of the P2P devices 41– 46 within the P2P device community. The link data 49 refers to the connection relationship between the P2P devices 41–46, which includes, but is not limited to, the connection structure, connection data and/or locations of connection. Ex. 1001, 4:51–57. On this preliminary record, we agree with Petitioner that the term “link data” is a “connection relationship between the P2P devices.” This meaning is consistent with the ordinary meaning of the term within the context of the claim, that is, “link data” means data on the links (connections) between each of the P2P devices, where the Specification provides a more fulsome meaning that the term includes, at least, “the connection structure, connection data and/or locations of connection.” See id. at 4:55–57. We invite the parties to provide additional briefing on the construction of this term during trial.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Lee discloses that the P2P overlay is generated with the overlay generation unit 220 that generates the P2P overlay by analyzing information regarding “the corresponding application service, the peer, and the network,” where the network information “may include a network topology, a maximum bandwidth, a current network usage, [and] a transmission delay time, and the like.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 54. We determine that this disclosure provides support for Mr. Lett’s testimony that “Lee describes techniques for changing an overlay in response to changing network characteristics,” which could be beneficial. Ex. 1003 ¶ 48. Accordingly, on this preliminary record, we find this evidence is sufficient to support a rationale to combine Schwan and Lee. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 401 (“[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious.”).” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,727,655 - Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00652 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–23 and 25–30 were unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’403 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties assert that each claim term should be construed in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 10; Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 73); see Ex. 1002 ¶ 22 (opining the same). And, in the respective claim construction sections of their briefs, the parties do not propose any claim terms for express construction. We agree with the parties that no claim terms require express construction to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Kahn discloses element [1.2] because the evidence cited does not disclose a “first computer system being configured to provide remote control of the first pump or first valve” (i.e., a fluid-handling device). Kahn is directed to providing access to fluid sensing data and analyzing and providing visual information on that data, but Petitioner has not identified any disclosure of the capability to remotely control fluid-handling devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:27–36, 2:50–3:2. More specifically, Kahn’s disclosures that Petitioner relies on for allegedly teaching remote control are deficient. We discuss each. First, Petitioner points to the following, “[f]or instance, as illustrated in FIG. 1C, a fluid control device such as a valve 15A is located on the input side of a sen[s]or unit 110.” Ex. 1005, 8:19–21, cited in Pet. 13. This portion of Kahn, however, does not disclose remote control. Second, Petitioner cites to the following: Finally, or in addition to, the communication unit 112B can include on-site alerts such as optical (indicator lights), audible alerts (e.g., alarm sounds), tactile (e.g., vibration of the unit) or can be interfaced to an appropriate control valve for simply shutting off the supply of fluid upon the detection of emergency events, for instance. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1005, 10:62–67). We agree with Patent Owner that this portion of Kahn teaches on-site alerts and local control of the fluid-handling device. See Prelim. Resp. 7. This portion of Kahn does not disclose remote control.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,294,403 - Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00651 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 6, 7, and 9–20 were unpatentable over any asserted ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’680 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“target value” is part of a command that is sent from a computing device to a server and then to a controller. The controller then receives a measurement of the fluid by a sensor and determines whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” If the measurement does not satisfy the “target value,” further operations are undertaken. The recited operation sequence makes clear that the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” is not as Dr. Wooley opines because the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time is represented by the measurement taken by the sensor, 11 Some claim language less relevant to construing “target value” was omitted for ease of reference. which the controller then uses to determine whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” Additionally, claim 1 recites that the “target value” is sent as part of a command to the controller. The “target value” is not sent to the controller from the sensor, as might be expected if the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” were as Dr. Wooley opines. Petitioner and Dr. Wooley’s construction would also result in “target value” meaning effectively the same thing as the measurement of the fluid by the sensor, a concept that is separately recited in claim 1 and to which the “target value” is compared. The Specification of the ’680 patent does not support Petitioner’s understanding of the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value.” Although the Specification does not recite “target value,” it recites “target state,” and describes “target state” sufficiently to understand the plain and ordinary meaning of “target” as used in “target value” and “target state.” In particular, the ’680 patent explains that “[i]n some embodiments, the process 104 includes receiving, via a network interface, from a remote user device, (e.g., via a command-center server) a command to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state.” Ex. 1001, 11:48–51. This portion reflects that the command is seeking to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state. In other words, the “target value” or “target state” is not generally “the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time”; rather, it is a value or state that the fluid-handling device is desired to be in, as Patent Owner and Dr. Durham explain. Additionally, just as claim 1 recites a directional component for the “target value” to be sent to the controller in a command, so too does the Specification describe a “target state” as being sent in a command from a remote user device. Thus, the Specification clearly supports the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Patent Owner and Dr. Durham and not the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Petitioner and Dr. Wooley. slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“time-stamped process data, report exception therein to the remote host, and extract and transmit time-stamped process data to the remote host.” Ex. 1005, Abst. (emphases added). Almadi explains that its remote field systems must include a plurality of controller units “to issue commands to, and gather and process data from a plurality of field devices, including remote systems and instruments, . . . [and] a database server for the storage of process data retrieved from the remote subsystems and instruments.” Id. at 2:22–30 (emphases added). Based on these disclosures, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not established that Almadi discloses element [1.4]. Specifically, the teachings from Almadi identified by Petitioner refer to process data, which is data retrieved from the remote subsystems/field devices. Thus, we understand that Almadi’s teaching—of using an Ethernet switch to transmit “process data”—describes transmitting data from the remote subsystems/field devices. See Ex. 1005, 3:13–17, cited in Pet. 15. But claim 1 and particularly element [1.4], recites “sending, with the server, the target value to the network address [which identifies a controller of the fluid-handling device13] via the network,” which is different than sending process data from the field devices to the remote host or database server for storage.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,175,680 - Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co., Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco NVInstitutedPTAB · Oct 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00598 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–31 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on obviousness over Beel and Dinka and over van de Laar and Kaplan.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we institute an inter partes review of the ’347 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues that Dr. Almeroth does not provide a reason why a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Beel and Dinka, and that, instead, he “summarily concludes that Skype’s status as ‘well-known’ somehow would have motivated the combination of Dinka with Beel.” Prelim. Resp. 15–16. We disagree. Dr. Almeroth testifies that Skype, as taught in Dinka, would have been an example of the type of application that would have run on Beel’s system and that applying Dinka’s teachings would have improved Beel’s similar system in the same manner as it improved Dinka’s, with predictable results. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 103, 129. See also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (“[W]hen a patent ‘simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform’ and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious.” (quoting Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976))). On the current record, including Dr. Almeroth’s testimony, Petitioner’s proposed reasons to combine the teachings of Beel and Dinka have rational underpinning.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Patent Owner’s argument is unpersuasive at least because Dinka expressly describes using VoIP technology on computer terminals 102. Ex. 1006, 5:45–48 (“A plurality of computer terminals 102 are shown coupled to the Internet 101, each comprising a network interface for communicating over the Internet.”), 6:7–8 (“Each computer terminal 102 is installed with a communication client application 110.”), 6:23–26 (“The communication client applications 110 [of computer terminals 102] and 113 [of television sets 103] are preferably peer-to-peer clients for setting-up and conducting VoIP calls according to peer-to-peer principles as discussed above.”). Thus, Dinka does not lead a skilled artisan in a direction divergent from the path taken in the ’347 patent. Moreover, “[a] reference may be read for all that it teaches, including uses beyond its primary purpose.” In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, even though Dinka expresses a preference for conducting VoIP calls using a television set, a skilled artisan still would have considered Dinka’s teaching of using computers for such calls. See id. at 1334 (“This court has further explained that just because better alternatives exist in the prior art does not mean that an inferior combination is inapt for obviousness purposes.”). Patent Owner’s teaching-away argument is unpersuasive. slip op. at 22
- Expert testimonyOther
“a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Beel and Dinka, and that, instead, he “summarily concludes that Skype’s status as ‘well-known’ somehow would have motivated the combination of Dinka with Beel.” Prelim. Resp. 15–16. We disagree. Dr. Almeroth testifies that Skype, as taught in Dinka, would have been an example of the type of application that would have run on Beel’s system and that applying Dinka’s teachings would have improved Beel’s similar system in the same manner as it improved Dinka’s, with predictable results. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 103, 129. See also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (“[W]hen a patent ‘simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform’ and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious.” (quoting Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976))). On the current record, including Dr. Almeroth’s testimony, Petitioner’s proposed reasons to combine the teachings of Beel and Dinka have rational underpinning.” slip op. at 21
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,966,347 - Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co., Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco NVInstitutedPTAB · Oct 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00597 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–22 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–22 would have been obvious over Beel and Dinka.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“In sum, on the current record, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Beel and Dinka. f) Claims 2–22 The parties present their arguments for independent claim 11 along with those for claim 1. Pet. 44–45; Prelim. Resp. 19, 23. Claims 2–10 and 22 depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1. Claims 12–21 depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 11. Patent Owner does not present separate arguments for claim 11 or the dependent claims. We have analyzed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence for claims 2–22 (Pet. 36–46) and, on the current record, conclude that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that claims 2–22 would have been obvious over Beel and Dinka.” slip op. at 25
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“III. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner, relying on the testimony of Dr. Almeroth and alleged admissions by Patent Owner in litigation, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a Master of Science (M.S.) degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and five years of work experience in a related field” and that “[a]dditional educational experience could substitute for some of the work experience.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art at this time.” Prelim. Resp. 6. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is consistent with the technology described in the ’346 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionNo construction neededOther
“Patent Owner accepts the Petition’s claim construction for the purposes of” the Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 5–6. In light of Patent Owner’s acceptance, and because the proposed constructions are, on this record, consistent with the evidence cited by Petitioner, we, too, accept Petitioner’s proposals for “providing simulations or translations, as required,” and “data transformations,” as recited in claim 1, for purposes of this Decision. Based on the record before us, we do not find it necessary to provide express claim constructions of any other claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues that Dr. Almeroth does not provide a reason why a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Beel and Dinka, and that, instead, he “summarily concludes that Skype’s status as ‘well-known’ somehow would have motivated the combination of Dinka with Beel.” Prelim. Resp. 16. We disagree. Dr. Almeroth testifies that Skype, as taught in Dinka, would have been an example of the type of application that would have run on Beel’s system and that applying Dinka’s teachings would have improved Beel’s similar system in the same manner as it improved Dinka’s, with predictable results. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 117, 132. See also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (“[W]hen a patent ‘simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform’ and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious.” (quoting Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976))). On the current record, including Dr. Almeroth’s testimony, Petitioner’s proposed reasons to combine the teachings of Beel and Dinka have rational underpinning.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,966,346 - Apple Inc. v. Proxense, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Oct 2, 2025 · IPR2025-00562 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–20 on all three § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“whether to institute an inter partes review. Applying the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which requires demonstration of a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim, we grant Petitioner’s request and institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Prior constructionPrior construction not adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Court provided a construction for “one or more of the integrated RDC and integrated PDK enabling one or more of an application, a function, and a service,” as recited in claim 1, and “enablement signal enabling one or more of an application, a function and a service.” Prelim. Resp. 1–6. Although Patent Owner points to the District Court’s Memorandum in Support of Claim Construction Order (id. (citing Ex. 2001, 25–26)) to support its contention that the District Court construed the term “enabled,” as we determined in the prior proceedings, this portion of the District Court’s Memorandum merely discusses that “hybrid device” is not indefinite, and discusses exemplary operations of the “hybrid device” from which a POSITA “could reasonably ascertain the scope of the claim.” See Ex. 2001, 26; see also IPR2024-00405, Paper 8 at 11–12; IPR2024-00407, Paper 8 at 12–13; IPR2024-00784, Paper 12 at 10–11. That is, a determination of whether a term is indefinite is not the same thing as construing a claim term. Thus, as we previously explained, by determining that “hybrid device” is not indefinite, the District Court did not construe the term “enabled.” Ex. 2001, 26. Accordingly, although the referenced portion of the District Court’s Memorandum indicates that a POSITA could reasonably ascertain the scope of the claim (id.), nothing in the Memorandum provides a construction of “enabled” as Patent Owner contends. Prelim. Resp. 5. That is, we are unpersuaded that the District Court construed that “‘[a]n application, function, or service is ‘enabled’ by a PDK when it receives information from a PDK in exchange for an access key” or that “hybrid device” includes “an RDC that ‘enable[es] one or more of an application, a function, and a service’ when it forwards such a message to the application, function, or service.” Id. (emphasis omitted, alteration in original). Thus, as in the prior proceedings, we determine that “enabl[ing] one or more of an application a function, and a service” does not require receiving information from a PDK in exchange for an access key or forwarding a message to the application, function, or service.” Id.; see also IPR2024-00405, Paper 8 at 11–12; IPR2024-00407, Paper 8 at 12–13; IPR2024-00784, Paper 12 at 10–11.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Petitioner proposes claim construction for “Personal Digital Key (PDK).” Pet. 8–9. Patent Owner does not take issue with Petitioner’s proposed construction for “PDK” but instead requests that we “follow the District Court’s construction” for “one or more of the integrated RDC and integrated PDK enabling one or more of an application, a function, and a service,” as recited in claim 1, and “enablement signal enabling one or more of an application, a function and a service,” with respect to claim 10. Prelim. Resp. 1–2. Because the parties do not take issue with each other’s proposed claim constructions, there is no term of the challenged claims that is in controversy, and thus, we determine that no term requires explicit construction. See Realtime, 912 F.3d at 1375. However, although it is not necessary to construe the term to resolve the disputed issues before us, we note that Patent Owner provides arguments with respect to “enabling one or more of an application, a function, and a service” recited in claims 1 and 10. Prelim. Resp. 1–2. We addressed similar arguments with respect to these terms in previous proceedings with related patents (see IPR2024-00405, Paper 8 at 11–12; IPR2024-00407, Paper 8 at 12–13; IPR2024-00784, Paper 12 at 10–11), and we similarly address Patent Owner’s contention in this proceeding.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“have been motivated to integrate an RDC into Giobbi ’157’s hybrid device for communication with external PDKs based, in part on the teachings of Giobbi ’139.” Pet. 27. In particular, Petitioner contends that Giobbi ’139 “expressly teaches integrating an RDC into the same type of hybrid device disclosed in Giobbi ’157, a cell phone,” wherein “a ‘Personal Digital Key Digital Content Security System (PDK-DCSS) is used to protect computers from unauthorized use and protect the digital content stored on computers from being wrongfully accessed, copied, and/or distributed.’” Id. at 28 (citing Ex. 1005, Abstract). According to Petitioner, “Giobbi ’139 teaches that RDCs should be incorporated into hybrid devices like cell phones because these devices ‘commonly included’ data storage,” wherein “Giobbi ’139 identified such a configuration as an ‘enhancement.” Pet. 29 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 87–88). Further, according to Petitioner, “Giobbi ’157 teaches that it is advantageous to incorporate PDKs into ‘commonly carried items,’ like phone, since it would eliminate the need for a user to carry a separate PDK device and would reduce the risk of loss.” Id. at 30 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 35; Ex. 1003 ¶ 48). In addition, Petitioner contends that “the Dua patent’s RFID system configuration also provides motivation to integrate and RDC into Giobbi ’157’s hybrid device.” Id. In particular, according to Petitioner, “Dua teaches a hybrid device—e.g., a cell phone—which establishes wireless connections with other devices to enable functions and exchange data.” Id. (citing Ex. 1006, 6:46–65).” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,049,188 - PTAB · Oct 2, 2025 · IPR2025-00673 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–7 and all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Amazon would show at least one claim unpatentable over Shin and Aoyama.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in demonstrating at least one of claims 1–7 of the ’675 patent is unpatentable. We begin our analysis with the principles of law that generally apply to an asserted ground based on obviousness, we then assess the level of skill in the art, next we provide brief overviews of Shin and Aoyama, and then we address the parties’ contentions with respect to independent claims 1, 6, and 7.” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“time it was made, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. “The importance of resolving the level of ordinary skill in the art lies in the necessity of maintaining objectivity in the obviousness inquiry.” Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The “person having ordinary skill in the art” is a hypothetical construct, from whose vantage point obviousness is assessed. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Factors pertinent to a determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art include “(1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.” Env’t Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d 1376, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). “Not all such factors may be present in every case, and one or 4 At this stage in the proceeding, SoundClear does not present arguments or evidence of secondary considerations. See Prelim. Resp. more of these or other factors may predominate in a particular case.” Id. at 696–97. Relying on the testimony of Dr. Stern, Amazon argues the following: [a] person of ordinary skill in the art . . . would have had a minimum of a bachelor’s degree in computer engineering, computer science, electrical engineering, or a similar field, and approximately two years of industry or academic experience in a field related to controlling the audio output of electronic devices. Work experience could substitute for formal education and additional formal education could substitute for work experience. Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 28–32). In the Preliminary Response, SoundClear does not address Amazon’s assessment of the level of skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding, we adopt Amazon’s uncontested assessment of the level of skill in the art because (1) it is consistent with the ’675 patent and the asserted prior art; and (2) it is supported by the testimony of Dr. Stern.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“arguments and evidence for purposes of institution that would support determining that a person of ordinary skill in the would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Shin and Aoyama. As one example, Amazon contends that the proposed combination is merely the addition of one known element (i.e., “Aoyama’s natural language processing and information retrieval”) to another known element (i.e., “Shin’s voice processing and response device”) to obtain predictable results (i.e., “identifying a user’s intent and providing information responsive to such intent”). Pet. 19–20 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 417; Ex. 1002 ¶ 83). As another example, Amazon contends the proposed combination also represents the addition of one known element (i.e., “Aoyama’s word replacement” feature) to another known element (i.e., “Shin’s distance-based content abbreviation/simplification”) to obtain predictable results (i.e., “using word replacement to simply content for distant users”). Id. at 25–26 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 417; Ex. 1002 ¶ 100). Amazon also presents sufficient arguments and evidence for purposes of institution that would support determining there is a reasonable expectation of success in making the proposed combination. Id. at 20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 84), 27–28 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 102; Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 97, 98 Fig. 7). To the extent SoundClear argues that Amazon is required to identify a problem a person of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to solve when combining the teachings of Shin and Aoyama, we do not agree. See Prelim. Resp. 31–32. This line of argument runs contrary to the principles of law articulated in KSR. In KSR, the Supreme Court emphasized “an expansive and flexible approach” to an obviousness evaluation. KSR, 550 U.S. at 415; see also Jazz Pharm., Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC, 895 F.3d 1347, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“KSR did not impose a rigid requirement to identify . . . a problem to be solved in the art . . . .”). The Supreme Court stated that, “[o]ften, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents,” amongst other things, “to determine whether there was apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Moreover, the Supreme Court explained that, “[u]nder the correct analysis, any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed.” Id. at 420.” slip op. at 26
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Based on the preliminary record, we discern no deficiency in Amazon’s characterizations of Shin, Aoyama, or the general background knowledge in the art. In addition, for purposes of institution, we are persuaded by Dr. Stern’s testimony concerning the relevant disclosures in Shin and Aoyama. At this stage of the proceeding, SoundClear argues that Shin does not teach limitations 1[b]—“a voice classifying unit configured 1[b][i] to calculate a distance between the user and the output-content control device by a proximity sensor 1[b][ii] to classify the voice into either a first voice or a second voice based on the calculated distance.” See Prelim. Resp. 19–22. a. Limitations 1[b]—“a voice classifying unit configured to 1[b][i] calculate a distance between the user and the output-content control device by a proximity sensor to 1[b][ii] classify the voice into either a first voice or a second voice based on the calculated distance” In the Preliminary Response, SoundClear contends that Shin fails to teach voice classification because “Shin is incapable of distinguishing [between] multiple voices.” Prelim. Resp. 21. More specifically, SoundClear argues that Shin cannot teach classifying a voice into a first voice or second voice because “Shin never refers to a ‘first user’ or ‘second user’ or ‘multiple users.’” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 generally); see also id. at 26– 27 (arguing that Amazon misstates the record because Shin never discloses a “first voice” nor a “second voice”). Instead, SoundClear asserts that Shin only contemplates a single user (i.e., user 10) when calculating the distance between the user and an electronic device (e.g., Shin’s electronic device 100). Id. at 21–22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37, 38). Based on the preliminary record, Amazon presents sufficient evidence that would support a finding that Shin teaches “a voice classifying unit configured to calculate a distance between the user and the output-content control device by a proximity sensor to classify the voice into either a first voice or a second voice based on the calculated distance.” Pet. 10–14. Shin discloses that “processor 120 may determine an output scheme of corresponding content based on a distance between a user and the electronic device 101.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 53. Shin’s processor 120 accomplishes this distance calculation by using distance detection module 180, which may include various sensors, such as a proximity sensor. Id. ¶ 66; see also id. ¶ 153 (disclosing an embodiment where electronic device 901 includes sensor module 940, which, in turn, includes proximity sensor 940G). Shin’s Table 3 illustrates how the distance between the user and electronic device 101 determines the output scheme. Id. ¶ 86, Table 3. For instance, Shin’s Table 3 illustrates classifying the user’s voice input as a “first voice” when the distance between the user and electronic device 101 is between 1 to 2 meters, and classifying the user’s voice input as a “second voice” when the distance between the user and electronic device 101 is less than 1 meter. Id. ¶¶ 86, 87, Table 3.” slip op. at 23
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,244,675 - PTAB · Aug 27, 2025 · IPR2025-00565 · APJ St John Courtenay III · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–5 on all five grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Shin.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Relying on the declaration testimony of Dr. Stern, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan for the ’337 patent “would have had a minimum of a bachelor’s degree in computer engineering, computer science, electrical engineering, or a similar field,” and would have “approximately two years of industry or academic experience in a field related to controlling the audio output of electronic devices.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 30–34). Petitioner further asserts that “[w]ork experience could substitute for formal education and additional formal education could substitute for work experience.” Id.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther
“repeatedly emphasized that an indefinite article “a” or “an” in patent parlance carries the meaning of “one or more” in open-ended claims containing the transitional phrase “comprising.” That “a” or “an” can mean “one or more” is best described as a rule, rather than merely as a presumption or even a convention. The exceptions to this rule are extremely limited: a patentee must “evince[ ] a clear intent” to limit “a” or “an” to “one.” The subsequent use of definite articles “the” or “said” in a claim to refer back to the same claim term does not change the general plural rule, but simply reinvokes that non-singular meaning. SanDisk Corp. v. Kingston Tech. Co., Inc., 695 F.3d 1348, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Baldwin Graphic Systems, Inc. v. Siebert, 512 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). These controlling case authorities are applicable here. At this stage, we preliminarily construe the scope of the claim 1[b] term “a user” as covering one or more users. Likewise, we preliminarily construe the scope of the 1[b] phrase “a voice spoken by a user” as covering one or more voices spoken by a single user, or by plural users.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Shin under Ground 2. Pet. 30–35. Petitioner contends that “[i]f [Patent Owner] argues that Shin fails to disclose any limitations [under anticipation Ground 1], such limitations would have been obvious over Shin [under obviousness Ground 2].” Pet. 30. Therefore, we refer to Petitioner’s individual mappings for claim 1 to Shin as set forth under anticipation Ground 1 as also being applicable to obviousness Ground 2, because “anticipation is the epitome of obviousness.” Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1984). We note that under Ground 2, no modifications are required to arrive at the claimed invention. Therefore, no showing of a motivation to modify Shin or a reasonable expectation of success is required. See Unification Techs. LLC v. Micron Tech Inc., 23-1348, 2024 WL 3738401, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 9, 2024) (nonprecedential). We have also considered the Declaration by Dr. Stern, as cited by Petitioner in support of institution. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 107–116.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,069,337 - Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co. Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco N.V.InstitutedPTAB · Jul 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00491 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–18 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 9, and 15 are unpatentable over Ground 1.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by both parties at this stage of the proceeding, we are persuaded that there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioners would prevail in showing that Beel discloses or suggests to a skilled artisan a base unit having a transmitter and a first peripheral device having a receiver and at least one fixed or a configurable endpoint, where the at least one fixed or a configurable endpoint is a data source or a data sink which is able to store or emit data, of the functional device exposed or made available on the first peripheral device.” slip op. at 26
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioners contend that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had “Master of Science (M.S.) degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and five years of work experience in a related field. Additional educational experience could substitute for some of the work experience.” Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). Patent Owner does not dispute this position at this time. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioners’ proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, as it is consistent with the ’972 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionTerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner that “fixed” or “configurable” requires more than what is agreed to by the parties––i.e., the characteristics and operational parameters of the endpoint are either set prior to operation or can be set during operation. We disagree that the ’972 patent defines “fixed or a configurable endpoint” as “a number of descriptive fields of the endpoint.” Rather column 8, lines 5–6, of the ’972 patent states that “[a]n endpoint is defined by a number of descriptive fields,” which speaks more about the mechanism used to establish the characteristics and operational parameters of the endpoint than it does about how “fixed” or “configurable” would be understood by a skilled artisan. And the fact that an endpoint may be defined by descriptive fields does not inform a skilled artisan that “fixed” or “configurable” requires the endpoint to allow the processing device to correctly interpret and utilize the data from the endpoint. Correctly interpreting and utilizing data may be the goal, but that goal is not turned into a requirement of the claims because the recited endpoint is fixed or configurable. Similarly, there is no basis for making that goal a requirement simply because a fixed endpoint is described as providing basic functionality and a configurable endpoint is described as being configurable by the base unit either while pairing or via the processing device. As a result, we find little merit in Patent Owner’s contention that the language “fixed or a configurable” requires a process for setting up the characteristics and operational parameters of an endpoint within a device so that the processing device can correctly interpret and utilize the data of this endpoint. Patent Owner, however, will have an opportunity during trial to further develop this contention.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableInstituted
“Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by both parties at this stage of the proceeding, we are persuaded that there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioners would prevail in showing that Beel discloses or suggests to a skilled artisan a base unit having a transmitter and a first peripheral device having a receiver and at least one fixed or a configurable endpoint, where the at least one fixed or a configurable endpoint is a data source or a data sink which is able to store or emit data, of the functional device exposed or made available on the first peripheral device. Petitioners’ offers evidence, supported by its expert declarant, that the endpoints disclosed in Beel are either fixed, such as a mass storage unit with predefined characteristics, or configurable, such as a virtual audio interface that may change configuration based on driver instructions or use context. Pet. 32–33. As Petitioners point out, the ’972 patent itself acknowledges that Beel’s Figure 11 illustrates a system comprising a combination of vendor-specific and standard endpoints, and further interprets these endpoints to correspond to drivers and host applications used for functionality like screen sharing and audio streaming, which demonstrates a direct conceptual and structural alignment between the ’972 patent and Beel. Id. Furthermore, Petitioner’s evidence demonstrates sufficiently that Beel describes a peripheral device acting as a virtual composite device capable of emulating different functions—such as a USB audio speaker—while rerouting the data stream (e.g., RTP audio stream) over the network. Id. For instance, Petitioners’ evidence demonstrates sufficiently Beel discloses or suggests that audio data can be captured by a virtual sound card interface implemented within the peripheral device, re-encoded, and transmitted to the base unit for playback or synchronization with video content. Id. In addition, Petitioners have demonstrated sufficiently that Beel’s architecture supports the requirement that the endpoint of the functional device—whether it is a camera, microphone, or speaker—is made available through or exposed on the peripheral device. Id. The functional device’s capabilities are effectively rendered accessible to the processing device by way of the peripheral device, which acts as an intermediary. Id. Petitioners’ evidence demonstrates sufficiently that this exposure can occur via logical interfaces, such as USB Audio Class (UAC) virtual drivers, that allow the processing device to recognize and interact with these endpoints using standard protocols. Id. Furthermore, Petitioners show sufficiently Beel discloses that the peripheral device may include software that facilitates communication with and presentation of media content on the processing device, further demonstrating that the endpoints are not only present but also actively used for data transmission. Id. Patent Owner’s arguments, at least at this stage of the proceeding, fail to undermine Petitioners’ showing because they are largely just that–– attorney arguments––without sufficient evidentiary backing and because they lack sufficient clarity regarding how the recited claim language distinguishes Beel’s disclosed system. First, Patent Owner makes several representations that Petitioners misplace its reliance on certain teachings or suggests found in Beel and that Beel does not support the contention Petitioners make, but Petitioners’ positions are backed the testimony of Dr. Almeroth and Patent Owner offers no contradictory evidence for why a skilled artisan would understand Beel differently. And, suffice it to say that, when the declaration of Dr. Almeroth is considered in juxtaposition with the cited evidence from Beel, we have found declarant Dr. Almeroth sufficiently persuasive to demonstrate Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail on the point. For example, Patent Owner simply argues that “there is no indication in Beel of using any fixed or a configurable endpoint of the functional device exposed or made available on the first peripheral device” (Prelim. Resp. 31), but declarant Dr. Almeroth states that “Beel discloses that a peripheral device can act as a ‘virtual audio device’ using a USB Audio Class (UAC) interface,” which “indicates that endpoints of the functional device are ‘exposed or made available on the first peripheral device’” (Ex. 1002 ¶ 130 (emphasis added); see also id. ¶¶ 128–129). Patent Owner’s argument, without any evidentiary support, does little to undermine the opinion testimony from Dr. Almeroth about what Beel’s teachings would indicate to a skilled artisan. Second, although Patent Owner repeatedly states that Beel fails to” slip op. at 26
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,684,972
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.