- PTAB · May 6, 2024 · IPR2024-00144 · APJ Hubert C Lorin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–21 on all petition grounds and granted Apple’s motion to join the Samsung IPR, subject to participation limits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“challenged claims and all asserted grounds of unpatentability. Samsung IPR, Paper 9; see also Samsung IPR, Paper 2 (the “Samsung Petition”). Petitioner here challenges the same claims and asserts the same grounds of unpatentability as those on which we instituted the Samsung IPR. Compare Pet. 1, with Samsung Petition, 2. Petitioner also relies on an identical declaration from the same declarant as relied upon by the petitioner in the Samsung IPR. Mot. 6 & n.2; Ex. 1003. Because the grounds of unpatentability in the instant Petition are identical to those in the Samsung IPR, for the same reasons stated in our Decision to Institute in the Samsung IPR we institute inter partes review in this proceeding on the grounds presented in the Petition. See Samsung IPR, Paper 9, 41-71 (analyzing challenges in the Samsung Petition).” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“As the moving party, Petitioner bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). A motion for joinder should (1) set forth the reasons joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; and (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review. See Kyocera Corp. v. SoftView LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013). joinder is appropriate because, as set forth above, the Petition (1) is materially the same as the Samsung Petition, (2) contains the same grounds based on the same evidence, and (3) would promote efficiency. See Mot. 3, 6. Petitioner represents that joinder will not unduly burden Patent Owner or negatively impact the Samsung trial schedule. Id. at 7.” slip op. at 9
NonePatents in suitUS 9,369,545 - PTAB · May 6, 2024 · IPR2024-00145 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–24 on all asserted grounds and granted Apple’s motion to join the Samsung IPR, subject to participation limits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be authorized unless the information in the Petition and any preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“We determine that Petitioner has met its burden of showing that joinder is appropriate because, as set forth above, the Petition (1) is materially the same as the Samsung Petition, (2) contains the same grounds based on the same evidence, and (3) would promote efficiency. See Mot. 3, 6. Petitioner represents that joinder will not unduly burden Patent Owner or negatively impact the Samsung trial schedule. Id. at 7.” slip op. at 10
NonePatents in suitUS 8,510,407 - PTAB · May 6, 2024 · IPR2024-00143 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–16 on all asserted grounds and granted Apple’s motion to join the Samsung IPR, subject to participation limits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be authorized unless the information in the Petition and any preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims of the ’083 patent on all grounds of unpatentability presented. We also grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“As the moving party, Petitioner bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). A motion for joinder should (1) set forth the reasons joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; and (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review. See Kyocera Corp. v. SoftView LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013). We determine that Petitioner has met its burden of showing that joinder is appropriate because, as set forth above, the Petition (1) is materially the same as the Samsung Petition, (2) contains the same grounds based on the same evidence, and (3) would promote efficiency. See Mot. 3, 6. Petitioner represents that joinder will not unduly burden Patent Owner or negatively impact the Samsung trial schedule. Id. at 7.” slip op. at 8
NonePatents in suitUS 8,020,083 - Google LLC / The Walt Disney Company et al. v. Wag Acquisition, L.L.C.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 27, 2024 · IPR2023-00813 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17 are unpatentable as obvious over Hill and Aharoni; the Board did not reach the other instituted grounds and dismissed the motion to exclude as moot.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“The Walt Disney Company, Disney Streaming Services LLC, Hulu LLC, and Netflix Inc. subsequently filed a similar petition along with a motion for joinder in IPR2023-00813. See IPR2023-00813, Papers 1, 6. We instituted an inter partes review and joined The Walt Disney Company, Disney Streaming Services LLC, Hulu LLC, and Netflix Inc. (“the joined parties”) as parties to this proceeding in a limited capacity. See IPR2023- 00813, Paper 11. Henceforth, we refer collectively to Google and the joined parties as “Petitioner.”” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“ordinary skill in the art “would have possessed at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science or an equivalent field requiring learning computation principles, and two years of work experience in networking or streaming media systems, particularly audio and video, over the Internet.” Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 18–23). Patent Owner “largely agrees with Petitioner’s formulation” but adds the following “clarification”: “the level of skill . . . specified would include some theoretical understanding as well as some familiarity with basic internet protocols and tools for working with dynamic content and creating interactive web sites to handle such content.” PO Resp. 6–7 (citing Ex. 2007 ¶ 13). We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art without the qualifier “at least,” which introduces ambiguity. We are satisfied that this definition comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’594 patent and the asserted prior art. We also note that our analysis would not change if we adopted Patent Owner’s “clarification,” which would have the effect of increasing the level of ordinary skill. See Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is generally easier to establish obviousness under a higher level of ordinary skill.”).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningNo construction neededOther
“We decline to read in a requirement that the “program” of the preambles must be an “entire program.” In particular, we do not agree with Patent Owner that the limitation directed to “additional requests . . . during playing” or the mention in the specification of “additional data requests for the duration of playing” necessarily requires that the “playing” refers to an entire program. For example, the recited requests could relate to playing a portion of a program, a premise with which both declarants agree. Ex. 1103, 22:22–24:9; Ex. 1111 ¶¶ 13–16. Thus, we reject Patent Owner’s “entire program” interpretation.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“We are persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments. Via its citations to Aharoni and Dr. Polish’s testimony, Petitioner establishes that it was known in the art to send video data via TCP. See, e.g., Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 129–130, 185– 187; Ex. 1008, 2:10–15, 6:35–40, 6:52–54, 7:32–35, 9:64–66. Despite the fact that other protocols were available and may have been preferred for certain operating conditions (see PO Resp. 33 (citing Ex. 1004, 12:12–22; Ex. 2007 ¶¶ 83–85)), Petitioner has established the known suitability of using TCP for transmitting video data, which is all that is necessary to prove obviousness. See Intel, 21 F.4th at 800. In addition, Petitioner persuasively shows that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to implement TCP (as taught by Aharoni) in Hill’s system to ensure reliable transport of video data, and would have expected success in doing so.10 See, e.g., Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 185–187. We disagree that Ravi and Aharoni teach away from using TCP. Ravi’s statement about UDP being easier to implement efficiently (Ex. 1004, 12:19–22) does not teach away because it does not “criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage” the use of TCP. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Similarly, the fact that Aharoni’s system uses TCP for key frames while using UDP for other frames (Ex. 1008, 9:62–66, 10:5–21) is 10 We further discuss Petitioner’s rationale for combining Aharoni with Hill below in conjunction with the analysis of claims 4 and 5. See infra § II.D.6. Our comments in that section are also applicable to all of the claims in this ground. enough to show the suitability of TCP for video streaming under the Intel standard. Further, we credit Petitioner’s additional rationale about considering all frames as key frames in Hill’s system given its ability to skip frames. See, e.g., Ex. 1111 ¶¶ 92–94. Petitioner also establishes that, with TCP, video data is transmitted as fast as the data connection allows. See, e.g., Ex. 1002 ¶ 130; Ex. 1019, 271– 72; Ex. 1042, 2. Mr. Hoarty agrees with this premise (see Ex. 1103, 75:13– 76:6), and Patent Owner does not dispute this. See PO Resp. 30 (arguing only that Petitioner had not established how fast data is received with TCP). Further, both parties’ declarants agree that a source sending video data via the Internet as fast as the data connection allows necessarily results in the media player receiving the video data as fast as the data connection allows. See, e.g., Ex. 1103, 76:5–6, 78:9–18; Ex. 1111 ¶¶ 68–69. We also agree with Petitioner (Pet. Reply 13 & n.6) that Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary are illogical. Although Hill includes teachings on how to treat inadequate source bandwidth (Ex. 1006, 8:20–10:24), this does not mean that—nonsensically—a source would transmit data into the data connection slower than the bandwidth and protocol allows. See, e.g., Ex. 1111 ¶ 78. Thus, we are persuaded that the combination of Hill and Aharoni would result in a TCP connection where video data is received as fast as the connection would allow.” slip op. at 40
Patent outcomesUS 9,729,594 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,729,594 - Google LLC / The Walt Disney Company et al. v. Wag Acquisition, L.L.C.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 27, 2024 · IPR2022-01411 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17 are unpatentable as obvious over Hill and Aharoni; the Board did not reach the other instituted grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“The Walt Disney Company, Disney Streaming Services LLC, Hulu LLC, and Netflix Inc. subsequently filed a similar petition along with a motion for joinder in IPR2023-00813. See IPR2023-00813, Papers 1, 6. We instituted an inter partes review and joined The Walt Disney Company, Disney Streaming Services LLC, Hulu LLC, and Netflix Inc. (“the joined parties”) as parties to this proceeding in a limited capacity. See IPR2023- 00813, Paper 11. Henceforth, we refer collectively to Google and the joined parties as “Petitioner.”” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“ordinary skill in the art “would have possessed at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science or an equivalent field requiring learning computation principles, and two years of work experience in networking or streaming media systems, particularly audio and video, over the Internet.” Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 18–23). Patent Owner “largely agrees with Petitioner’s formulation” but adds the following “clarification”: “the level of skill . . . specified would include some theoretical understanding as well as some familiarity with basic internet protocols and tools for working with dynamic content and creating interactive web sites to handle such content.” PO Resp. 6–7 (citing Ex. 2007 ¶ 13). We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art without the qualifier “at least,” which introduces ambiguity. We are satisfied that this definition comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’594 patent and the asserted prior art. We also note that our analysis would not change if we adopted Patent Owner’s “clarification,” which would have the effect of increasing the level of ordinary skill. See Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is generally easier to establish obviousness under a higher level of ordinary skill.”).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“We decline to construe limitations 1b(i)–1b(ii) other than to agree with both parties (PO Resp. 11, 28–29; Pet. Reply 5) that the recited “data rate” refers to the capability of the data connection. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 4:40–43 (“The bandwidth requirement of audio or video media refers to the data rate in bits per second that must be transmitted and received in order to listen to or view the material uninterrupted.”); Ex. 1002 ¶ 126; Ex. 1103, 26:19–29:7; Ex. 1111 ¶ 24. This is sufficient to dispose of the instant case. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“We are persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments. Via its citations to Aharoni and Dr. Polish’s testimony, Petitioner establishes that it was known in the art to send video data via TCP. See, e.g., Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 129–130, 185– 187; Ex. 1008, 2:10–15, 6:35–40, 6:52–54, 7:32–35, 9:64–66. Despite the fact that other protocols were available and may have been preferred for certain operating conditions (see PO Resp. 33 (citing Ex. 1004, 12:12–22; Ex. 2007 ¶¶ 83–85)), Petitioner has established the known suitability of using TCP for transmitting video data, which is all that is necessary to prove obviousness. See Intel, 21 F.4th at 800. In addition, Petitioner persuasively shows that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to implement TCP (as taught by Aharoni) in Hill’s system to ensure reliable transport of video data, and would have expected success in doing so.10 See, e.g., Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 185–187. We disagree that Ravi and Aharoni teach away from using TCP. Ravi’s statement about UDP being easier to implement efficiently (Ex. 1004, 12:19–22) does not teach away because it does not “criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage” the use of TCP. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Similarly, the fact that Aharoni’s system uses TCP for key frames while using UDP for other frames (Ex. 1008, 9:62–66, 10:5–21) is 10 We further discuss Petitioner’s rationale for combining Aharoni with Hill below in conjunction with the analysis of claims 4 and 5. See infra § II.D.6. Our comments in that section are also applicable to all of the claims in this ground. enough to show the suitability of TCP for video streaming under the Intel standard. Further, we credit Petitioner’s additional rationale about considering all frames as key frames in Hill’s system given its ability to skip frames. See, e.g., Ex. 1111 ¶¶ 92–94. Petitioner also establishes that, with TCP, video data is transmitted as fast as the data connection allows. See, e.g., Ex. 1002 ¶ 130; Ex. 1019, 271– 72; Ex. 1042, 2. Mr. Hoarty agrees with this premise (see Ex. 1103, 75:13– 76:6), and Patent Owner does not dispute this. See PO Resp. 30 (arguing only that Petitioner had not established how fast data is received with TCP). Further, both parties’ declarants agree that a source sending video data via the Internet as fast as the data connection allows necessarily results in the media player receiving the video data as fast as the data connection allows. See, e.g., Ex. 1103, 76:5–6, 78:9–18; Ex. 1111 ¶¶ 68–69. We also agree with Petitioner (Pet. Reply 13 & n.6) that Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary are illogical. Although Hill includes teachings on how to treat inadequate source bandwidth (Ex. 1006, 8:20–10:24), this does not mean that—nonsensically—a source would transmit data into the data connection slower than the bandwidth and protocol allows. See, e.g., Ex. 1111 ¶ 78. Thus, we are persuaded that the combination of Hill and Aharoni would result in a TCP connection where video data is received as fast as the connection would allow.” slip op. at 40
Patent outcomesUS 9,729,594 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,729,594 - PTAB · Oct 2, 2023 · IPR2023-00813 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–17 on all petition grounds and granted joinder with IPR2022-01411, subject to participation limits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.4 (2023). Upon consideration of the Petition and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least 1 claim of the ’594 patent. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review of claims 1–17 of the ’594 patent. We also grant Petitioner’s Motion” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“should: (1) set forth the reasons joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review; and (4) address how briefing and/or discovery may be simplified to minimize schedule impact. Kyocera Corp. v. SoftView, LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013). We determine that Petitioner has met its burden of showing that joinder is appropriate because, as set forth above, the Petition is substantively identical to the petition in the Google IPR, contains the same grounds based on the same evidence, and relies on the same declaration of Dr. Nathaniel Polish. Mot., passim; Ex. 1002. Petitioner also represents that it “agree[s] to take an ‘understudy’ role” so that “Patent Owner and the current petitioner in the Google IPR can comply with the existing trial schedule without needing any duplicative efforts by the Board or the Patent Owner.” Mot. 7–8.” slip op. at 5
NonePatents in suitUS 9,729,594 - Google LLC v. Spacetime3d, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Aug 7, 2023 · IPR2023-00577 · APJ Hubert C Lorin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–18 on all petition grounds and granted Google’s motion to join the Apple IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution Decision in the Apple IPR, which we incorporate expressly herein, we find Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing that at least one challenged claim of the ’048 patent is unpatentable. See Apple IPR, Paper 11. In addition, for substantially the same reasons discussed in our Institution Decision in the Apple IPR, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). See id. at 13–18.7 We, therefore, find that the Petition warrants institution of inter partes review of all challenged claims on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“same arguments as those included in its preliminary response filed in the Apple IPR. Compare Prelim. Resp., with Apple IPR, Paper 6 at 1–2, 8–59. Although the Preliminary Response additionally incorporates Patent Owner’s arguments regarding discretionary denial under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) from Patent Owner’s Preliminary Sur-reply in the Apple IPR (compare Prelim. Resp. 2–7, with Apple IPR, Paper 8 at 1–6), no new arguments are presented by Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response in this proceeding with respect to discretionary denial under § 325(d) or the patentability of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“As discussed above, we find that the Petition here: (1) is substantively identical to the petition in the Apple IPR; (2) contains the same grounds based on the same evidence as the Apple petition; and (3) relies on the same declaration of Henry Fuchs, Ph.D., relied upon in the Apple petition. Mot. 2, 5; Ex. 1003. And no new grounds or patentability issues are presented by the Petition. Petitioner also represents that it “will assume an understudy role” in the joined proceeding. Mot. 2. Specifically, Petitioner agrees that: Petitioner will: 1. Adhere to all applicable deadlines in the Apple IPR; 2. Submit “consolidated” filings with the Apple, as set forth above in the statement of precise relief requested; 3. Refrain from requesting or reserving any additional depositions or deposition time; 4. Refrain from requesting or reserving additional oral hearing time; and 5. Assume a second-chair role as long as Apple remains in the proceeding. Id. at 6. In addition, Petitioner asserts that “joinder would not adversely impact the trial schedule, briefing, or discovery in the Apple IPR.” Id. at 8.” slip op. at 7
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,881,048 - Google LLC v. Spacetime3d, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Aug 7, 2023 · IPR2023-00579 · APJ Minn Chung · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–19 on all asserted grounds and granted Google’s motion to join the Apple IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Consequently, for substantially the same reasons discussed in our Institution Decision in the Apple IPR, which we incorporate expressly herein, we find Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing that at least one challenged claim of the ’654 patent is unpatentable. See Apple IPR, Paper 11. In addition, for substantially the same reasons discussed in our Institution Decision in the Apple IPR, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). See id. at 11–18.5 We, therefore, find that the Petition warrants institution of inter partes review of all challenged claims on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Consequently, for substantially the same reasons discussed in our Institution Decision in the Apple IPR, which we incorporate expressly herein, we find Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing that at least one challenged claim of the ’654 patent is unpatentable. See Apple IPR, Paper 11. In addition, for substantially the same reasons discussed in our Institution Decision in the Apple IPR, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). See id. at 11–18.5 We, therefore, find that the Petition warrants institution of inter partes review of all challenged claims on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“As discussed above, we find that the Petition here: (1) is substantively identical to the petition in the Apple IPR; (2) contains the same grounds based on the same evidence as the Apple petition; and (3) relies on the same declaration of Henry Fuchs, Ph.D., relied upon in the Apple petition. Mot. 2, 5; Ex. 1003. And no new grounds or patentability issues are presented by the Petition. Petitioner also represents that it “will assume an understudy role” in the joined proceeding. Mot. 2. Specifically, Petitioner agrees that Petitioner will: (1) assume “a second-chair role as long as Apple remains in the proceeding”; (2) adhere to all applicable deadlines in the Apple IPR; (3) submit “consolidated” filings with Apple for all substantive papers; (4) refrain from requesting or reserving any additional depositions or deposition time; and (5) refrain from requesting or reserving additional oral hearing time. Id. at 6. In addition, Petitioner asserts that “joinder would not adversely impact the trial schedule, briefing, or discovery in the Apple IPR.” Id. at 8.” slip op. at 7
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,304,654 - Google LLC v. Spacetime3d, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Aug 7, 2023 · IPR2023-00578 · APJ Minn Chung · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds and granted Google’s motion to join the Apple IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Consequently, for substantially the same reasons discussed in our Institution Decision in the Apple IPR, which we incorporate expressly herein, we find Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing that at least one challenged claim of the ’868 patent is unpatentable. See Apple IPR, Paper 11. In addition, for substantially the same reasons discussed in our Institution Decision in the Apple IPR, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). See id. at 12–19.6 We, therefore, find that the Petition warrants institution of inter partes review of all challenged claims on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“Consequently, for substantially the same reasons discussed in our Institution Decision in the Apple IPR, which we incorporate expressly herein, we find Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing that at least one challenged claim of the ’868 patent is unpatentable. See Apple IPR, Paper 11. In addition, for substantially the same reasons discussed in our Institution Decision in the Apple IPR, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). See id. at 12–19.6 We, therefore, find that the Petition warrants institution of inter partes review of all challenged claims on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“As discussed above, we find that the Petition here: (1) is substantively identical to the petition in the Apple IPR; (2) contains the same grounds based on the same evidence as the Apple petition; and (3) relies on the same declaration of Henry Fuchs, Ph.D., relied upon in the Apple petition. Mot. 2, 5; Ex. 1003. And no new grounds or patentability issues are presented by the Petition. Petitioner also represents that it “will assume an understudy role” in the joined proceeding. Mot. 2. Specifically, Petitioner agrees that Petitioner will: (1) assume “a second-chair role as long as Apple remains in the proceeding”; (2) adhere to all applicable deadlines in the Apple IPR; (3) submit “consolidated” filings with Apple for all substantive papers; (4) refrain from requesting or reserving any additional depositions or deposition time; and (5) refrain from requesting or reserving additional oral hearing time. Id. at 6. In addition, Petitioner asserts that “joinder would not adversely impact the trial schedule, briefing, or discovery in the Apple IPR.” Id. at 8.” slip op. at 7
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,696,868 - PTAB · Jun 8, 2023 · IPR2023-00232 · APJ Jeremy M Plenzler · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–28 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Woycik, and granted Clover’s motion to join IPR2022-00779.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“2. Petitioner’s Challenge Based on Woycik Initially, we note that there does not appear to be any dispute that Woycik’s administration tool would be understood as point of sale builder software by one skilled in the art. Prelim. Resp. 39–53.7 Indeed, based on the record before us, we do not see any less disclosure in Woycik regarding its administration tool than that disclosed in the ’640 patent for its point of sale builder software.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Trademark Office regarding discretionary denials5 requires that “the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Guidance Memo 3. In this proceeding, Petitioner stipulates that “if this IPR is instituted and Fintiv[6] remains precedential at the time of institution, [Petitioner] stipulates not to pursue in the district court any ground raised or that could have reasonably been raised in IPR (i.e., under §§ 102 or 103 based on prior art patents or printed publications alone).” Paper 14, 2. Moreover, any timing issues or inefficiencies are moot in view of our decision on Petitioner’s Joinder Motion. Accordingly, we decline Patent Owner’s invitation for us to apply our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny the petition.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Petitioner represents that the current Petition and that from the 779 IPR are identical in all substantive respects, including “identical grounds, prior art, and analysis.” Mot. 3. And although Petitioner used a different declarant than the one used in the 779 IPR, there is no briefing remaining for the petitioner in the 779 IPR, as Petitioner’s Reply in that proceeding was entered on May 10, 2023. See IPR2022-00779, Paper 20. Moreover, Petitioner agrees to use the declarant from the 779 IPR if joinder is granted. See Paper 14, 2; Ex. 1033, 11:8–15:24; Ex. 1034, 16:13–17:7. Given the advanced stage of the 779 IPR proceeding, if Petitioner is joined as a party to the 779 IPR, Petitioner’s only possible remaining role would be to present oral argument or potentially request rehearing or appeal our final written decision in the 779 IPR if the initial petitioner in that proceeding drops out. Patent Owner opposes the Motion, contending that joinder would increase complexity and costs, as well as delay the schedule of the 779 IPR. Paper 8, 6–13. But those concerns are unfounded, particularly in view of the advanced stage of the 779 IPR. Indeed, Patent Owner acknowledges that, at this stage of the proceeding, there is nothing left for Petitioner to deal with as far as briefing or declarant testimony in the 779 IPR. See, e.g., Ex. 1033, 18:2–20. We see no increase in complexity and costs, or any schedule delay in the 779 IPR as asserted by Patent Owner. Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s Motion, and add it as a party to the 779 IPR.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“(POSITA) at the time of the effective filing date of the ’640 patent would have been someone with a working knowledge of designing and developing web-based software and systems” and “would have a Bachelor of Science in computer science or a related field, and approximately two years of professional experience or equivalent study in the design and development of web-based software and systems, including web-based POS systems.” Pet. 8. Petitioner contends that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Id. Patent Owner responds: “Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSITA does not require any experience with retail POS systems—let alone building POS screens—that are the field of the ’640 Patent.” Prelim. Resp. 10. According to Patent Owner, “Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSITA makes experience in retail POS systems optional.” Id. at 11. Patent Owner contends that its “proposed definition of a POSITA remedies this deficiency by including experience or equivalent study in the field of the 4 Our discussion below focuses on claim 1. ’640 Patent, retail point of sale (“POS”) systems, including experience with building POS screens.” Id. We fail to see how the alleged differences in the level of ordinary skill in the art advanced by Patent Owner affects our decision to institute in this proceeding. Accordingly, for purposes of this decision, we apply the level of skill set forth by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 5
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,400,640
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.