• Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 6, 2026 · IPR2024-01090 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board found claims 1–3, 21, 29–31, 42–44, 54, and 62–65 not proven unpatentable because the asserted combination did not teach the third conditional limitation.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner’s position that the language of the claim requires the fulfillment of all the listed conditions (for each “when” clause) to cause the performance of the recited function. As stated above, the natural reading of the conditions is that they are prerequisites; they must be satisfied for the program to perform the recited function(s). For the third scenario, for example, the condition that the first web page is displayed must be satisfied in order for there to be a hyperlink to a second web page, such that the program can detect whether the location of the first contact point corresponds to that hyperlink. Ex. 1001, 102:60−62, 103:32−33, 103:37−39. The duration of the first contact has exceeded the second duration threshold without ending that first contact, and with no movement of the first contact point. Ex. 1001, 102:66−67, 103:1−3, 103:33−36, 103:39−42.13 These conditions collectively set the characteristics of the gesture that endures for the required amount of time. “When” this particular gesture is detected, for 13 We note that other non-challenged claims, require determining that there is movement of the first contact and performing corresponding functions of displaying the movement. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 108:9−24 (Claim 40, which depends from claim 1). the required duration, and recognizing the hyperlink is selected on the displayed first web page, then the three functions corresponding to these conditions in the third scenario are performed. This “when-then” relationship is conditional, as the parties seem to agree; but, we find, it is also causal. Because the cause of outputting the feedback with the actuator, displaying a menu, and further displaying a portion of the second web page to which the hyperlink pointed is that all the conditions were satisfied as required by the claim. Ex. 1001, 103:43−55. This is the plain and straightforward reading of the “when” clauses in claim 1.” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Thus, Petitioner’s mapping as described above does not meet the requirements of the third “when” clause. We find that neither the snippet of Blumenberg nor the preview of Bhumkar is displayed in Petitioner’s proffered combination when the conditions of the third “when” clause are met. The condition of determining that the duration exceeds the “activation threshold” has no relationship to whether the display of the snippet or the preview occur. Blumenberg displays the link preview or snippet upon exceeding the 0.2 seconds or “selection threshold.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 49. Thus, there is no conditional relationship, much less a causal relationship between the display of the link preview or snippet and the “activation threshold” to which Petitioner has mapped the condition of the third “when” clause. The substitution of the snippet with Bhumkar’s “quick view” under Petitioner’s “simple substitution” rationale does not remedy the deficiency noted here. The function of “further display at least a portion of the second web page” (i.e., the “quick view”) is causally related to the “selection threshold,” and has no correlation to the duration determination, that the “activation threshold” has been exceeded. See Tr. 9:8−20 (Petitioner’s counsel arguing that “[t]here’s got to be correlation between them.”). Indeed, without a show of causality, the recited “further display” limitation is rendered irrelevant, in the Blumenberg-Bhumkar-Griffin combination. There is no need to “further display” because it already has been displayed, untethered to any condition recited in the third “when” clause.” slip op. at 41

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “at the time of the alleged invention would have had a “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience working with graphical user interfaces and applications for computers.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 36–37). In the Decision on Institution, the Board adopted the uncontested language quoted above in Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill. The Board however did not adopt additional statements proffered by Petitioner regarding the “extensive background knowledge and understanding” allegedly possessed by a person of ordinary skill in the art (Pet. 6–7). Dec. on Inst. 9−10. Patent Owner agrees with the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted by the Board for purposes of the Decision on Institution. PO Resp. 12; see also Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 58−59. The specification of the ’581 patent describes an electronic device that allows for manipulation of user interface objects and, more specifically, the display of web pages through a user interface of a network browser application, according to contact with a touch-sensitive interaction surface. Ex. 1001, (54), Abstr. Consistent with the scope of the ’581 patent and the lack of dispute on the issue, we find that the level of skill in the art is reflected in a person having a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience working with graphical user interfaces and applications for computers.” slip op. at 6

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Dr. Cockburn that the claims are not themselves programming code or even pseudo code. But they recite the functionality that the program instructions implement.15 We do not find useful Dr. Cockburn’s quibble with the word “instructions” recited in the claim as being too generic to import the understanding in the relevant art that programming logic is involved. Id. ¶ 55. Claim 1 recites more than mere “instructions.” As discussed above in Section II.E.1, the claim requires “one or more programs” and those “programs including instructions.” Ex. 1001, 102:56−59. We are persuaded by Dr. Mahon’s explanation concerning the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art and the implementation of instructions in programming logic that is executed by a processor, and that 15 Claim 42 is a method claim and does not recite the “program including instructions to” as claim 1 does. However, claim 42 does recite the processor and memory in parallel with the same functions recited in claim 1, and Petitioner has not argued that the scope of claims 1 and 42 differ in any material way. Ex. 1058 ¶ 55, n.3. Ex. 2008 ¶ 51. “from a software engineering standpoint, it would not be possible to implement a function that performs an action ‘when’ preconditions are met unless that function is designed to be executed because those preconditions have been detected.” Mahon Decl. ¶ 52. We credit Dr. Mahon’s explanations as they are reasoned and supported by the specification of the ’581 patent. Mahon Decl. ¶ 50. We are not persuaded by Dr. Cockburn’s rebuttal of Dr. Mahon’s reliance on the specification as supporting the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it dismisses the discussions of logic to implement the gesture detection and corresponding operations merely because these passages do not refer specifically to the three scenarios of the claim. Dr. Mahon’s discussion of general programming principles of conditional statements provides context relevant to the field of the invention. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319 (“extrinsic evidence can help educate the court regarding the field of the invention and can help the court determine what a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand claim terms to mean” but warning about the flaws inherent in this type of extrinsic evidence). Accordingly, we are persuaded that Dr. Mahon’s testimony confirms the understanding of the plain and natural reading of the claim language to require a causal relationship between the conditions and the functions.” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 10,725,581 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 10,725,581
• Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 31, 2025 · IPR2024-01085 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6–10, 17, 19, 22–26, 28–30, 32, 33, 36, 41, 48, 58–62, 64, 65, 67, 69, 70, 73, 77, 82, and 83 were not shown unpatentable under either § 103 ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “The difference between the parties’ positions is solely that Petitioner includes “human-computer interaction” as a relevant degree and “human computer interfaces” as relevant working experience. We need not resolve that difference, because no matter which stated level of ordinary skill is applied, all of our findings and conclusions would be the same and because neither party asserts the other party’s expert is not qualified as an expert. In the Decision on Institution, we adopted Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art. Inst. Dec. 9. We continue to adopt Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art.5 C.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Only those claim terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Petitioner asserts that “no claim terms need be construed to resolve issues of controversy in the present Petition.” Pet. 2. Patent Owner agrees that “no formal constructions of any claim terms are necessary.” PO Resp. 4. We agree with the parties that no express construction of any claim term is necessary. D.” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner (PO Resp. 13) that when Ording refers to user interfaces that are “intuitive and transparent,” “transparent” in that context does not mean optically transparent but something readily understandable, like the preceding word “intuitive.” That makes more sense in context. Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Mahon, explains that Ording’s paragraph 28, where the phrase “intuitive and transparent” is found, is not concerned with optical transparency, but with increasing user satisfaction with portable devices by offering multifunctional operations on user interfaces based on finger input. Ex. 2012 ¶ 54. Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Cockburn explains why “transparent” in that context should mean optically transparent. We credit the testimony of Dr. Mahon, and reproduce paragraph 28 of Ording below: The various applications that may be executed on the device may use at least one common physical user interface device, such as the touch screen. One or more functions of the touch screen as well as corresponding information displayed on the device may be adjusted and/or varied from one application to the next and/or within a respective application. In this way, a common physical architecture (such as the touch screen) of the device may support the variety of applications with user interfaces that are intuitive and transparent. Ex. 1006 ¶ 28. We credit Dr. Mahon’s testimony that “Ording is addressing [in paragraph 28] user interfaces that are user-friendly and intuitive to navigate and operate.” Ex. 2012 ¶ 55.” slip op. at 33

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “The Zlider widget already is the least intrusive in the form as disclosed in the Ramos Paper/Ramos Video, placed off to the side of image content, not above and overlapping with image content. Petitioner’s semitransparency solution is for a self-created problem that otherwise does not exist, i.e., blocking the image by placing the Zlider widget directly over image content in Ording’s device. This is not reasoning with rational underpinning for making the Zlider widget partially semitransparent. Even assuming that the Zlider widget is properly placed directly over a camera image, making the Zlider widget semitransparent does not solve the intrusion problem, because the image and the Zlider widget may obscure each other, as shown in these illustrations provided by Patent Owner: [The illustrations show interference between a semitransparent Zlider widget and an underlying image] In its Reply, Petitioner asserts that it would have been well within the skill level of one of ordinary skill in the art to make adjustments to address a problem caused by such obscuring, such as by making the Zlider widget more visible as shown below: [The illustration shows one way Petitioner asserts one of ordinary skill in the art may apply to solve the obscuring issue (Reply 5–6)] Petitioner’s argument is misplaced. Although there may be graphic display techniques one of ordinary skill in the art may adopt to reduce the visibility problem if the Zlider widget were moved to directly above the image content as Petitioner proposes, that does not cure the problem of lacking a reasonable motivation to place the Zlider widget of the Ramos Paper/Ramos Video directly over image content. Still, there is the least obscuring and the least intrusion with the Zlider widget remaining where it is shown to be in the Ramos Paper/Ramos Video, side-by-side relative to the image content. It is irrational to make a modification that creates a problem, solely on the basis that a solution may be available to reduce the severity of the problem. Indeed, such a strained rationale shows that hindsight has played a part on Petitioner’s contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have put the Zlider widget over content as required by the claims.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 10,649,580 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,649,580
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Maxell LtdNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 31, 2025 · IPR2024-00777 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 16–27 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to account for limitations 16[b] and 16[i] and their counterparts across the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Computer Science, Human Computer Interaction, or a related technical field, with at least one year of experience working in the field of user interfaces and/or content management.” PO Resp. 11 (citing Ex. 2040 ¶ 53). The Decision on Institution adopted Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. Inst. Dec. 10. We find Patent Owner’s stated level to be less precise than that proposed by Petitioner in that the modifier “at least” used by Patent owner imposes no upper bound on the amount of experience possessed by one of ordinary skill in the art. Also, Patent Owner states: “The difference between the Board’s definition and Patent Owner’s (EX2040. ¶53) does not change the arguments set forth herein.” PO Resp. 11. Thus, we continue to adopt Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art.4 4 All of our findings and conclusions would still be the same, however, had we applied Patent Owner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “In its Reply, Petitioner does not assert that the district court’s construction is incorrect. We agree with Patent Owner that the district court’s construction is better than Petitioner’s proposed construction, because for reasons indicated by Patent Owner, which are not disputed by Petitioner, settings in the computer, e.g., dedicated folders for each user are the user profiles, rather than simply data alone of any kind. Further, when asked about the appropriateness of the district court’s construction, counsel for Petitioner expressed that Petitioner has no objection to the Board’s adopting the district court’s construction for “user profile”: JUDGE LEE: So, you’d be fine with just going with the District Court’s construction? MR. HEINTZ: Yes, Your Honor. Tr. 15:22–24. For the foregoing reasons, we adopt the district court’s construction for “user profile,” i.e., “a collection of settings and information associated with a user.”” slip op. at 13

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “PO Resp. 30–31 (Figure 26 omitted). In its Reply, Petitioner still does not provide an articulated reason for placing user profile selection buttons, labeled with user names, within Horn’s panes 2601 or 2602. Reply 12–14. Although Horn does describe personalized profile, Petitioner points to no disclosure of Horn as to how a user would have selected his or her own profile from among a plurality of user profiles. Petitioner presents no reason for placing these user profile selection buttons, labeled with user names, gleaned from or suggested by Baumgartner, within either pane 2601 or pane 2602 in Horn’s workspace view. Further, pane 2602 contains “a list of all collections defined by MFS and the user,” and pane 2601 lists the source examined by the user to create his or her collections. Ex. 1005, 19:41–46. That disclosure suggests the contents of panes 2601 and 2602 are tied to one particular user. No rational basis is articulated by Petitioner to place user profile selection buttons within these panes which appear to be in the profile space of one user. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has not adequately accounted for limitation 16[b].” slip op. at 22

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “The test for sufficiency of a written description under 35 U.S.C. § 112 is whether the earlier application’s disclosure “reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). The specification must “clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.” Id. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained: One shows that one is “in possession” of the invention by describing the invention, with all its claimed limitations, not that which makes it obvious. Id. (“[T]he applicant must also convey to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention. The invention is, for purposes of the ‘written description’ inquiry, whatever is now claimed.”) (emphasis in original). One does that by such descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc., that fully set forth the claimed invention. Although the exact terms need not be used in haec verba, see Eiselstein v. Frank, 52 F.3d 1035, 1038, 34 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 (Fed.Cir.1995) (“[T]he prior application need not describe the claimed subject matter in exactly the same terms as used in the claims. . . .”), the specification must contain an equivalent description of the claimed subject matter. A description which renders obvious the invention for which an earlier filing date is sought is not sufficient. Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1997).” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 11,017,815 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,017,815
• Microsoft Corporation v. Interdigital Patent Holdings, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 23, 2025 · IPR2024-00538 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held all challenged claims of the ’933 and ’054 patents not unpatentable because the claims were entitled to the December 22, 2009 priority date, making the asserted prior art unavailable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “the time of the invention as someone that would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a closely related field, and one to three years of experience working with wirelessly connected mobile devices that used common wireless communications protocols such as Bluetooth and 802.11.” 537 Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1203 ¶¶ 29–32). Petitioner also contends that this description “would not differ materially between December 2008 and June 2013,” the earliest possible priority date for the patents-at-issue and the priority date alleged by Petitioner, respectively. Petitioner further contends that more education “would compensate for less work experience and vice versa.” Id. Petitioner. 537 PO Resp. 6−7; 538 PO Resp. 6−7. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s description as our own. We adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art particularly because it specifies having one to three years of experience working with wireless devices that use Bluetooth and 802.11.” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner construes the claims to have their “plain and ordinary meaning” and contends “that no terms invoke means-plus-function analysis.” 537 Pet. 17–18; 538 Pet. 18−19. Patent Owner does not contend that any terms require construction. 537 PO Resp. 6; 538 PO Resp. 6. We have not identified any terms that require construction for us to decide the threshold issue of priority. And given that the parties have no disputed terms, no claim terms are hereby construed.” slip op. at 17

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

    “The written description requirement is satisfied when “the missing descriptive matter” is necessarily present in the original “application’s specification such that one skilled in the art would recognize such a disclosure.” Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Thus, it is sufficient to show that the written description actually or inherently discloses the claim element. TurboCare Div. of Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 264 F.3d 1111, 1118−20 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We also note that Patent Owner argues that the field of the 948 application is a predictable application of wireless communications, which, compared to other complex and unpredictable technologies, would require a lower level of detail to satisfy the requirement. See Hologic, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 884 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“the level of detail required . . . varies depending on the nature and scope of the claims and on the complexity and predictability of the relevant technology.”); 537 PO Resp. 26−27; 537 Edwards Decl. ¶¶ 82, 87; 537 Surreply 8.” slip op. at 20

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for patent owner

    “1277 (Fed. Cir. 2011); PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008). At issue in the instant proceedings is the first requirement, whether the written description of the 948 application is sufficient, because Petitioner contends that the claims of the ’933 and ’054 patent are not entitled to claim priority to ancestry applications under 35 U.S.C. § 120. 537 Pet. 18.43 We disagree with Petitioner because we find that the claims are supported by the written description of the 948 application disclosure.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 9,173,054 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 9,173,054
• Microsoft Corporation v. Interdigital Patent Holdings, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 23, 2025 · IPR2024-00537 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held all challenged claims of the ’933 and ’054 patents not unpatentable because the claims are entitled to priority to December 22, 2009, making Forutanpour not prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd all claims patentableNot shown unpatentable

    “VI. ANALYSIS OF UNPATENTABILITY Because of our determination that the priority date of December 22, 2009 is appropriate, we conclude that the Forutanpour reference (a U.S. patent application published on April 7, 2011) is not prior art. presented in either Petition. VII. CONCLUSION Having reviewed the argument and supporting evidence of record, and after a full and fair hearing, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that any of the challenged claims of the ’933 and ’054 patents are unpatentable.” slip op. at 36

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Entitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

    “Thus, we find that the 948 application reasonably conveys to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the inventors contemplated the communication of wireless devices to continue using the known method of file/data transfers via Wi-Fi and that the technique for device discovery using Bluetooth would additionally provide environment information useful for assessing which nearby device has the TapApp functionality. Disclosure of the knowledge of wireless radio dialogue between devices to collect further information to provide a particular location of a device informs a person of ordinary skill in the art that the 948 application was not limited to using only Bluetooth for the method performed by the WTRU, culminating in data transfer.” slip op. at 23

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artDecided for patent owner

    “sufficiency of the written description, we conclude that the 948 application sufficiently describes Wi-Fi transfer for data transmissions in WTRUs even if the method also uses Bluetooth for selecting target WTRUs. Accordingly, the claims of the ’933 and ’054 patents are entitled to the priority date of December 22, 2009, the date of the 948 application. VI. ANALYSIS OF UNPATENTABILITY Because of our determination that the priority date of December 22, 2009 is appropriate, we conclude that the Forutanpour reference (a U.S. patent application published on April 7, 2011) is not prior art.” slip op. at 36

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “F. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner identifies a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the invention as someone that would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a closely related field, and one to three years of experience working with wirelessly connected mobile devices that used common wireless communications protocols such as Bluetooth and 802.11.” 537 Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1203 ¶¶ 29–32). Petitioner also contends that this description “would not differ materially between December 2008 and June 2013,” the earliest possible priority date for the patents-at-issue and the priority date alleged by Petitioner, respectively. Petitioner further contends that more education “would compensate for less work experience and vice versa.” Id. Petitioner. 537 PO Resp. 6−7; 538 PO Resp. 6−7. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s description as our own. We adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art particularly because it specifies having one to three years of experience working with wireless devices that use Bluetooth and 802.11.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 8,737,933 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,737,933
• Mianyang Boe Optoelectronics Technology Co., Ltd. / Wuhan China Star Optoelectronics Semiconductor Display Technology Co., Ltd. et al. v. Samsung Display Co., Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 6, 2025 · IPR2023-01075 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Final written decision

  Petitioner failed to show claims 1–6, 10, 12, 17–19, 21–23, 40–47, 51, and 52 unpatentable because the cited art did not teach or suggest a pixel defining layer.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “For purposes of this Decision, we again adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. It is supported by the testimony of Dr. Pattison, and appears consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art references. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). We find Patent Owner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill to be imprecise, because Patent Owner does not specify the amount of experience possessed by an ordinarily skilled artisan. The unbounded reference to “experience” is vague and overly broad, as it could mean 1 year of experience or over 30 years of experience, for example. In addition, the ’578 patent is directed to “a pixel arrangement structure of an (OLED) [organic light emitting diode] display” (Ex. 1001, 1:22–23), whereas Patent Owner’s proposed experience is tied to “active-matrix displays.” PO Resp. 5. Given that the field of OLED displays includes both passive and active matrix designs (see generally Ex. 2009 ¶¶ 40–56), we see no reason to restrict the relevant experience to active matrix displays. For these reasons, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 19

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner has failed to show that the cited art teaches or suggests a “pixel defining layer” as recited. Neither party in this proceeding or in the ITC Investigation argued that “pixel defining layer” as recited in the challenged claims required construction, and neither party presented any arguments regarding the construction or meaning of this term.6 Pet. 13; PO Resp. 4–5. 5 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) requires that a petition contain a statement identifying how a challenged claim is to be construed. 6 In our Decision instituting trial, we stated that “[i]f either party contends that explicit claim construction is necessary in order to make a final determination whether or not any challenged claim is unpatentable based on the arguments and evidence presented, it should clearly explain why during We give the term “pixel defining layer” as recited its plain and ordinary meaning. For purposes of this decision, we determine that no aspects of the challenged claims require explicit construction. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D. Petitioner Has Not Shown That the Cited Art Teaches or Suggests All the” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “or suggestion in Matthies of a pixel defining layer, because there is none.” PO Resp. 31 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 187); see also PO Sur-reply 15–17. Petitioner contends that “[a] POSITA would have understood that Matthies employs (or at least could obviously employ) the claimed ‘pixel defining layer.’” Pet. 23. An allegation that a skilled artisan would have understood that the prior art “could obviously” be modified to include an element of the claimed invention does not establish that the prior art teaches or suggests such recited element. See Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[O]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.”).” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “require for the same reasons set forth above.”). And, in discussing motivation to combine the teachings of Matthies and Yamada, Petitioner articulates no reasoning to support modifying Matthies’ structure based on Yamada to yield a “pixel defining layer.” See Pet. 69–75. Patent Owner argues that “[t]he Petition failed to identify any teaching or suggestion in Matthies of a pixel defining layer, because there is none.” PO Resp. 31 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 187); see also PO Sur-reply 15–17. Petitioner contends that “[a] POSITA would have understood that Matthies employs (or at least could obviously employ) the claimed ‘pixel defining layer.’” Pet. 23. An allegation that a skilled artisan would have understood that the prior art “could obviously” be modified to include an element of the claimed invention does not establish that the prior art teaches or suggests such recited element. See Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[O]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.”).” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 11,594,578 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,594,578
• Apple Inc. v. Smart Mobile Technologies LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 25, 2024 · IPR2022-01223 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3 and 5 were not shown unpatentable over Yegoshin, Bernard, Johnston, and Preiss under § 103 because the evidence did not establish multiplexing signals.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “communication device for multiplexing signals.” Ex. 1001, 12:2–3 (emphasis added). The language in the preamble does not support adopting Petitioner’s proposed interpretation of “multiplexing” to mean that “the connections may be used simultaneously or sequentially for combining multiple data paths into a single path,” because signals are being multiplexed, not connections or data paths. Pet. Reply 10. No connection is recited in the preamble with regard to multiplexing.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “Resp. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 (file history of the ’075 patent), 12; Ex. 2003 (Defendants’ Opening Claim Construction Brief from related litigation), 40–41; Ex. 2023 (Claim Construction Order from related litigation), 7). “Petitioner does not dispute that the preamble of claim 1 is limiting.” Pet. Reply 9 (citing PO Resp. 9–10; Ex. 2003, 45–46). Based on the full record, we adopt the parties’ agreement that the preamble is limiting. See also Ex. 2003, 45–46; Ex. 2023, 7.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “show by a preponderance of the evidence that Yegoshin teaches or would have been understood to reasonably suggest “multiplexing signals” and that Bernard “includes or operates as a multiplexer for combining the data packets.” See Pet. 32–40. Because Petitioner does not show multiplexing signals in any of the asserted references, Petitioner does not show by a preponderance of the evidence that its proposed combination of Yegoshin, Bernard, Johnston, and Preiss would have rendered obvious “[a]n IP-enabled communication device for multiplexing signals,” as recited by claim 1. Also, because Petitioner fails to show Yegoshin teaches or would have been understood to reasonably suggest multiplexed signals and fails to show that Bernard “includes or operates as a multiplexer for combining the data packets,” Petitioner’s asserted motivation to modify Yegoshin in view of Bernard for “multiplexing signals” lacks rational underpinning. Weighing the underlying factual determinations, a preponderance of the evidence does not persuade us that claim 1 of the ’075 patent is unpatentable over Yegoshin, Bernard, Johnston, and Preiss. Arctic Cat, 876 F.3d at 1361.” slip op. at 44

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “We do not credit Petitioner’s cited testimonial evidence because, for the reasons above, Yegoshin and the full record do not support it. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 79, 80. We, instead, credit Patent Owner’s cited testimonial evidence because Yegoshin and the full record better support it. Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 50, 51, 55–56, 58–61; see also Ex. 2025, 65:19–66:4.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 9,319,075 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,319,075
• Cisco Systems, Inc. / Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Orckit CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 17, 2024 · IPR2024-00037 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9, 12–24, and 27–31 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner did not prove either asserted obviousness combination taught the claimed controller or packet-applicable criterion.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Id. at 13, 17. Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA): would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or an equivalent, and two years of professional experience, and a POSA would have had a working knowledge of hardware and software for packet-switched networking. EX1004, ¶¶48-49. Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education and vice versa. Id., ¶48. Pet. 5. “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 16. We are persuaded that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’111 patent and prior art of record. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Both parties agree that the ultimate analysis “remains the same” under either construction. Id. at 2; PO Sur-reply 2. We likewise agree that we do not need to decide between the two constructions. At the same time, consistent with parties’ positions, we construe “controller” to mean an entity that is either 1) configured to 2 Though Patent Owner does not provide a citation in support, Petitioner does not disagree that this is consistent with what occurred in the parallel district court proceeding. See Reply 1. perform deep packet inspection on packets, or 2) that is capable of controlling deep packet inspection. We determine that no other terms need to be construed. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Though Petitioner asserts that there are a “limited number of design options” and that it would have been obvious to combine the different components of Lin, Petitioner does not establish that a controller configured to perform DPI analysis on packets was a known solution, and thus one of the limited design options. As discussed in KSR: When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that is was obvious under § 103. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. Besides asserting the combination would have been “obvious to try,” Petitioner provides no other analysis or reason why one of skill in the art would have modified the teachings of Lin to obtain the claimed controller. Thus, Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the teachings of Lin render obvious all of the features of claim 1.” slip op. at 18

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Further, we find the testimony of Patent Owner’s declarant more persuasive based at least on his consideration of Swenson as a whole and his more detailed analysis and explanations. For example, Patent Owner’s declarant explains in detail why, “[i]n the context of a HTTP GET request and response, as disclosed in Swenson, the message does not constitute a single packet but a flow of packets:” Furthermore, Swenson discloses that the steering device 130 “sends an ICAP request message 516 comprising [a] HTTP GET request header and a portion of the [HTTP] response payload to the network controller 140, which inspects the message to determine whether to monitor the flow or optimize the video.” Ex. 1007 [0065]. In the context of a HTTP GET request and response, as disclosed in Swenson, the message does not constitute a single packet but a flow of packets. The reference to a HTTP request and response “header” and “payload” are thus not references to the header and payload of a packet. A POSA would know that despite common parlance references to “HTTP packets,” HTTP does not pertain to individual packets, whereas packet transmission is governed by the TCP protocol. HTTP utilizes TCP to exchange data such that information may be used by an end user (e.g., a video or audio stream). Even assuming that Swenson’s controller were analyzing the header and payload of an HTTP request/response, a POSA would understand that this analysis is not at the packet but at the flow level and thus does not constitute deep packet inspection. Ex. 2025 ¶ 69. Petitioner’s declarant merely responds by reiterating what was previously stated: Swenson is explicit in stating that its inspection techniques include inspection of “a portion of the [HTTP] response payload.” . . . A POSA would have understood the analysis of the “response payload” to be DPI by a DPI-capable controller, as DPI refers to monitoring the payload of a packet.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 10,652,111 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,652,111
• Cisco Systems, Inc. / Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Orckit CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 17, 2024 · IPR2023-00554 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9, 12–24, and 27–31 were not shown unpatentable because neither asserted obviousness combination established all limitations of claim 1.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Id. at 13, 17. Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA): would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or an equivalent, and two years of professional experience, and a POSA would have had a working knowledge of hardware and software for packet-switched networking. EX1004, ¶¶48-49. Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education and vice versa. Id., ¶48. Pet. 5. “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 16. We are persuaded that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’111 patent and prior art of record. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “We likewise agree that we do not need to decide between the two constructions. At the same time, consistent with parties’ positions, we construe “controller” to mean an entity that is either 1) configured to 2 Though Patent Owner does not provide a citation in support, Petitioner does not disagree that this is consistent with what occurred in the parallel district court proceeding. See Reply 1. perform deep packet inspection on packets, or 2) that is capable of controlling deep packet inspection. We determine that no other terms need to be construed. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that DPI and DFI would have been understood to be different processes – That DPI inspects the detailed contents of individual packets in a granular, thorough manner; and, in contrast, DFI focuses on the broader patterns of network traffic flows by looking at aggregate data flow characteristics. As discussed above, the testimony of Patent Owner’s declarant as to the understanding of DPI is largely uncontested. Further, the testimony of Patent Owner’s declarant as to the understanding of DFI is supported by Swenson when considered as a whole as well as supported by Exhibit 2027.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “a POSA would have understood that one of the limited number of design options would have been to implement the security service as part of a controller configured to perform DPI analysis on packets, and a POSA would have had a reasonable expectation that the controller would have been successful in performing DPI analysis. Id. at 18–19 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 79 (making an identical statement)). No additional discussion, explanation, or evidence on these points were provided at the Petition stage. Patent Owner argues that: The mere fact that the security service may share certain common technical characteristics with the controller (i.e., its connection to the network switch and the hardware in which these two separate entities are implemented) cannot in and of itself suggest to a POSA that the function carried out by the security service should also be performed by the controller or that the controller should be configured to perform that function (i.e., deep packet inspection). PO Resp. 21–22 (citing Ex. 2025 ¶¶ 54–55). We agree. Though Petitioner asserts that there are a “limited number of design options” and that it would have been obvious to combine the different components of Lin, Petitioner does not establish that a controller configured to perform DPI analysis on packets was a known solution, and thus one of the limited design options. As discussed in KSR: When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that is was obvious under § 103. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. Besides asserting the combination would have been “obvious to try,” Petitioner provides no other analysis or reason why one of skill in the art would have modified the teachings of Lin to obtain the claimed controller. Thus, Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the teachings of Lin render obvious all of the features of claim 1.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 10,652,111 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,652,111
• Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Corrigent CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 6, 2024 · IPR2023-00447 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–26 were not shown unpatentable because the Petition did not establish the claimed port assignment and packet labeling under Raz or adequately explain the Raz–Ferguson combination.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “packet-switched networking, MPLS and LAG.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 57–58). Petitioner also states that a lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 57). Patent Owner “uses the same definition.” PO Resp. 4. We apply Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill, which is undisputed and is consistent with the level reflected by the ’602 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We construe claims using the principles set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) and related cases. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2022). Under that precedent, the words of a claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the specification. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. Neither party proposes any express claim constructions. Pet. 6–7; see PO Resp. 4. To the extent that the parties dispute the meaning of certain claim terms, we address those issues below, but we determine it is unnecessary to expressly construe any terms. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 6

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “Patent Owner argues, and we agree, that the cited portions of Raz do not disclose a LAG between two switches. PO Resp. 8–9. Petitioner acknowledges this; as stated in Petitioner’s Reply, “Petitioner has always acknowledged that Raz addresses the use of subports within an LSR, but a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have found it obvious from Raz to use Ethernet physical data ports of a router or switch in an Ethernet LAG to communicate high-speed packet streams in [an] MPLS network.” Pet. Reply 2 (citing Pet. 15, 19, 22–25; Ex. 1021 ¶ 13; Ex. 1006, 1:16–19, 2:23– 31, 7:7–29, 11:3–12, 13:16–19, 14:42–44, 15:56–58, 17:7–9). Petitioner argues that LAGs were well known and, “[w]hile PO argues that Raz teaches the use of a single high-speed link to communicate between LSRs, that is merely a design choice.” Pet. Reply 3 (citing Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 15–17; PO Resp. 8–9). Further, Petitioner argues “[i]t would have been obvious to a [person of ordinary skill in the art] that high-speed packet streams could be communicated between switches or routers through a physical tunnel port of a LAG.” Pet. Resp. 3 (citing Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 15–17) (emphasis added). Among other problems, though, those arguments were not in the Petition; the Petition does not describe modifications of Raz’s teachings, much less establish those modifications as a “design choice.” See Pet. 25; see also PO Sur-reply 3. Further, we agree with Patent Owner that Raz is fundamentally different with its teachings of multiplexing the outputs of multiple slow- speed subports/processors into a single stream for transmission across a single high-speed link. PO Resp. 7–9, 12–13, 15–16; PO Sur-reply 4–5. As stated in Raz, “[t]he present invention provides a subport forwarding and provisioning mechanism whereby a plurality of subports comprising slower speed processors are used to perform the packet processing for a higher speed packet stream.” Ex. 1006, 6:24–27. Additionally, where Raz describes communication between two LSRs, Petitioner acknowledges that Raz teaches that its cited second LSR assigns the port on which it will receive a data packet. Pet. Reply 4; Ex. 1021 ¶ 20 (“in Raz, the second LSR chooses the subport that will be used to transmit the data packet from the first LSR and receive the data packet at the second LSR”). According to Petitioner, Raz teaches that “a first LSR generates a data packet label in which a port serial number is encoded and sends the label to a preceding LSR. Subsequently, the preceding LSR sends a data packet to the proper subport for processing. The process is then repeated in sending the data packet from the first LSR to a second LSR.” Pet. Reply 4 (citations omitted). “This technique just as easily could have been implemented to identify a single physical tunnel port through which a data packet in a first router or switch would be communicated to a second router or switch via a LAG.” Pet. Reply 4 (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1006, 2:23–25, 7:7–16, 7:22–26, 11:3–29, Fig. 5; Ex. 1021 ¶ 18). Again, these arguments were not made in the Petition (see Pet. 22–25), and Petitioner’s assertions that Raz’s teachings “just as easily could have been implemented” in the manner claimed is improper hindsight and inconsistent with the fundamental differences between Raz’s multiplexing within an LSR and the claimed link aggregation and port assignment between MPLS/LAG switches.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “[c]laims 1–13, 15–24 and 26 set forth above in Ground 1.” Pet. 52. Further, Petitioner states that “[f]or independent [c]laims 1, 15, and 26, Ferguson builds on the previous analysis of Raz by disclosing a system for communicating packets between switches and routers in an MPLS network.” Pet. 52; see Pet. 52–55. Critically, though, Petitioner does not specifically explain how the combined teachings of Raz and Ferguson would satisfy individual claim elements. Among other problems with Petitioner’s proposed combination, Petitioner does not adequately explain how or why a person of ordinary skill would have combined the references to include the claimed port assignment and packet labeling for transmission of a packet from a preceding node and then between a first and second MPLS switch. See Pet. 56–59. Instead, Petitioner generally advocates for the combination of Raz and Ferguson, arguing for example that “both Raz and Ferguson are directed to solving the problem of ensuring enough bandwidth is available to communicate high-speed packet streams through an MPLS network.” Pet. 57 (citing Ex. 1006, 10:60–11:12, 14:33–41, 15:47–55, 17:1–9, Fig. 5; Ex. 1007, 1:28–42, 2:54–57, 4:55–60; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 247–249). Further, Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill “would have understood from the disclosures in Ferguson that techniques for utilizing an Ethernet physical data port in a LAG to communication data packets between routers or switches in an MPLS network are also applicable to the use of subports transmitting the data packets within the routers or switches, and vice versa.” Pet. 59 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 250; Ex. 1007, 5:61–6:6); see Pet. 56–59; Pet. Reply 20. But Petitioner does not adequately explain how the proposed combination of Raz and Ferguson would cure the deficiencies addressed above in Petitioner’s analysis of Raz for Ground 1. Among other problems, none of Petitioner’s arguments adequately address port assignment and labeling in the proposed combination, much less adequately explain why the proposed combination would satisfy the challenged claims. See Pet. 55–56. As Petitioner does not adequately explain how the teachings of Raz and Ferguson might be combined to cure the deficiencies addressed above, we additionally determine Petitioner’s arguments and evidence advanced for the combination of Raz and Ferguson do not establish obviousness by a preponderance of the evidence for any of claims 1–26.” slip op. at 11

  Patent outcomesUS 9,118,602 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 9,118,602

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.